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1.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):634-651
A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI's national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between ?52% and ?69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic ?35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap. 相似文献
2.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):534-547
The climate negotiations up to Copenhagen will need to elaborate on measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) mitigation commitments and actions as part of the future of the climate regime. The conceptual, political, scientific, financial and institutional principles for MRV are explored for (1) mitigation commitments in developed countries, (2) mitigation actions in developing countries, supported by (3) means of implementation. For developed countries, the procedures in Articles 5, 7, 8 and 18 of the Kyoto Protocol will be critical in order to ensure comparability of commitments, both in effort and compliance. Outcomes should be reportable and verifiable through Annex I national communications and in-depth review. Existing procedures could be enhanced and need to apply across Protocol and Convention. MRV mitigation actions by developing countries should result in measurable deviations below baseline. Inventories will be important to measure, and enhanced national communications for reporting. The challenge will be to make mitigation actions verifiable, and options include verification by domestic institutions working to internationally agreed guidelines. A critical distinction is to be made between unilateral mitigation actions and those with international support. MRV applies to the provision of the means of implementation, including technology and finance. Investment in technology can be measured, so that institutional arrangements for technology and finance should be aligned. Verification of funds raised at international level would be simpler than raising funds nationally. 相似文献
3.
International organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying differentiated commitments that may, in turn, affect negotiation dynamics. Drawing on incentive-based and socialization arguments, we develop a “constructed peer group” hypothesis suggesting that by creating these groups those organizations may actually construct new lines of confrontation over and above the substance-based disagreements existing between countries. This generates a particular type of path dependence, rendering broad-based international agreements more difficult in the future.We analyze this question at the example of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's increasingly politicized split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Using a self-coded dataset of country oral statements during the negotiations between December 2007 and December 2009 we assess whether Annex I membership influences a country's stance toward other countries’ arguments, while controlling for country characteristics that may drive their preferences and the affiliation to Annex I. We find that the split between Annex I and non-Annex I has indeed influenced negotiation behavior and amplified the divide between developing and industrialized countries in the climate negotiations. 相似文献
4.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(1):109-116
The Kyoto Protocol allows a group of Annex B countries to fulfill their emissions limitation commitments jointly by forming a “bubble” equal to their collective commitment. Annex B countries, whether members of a bubble or not, can use the Kyoto mechanisms to help meet their emissions limitation commitments. I argue that Kyoto mechanism rules should be applied to Parties individually regardless of their membership in a bubble. This means there are virtually no advantages to joining a bubble, but it is not clear that the option to form a bubble should confer benefits on the members relative to other Annex B Parties that do not join a bubble. 相似文献
5.
As part of the Copenhagen Accord, Annex I Parties (industrialised countries) and non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) have submitted reduction proposals (pledges) and mitigation actions to the UNFCCC secretariat. Our calculations show that if the current reduction offers of Annex I and non-Annex I countries are fully implemented, global greenhouse gas emissions could amount to 48.6-49.7 GtCO2eq by 2020. Recent literature suggests that the emission level should be between 42 and 46 GtCO2eq by 2020 to maintain a “medium” chance (50-66%) of meeting the 2 °C target. The emission gap is therefore 2.6-7.7 GtCO2eq. We have identified a combined set of options, which could result in an additional 2.8 GtCO2eq emission reduction. This would lead to an emission level just within the range needed. The options include reducing deforestation and emissions from bunker fuels, excluding emissions allowance increases from land use and forestry rules, and taking into account the national climate plans of China and India. However, there are also important risks that could widen the emissions gap, like lower reductions from countries with only a conditional pledge and the use of Kyoto and/or trading of new surplus emission allowances. 相似文献
6.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):355-376
