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1.
Not only is the carbon market inundated with Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) issued by successful projects, it is also littered with failed projects, that is, projects that either fail to be registered under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or projects that have been successfully registered but fail to issue CERs. By relying on a novel application of survival analysis in the context of the CDM, this article shows that half of all projects that start the Global Stakeholder Process fail to issue CERs, while the other half have a median time to market of four years. Furthermore, it is shown that some of the best projects, in terms of being additional, are those that are least likely to make it to market, whereas some of the worst projects, in terms of not being additional, are the ones that are most likely to make it to market. This presents a fundamental challenge for the CDM and future offset schemes that rely on the same design as the CDM. In contrast with previous studies, it is shown that, when project characteristics are controlled for, not all durations measured along the CDM project cycle have increased over time.

Policy relevance

This article develops a novel method for analysing durations measured along the CDM project cycle that avoids the biases of previous studies, and corrects for some misconceptions of what the delays faced by CDM projects are and how these delays have changed over time. Developing an understanding of the delays is important in order not to draw the wrong lessons from the CDM experience. As the leading example of an offset scheme, both in terms of geographical scope and sectoral coverage, and some would say institutional complexity, the CDM serves as a benchmark and reference for all future offset schemes, among others, for the New Market Mechanisms (NMMs) and the Chinese domestic offset programme. While the NMMs are still very much in development, China has announced that it will rely on the methodologies and procedures developed under the CDM for generating offsets for their regional carbon trading schemes.  相似文献   

2.
Technology transfer (TT) is not mandatory for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, yet proponents of CDM argue that TT in CDM can bring new technologies to developing countries and thus not only reduce emissions but also foster development. We review the quantitative literature on determinants of TT in CDM and estimate determinants for CDM projects in China. China is by far the largest host country of CDM projects and it is therefore crucial to understand the factors that drive TT there. To gain better interpretation, we focus on heterogeneity within a single country and results can thus be linked to specific policies of the country. Our probit estimations confirm previous international cross-country studies, indicating that larger projects and more advanced technologies are more likely to involve TT. In addition, we find evidence that agglomeration effects are more pronounced at the province level rather than larger regions. We also find a positive effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on TT, and academic research and development (R&D) is complementary to TT.

Policy relevance

Technology transfer (TT) is a goal of Chinese CDM legislation, but it is not a prerequisite for project approval. Our estimations show the project specific, technological and region-specific features that encourage more TT among CDM projects. Some variables analysed such as R&D spending and FDI (both are found to have positive effects on TT) can be, to some extent, influenced by the policy-makers. Moreover, we find some evidence for the presence of negative agglomeration effects on the provincial level: the likelihood of TT is decreasing in the number of previous projects operating in the same technology and province. This finding needs to be interpreted with great caution. It may suggest the existence of a learning externality, which could serve as a justification for policy intervention. Any policy intervention requires however careful analysis of potential positive or negative externalities resulting from the agglomeration of CDM projects and a comparison of possible benefits with the costs of TT.  相似文献   

3.
We can generate a net global GHG emission reduction from developing countries (in an UNFCCC term, non-Annex 1 Parties) without imposing targets on them, if we discount CERs generated from CDM projects. The CER discounting scheme means that a part or all of CDM credits, i.e., CERs, made by developing countries through unilateral CDM projects will be retired rather than sold to developed countries to increase their emissions. It is not feasible to impose certain forms of target (whether sectoral or intensity targets) on non-Annex 1 whose emission trend is hard to predict and whose industrial structure is undergoing a rapid change.

Instead of imposing targets (a command and control approach), we should apply market instruments in generating a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. Since April 2005 when the first unilateral CDM was approved by the CDM Executive Board, CDM has been functioning as a market mechanism to provide incentives for developing countries to initiate their own emission reduction projects. As CDM is the only market mechanism engaging developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, we should try to re-design CDM so that it can generate net global emission reductions by introducing the idea of discounting CERs. But in order to produce meaningful GHG emission reductions by discounting CERs, the project scope of CDM has to be expanded by relaxing project additionality criteria while maintaining strict technical additionality criteria. Agreeing on the CERs Discounting Scheme will have a better political chance than agreeing on imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries.  相似文献   

4.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been criticized in the literature for encouraging a focus on offset production (OP) at the expense of achieving or encouraging sustainable development (SD). It is argued that one explanation for this is that there is no commonly agreed definition of SD and, moreover, the priority of CDM project developers is often to produce cost-effective OP. Many of the proposals to address these drawbacks are not politically feasible. It is argued that the CDM should be split into a two-track mechanism, with one track for offset production and the other for offset production with an emphasis on sustainable development benefits. This would enable the political deadlock to be broken, allow the inclusion of SD benefits in the price mechanism itself, and allow both SD and OP objectives to be simultaneously achieved.

