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Summary Short-period vertical-componentP-wave spectra of seven presumed Semipalatinsk underground nuclear explosions, recorded by the Swedish seismic station network, are investigated. The events considered have closely spaced foci and cover the magnitude range fromm b=5.5 tom b=6.6. Spectra of six of these explosions show pronounced minima, varying from about 1.5 to 1.8 cps, which could be explained as principle minima due toP-pP interference. Supposing a nearsurfaceP-wave velocity at the test area of 4 km/sec, the shot depths are estimated to vary roughly from 750 to 1350 m. In order to obtain an estimate of the yield, the observed spectra are compared withHaskell's theoretical source spectra. For four events, relative yield estimates fit well the predicted values for explosions fired in a granitic medium. The behaviour of the remaining three explosions is discussed in detail.  相似文献   

3.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a global ban on nuclear explosions, is currently in a ratification phase. Under the CTBT, an International Monitoring System (IMS) of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasonic and radionuclide sensors is operational, and the data from the IMS is analysed by the International Data Centre (IDC). The IDC provides CTBT signatories basic seismic event parameters and a screening analysis indicating whether an event exhibits explosion characteristics (for example, shallow depth). An important component of the screening analysis is a statistical test of the null hypothesis H 0: explosion characteristics using empirical measurements of seismic energy (magnitudes). The established magnitude used for event size is the body-wave magnitude (denoted m b) computed from the initial segment of a seismic waveform. IDC screening analysis is applied to events with m b greater than 3.5. The Rayleigh wave magnitude (denoted M S) is a measure of later arriving surface wave energy. Magnitudes are measurements of seismic energy that include adjustments (physical correction model) for path and distance effects between event and station. Relative to m b, earthquakes generally have a larger M S magnitude than explosions. This article proposes a hypothesis test (screening analysis) using M S and m b that expressly accounts for physical correction model inadequacy in the standard error of the test statistic. With this hypothesis test formulation, the 2009 Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea announced nuclear weapon test fails to reject the null hypothesis H 0: explosion characteristics.  相似文献   

4.
—?Some of the most suspicious seismic disturbances under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are likely to be those associated with mining, as they are shallow, and at least some have an explosion-like m b :M s signature. Previous research highlighted the potential of broadband teleseismic P waves as a way of identifying large mine tremors. Broadband teleseismic P from two suspected large mine collapses, one in Germany (1302 UT, 13 March 1989, 5.4?m b ) and another in Wyoming (1526 UT, 3 February 1995, 5.3?m b ), show differences in character despite the similarity of the reported ground failure and mine types. We apply a full moment-tensor analysis to the teleseismic P waves and show that the data are inconsistent with either a shallow explosion or an earthquake (double-couple) at depth, but this method is unable to distinguish between a shallow dip-slip source and a closing-crack moment tensor. However, three-component surface-wave seismograms recorded at regional distances fit the shallow closing-crack model, but are inconsistent with a shallow earthquake source, because strong Love waves, expected from a double-couple source, are not observed at a number of stations well distributed in azimuth. Here, we restate the equivalence for shallow sources of the closing-crack model and a gravitational collapse model. We use the latter to model the broadband P waves from these mine tremors and show that, while non-unique, the differences in the observed broadband P waves from the two tremors can be attributed to the area, amount of collapse, depth, and rate of collapse. The collapse model predicts negative first-motion for all P waves in contrast to the positive polarity expected from explosions. Thus, the broadband teleseismic P waves have the potential to discriminate between large collapses and explosions.  相似文献   

