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1.
The establishment of a carbon market assumes that there is an effective means of transforming price information into technical carbon reduction measures. However, empirical evidence reveals that the links between price information and carbon management strategies are far from obvious. To understand how delegating CO2 responsibility affects CO2 trading behaviour, this article proposes a neo-institutionalist approach to answering the question of why companies became sellers, buyers or a combination of both during phase I of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Original data from a survey on companies that participated in this scheme were collected and analysed. It was assumed that the trading scheme offered two ways to delegate decisions regarding emissions trading: decoupling from technical knowledge and financialization (i.e. delegating to financial departments) or coupling using technicalization (i.e. delegating to manufacturing departments). The results support the hypothesis that a company that adopts a decoupling strategy is more likely to buy certificates to fulfil their emissions targets. Adopting a coupling strategy indicates that a company is more likely to become a seller, all else equal. Professional identity is the theoretical basis for this relationship. Delegating carbon management to different departments represents either a stronger coupling or a stronger decoupling from core technological processes.Policy relevanceThe transaction data from phase I of the EU ETS open new questions and possibilities regarding the reasons that drive selling and buying in companies. It is important to look not only at the traditional sources of transaction costs, but rather also at the reasons for these tensions. One important source is the professional education of the people in charge of the EU ETS. Tailored information that directly addresses the different professional backgrounds of managers working in both financial departments and more technical departments might help to lower these types of transaction costs. In today's context, important emitter countries, such as China and Korea, have launched their own emissions markets, copying many aspects of the EU ETS. For the positive development of these markets and as a way of establishing a global emissions market, these new schemes should learn from the EU ETS experience. 相似文献
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System dynamics models are employed for analyzing the impact of different uncertainties on carbon emission trading–both on national and business levels. Economic, institutional and technological uncertainties significantly influence any country's benefits from emission permit trading. If a country participates in trading on the international market then the possible price range becomes the source of additional uncertainty. In the case of business investment decisions for implementing resource‐saving technology, our system dynamics model shows that the first‐mover investor will get significantly fewer advantages than his followers, which leads to delay in primary investment to the sector. 相似文献
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Addressing climate change requires the synergy of technological, behavioural and market mechanisms. This article proposes a policy framework that integrates the three, deploying personal carbon trading as a key element within a policy portfolio to reduce personal carbon footprints. It draws on policy and human motivation literatures that address the behavioural changes that may be needed in the context of a long-term threat such as climate change. This proposal builds on an analysis of the British Columbia carbon tax, international examples of carbon pricing instruments and strategies for behavioural change such as social networks, loyalty management, mobile apps and gamification. Interviews were conducted with experts in financial services, energy conservation and clean technology, as well as with specialists in climate, health and taxation policy. Their input, together with a review of the theoretical literature and practical case studies, informed the proposed design of a Carbon, Health and Saving System for promoting individual engagement and collective action by linking long-term climate mitigation measures with short-term personal and social goals, including health, recreation and social reinforcement.Policy RelevanceThis article identifies areas for climate policy innovation and recommends policies that can support, promote and enable personal carbon budgeting and collective action. Although this study is focused on British Columbia, both the input provided by key opinion leaders and the proposed framework are applicable to other jurisdictions.This policy proposal shows how personal carbon trading could work in the context of a Canadian province with an existing climate mitigation policy. It also specifies a minimum viable product approach to establishing the economic, social and technological foundations for personal carbon trading.The Carbon, Health and Saving System identifies the technologies and stakeholders needed to implement personal carbon trading, and offers the possibility of motivating a widespread conscious human response in the event that carbon taxation proves insufficient to generate economic adaptation in a changing climate. 相似文献
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Bernhard Schlamadinger Benoit Bosquet Charlotte Streck Ian Noble Michael Dutschke Neil Bird 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):199-208
Abstract The European Commission is mandated to consider the inclusion of credits from land-use projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), beginning with the second period of the European Union's emission trading scheme (ETS) in its report due in July 2006. Temporary credits from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM are seen by many as posing a technical problem for their use under the ETS. This article summarizes three feasible, efficient and environmentally sound alternatives for achieving the integration of such temporary credits in the European emissions trading market starting in 2008. The first proposal integrates tCERs and lCERs (temporary credits) into the EU ETS by allowing for their direct use for compliance purposes. The second proposal builds on the idea of swapping temporary credits for EU allowances (EUAs) by Member States. The third proposal would not require a political decision at the EU level. Instead supportive Member States or private carbon fund operators would agree to swap temporary credits for the CERs or ERUs they hold in their accounts. All three solutions would be linked to a risk-mitigation strategy based on levying a fee or fixing an exchange rate, which would allow governments to hedge the risk of losing temporary credits. 相似文献
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Most countries implementing an emissions trading system (ETS), such as EU member states, California in the US, or South Korea, are generally targeting large sized companies, which consume energy above a specific threshold. However, previous studies using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have analyzed climate policies without considering company size. This may have led to inaccurate results because the impacts of climate policy would differ depending on the coverage of regulated companies. Accordingly, this study examines the environmental and economic impacts of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies, assuming policy results vary by firm size, as covered by the Korean emission trading system. To this end, a CGE model with a separate social accounting matrix based on company size is used to compare three scenarios that reflect different types of carbon pricing methods. The results show that greenhouse gases will be reduced to a lower extent and utility will decrease more if mitigation policies are only imposed to large companies.