Policy relevance

The CDM has been criticized for failing to achieve its sustainable development objective, for verification problems regarding the mitigation effects of projects’ emissions, for being complex and bureaucratic, and for the very limited participation by the least developed countries. Given the adoption of a second period of the Kyoto Protocol and the discussion of new market mechanisms in the context of negotiating a new global climate agreement to be adopted in 2015, it is time to explore the ways in which the CDM might be reformed. A two-track version of the CDM is proposed, with one track focused on credit (offset) production and the other track focused on sustainable development. This system could improve the incentive for achieving sustainable development, reduce the uncertainty regarding whether real emissions reductions have been achieved, and be attractive to both developing and industrialized countries.  相似文献   

5.
Even though sustainable development has been broadly debated, the clean development mechanism (CDM) still lacks sophisticated multi-criteria decision methods for identifying, selecting and assessing CDM project activities from this perspective. Bearing in mind the huge number of CDM projects that are beginning to accumulate as the carbon market gains momentum, and the importance for non-Annex I Parties to keep focused on the sustainability objective, this article aims at developing a tool for prioritizing—within a given group, and once a specific list of sustainable development criteria is agreed upon and given—proposed CDM projects from this sustainable development point of view. We reached the following conclusions: (1) it is important to make a conscious choice of an appropriate way to normalize the sustainability performance data of CDM projects; (2) it is important to make a conscious choice of how to aggregate across multiple attributes; (3) in contrast with conventional multi-criteria assessments, which elicit preferences from a stakeholder panel, preference optimization infers from CDM projects' performance data an optimal set of weights that proponents would choose in order to win a competitive selection process. Such preference optimization methods (a) yield sensible results, simulating a range of decision circumstances, (b) avoid conflict and convey impartiality in situations where competing project proponents are likely to clash over objectionable weightings, (c) avoid cognitive overload when the number of CDM projects and/or indicators is overwhelmingly large, and (d) circumvent time-consuming and costly interviews and surveys.

From a policy perspective, the multi-criteria assessment described here can be a powerful tool for prioritizing CDM projects (1) when there is a limited amount of grant funding to certain CDM project candidates, and (2) when the decisionmaking process incorporates the CDM objective of promoting sustainable development, in addition to the objective of helping developed countries to meet part of their reduction obligations as specified in Annex I of the Protocol.  相似文献   

6.
Policy documents and academic literature suggest that Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) finance could complement traditional ‘energy access’ (EA) funding in developing countries, including the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Yet these propositions have not been empirically tested. This study helps fill this gap by examining constraints to CDM project passage through five stages of an idealized project development cycle (PDC) in Tanzania, and their implications for the ability of the CDM to contribute to financing energy access in LDCs. Twenty-five semi-structured interviews and documentary material were analysed using an analytical framework developed for systematic investigation of constraints. Institutional constraints such as the under-performance of Tanzania's Designated National Authority were the most often mentioned obstacles for project development. Yet non-institutional constraints such as limited energy sector mitigation potential, indigenous skill shortages, and low carbon market prices also hinder project development. Institutional constraints buttress, rather than supersede, pre-existing non-institutional constraints, and together they prevent energy projects from completing the PDC and accessing CDM finance. The number and severity of constraints suggest that the situation is unlikely to change rapidly, and that the CDM sustains and exacerbates existing global inequalities. Since traditional energy access funding is insufficient to address these inequalities, new funding and policy mechanisms are required.