5.
We estimated the network-averaged mantle attenuation t*(total) of 0.5 s beneath the North Korea test site (NKTS) by use of P-wave spectra and normalized spectral stacks from the 25 May 2009 declared nuclear test (mb 4.5; IDC). This value was checked using P-waves from seven deep (580–600 km) earthquakes (4.8 < M w < 5.5) in the Jilin-Heilongjiang, China region that borders with Russia and North Korea. These earthquakes are 200–300 km from the NKTS, within 200 km of the Global Seismic Network seismic station in Mudanjiang, China (MDJ) and the International Monitoring System primary arrays at Ussuriysk, Russia (USRK) and Wonju, Republic of Korea (KSRS). With the deep earthquakes, we split the t*(total) ray path into two segments: a t*(u), that represents the attenuation of the up-going ray from the deep hypocenters to the local-regional receivers, and t*(d), that represents the attenuation along the down-going ray to teleseismic receivers. The sum of t*(u) and t*(d) should be equal to t*(total), because they both share coincident ray paths. We estimated the upper-mantle attenuation t*(u) of 0.1 s at stations MDJ, USRK, and KSRS from individual and stacks of normalized P-wave spectra. We then estimated the average lower-mantle attenuation t*(d) of 0.4 s using stacked teleseismic P-wave spectra. We finally estimated a network average t*(total) of 0.5 s from the stacked teleseismic P-wave spectra from the 2009 nuclear test, which confirms the equality with the sum of t*(u) and t*(d). We included constraints on seismic moment, depth, and radiation pattern by using results from a moment tensor analysis and corner frequencies from modeling of P-wave spectra recorded at local distances. We also avoided finite-faulting effects by excluding earthquakes with complex source time functions. We assumed ω2 source models for earthquakes and explosions. The mantle attenuation beneath the NKTS is clearly different when compared with the network-averaged t* of 0.75 s for the western US and is similar to values of approximately 0.5 s for the Semipalatinsk test site within the 0.5–2 Hz range.  相似文献   

6.
—?A comparison of regional and teleseismic log rms (root-mean-square) L g amplitude measurements have been made for 14 underground nuclear explosions from the East Kazakh test site recorded both by the BRV (Borovoye) station in Kazakhstan and the GRF (Gräfenberg) array in Germany. The log rms L g amplitudes observed at the BRV regional station at a distance of 690?km and at the teleseismic GRF array at a distance exceeding 4700?km show very similar relative values (standard deviation 0.048 magnitude units) for underground explosions of different sizes at the Shagan River test site. This result as well as the comparison of BRV rms L g magnitudes (which were calculated from the log rms amplitudes using an appropriate calibration) with magnitude determinations for P waves of global seismic networks (standard deviation 0.054 magnitude units) point to a high precision in estimating the relative source sizes of explosions from L g-based single station data. Similar results were also obtained by other investigators (Patton, 1988; Ringdal et?al., 1992) using L g data from different stations at different distances.¶Additionally, GRF log rms L g and P-coda amplitude measurements were made for a larger data set from Novaya Zemlya and East Kazakh explosions, which were supplemented with m b (L g) amplitude measurements using a modified version of Nuttli's (1973, 1986a) method. From this test of the relative performance of the three different magnitude scales, it was found that the L g and P-coda based magnitudes performed equally well, whereas the modified Nuttli m b (L g) magnitudes show greater scatter when compared to the worldwide m b reference magnitudes. Whether this result indicates that the rms amplitude measurements are superior to the zero-to-peak amplitude measurement of a single cycle used for the modified Nuttli method, however, cannot be finally assessed, since the calculated m b (L g) magnitudes are only preliminary until appropriate attenuation corrections are available for the specific path to GRF.  相似文献   

7.
The problem of discriminating between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions is formulated as a problem in pattern recognition. As such it may be separated into two stages, feature extraction and classification. The short-period (SP) features consist of mb and autoregressive parameters characterising the preceding noise, signal and coda. The long-period (LP) features consist of LP power spectral estimates taken within various group velocity windows. Contrary to common usage we have extracted features from horizontal Rayleigh waves and Love waves as well as vertical Rayleigh waves. The classification is performed by approximating the statistical distribution of earthquake and explosion feature vectors by multivariate normal distributions.The method has been tested on a data base containing 52 explosions and 73 earthquakes from Eurasia recorded at NORSAR between 1971 and 1975. Several of these events are difficult on the mb : Ms diagram [mb(PDE) and Ms (NORSAR) have been used]. The data set was divided into a learning and an independent data set. All of the events both from the learning data set and the independent data set were correctly classified using the new procedures. Furthermore, the increase in separation as compared to the mb : Ms discriminant is significant.  相似文献   