Key policy insights
Carbon pricing policies should consider the different impacts on companies of different sizes and industry sectors.
Without considering the different sizes of companies covered by an ETS, the expected carbon price and its economic impact will be underestimated.
Small and medium-sized companies will face more negative impacts than large companies in some industry sectors under an ETS, even if the mitigation burden is only faced by large companies.
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《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):137-148
Abstract Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries. This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end. 相似文献
7.
In this study, we aim to describe the background for design characteristics of emissions trading schemes (ETS) in developing and emerging economies, with a particular focus on the case of Korea. These countries may face unique hardships such as fierce opposition from industry sectors, the presence of a power imbalance between the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and ministries that are in charge of supporting output growth, and the absence or incomplete development of financial markets and auctioning mechanisms. To overcome these hardships, the Korean government legislated laws that defined timelines for every stage of ETS development, established a strategic governance architecture to make up the weak position of the MOE, offered strong market-stabilizing measures focused on maintaining the allowance price below a certain level, and provided support packages to make the low-carbon transition easy by compensating for losses caused by the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (KETS). Such policy instruments that made adoption of KETS easier could be obstacles to making it efficient.Policy relevanceIn the process of adopting a cap-and-trade system, both a developing economy and an emerging economy may face unique hardships, such as strong opposition from industry sectors, the presence of a power imbalance between the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and ministries that are in charge of supporting output growth, and the absence or incomplete development of financial markets and auctioning mechanisms. To make up for the weak base of Korea’s ETS, the government legislated laws that defined timelines for every stage of the ETS development, established a strategic governance architecture to make up for the weak position of the MOE, offered strong market-stabilizing measures focused on maintaining the allowance price below a certain level, and provided support packages to make the low-carbon transition easy by compensating for losses caused by the Korea’s ETS. Korea’s experiences can be shared with other developing economies that are considering adoption of a cap-and-trade scheme. 相似文献
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Erik Haites 《Climate Policy》2018,18(8):955-966
Systematic evidence relating to the performance of carbon pricing – carbon taxes and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs) – is sparse. In 2015, 17 ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions while 18 jurisdictions collected a carbon tax. The papers in this special thematic section review the performance of many of these instruments over the 2005–2015 period. The performance of existing carbon taxes and GHG ETSs can help policy makers make informed choices about whether to introduce these instruments and to improve their design. The purpose of carbon pricing instruments is to reduce GHG emissions cost effectively. Assessing their performance is difficult because emissions are also affected by other policies and exogenous factors such as economic conditions. Carbon taxes in Europe prior to 2008 and in British Columbia reduced emissions from business-as-usual but actual emissions continued to rise. Since 2008 emissions subject to European carbon taxes have declined, but in most countries, other mitigation policies have probably contributed more to the reductions than the carbon taxes. Emissions subject to ETSs, with the exception of four systems without emissions caps, have declined. The ETSs contributed to the emissions reductions, but their share of the overall reduction is not known. Most tax rates are low relative to levels thought to be needed to achieve climate change objectives. Few jurisdictions regularly adjust their tax rates. All ETSs have accumulated surplus allowances and implemented measures to reduce these surpluses. The largest ETSs now specify annual reductions in their emissions cap several years into the future. Emissions trading system allowance prices are generally lower than the tax rates.
Key policy insights
Theoretical discussions usually portray carbon taxes and GHG ETSs as alternatives. In practice, a jurisdiction often implements both instruments to address emissions by different sources.
Designs of ETSs have evolved based on experience shared bilaterally and via dedicated institutions.