Policy relevance

The CDM fails to fill the EA financing gap in Tanzania. This is also true for other LDCs where comparable project development challenges prevail. The CDM therefore appears to sustain uneven development patterns overlooking those most in need. Claims about its potential to enhance EA are misplaced, and the situation is unlikely to change rapidly. CDM and carbon market projects more widely will have limited ability to help financing EA in LDCs, even if the institutional setting within which they are implemented were reformed in the future. Yet traditional energy funding will be inadequate on its own. The debate over extending the CDM post-2017, when the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period expires, should be informed by honest appraisal of its merits and defects. Policy makers should revisit lessons provided by this article and wider research to help ensure that new EA mechanisms are not hampered by constraints and can benefit those most in need.  相似文献   


7.
Reducing carbon transaction costs in community-based forest management   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Abstract

The article considers the potential for community-based forest management (of existing forests) in developing countries, as a future CDM strategy, to sequester and mitigate carbon and to claim credits in future commitment periods. This kind of forestry is cost-effective, and should bring many more benefits to local populations than do afforestation and reforestation, thus contributing more strongly to sustainable development. However, community forest management projects are small-scale, and the transaction costs associated with justifying them as climate projects are likely to be high. A research project being carried out in five developing countries is testing carbon measurement and monitoring methods which can be carried out by community members with very little formal education, which should greatly reduce these transaction costs. Using hand-held computers with GIS capability and attached GPS, villagers with 4 years of primary education are able to accurately map their forest resource and input biomass data from sample plots into a program which calculates carbon values.  相似文献   

8.
Abstract

Economic studies suggest that market leakage rates of greenhouse gas abatement can reach the two-digit percentage range. Although the Marrakesh Accords require Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to account for leakage, most projects neglect market leakage. Insufficient leakage accounting is facilitated by a lack of applicable methods regarding the quantification and attribution of project-related leakage effects. This article proposes a method for attributing CDM-related market leakage effects to individual projects. To this purpose, alternative attribution methods are analysed. We find that project-specific approaches fail to take account of market leakage effects. Consequently, we propose to estimate aggregate market leakage effects and attribute them proportionally to individual projects. We suggest that predetermined commodity-specific leakage factors are applied by project developers to any emission reductions that are associated with a project's leakage-relevant demand or supply changes. This approach is conservative, equitable, incentive-compatible and applicable at manageable costs.  相似文献   

9.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):752-767
Policy-makers and scientists have raised concerns about the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in particular regarding its low contribution to sustainable development, unbalanced regional and sectoral distribution of projects, and its limited contribution to global emission reductions. Differentiation between countries or project types has been proposed as a possible way forward to address these problems. An overview is provided of the different ways in which CDM differentiation could be implemented. The implications for the actors involved in the CDM are analysed, along with a quantitative assessment of the impacts on the carbon market, using bottom-up marginal abatement cost curves. The discounting of CDM credits, quota systems, or differentiated eligibility of countries could help to address several of the concerns raised. Preferential treatment may also make a limited contribution to achieving the aims of CDM differentiation by increasing opportunities for under-represented host countries. The impact on the carbon market appears to be limited for most options.  相似文献   

10.
Abstract

This article provides a first-cut estimate of the potential impacts of the clean development mechanism (CDM) on electricity generation and carbon emissions in the power sector of non-Annex 1 countries. We construct four illustrative CDM regimes that represent a range of approaches under consideration within the climate community. We examine the impact of these CDM regimes on investments in new generation, under illustrative carbon trading prices of US$ 10 and 100/t C. In the cases that are most conducive to CDM activity, roughly 94% of new generation investments remains identical to the without-CDM situation, with only 6% shifting from higher to lower carbon intensity technologies.We estimate that the CDM would bolster renewable energy generation by as little as 15% at US$ 10/t C, or as much as 300% at US$ 100/t C.

A striking finding comes from our examination of the potential magnitude of the “free-rider” problem, i.e. crediting of activities that will occur even in the absence of the CDM. The CDM is intended to be globally carbon-neutral—a project reduces emissions in the host country but generates credits that increase emissions in the investor country. However, to the extent that unwarranted credits are awarded to non-additional projects, the CDM would increase global carbon emissions above the without-CDM emissions level. Under two of the CDM regimes considered, cumulative free-riders credits total 250–600 MtC through the end of the first budget period in 2012. This represents 10–23% of the likely OECD emissions reduction requirement during the first budget period. Since such a magnitude of free-rider credits from non-additional CDM projects could threaten the environmental integrity of the Kyoto protocol, it is imperative that policy makers devise CDM rules that encourage legitimate projects, while effectively screening out non-additional activities.  相似文献   