8.
v--vThis second paper (Part 2) pertaining to optimized site-specific threshold monitoring addresses the application of the method to regions covered by a teleseismic or a combined regional-teleseismic network. In the first paper (Part 1) we developed the method for the general case, and demonstrated its application to an area well-covered by a regional network (the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site). In the present paper, we apply the method to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear test sites, and show results during the periods of nuclear testing by these two countries in May 1998. Since the coverage by regional stations in these areas is poor, an optimized approach requires the use of selected, high-quality stations at teleseismic distances.¶To optimize the threshold monitoring of these test sites, we use as calibration events either one of the nuclear explosions or a nearby earthquake. From analysis of the calibration events we derive values for array beamforming steering delays, filter bands, short-term averages (STA) lengths, phase travel times (P waves), and amplitude-magnitude relationships for each station. By applying these parameters, we obtain a monitoring capability of both test sites ranging from mb 2.8-3.0 using teleseismic stations only. When including the nearby Nilore station to monitor the Indian tests, we show that the threshold can be reduced by about 0.4 magnitude units. In particular, we demonstrate that the Indian tests on 13 May, 1998, which were not detected by any known seismic station, must have corresponded to a magnitude (mb) of less than 2.4.¶We also discuss the effect of a nearby aftershock sequence on the monitoring capability for the Pakistani test sites. Such an aftershock sequence occurred in fact on the day of the last Pakistani test (30 May, 1998), following a large (mb 5.5) earthquake in Afghanistan located about 1100 km from the test site. We show that the threshold monitoring technique has sufficient resolution to suppress the signals from these interfering aftershocks without significantly affecting the true peak of the nuclear explosion on the threshold trace.  相似文献   