Many stabilization scenarios have examined the implications of stabilization on the assumption that all regions and all sectors of all of the world's economies undertake emissions mitigations wherever and whenever it is cheapest to do so. This idealized assumption is just one of many ways in which emissions mitigation actions could play out globally, but not necessarily the most likely. This paper explores the implications of generic policy regimes that lead to stabilization of CO2 concentrations under conditions in which non-Annex I regions delay emissions reductions and in which carbon prices vary across participating regions. The resulting stabilization scenarios are contrasted with the idealized results. Delays in the date by which non-Annex I regions begin to reduce emissions raise the price of carbon in Annex I regions relative to the price of carbon in Annex I in an idealized regime for any given CO2 concentration limit. This effect increases the longer the delay in non-Annex I accession, the lower the non-Annex I carbon prices relative to the Annex I prices, and the more stringent the stabilization level. The effect of delay is very pronounced when CO2 concentrations are stabilized at 450 ppmv, however the effect is much less pronounced at 550 ppmv and above. For long delays in non-Annex I accession, 450 ppmv stabilization levels become infeasible. 相似文献
7.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):109-116
Abstract The Kyoto Protocol allows a group of Annex B countries to fulfill their emissions limitation commitments jointly by forming a “bubble” equal to their collective commitment. Annex B countries, whether members of a bubble or not, can use the Kyoto mechanisms to help meet their emissions limitation commitments. I argue that Kyoto mechanism rules should be applied to Parties individually regardless of their membership in a bubble. This means there are virtually no advantages to joining a bubble, but it is not clear that the option to form a bubble should confer benefits on the members relative to other Annex B Parties that do not join a bubble. 相似文献
8.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(5):494-515
A sectoral approach to GHG emissions reductions in developing countries is proposed as a key component of the post-2012 climate change mitigation framework. In this approach, the ten highest-emitting developing countries in the electricity and other major industrial sectors pledge to meet voluntary, ‘no-lose’ GHG emissions targets in these sectors. No penalties are incurred for failing to meet a target, but emissions reductions achieved beyond the target level earn emissions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be sold to industrialized nations. Participating developing countries establish initial ‘no-lose’ emissions targets, based upon their national circumstances, from sector-specific energyintensity benchmarks that have been developed by independent experts. Industrialized nations then offer incentives for the developing countries to adopt more stringent emissions targets through a ‘Technology Finance and Assistance Package’, which helps to overcome financial and other barriers to technology transfer and deployment. These sectorspecific energy-intensity benchmarks could also serve as a means for establishing national economy-wide targets in developed countries in the post-2012 regime. Preliminary modelling of a hybrid scenario, in which Annex I countries adopt economy-wide absolute GHG emissions targets and high-emitting developing countries adopt ‘no-lose’ sectoral targets, indicates that such an approach significantly improves the likelihood that atmospheric concentrations of CO2 can be stabilized at 450 ppmv by the end of the century. 相似文献
9.
What would the shape of a realistic, yet ambitious, package for the climate regime after 2012 look like? How do we obtain a package deal starting in Bali but building bridges to a post-2020 climate regime? A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive package deal has to strike a core balance between development and climate imperatives (mitigation, adaptation, dealing with the impacts of response measures, technology transfer, investment and finance) to create bargaining space and establish a conceptual contract zone. Within a continuum of possible packages, two packages in the contract zone are identified: ‘multi-stage’ and ‘ambitious transitional’. The latter is ambitious, combining domestic cap-and-trade for the USA, deeper cuts for Annex B countries, and quantifiable mitigation actions by developing countries. It is transitional as a possible bridge to a more inclusive regime beyond 2020. Multi-stage is defined around mechanisms by which countries move through increasingly stringent levels of participation, and must be based upon agreed triggers. Our assessment of political dynamics is that multi-stage is not yet in the political contract zone. Key to this is the absence of a ‘trigger from the North’, in that the largest historical emitter must act earlier and most decisively. But progress will also depend on continued leadership from Annex B countries, as well as more proactive, incentivized leadership in the South. Agreeing on the transitional stage is the critical next step in the evolution of the climate regime. Negotiating any package will require an institutional space for bargaining, political leadership and trust, and a clear time-frame. 相似文献
10.