11.
Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have traditionally served as an indirect link between cap and trade systems around the world. However, since 2010, import restrictions have increased. Reasons for import limitations include the supplementarity principle, genuine concerns about the environmental integrity of CERs and social benefits of CDM projects, pressure from domestic emissions mitigation industries, concerns about competition in the industries in which reductions take place, as well as the attempt to pressure advanced developing countries to accept national emissions commitments under a future international climate policy regime. It is shown that import limitations lead to a decrease in CER prices and a race to generate CERs as quickly as possible. Such effects are visible in the CDM market after the EU announced its import limitations. The exclusion of CERs from specific project types will distort the CDM supply curve and increase the CER price unless the marginal abatement costs of the excluded project type are above the CER world market price. Similarly, exclusion of CERs from specific host countries will increase the price. Substantial differences are found in CER access to national carbon markets around the world.Policy relevanceCDM regulators could try to improve access of CERs to cap and trade schemes through improvements to additionality testing, standardizing baseline and monitoring methodologies and stakeholder consultation. However, regulators should be aware that standardization is no panacea, and controversies may resurface if standardized additionality determination (e.g. through benchmarks or positive lists) are applied for a certain period and found to be problematic. However, domestic policy concerns such as an unwillingness to send money abroad to buy credits, an inability to control market prices, and competitiveness impacts cannot be resolved by CDM reforms. If, despite such reforms of the CDM, blatant protectionism continues, a challenge before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be launched to stop discrimination of service exports from specific countries.  相似文献   

12.
This study empirically explores factors driving international technology transfer via Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects by explicitly considering factors that have been identified in the literature on international technology transfer as being relevant for transfer success. These factors include technological characteristics, such as the novelty and complexity of a technology, as well as the use of different transfer channels. Employing data from an original survey of CDM project participants, the econometric analysis also distinguishes between knowledge and equipment transfer. The findings suggest that more complex technologies and the use of export as a transfer channel are both associated with a higher degree of technology transfer. Projects involving two- to five-year-old technologies seem more likely to involve technology transfer than both younger and older technologies. Energy supply and efficiency projects are correlated with a higher degree of technology transfer than non-energy projects. Unlike previous studies, technology transfer was not related to project size, to the length of time a country has hosted CDM projects, or to the host country's absorptive capacity. The findings for knowledge and equipment transfer are similar, but not identical.

Policy relevance

CDM projects are often seen as a vehicle for the transfer of climate technologies from industrialized to developing countries. Technology transfer is an important element of the new and emerging market mechanisms and frameworks under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, such as the Technology Mechanism, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, or Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. Thus, a clearer understanding of the factors driving technology transfer may help policy makers in their design of such mechanisms. For the CDM, this may be achieved by including more stringent technology transfer requirements in countries’ CDM project approval processes. Based on our findings, such policies should focus particularly on energy supply and efficiency technologies. Likewise, it may be beneficial for host countries to condition project approval on the novelty and complexity of technologies and adjust these provisions over time. Since such technological characteristics are not captured systematically by project design documents, using a survey-based evaluation opens up new opportunities for a more holistic and targeted evaluation of technology transfer in CDM projects.  相似文献   


13.
The voluntary carbon market allows participants to go beyond regulatory carbon offsetting. Recent developments have improved the transparency and credibility of voluntary carbon trading, and forest carbon credit transactions constitute more than half of trade volume. Its workings, however, have not been sufficiently explored in the literature. This study analyses the characteristics of forest carbon credit transactions in the voluntary carbon market using frequency analysis and logistic regression analysis. The results reveal that the co-benefits of forest carbon projects are an important factor influencing carbon credit transactions. From the higher transaction ratio of credits from CCB Standards-labelled projects and projects using co-benefit-oriented standards, it can be inferred that credits with potential for co-benefits (e.g. fostered corporate social responsibility, social cohesion of local communities and voluntary leadership, and positive environmental impacts) are preferred to those focusing exclusively on emission reduction in the voluntary carbon market. The findings of this study suggest that developing co-benefits is important for strengthening the market competitiveness of forest carbon credits in the voluntary carbon market. Additionally, unlike the compliance carbon market, in the voluntary carbon market stringent carbon standards do not always guarantee credit transaction performance.