9.
Forensic seismology revisited   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
The first technical discussions, held in 1958, on methods of verifying compliance with a treaty banning nuclear explosions, concluded that a monitoring system could be set up to detect and identify such explosions anywhere except underground: the difficulty with underground explosions was that there would be some earthquakes that could not be distinguished from an explosion. The development of adequate ways of discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions proved to be difficult so that only in 1996 was a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) finally negotiated. Some of the important improvements in the detection and identification of underground tests—that is in forensic seismology—have been made by the UK through a research group at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). The paper describes some of the advances made in identification since 1958, particularly by the AWE Group, and the main features of the International Monitoring System (IMS), being set up to verify the Test Ban. Once the Treaty enters into force, then should a suspicious disturbance be detected the State under suspicion of testing will have to demonstrate that the disturbance was not a test. If this cannot be done satisfactorily the Treaty has provisions for on-site inspections (OSIs): for a suspicious seismic disturbance for example, an international team of inspectors will search the area around the estimated epicentre of the disturbance for evidence that a nuclear test really took place. Early observations made at epicentral distances out to 2,000 km from the Nevada Test Site showed that there is little to distinguish explosion seismograms from those of nearby earthquakes: for both source types the short-period (SP: ∼1 Hz) seismograms are complex showing multiple arrivals. At long range, say 3,000–10,000 km, loosely called teleseismic distances, the AWE Group noted that SP P waves—the most widely and well-recorded waves from underground explosions—were in contrast simple, comprising one or two cycles of large amplitude followed by a low-amplitude coda. Earthquake signals on the other hand were often complex with numerous arrivals of similar amplitude spread over 35 s or more. It therefore appeared that earthquakes could be recognised on complexity. Later however, complex explosion signals were observed which reduced the apparent effectiveness of complexity as a criterion for identifying earthquakes. Nevertheless, the AWE Group concluded that for many paths to teleseismic distances, Earth is transparent for P signals and this provides a window through which source differences will be most clearly seen. Much of the research by the Group has focused on understanding the influence of source type on P seismograms recorded at teleseismic distances. Consequently the paper concentrates on teleseismic methods of distinguishing between explosions and earthquakes. One of the most robust criteria for discriminating between earthquakes and explosions is the m b : M s criterion which compares the amplitudes of the SP P waves as measured by the body-wave magnitude m b, and the long-period (LP: ∼0.05 Hz) Rayleigh-wave amplitude as measured by the surface-wave magnitude M s; the P and Rayleigh waves being the main wave types used in forensic seismology. For a given M s, the m b for explosions is larger than for most earthquakes. The criterion is difficult to apply however, at low magnitude (say m b < 4.5) and there are exceptions—earthquakes that look like explosions. A difficulty with identification criteria developed in the early days of forensic seismology was that they were in the main empirical—it was not known why they appeared to work and if there were test sites or earthquakes where they would fail. Consequently the AWE Group in cooperation with the University of Cambridge used seismogram modelling to try and understand what controls complexity of SP P seismograms, and to put the m b : M s criterion on a theoretical basis. The results of this work show that the m b : M s criterion is robust because several factors contribute to the separation of earthquakes and explosions. The principal reason for the separation however, is that for many orientations of the earthquake source there is at least one P nodal plane in the teleseismic window and this biases m b low. Only for earthquakes with near 45° dip-slip mechanisms where the antinode of P is in the source window is the m b:M s criterion predicted to fail. The results from modelling are consistent with observation—in particular there are earthquakes, “anomalous events”, which look explosion-like on the m b:M s criterion, that turn out to have mechanisms close to 45° dip-slip. Fortunately the P seismograms from such earthquakes usually show pP and sP, the reflections from the free surface of P and S waves radiated upwards. From the pP–P and sP–P times the focal depth can be estimated. So far the estimated depth of the anomalous events have turned out to be ∼20 km, too deep to be explosions. Studies show that the observation that P seismograms are more complex than predicted by simple models can be explained on the weak-signal hypothesis: the standard phases, direct P and the surface reflections, are weak because of amongst other things, the effects of the radiation pattern or obstacles on the source-to-receiver path; other non-standard arrivals then appear relatively large on the seismograms. What has come out of the modelling of P seismograms is a criterion for recognising suspicious disturbances based on simplicity rather than complexity. Simple P seismograms for earthquakes at depths of more than a few kilometres are likely to be radiated only to stations that lie in a confined range of azimuths and distances. If then, simple seismograms are recorded over a wide range of distances and particularly azimuths, it is unlikely the source is an earthquake at depth. It is possible to test this using the relative amplitudes of direct P and later arrivals that might be surface reflections. The procedure is to use only the simple P seismograms on the assumption that whereas the propagation through Earth may make a signal more complex it is unlikely to make it simpler. From the amplitude of the coda of these seismograms, bounds can be placed on the size of possible pP and sP. The relative-amplitude method is then used to search for orientations of the earthquake source that are compatible with the observations. If no such orientations are found the source must be shallow so that any surface reflections merge with direct P, and hence could be an explosion. The IMS when completed will be a global network of 321 monitoring stations, including 170 seismological stations principally to detect the seismic waves from earthquakes and underground explosions. The IMS will also have stations with hydrophones, microbarographs and radionuclide detectors to detect explosions in the oceans and the atmosphere and any isotopes in the air characteristic of a nuclear test. The Global Communications Infrastructure provides communications between the IMS stations and the International Data Centre (IDC), Vienna, where the recordings from the monitoring stations is collected, collated, and analysed. The IDC issues bulletins listing geophysical disturbances, to States Signatories to the CTBT. The assessment of the disturbances to decide whether any are possible explosions, is a task for State Signatories. For each Signatory to do a detailed analysis of all disturbances would be expensive and time consuming. Fortunately many disturbances can be readily identified as earthquakes and removed from consideration—a process referred to as “event screening”. For example, many earthquakes with epicentres over the oceans can be distinguished from underwater explosions, because an explosion signal is of much higher frequency than that of earthquakes that occur below the ocean bed. Further, many earthquakes could clearly be identified at the IDC on the m b : M s criterion, but there is a difficulty—how to set the decision line. The possibility has to be very small that an explosion will be classed by mistake, as an earthquake. The decision line has therefore to be set conservatively, consequently with routine application of current screening criteria, only about 50% of earthquakes can be positively identified as such. Various methods have been proposed whereby a “determined violator” could avoid the provisions of a CTBT and carry out a test that would be either undetected or detected but not identified as an explosion. The increase in complexity and cost of such a test should discourage any State from attempting it. In addition, there is always the possibility of some stations detecting the test, the test being identified as suspicious, and so subject to an OSI. With time as the IMS becomes more efficient and effective it will act increasingly to deter anyone contemplating a clandestine test, from going ahead. What has emerged is several robust criteria. The criteria include: location, which when combined with hydro-acoustic data can identify earthquakes under the sea; m b : M s; and depth of focus. More detailed study is required of any remaining seismic disturbance that is regarded as suspicious: for example, is close to a site where nuclear tests have been carried out in the past. Any disturbance that is shown to be explosion-like, may be the subject of an OSI. One surprise is how little plate tectonics has contributed to resolving problems in forensic seismology. Much of the evidence for plate tectonics comes from seismological studies so it would be expected that the implications for Earth structure arising from forensic seismology would be consistent with plate-tectonic models. So far the AWE Group have found little synergy between plate tectonics and forensic seismology. It is to be hoped that the large volume of seismological data of high quality now being collected by the IMS and the increasing number of digital stations, will result in a revised Earth model that is consistent with the findings of forensic seismology, so that a future review of progress will show that the forensic seismologist can draw on this model in attempting to interpret apparently anomalous seismograms.
A. DouglasEmail:
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10.
Seismic data recorded at the broad-band teleseismic GRF array and theshort-period regional GERESS array, which is a designated IMS primarystation, are analyzed to determine the effectiveness of teleseismic P-wave complexity for the purpose of seismic event screening within theframework of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification. For theGRF array, seismic waveform data from nearly 200 nuclear explosions havebeen recorded since its installation in the late 1970's, which were studiedalong with several thousand earthquakes from the last few years.Additionally, we investigated teleseismic P wave complexity for a similarnumber of earthquakes recorded at GERESS. However, owing to itsoperation starting in 1991, only a limited number of nuclear explosionseismograms are available for study.For nuclear explosions, complexity does not exceed levels of 0.3 except fora number of events from the Nevada Test Site recorded only at the GRFarray and located at a large distance where PcP may interfere with the initialP wavelet. Since all events with complexity at GRF larger than 0.3 areexclusively located on Pahute Mesa within the Nevada Test Site,near-source geology or topography must play a dominant role for theseincreased complexity values, while PcP may not contribute significantly tothe high-frequency energy measured by the complexity parameter.Although many earthquakes show complexities below this level, for morethan 25% of the earthquakes investigated the complexities determined arelarger than 0.7, thus showing distinctly larger values than nuclearexplosions. Therefore, this percentage may be screened as earthquakes fromall seismic events detected. As currently only about half of the eventsdetected by the global IMS network are screened out based on focal depthand the m b :M s criterion, teleseismic P-wavecomplexity may contribute significantly to the task of seismic eventscreening.  相似文献   

