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1.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(1):109-116
The Kyoto Protocol allows a group of Annex B countries to fulfill their emissions limitation commitments jointly by forming a “bubble” equal to their collective commitment. Annex B countries, whether members of a bubble or not, can use the Kyoto mechanisms to help meet their emissions limitation commitments. I argue that Kyoto mechanism rules should be applied to Parties individually regardless of their membership in a bubble. This means there are virtually no advantages to joining a bubble, but it is not clear that the option to form a bubble should confer benefits on the members relative to other Annex B Parties that do not join a bubble. 相似文献
2.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):109-116
Abstract The Kyoto Protocol allows a group of Annex B countries to fulfill their emissions limitation commitments jointly by forming a “bubble” equal to their collective commitment. Annex B countries, whether members of a bubble or not, can use the Kyoto mechanisms to help meet their emissions limitation commitments. I argue that Kyoto mechanism rules should be applied to Parties individually regardless of their membership in a bubble. This means there are virtually no advantages to joining a bubble, but it is not clear that the option to form a bubble should confer benefits on the members relative to other Annex B Parties that do not join a bubble. 相似文献
3.
The contribution that no-lose target schemes for non-Annex I (NAI) countries could make to achieve the 2°C target is explored by accounting for the incentives of 18 NAI countries’ participation in no-lose target schemes. Using various scenarios, it is shown that implementing uniform no-lose targets as part of the burden-sharing will not lead to global emissions levels compatible with the 2°C target, because uniform no-lose targets will only be beneficial to a few NAI countries. Employing more lenient uniform no-lose targets or individual no-lose targets for large emitters could increase participation by NAI countries and decrease global emissions, global compliance costs, rents by NAI countries, and compliance costs for Annex I (AI) countries. However, the resulting global emissions levels will not be compatible with attaining the 2°C target. Achieving this target will require more stringent emissions targets for AI countries and more lenient no-lose targets for NAI countries. As such, no-lose targets should account for 20% to 47% of global emissions reductions, while due to emissions trading around two-thirds of global emissions reductions should be realized in NAI countries. Indeed, an effective solution may only require no-lose targets for five to seven of the largest NAI countries. Policy relevance No-lose targets are one of a number of instruments discussed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change New Market Mechanism to integrate NAI countries in global emissions reduction efforts. In contrast to binding reduction targets, which apply penalties if a target is not met, no-lose targets provide incentives for meeting a target, e.g. in the form of excess emissions certificates that can be sold on the global carbon market. The presented simulations show that no-lose targets can result in contributions from NAI countries to global emissions reduction efforts. However, the simulations also show that the necessary incentives for no-lose targets need to be adjusted. AI countries require more ambitious targets and NAI countries require less ambitious no-lose targets than proposed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report. Effective no-lose targets may only be required for five to seven of the largest NAI countries. 相似文献
4.
This paper presents an alternative framework to the approach currently embodied in the Kyoto Protocol for managing global climate change post-2012. The framework has two key provisions. The first is that each person in the world would be ‘allowed’ an equal amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This is labeled the equity-first provision. The second provision focuses on incorporating risk concepts into the setting of GHG emission reductions. It is proposed that the global climate be managed as to avoid three categories of risks: (I) Substantial regional economic, political, and/or biological impacts; (II) Severe global economic, political, and/or biological impacts; and (III) Extinction of humans. Acceptable risk thresholds are suggested to be one-in-a-million, one-in-one-hundred-million, and one-in-ten-billion, respectively. This equity-first, risk-based framework overcomes many criticisms of the current Kyoto Protocol: it explicitly involves all countries on earth; it avoids several administrative issues that are anticipated to plague a global carbon emissions trading market; and it avoids several contentious issues associated with pegging carbon emission reductions to 1990 levels. Because the framework is risk-based and emissions are tied to population and not historic emission levels, the basic framework would not have to be frequently renegotiated, as will be needed for the Kyoto-style approach to take the world past that agreement's 2012 endpoint. 相似文献
5.
Abstract This paper examines implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without Russia. It concludes that implementation without Russia is possible, although it requires political will on the part of the countries that wish to proceed with the Protocol. It would lead to higher compliance costs for Annex B buyer regions, but other regions, except Russia, would benefit financially. Russia would forego revenue of at least $20 billion for the first commitment period. Implementation without Russia could improve the environmental performance of the Protocol. It would reduce reliance on Annex B sinks, use of surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) for compliance, and the quantity of Kyoto units banked for subsequent commitment periods. Actual emissions by Kyoto Protocol Parties would fall, but the reduction may be offset by leakage to the US and Russia. 相似文献
6.
Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol 总被引：11，自引：3，他引：8
The current annual rates of tropical deforestation from Brazil and Indonesia alone would equal four-fifths of the emissions reductions gained by implementing the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period, jeopardizing the goal of Protocol to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. We propose the novel concept of “compensated reduction”, whereby countries that elect to reduce national level deforestation to below a previously determined historical level would receive post facto compensation, and commit to stabilize or further reduce deforestation in the future. Such a program could create large-scale incentives to reduce tropical deforestation, as well as for broader developing country participation in the Kyoto Protocol, and leverage support for the continuity of the Protocol beyond the 2008–2012 first commitment period. 相似文献
7.
Paula Castro 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):198-218
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ argument is analysed empirically by comparing marginal abatement cost curves. Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in most countries. Although the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped are below the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM predominantly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for the adoption of low-cost abatement options. 相似文献
8.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2-3):161-177
Abstract US President Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol because, in his view, it is ‘fatally flawed in fundamental ways’. This paper evaluates seven proposals to redress the protocol according to their potential to deal with three key issues that have reinforced US intransigence: hot air, cost uncertainty and developing country participation. It argues that negotiations on intensity targets hold the most promise. Because intensity targets limit hot air, but do not limit economic growth, and a high variance of carbon intensity exists among countries with similar GDP per capita, intensity targets based on best practice levels might be agreeable to developing countries and the US. If a protocol specifying such targets were implemented, less warming would be associated with larger world GDP than would otherwise be the case, and countries' carbon intensity and emissions per capita would tend to converge to best practice levels at every stage of development. 相似文献
9.
Many developed countries in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol have been able to report decreasing emissions, and some have officially fulfilled their CO2 reduction commitments. This is in part because current reporting and regulatory regimes allow these countries to displace emissions intensive production offshore. Using a new highly detailed account of emissions embodied in international trade we investigate this phenomenon of emissions leakage. We independently confirm previous findings that adjusting for trade, developed countries emissions have increased, not decreased. We find that the sectors successfully holding or lowering their domestic emissions are often the same as those increasing their imports of embodied CO2. We also find that the fastest growing flow paths of embodied CO2 largely originate outside the Kyoto Annex B signatory nations. Finally, we find that historically the same phenomenon of emissions displacement has already occurred for air pollution, with the result that despite aggressive legislation in major emitters total global air pollution emissions have increased. If regulatory policies do not account for embodied imports, global emissions are likely to rise even if developed countries emitters enforce strong national emissions targets. 相似文献
10.
Various climate protocol proposals oblige different industrialized countries to reduce CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. In principle, the total costs of these obligations could be substantially reduced if emission reductions are implemented in regions with low marginal costs for CO2 reduction. This has been difficult to quantify because of lack of models with suitable regional and sectoral detail. In this paper we perform these calculations by taking advantage of the capability of the IMAGE 2 model to compute regional emissions and costs. Two main options are examined for allocating emission reductions required of industrialized regions in a cost effective manner: (1) allocating them among industrialized regions (2) allocating them among all world regions. The cost savings for each of these options are presented. The main conclusions are that (a) it is of great importance for the cost comparisons of protocols to use a well defined baseline scenario and clearly formulated targets, and (b) large economic benefits, in the order of 35–65%, can accrue from joint-implementation agreements which allocate investments on the basis of net marginal costs of CO2 emission reduction. 相似文献
11.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(3):309-326
Carbon dioxide emissions from UK energy use have fallen by more than 20% over the last 30 years, and carbon intensity — carbon emissions per unit of GDP — has halved. These reductions have been achieved by a combination of decarbonisation of the energy system and substantial improvements in energy efficiency. Use of natural gas in power generation has been a big factor in recent years, but energy efficiency improvements in households and particularly industry have been more important over a longer period. Government policies designed primarily to address climate change have not been important contributors, until recently.Future reductions in emissions will require more proactive policies. However, they are possible without any economic difficulties, notably by adopting cost-effective energy efficiency measures, using new renewable energy sources and reducing dependence on private cars. These policies will improve economic efficiency. The new UK Climate Change Programme includes policies that combine regulation, investment, fiscal measures and other economic instruments. By working with the grain of other social, environmental and economic policies, they can achieve far more than a carbon tax alone, set at any politically acceptable level. Modelling the costs of emission reductions using a carbon tax as the only instrument would not only massively over-estimate costs, it would bear little resemblance to real world politics.The paper demonstrates that a more diverse set of policy instruments is likely to be an effective and politically acceptable approach in a mature industrial economy. It is concluded that the UK’s Kyoto target of a 12.5% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is not challenging. The UK Government’s target of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20% between 1990 and 2010 is also achievable. By 2010 per capita emissions from the UK will be well below 2.5 tC per year. Claims that some countries, notably the USA, could not reduce per capita emissions below 6 tC per year seem inconsistent with this experience. 相似文献
12.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(2-3):179-196
The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM’s share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market. 相似文献
13.