The principle of common, but differentiated, responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR&RC) is fundamental to the UNFCCC. Some options for a nuanced model of differentiation that addresses both responsibility and capability in a changing world are explored, such as new categories of countries, and some of the political issues that such a model might face are considered. The strengths and limitations of options for graduation based on ‘objective’ criteria such that countries could move between categories or ‘graduate’ – an option provided by the UNFCCC – are discussed. Countries could also choose to join another club (e.g. the G20), self-elect into categories or differentiate among themselves implicitly by accepting different commitments and actions. CBDR&RC will form part of the overall legally binding agreement, and must apply symmetry in some respects and differentiation in others to the commitments and actions contained therein. Some possible characteristics of CBDR&RC of relevance in a regime ‘applicable to all’ are outlined. These include promoting climate action and using mechanisms available in the UNFCCC to instil dynamism. Differentiation on mitigation must consider the distinctions between absolute and relative reductions, as well as commitments to outcomes and implementation. CBDR&RC should be applied to mitigation, adaptation, and the means of implementation.Policy relevanceIn Durban, Parties agreed to negotiate a regime ‘applicable to all’, which sent a political signal that there should be greater symmetry between nations. The world has changed since the UNFCCC was negotiated in 1992. It is now less helpful to think only in terms of two groups of countries (e.g. Annex I and non-Annex I), and evident that there are significant differences between member states. This requires a more nuanced interpretation of the principles of equity and CBDR&RC, which is an integral part of the UNFCCC. The options for the different approaches outlined in this article might help in the construction of a more nuanced model. All must do more, while some must do more still than others. To achieve this, some defining characteristics of CBDR&RC in a regime applicable to all are suggested. 相似文献
11.
Methane emissions from livestock enteric fermentation and manure management represent about 40% of total anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions from the agriculture sector and are projected to increase substantially in the coming decades, with most of
the growth occurring in non-Annex 1 countries. To mitigate livestock methane, incentive policies based on producer-level emissions
are generally not feasible because of high administrative costs and producer transaction costs. In contrast, incentive policies
based on sectoral emissions are likely administratively feasible, even in developing countries. This study uses an economic
model of global agriculture to estimate the effects of two sectoral mitigation policies: a carbon tax and an emissions trading
scheme based on average national methane emissions per unit of commodity. The analysis shows how the composition and location
of livestock production and emissions change in response to the policies. Results illustrate the importance of global mitigation
efforts: when policies are limited to Annex 1 countries, increased methane emissions in non-Annex 1 countries offset approximately
two-thirds of Annex 1 emissions reductions. While non-Annex 1 countries face substantial disincentives to enacting domestic
carbon taxes, developing countries could benefit from participating in a global sectoral emissions trading scheme. We illustrate
one scheme in which non-Annex 1 countries collectively earn USD 2.4 billion annually from methane emission permit sales when
methane is priced at USD 30/t CO2-eq. 相似文献
12.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):303-318
Abstract To stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, all countries will eventually need to be included in the effort to limit climate change. This article explores what potential future greenhouse gas allocation schemes might mean for key developing countries. The need for development is widely acknowledged, but growth in non-Annex I country emissions means that such development may need to take a different path to business as usual. The national interests of developing countries in negotiating potential future commitments are shaped by basic characteristics, notably emissions (both annual and historical cumulative), economic growth and population. These factors in turn shape the acceptability of allocations based on ability to pay, emissions intensity, or emissions per capita. Results for six major developing countries (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina and Nigeria) show that the implications for developing countries differ widely. For example, ability to pay does not favour Argentina; a reduction based on emissions intensity is not appropriate for Brazil; and per capita allocations would be problematic for South Africa. It is difficult to conceive of a single allocation scheme that would be appropriate for all developing countries. This points to the need for differentiation between developing countries in terms of any potential future commitments. 相似文献
13.