Carbon tax designs, in contrast, have hardly evolved and there are no institutions dedicated to sharing experience.
Every jurisdiction with an ETS and/or carbon tax also has other policies that affect its GHG emissions.
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《Global Environmental Change》2001,11(3):251-255
In an attempt to combat climate change on a global scale, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in conjunction with a wide range of policies both at national and international level. In particular, flexibility mechanisms-emissions trading system, joint implementation (JI) and clean development mechanism (CDM)-were incorporated in the Protocol to fulfil the commitment of the Parties by utilising a market system. Under the flexibility mechanisms, an artificial market is created in which the emission allowances or emission reduction units are traded. Not surprisingly, such measures might result in significant impacts on the trade of both goods and services, presumably creating the most complex and dynamic interaction with the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) which is overseen by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). If the implementation of flexibility mechanisms is identified as inconsistent with the requirements of the MTS, enforcement of such policies may prove difficult due to constraints imposed by GATT/WTO provisions.The purpose of this article is to scrutinise potential incompatibility between the implementation of flexibility mechanisms and GATT/WTO provisions. The rules governing the implementation of flexibility mechanisms have yet to be decided due to the divergent views of States regarding the design of the mechanisms. Thus, the analysis of the interaction will be undertaken based on hypothetical scenarios of each mechanism to account for all possible consequences of their implementation. Such an analysis will facilitate detection of any potential conflicts between the implementation of flexibility mechanisms and the trade regimes in advance, thus encompassing the potential incompatibility in designing the mechanisms and helping achieve increasingly effective implementation of flexibility mechanisms. 相似文献
10.
Addressing regional disparities in allowance allocation in China’s national emissions trading scheme
China's national emissions trading scheme (ETS) is expected to be operational in 2017. Effectively addressing regional disparities at the provincial level in allowance allocation will greatly affect the acceptance of the allocation approach and thus deserves careful consideration. This article aims to explore possible approaches for addressing regional disparities, by introducing regional adjustment factors (RAF) in free allowance allocation. Based on the principle of ‘national unified rules?+?stricter adjustment by provincial authorities’, four single factorial and three multi-factorial methods are proposed to calculate the RAFs, through a normalization process. These methods are associated with the most acknowledged factors dealing with regional disparities, including per-capita GDP; per-capita CO2 emissions; industrial sector contribution to GDP; economy-wide emissions control targets and CO2 emissions per unit GDP, per unit power and heat output and per unit industrial added value. A comparative analysis is made for the seven methods, in regard to value distribution and level of matching regional political demand.Key policy insights
‘Allowing stricter regional adjustment’ represents a dominant feature for China's national ETS, which aims to address regional disparities and government demands.
How the adjustment plan is designed will have a major influence on the operation of the national ETS and regional business competitiveness. Provincial governments need to consider the trade-off between auction revenue and local business competitiveness.
Applying the different methods leads to more scattered results for some regions, for whom the choice of adjustment approach will therefore have a greater impact.
Based on the analysis, four adjustment methods that generate similar results – the per-capita GDP-based method, the intensity reduction target-based method, the 12th FYP target-based method and intensity-based grandfathering – are recommended for most provincial-level regions, with some exceptions.
11.
Stefano F. Verde Jordi Teixidó Claudio Marcantonini Xavier Labandeira 《Climate Policy》2019,19(4):439-452
This paper analyses the rules for free allocation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The analysis draws on the empirical evidence emerging from two literature strands. One group of studies sheds light on the following questions: how efficient are free allocation rules in minimizing the risk of carbon leakage? Have they become more efficient over the trading periods? What are the technical limits to making them more efficient? Further: is firm behaviour affected by allowance allocation? Did specific provisions induce strategic behaviour with unintended effects? Studies from the second group estimate sectoral pass-through rates for the costs imposed by the EU ETS. Taking cost pass-through into account is necessary for properly targeting free allocation. The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability, especially in manufacturing sectors (due to limited data availability and market heterogeneity), is the main hindrance to achieving further efficiency in allowance allocation. The new rules defined in the reform for Phase IV (2021–2030) nevertheless make some progress in this direction.Key policy insights
The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability is the main hindrance to efficient free allocation in minimizing carbon leakage risk.
In Phase IV (2021–2030), carbon leakage risk will be assessed more accurately thanks to: a) carbon intensity and trade intensity considered together through a combined indicator; b) possible use of more disaggregated data, and c) possible consideration of complementary qualitative assessments of abatement potential, market characteristics and profit margins.