Given the present commitment of the developed countries according to the Kyoto Protocol, most published scenarios demonstrate that global greenhouse gases concentrations would not be stabilized at any level. In order to stabilize these concentrations, a deeper global involvement is needed. Taking Israel as an example of a `recently-developed' country, we assess the role that such countries could play by assuming voluntary commitments in strengthening global involvement. This case as a model may encourage a global scheme for curbing carbon emissions, in which the more developed countries assume a stronger role and the less developed countries participate according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. The scheme builds on the inverse relation that exists between the per capita gross domestic product and the rate of increase of emissions due to economic growth. According to this theoretical scheme, the voluntary commitments assumed by the `recently-developed' countries encourage the more developed countries to deepen their involvement by assuming more stringent reductions of emissions at home and transferring technological and financial means to the less developed countries. The proposed scheme would enable non-Annex I countries, both `recently-developed' countries and less developed countries, to participate much earlier in the net mitigation of greenhouse gases. 相似文献
14.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):273-292
Abstract The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties have important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are particularly relevant, because these variables have the largest impact on the overall abatement cost to be borne by Annex B countries in the short and in the long run. This paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol both on technological innovation and on the price of emission permits (and, as a consequence, on abatement costs). In particular, the analysis highlights mechanisms and feedbacks related to technological innovation, technological spillovers and R&D which could be relevant and which modify some policy relevant conclusions. First, we identify two feedback effects which explain why our results lead to a less significant fall in the price of permits than in most empirical analyses recently circulated. We show that the US defection from the Kyoto Protocol, by inducing a decline in the demand and price of emission permits, lowers the incentives to undertake energy-saving R&D. As a consequence, emissions increase and feed back on the demand and supply of permits, thus implying a lower decline in the price of permits than previously estimated. At the same time, as a result of the reduced R&D investments and the augmented emissions, climate change damages intensify and require an increase in investments that are again coupled with a growth of emissions. By thus again increasing the demand for permits and reducing their supply, this effect enhances the previous mechanism. Notwithstanding the lower decline in the price of permits, the paper still identifies a smaller price than would occur with a US participation. Therefore, we emphasise in a second step the crucial role of Russia in climate negotiations due to a large increase in Russia's bargaining power. 相似文献
15.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(4):273-292
The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties have important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are particularly relevant, because these variables have the largest impact on the overall abatement cost to be borne by Annex B countries in the short and in the long run. This paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol both on technological innovation and on the price of emission permits (and, as a consequence, on abatement costs). In particular, the analysis highlights mechanisms and feedbacks related to technological innovation, technological spillovers and R&D which could be relevant and which modify some policy relevant conclusions. First, we identify two feedback effects which explain why our results lead to a less significant fall in the price of permits than in most empirical analyses recently circulated. We show that the US defection from the Kyoto Protocol, by inducing a decline in the demand and price of emission permits, lowers the incentives to undertake energy-saving R&D. As a consequence, emissions increase and feed back on the demand and supply of permits, thus implying a lower decline in the price of permits than previously estimated. At the same time, as a result of the reduced R&D investments and the augmented emissions, climate change damages intensify and require an increase in investments that are again coupled with a growth of emissions. By thus again increasing the demand for permits and reducing their supply, this effect enhances the previous mechanism. Notwithstanding the lower decline in the price of permits, the paper still identifies a smaller price than would occur with a US participation. Therefore, we emphasise in a second step the crucial role of Russia in climate negotiations due to a large increase in Russia’s bargaining power. 相似文献
16.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):309-326