During the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil proposed allocating the greenhouse gas emission reductions of Annex I Parties according to the relative effect of a country’s historical emissions on global temperature increase. This paper analyses the impact of scientific uncertainties and of different options in policy implementation (policy choices) on the contribution of countries’ historical emissions to indicators of historical responsibility for climate change. The influence of policy choices was found to be at least as large as the impact of the scientific uncertainties analysed here. Building on this, the paper then proceeds to explore the implications of applying the Brazilian Proposal as a climate regime for differentiation of future commitments on the global scale combined with an income threshold for participation of the non-Annex I regions. Under stringent climate targets, such a regime leads to high emission reductions for Annex I regions by 2050, in particular for Europe and Japan. The income threshold assumptions strongly affect the Annex I reductions, even more than the impact of another burden-sharing key. A variant of the Brazilian Proposal, allocating emission reductions on the basis of cumulative emissions since 1990, would lead to a more balanced distribution of emission reductions. 相似文献
14.
The adoption of the Warsaw mechanism on loss and damage has again highlighted the North-South divide in those parts of UNFCCC negotiations dealing with international climate finance. Current estimates put required funding from rich countries at 50–100 billion Euros per year to induce non-Annex I countries to take on greenhouse gas limitation commitments and to assist highly vulnerable countries. Results from survey-embedded conjoint experiments can help policy-makers anticipate opportunities and pitfalls in designing large-scale climate funding schemes. We implemented such experiments in the United States and Germany to better understand what institutional design characteristics are likely to garner more public support for climate funding among citizens in key developed countries. We find that climate funding receives more public support if it flows to efficient governments, funding decisions are made jointly by donor and recipient countries, funding is used both for mitigation and adaptation, and other donor countries contribute a large share. Contrary to what one might expect, climate change damage levels, income, and emissions in/of potential recipient countries have no significant effect on public support. These findings suggest that finance mechanisms that focus purely on compensating developing countries, without contributing to the global public good of mitigation, will find it hard to garner public support. 相似文献
15.
圣保罗案文的基本要点 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
陈迎 《气候变化研究进展》2007,3(3):177-182
2006年8月,BASIC项目的巴西课题组推出了一个后京都国际气候制度的全面设计方案,简称圣保罗案文。概括介绍了该案文的设计思路和基本要点,包括全球中长期目标、附件I和非附件I国家的不同义务、市场机制、适应问题、技术研发和转让,以及议定书的审评和遵约机制等。在此基础上,简要比较了圣保罗案文与巴西案文的不同特点,客观评价了圣保罗案文在政治阻力和技术难度上存在的内在缺陷。 相似文献
16.
Given the present commitment of the developed countries according to the Kyoto Protocol, most published scenarios demonstrate that global greenhouse gases concentrations would not be stabilized at any level. In order to stabilize these concentrations, a deeper global involvement is needed. Taking Israel as an example of a `recently-developed' country, we assess the role that such countries could play by assuming voluntary commitments in strengthening global involvement. This case as a model may encourage a global scheme for curbing carbon emissions, in which the more developed countries assume a stronger role and the less developed countries participate according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. The scheme builds on the inverse relation that exists between the per capita gross domestic product and the rate of increase of emissions due to economic growth. According to this theoretical scheme, the voluntary commitments assumed by the `recently-developed' countries encourage the more developed countries to deepen their involvement by assuming more stringent reductions of emissions at home and transferring technological and financial means to the less developed countries. The proposed scheme would enable non-Annex I countries, both `recently-developed' countries and less developed countries, to participate much earlier in the net mitigation of greenhouse gases. 相似文献
17.