POLICY RELEVANCE

After UNFCCC COP-21, the global society agreed to acknowledge various forms of international carbon crediting mechanisms, and noted the significance of greenhouse gas emissions reduction for sustainable development and environmental integrity through the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the agreement encouraged both REDD+ activities in developing countries and supports from developed countries. Additionally, co-benefits of forest carbon projects are important for credit transaction in the global voluntary carbon market. Under the new climate regime, co-benefits of forest carbon projects are expected to gain attention in the carbon market. To promote the social, economic, and environmental co-benefits of forest carbon projects, the introduction of an objective co-benefit assessment and certification system should be reviewed at the national level.  相似文献   


14.
Monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) requirements in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are perceived to be of high quality, but also complex and stringent. Only one-third of the registered projects successfully managed initial verification and already received carbon credits. The time required to achieve first issuance remains high despite considerable improvements in other CDM project cycle steps. This leads to the question of whether MRV provisions in the CDM represent barriers that could be lowered while ensuring the CDM's integrity. The CDM requirements are compared with the MRV provisions of the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS). The comparison shows that CDM–MRV provisions are often stricter and less flexible compared to similar provisions in the EU ETS. Due to structural differences between the EU ETS and the CDM, some different MRV approaches are justified and reflect the CDM's disparate objectives and complexity. It is found that some CDM provisions result in barriers which seem avoidable and do not contribute to the CDM's environmental integrity. Recommendations are made for CDM-specific improvements and general structural changes to improve cost-efficiency and reduce uncertainty with relevance to policy developments around future market mechanisms.  相似文献   

15.
Abstract

Technology development and transfer is an important feature of both the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol. Although the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) does not have an explicit technology transfer mandate, it may contribute to technology transfer by financing emission reduction projects using technologies currently not available in the host countries. This article analyses the claims about technology transfer made by CDM project participants in their project design documents. Roughly one-third of all CDM projects, accounting for almost two-thirds of the annual emission reductions, involve technology transfer. Technology transfer varies widely across project types and is more common for larger projects and projects with foreign participants. Equipment transfer is more common for larger projects, while smaller projects involve transfers of both equipment and knowledge or of knowledge alone. Technology transfer does not appear to be closely related to country size or per-capita GDP, but a host country can influence the extent of technology transfer involved in its CDM projects.  相似文献   

16.
Land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities will play an important role in global climate change mitigation. Many carbon schemes require the delivery of both climate and rural development benefits by mitigation activities conducted in developing countries. Agroforestry is a LULUCF activity that is gaining attention because of its potential to deliver climate benefits as well as rural development benefits to smallholders. There is hope that agroforestry can deliver co-benefits for climate and development; however experience with early projects suggests co-benefits are difficult to achieve in practice. We review the literature on agroforestry, participatory rural development, tree-based carbon projects and co-benefit carbon projects to look at how recommended project characteristics align when trying to generate different types of benefits. We conclude that there is considerable tension inherent in designing co-benefit smallholder agroforestry projects. We suggest that designing projects to seek ancillary benefits rather than co-benefits may help to reduce this tension.  相似文献   

17.
International agricultural carbon market projects face significant challenges in delivering greenhouse gas mitigation objectives whilst also seeking to provide additional benefits for poverty alleviation. The carbon credit producer (the smallholder farmer) and carbon credit buyer in the carbon market transaction typically operate at different spatial and temporal scales. Buyers operate at a global scale, responding to opportunities for financial speculation and both private and public climate action plans. Farmers operate within households, farms, and immediate agricultural landscapes, pursuing livelihood and food security needs. These different scales often result in mismatches of timing, payment, and knowledge in market transactions and can be partially rectified by project developers who serve to broker the relationship between the farmers and the buyers. We examined eight East African agricultural carbon market projects to determine how project developers function as bridging organizations and minimize the mismatches between these actors. Results show that projects better bridged the timing and payment gap between buyers and producers when project developers provided non-monetary benefits or direct monetary assistance to farmers. However, knowledge gaps remained a significant barrier for farmers wishing to participate in the market. We discuss how project developers brokered relationships in ways that reflected their interests and highlight the limitations, trade-offs, and challenges that must be overcome if win-win outcomes of poverty alleviation and climate change mitigation are to be realized.  相似文献   