It is expected that benchmarked allocation introduced in Phase III (2013–2020) has induced additional emission abatement, but there is still a lack of empirical evidence.
12.
基于中国风电及光伏国家核证自愿减排量(CCER)现状及发展趋势,针对CCER供给、抵销和价格形成等关键机制问题,运用电力部门细分的递推动态可计算一般均衡(CGE)模型,模拟了在取消电价补贴的背景下全国碳市场引入风电及光伏CCER交易及抵销机制的经济影响。研究发现:引入CCER交易及抵销机制会降低碳配额交易价格,并缓解取消电价补贴对风电和光伏电力的负面影响,但也会削弱全国碳市场的碳减排效果,且随着CCER供给总量增加这些作用更明显;全国碳市场引入CCER交易及抵销机制后,碳排放强度较高的控排行业将选择购买更多的CCER,其中火电行业是主要的CCER需求方;未来我国如果不放开CCER项目备案审批则风电行业将是主要受益方,而未来适度放开CCER项目备案审批则风电和光伏行业都将从中受益。因此,全国碳市场在引入CCER交易及抵销机制的同时需从紧设置初始碳配额发放量,并可考虑适时重启CCER项目备案审批工作以更好地促进风电和光伏电力的发展,但允许的CCER清缴比例上限应结合碳减排目标合理设定,以避免对全国碳市场产生较大冲击。 相似文献
13.
Eugénie Joltreau 《Climate Policy》2019,19(4):453-471
Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms’ competitiveness or profitability. For the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) the empirical literature documents that significant emissions reductions have resulted from it. Surprisingly, however, the literature shows that there have been hardly any concurrent negative effects on firms’ competitiveness during the first two phases of the scheme (2005–2012). We show that the main explanations for the absence of negative impacts on competitiveness are a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop and the ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through combined with free allocation, in turn, partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may have limited the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found so far. Several factors suggest that over-allocation is likely to remain substantial in the upcoming periods of the scheme. Therefore, we expect to see no negative competitiveness effects from the EU ETS in Phases III and IV (2013–2030).
Key policy insights
Empirical literature on the EU ETS shows that there have been hardly any effects on firms’ competitiveness or profitability.
One main explanation is a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop. This reduced incentives for innovation.
Moreover, firms were able to pass costs on to consumers in some sectors which partly generated windfall profits.
Innovation effects have so far been small but positive.
We expect to see no negative competitiveness effects on regulated firms in the near future suggesting that no further reliefs for regulated firms are required.
14.
Anthony S. Kiem 《Global Environmental Change》2013,23(6):1615-1626
This paper reviews historical and existing drought and water policy in Australia in order to gain a sense of the strengths and weaknesses in enabling effective adaptation to climate change. In particular, (a) the social, economic, and environmental costs and benefits of water trading and (b) the limitations of using ‘market-based’ instruments (MBIs), like water trading, for adapting to drought and water security related climate change impacts are investigated. It was found that water trading has potential as a climate change adaptation strategy with many benefits experienced in previous and current versions of water trading. However, there are also limitations and those negatively impacted by water trading are hit hard. These social impacts of water trading have not been thoroughly investigated and are not well understood. Significant uncertainty also exists around the impacts of water trading on the environment (e.g. changed hydrological regimes, underestimation of sustainable environmental flows etc.). Proper quantification of these impacts is needed, however, it is a complex task given Australia's large hydroclimatic variability and the current lack of understanding as to how to optimise water needs of the environment, humans, agriculture and other industries. It appears that ‘cap and trade’ quantity-based MBIs such as water trading will eventually do what they are designed to do (i.e. reallocate a resource to ‘high value’ users). However, given that the ‘low value’ users in this case are agriculture and town/urban water supply (not including drinking water) and the ‘high value’ users are mining, manufacturing, and electricity production (i.e. high greenhouse gas emissions), do we really want the water trading MBI to achieve its objective? And, what would the social and environmental ramifications of such a shift in water use within Australia be? These questions, along with the limitations and potential implications of using water trading (and MBIs in general) as a climate change adaptation tool, must be carefully considered if past Australian drought and water policy failures are not to be repeated. 相似文献
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作物布局,耕作制度,栽培技术与棉铃虫调控 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
分析了８０年代以来作物布局、耕作制度、栽培技术的变化,指出这些变化与棉铃虫为害有着密切的关系,从这一角度提出了调控棉铃虫的措施。 相似文献