We present and apply a simple bottom–up model for estimating non-energy use of fossil fuels and resulting CO2 (carbon dioxide) emissions. We apply this model for the year 2000: (1) to the world as a whole, (2) to the aggregate of Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries, and (3) to the ten non-Annex I countries with the highest consumption of fossil fuels for non-energy purposes. We find that worldwide non-energy use is equivalent to 1,670 ± 120 Mt (megatonnes) CO2 and leads to 700 ± 90 Mt CO2 emissions. Around 75% of non-energy use emissions is related to industrial processes. The remainder is attributed to the emission source categories of solvent and other product use, agriculture, and waste. Annex I countries account for 51% (360 ± 50 Mt CO2) and non-Annex I countries for 49% (340 ± 70 Mt CO2) of worldwide non-energy use emissions. Among non-Annex I countries, China is by far the largest emitter of non-energy use emissions (122 ± 18 Mt CO2). Our research deepens the understanding of non-energy use and related CO2 emissions in countries for which detailed emission inventories do not yet exist. Despite existing model uncertainties, we recommend NEAT-SIMP to inventory experts for preparing correct and complete non-energy use emission estimates for any country in the world. 相似文献
18.
A.C. Lesnikowski J.D. Ford L. Berrang-Ford M. Barrera P. Berry J. Henderson S.J. Heymann 《Global Environmental Change》2013,23(5):1153-1163
Our understanding of whether adaptive capacity on a national level is being translated into adaptation policies, programs, and projects is limited. Focusing on health adaptation in Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC, we examine whether statistically significant relationships exist between regulatory, institutional, financial, and normative aspects of national-level adaptive capacity and systematically measured adaptation. Specifically, we (i) quantify adaptation actions in Annex I nations, (ii) identify potential factors that might impact progress on adaptation and select measures for these factors, and (iii) calculate statistical relationships between factors and adaptation actions across countries. Statistically significant relationships are found between progress on adaptation and engagement in international environmental governance, national environmental governance, perception of corruption in the public sector, population size, and national wealth, as well as between responsiveness to health vulnerabilities, population size and national wealth. This analysis contributes two key early empirical findings to the growing literature concerning factors facilitating or constraining adaptation. While country size and wealth are necessary for driving higher levels of adaptation, they may be insufficient in the absence of policy commitments to environmental governance. Furthermore, governance and/or incentive frameworks for environmental governance at the national level may be an important indicator of the strength of national commitments to addressing health impacts of climate change. 相似文献
19.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(4):481-497
This paper presents a new sector-based framework — called the multi-sector convergence approach — for negotiating binding national GHG mitigation targets after the first budget period defined by the Kyoto Protocol (2008–2012). The major characteristics of this approach are that: (i) it is based on the distinction of different sectors within the national economy; (ii) it prescribes that, in principle, the amount of per capita emission assignments should ultimately converge to the same level for all countries; (iii) it accounts for differences in national circumstances by offering the opportunity to grant additional emission allowances to countries facing specific circumstances that justify higher emission assignments; and (iv) it offers a framework for negotiating mitigation commitments among parties of the UNFCCC, including a (gradual) participation of developing countries that pass a certain threshold level of per capita emissions. In addition to briefly discussing the underlying principles of promising proposals to differentiate future GHG mitigation commitments, the paper outlines the methodology and major characteristics of the multi-sector convergence (MSC) approach, followed by some numerical illustrations. The paper is concluded by a preliminary assessment of the MSC approach. 相似文献
20.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):481-497
Abstract This paper presents a new sector-based framework—called the multi-sector convergence approach—for negotiating binding national GHG mitigation targets after the first budget period defined by the Kyoto Protocol (2008–2012). The major characteristics of this approach are that: (i) it is based on the distinction of different sectors within the national economy; (ii) it prescribes that, in principle, the amount of per capita emission assignments should ultimately converge to the same level for all countries; (iii) it accounts for differences in national circumstances by offering the opportunity to grant additional emission allowances to countries facing specific circumstances that justify higher emission assignments; and (iv) it offers a framework for negotiating mitigation commitments among parties of the UNFCCC, including a (gradual) participation of developing countries that pass a certain threshold level of per capita emissions. In addition to briefly discussing the underlying principles of promising proposals to differentiate future GHG mitigation commitments, the paper outlines the methodology and major characteristics of the multi-sector convergence (MSC) approach, followed by some numerical illustrations. The paper is concluded by a preliminary assessment of the MSC approach. 相似文献