Abstract Carbon dioxide emissions from UK energy use have fallen by more than 20% over the last 30 years, and carbon intensity—carbon emissions per unit of GDP—has halved. These reductions have been achieved by a combination of decarbonisation of the energy system and substantial improvements in energy efficiency. Use of natural gas in power generation has been a big factor in recent years, but energy efficiency improvements in households and particularly industry have been more important over a longer period. Government policies designed primarily to address climate change have not been important contributors, until recently. Future reductions in emissions will require more proactive policies. However, they are possible without any economic difficulties, notably by adopting cost-effective energy efficiency measures, using new renewable energy sources and reducing dependence on private cars. These policies will improve economic efficiency. The new UK Climate Change Programme includes policies that combine regulation, investment, fiscal measures and other economic instruments. By working with the grain of other social, environmental and economic policies, they can achieve far more than a carbon tax alone, set at any politically acceptable level. Modelling the costs of emission reductions using a carbon tax as the only instrument would not only massively over-estimate costs, it would bear little resemblance to real world politics. The paper demonstrates that a more diverse set of policy instruments is likely to be an effective and politically acceptable approach in a mature industrial economy. It is concluded that the UK's Kyoto target of a 12.5% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is not challenging. The UK Government's target of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20% between 1990 and 2010 is also achievable. By 2010 per capita emissions from the UK will be well below 2.5 tC per year. Claims that some countries, notably the USA, could not reduce per capita emissions below 6 tC per year seem inconsistent with this experience. 相似文献
17.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2-3):179-196
Abstract The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely. The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM's share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market. 相似文献
18.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(4):303-318
To stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, all countries will eventually need to be included in the effort to limit climate change. This article explores what potential future greenhouse gas allocation schemes might mean for key developing countries. The need for development is widely acknowledged, but growth in non-Annex I country emissions means that such development may need to take a different path to business as usual. The national interests of developing countries in negotiating potential future commitments are shaped by basic characteristics, notably emissions (both annual and historical cumulative), economic growth and population. These factors in turn shape the acceptability of allocations based on ability to pay, emissions intensity, or emissions per capita.Results for six major developing countries (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina and Nigeria) show that the implications for developing countries differ widely. For example, ability to pay does not favour Argentina; a reduction based on emissions intensity is not appropriate for Brazil; and per capita allocations would be problematic for South Africa. It is difficult to conceive of a single allocation scheme that would be appropriate for all developing countries. This points to the need for differentiation between developing countries in terms of any potential future commitments. 相似文献
19.
Substantially postponing the emission reductions, compared to the ranges indicated in IPCC’s recent assessment for 2020 as required for meeting the longterm 2°C target, increases the risk of exceeding this target. The costs of a delay strategy are lower in the short term, but leads to higher costs in the longer term. The analysis shows if the emission reductions are postponed to 2030 it is not likely that higher emissions from the earlier years can be fully compensated in future decades in a so-called ‘delayed action scenario’. A full compensation would require emission reduction rates in the coming decades that are much higher than those found in the scenario literature. Without compensation, the risk of exceeding the global temperature rise target of 2°C will increase. This confirms that it is not only the reduction commitments for 2050 that determine the risk of exceeding the 2°C target, but also the path between now and 2050. To meet this 2°C target, more ambitious 2020 reduction targets are needed for the developed and developing countries than those that have been pledged so far. 相似文献
20.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):303-318
Abstract To stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, all countries will eventually need to be included in the effort to limit climate change. This article explores what potential future greenhouse gas allocation schemes might mean for key developing countries. The need for development is widely acknowledged, but growth in non-Annex I country emissions means that such development may need to take a different path to business as usual. The national interests of developing countries in negotiating potential future commitments are shaped by basic characteristics, notably emissions (both annual and historical cumulative), economic growth and population. These factors in turn shape the acceptability of allocations based on ability to pay, emissions intensity, or emissions per capita. Results for six major developing countries (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina and Nigeria) show that the implications for developing countries differ widely. For example, ability to pay does not favour Argentina; a reduction based on emissions intensity is not appropriate for Brazil; and per capita allocations would be problematic for South Africa. It is difficult to conceive of a single allocation scheme that would be appropriate for all developing countries. This points to the need for differentiation between developing countries in terms of any potential future commitments. 相似文献