18.
The prospects of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and for carbon income, up to and beyond 2012, in the industrial sectors of Iran and five other Asian countries are investigated. The attractiveness and suitability of each host country, the status of their industrial sectors (based on four post-2012 scenarios), and the post-2012 potential of the CDM (or similar carbon projects) in these sectors are all examined. A multi-criteria analysis of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, China, and India, based on seven sets of criteria (institutional, regulatory, economic, political, social, CDM experience, and energy production/consumption), is conducted, and the post-2012 potential carbon incomes of each country – based on CO2e emissions of industrial processes – are calculated. Finally, the Iranian industrial sector and the impact of deregulation of energy prices are examined. The post-2012 potential savings in the Iranian industrial sector are calculated based on energy savings, carbon income, and environmental savings. The results indicate that there is strong demand for investment and new technology in this sector to combat several-fold energy price increases. Moreover, high-priced carbon credits could play a meaningful role in post-2012 energy policies in this sector.

Policy relevance

This research is the first study to quantify the carbon market potentials in the industrial sectors of the selected Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members. The Kyoto Protocol is considered by most OPEC countries to be a mixed bag of threats and opportunities and they have shown ambivalence towards it, mainly due to the threat a reduction of fossil fuel consumption poses to their economies. On the other hand, energy efficiency is a desirable goal for their industrial sectors. Iran, as an OPEC member country with vast energy resources, has mostly ignored the CDM during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and has performed poorly on CDM implementation. However, the current deregulation of energy prices in Iran, with profound cuts in energy subsidies, would definitely alter the perspective of its industrial decision makers on the post-2012 carbon potentials.  相似文献   

19.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):62-74
What is the potential for developing small-scale CDM projects in India to reduce enteric methane emissions from cattle and buffaloes? The issue of baseline setting for prospective CDM projects is a complex one in the Indian context. The baselines constructed on the basis of aggregate emission rates at the national level are unlikely to be precise as methane emission rates are influenced by the livestock and feed characteristics, which vary widely across regions in an agro-climatically diverse country like India. This calls for establishing a project specific baseline underpinned with regional methane emission rates. The various aspects of sustainable development that merit consideration in formulating a CDM project in the Indian dairy sector include; increasing the productivity of animals, increasing the net income of producers, decreasing the cost of milk production and the transfer of safe technologies. The projects in the sector would be able to meet the ‘additionality’ conditions of the CDM. However, there are a number of constraints in implementing the enteric methane mitigation strategies through a CDM project at the field level. The article discusses these technical, financial, socio-cultural and institutional barriers along with possible responses to these constraints.  相似文献   

20.
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project developers have long complained about the complexities of project-specific baseline setting and the vagaries of additionality determination. In response to this, the CDM Executive Board took bold steps towards the standardization of CDM methodologies, culminating in the approval of guidelines for the establishment of performance standards in November 2011. The guidelines specify a performance standard stringency level for both baseline and additionality of 80% for several priority sectors and 90% for all other sectors. However, an analysis of 14 large-scale CDM methodologies that use performance standard approaches challenges this top-down approach to the performance standard design. An appropriate performance standard stringency level strongly depends on sector and technology characteristics. A single stringency level for baseline and additionality determination is appropriate only for greenfield projects, but not for retrofit ones. Overly simple, highly aggregated performance standards are unlikely to ensure high environmental integrity, and difficult questions regarding stringency and updating frequency will eventually have to be addressed on a rather disaggregated level. A careful balance between data requirements and the practicability of performance standards is essential because the heavy data requirements of the existing performance standard methodologies have been the key barrier to their actual implementation.

Policy relevance

CDM regulators have been pushed by many stakeholders to standardize baseline setting and eliminate project-specific additionality determination. At first glance, performance standards seem to provide the perfect solution for both tasks. However, a one-size-fits-all political decision – e.g. the average of the top 20% performers as enshrined in the Marrakech Accords – is inappropriate. Substantial disaggregation of performance standards is required both technologically and geographically in order to limit over- and under-crediting and close loopholes for non-additional projects. As a lack of reliable and complete data has been and will be a key bottleneck for the development of performance standards, international support for data collection will be indispensable, but costly, and time-consuming. Empirically driven, techno-economic assessments of performance standard stringency levels must be the central task of the future work on standardized methodologies, and should not be sidelined by perceived needs of policy makers to take bold decisions under time pressures.  相似文献   

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