11.
—?Data sets of m b (Pn) and m b (Lg) measurements are presented for three continental regions in order to investigate scaling relationships with moment magnitude M w and event discrimination at small magnitudes. Compilations of published measurements are provided for eastern North American and central Asian earthquakes, and new measurements are reported for earthquakes located in western United States. Statistical tests on M w :m b relationships show that the m b (Lg) scale of Nuttli (1973) is transportable between tectonic regions, and a single, unified M w :m b (Lg) relationship satisfies observations for M w ~4.2–6.5 in all regions. A unified relationship is also developed for nuclear explosions detonated at the Nevada Test Site and test sites of the former Soviet Union. Regional m b for explosions scale at higher rates than for earthquakes, and of significance is the finding that m b (Pn) for explosions scales at a higher rate than m b (Lg). A model is proposed where differences in scaling rates are related to effects of spectral overshoot and near-field Rg scattering on the generation of Pn and Lg waves by explosions. For earthquakes, m b (Pn) and m b (Lg) scale similarly, showing rates near 1.0 or 2/3?·?log10 M o (seismic moment).¶M w :m b (Lg) scaling results are converted to unified M s :m b (Lg) relationships using scaling laws between log M o and M s . For earthquakes with M s greater than 3.0, the scaling rate is 0.69?·?M s , which is the same as it is for nuclear explosions if M s is proportional to 1.12?·?log M o, as determined by NTS observations. Thus, earthquake and explosion populations are parallel and separated by 0.68 m b units for large events. For small events (M s ?M s :m b (Lg) plots for stable and tectonic regions, respectively. While the scaling rate for explosions is ~0.69, this value is uncertain due to paucity of M o observations at small yields. Measurements of [m b (P)???m b (Lg)] for earthquakes in the western United States have an average value of ?0.33?±?.03 m b units, in good agreement with Nuttli's estimate of m b bias for NTS. This result suggests that Nuttli's method for estimating test site bias can be extended to earthquakes to make estimates of bias on regional scales. In addition, a new approach for quick assessments of regional bias is proposed where M s :m b (P) observations are compared with M s :m b (Lg) relationships. Catalog M s :m b (P) data suggest that m b bias is significant for tectonic regions of southern Asia, averaging about ?0.4 m b units.  相似文献   

12.
—?We test how well low-magnitude (m bLg 1.8 to 2.6), 25-ton chemical explosions at Balapan, Kazakhstan, can be located using IMS stations and standard earth models, relying on precisely determined relative arrival times of nearly similar, regional and teleseismic waveforms. Three 1997 Balapan explosions were recorded by a number of currently reporting and surrogate IMS stations. Three regional stations and two teleseismic arrays yielded consistent waveforms appropriate for relative picking. Master-event locations based on the AK135 model and ground-truth information from the first, shallowest and best-recorded explosion, fell under 1 km from known locations, for depths constrained to that of the master event. The resulting 90% confidence ellipses covered 12–13?km2 and contained the true locations; however, results for depth constrained to true depth were slightly less satisf actory. From predictions based on ground truth, we found a P g -coda phase at Makanchi, Kazakhstan to be misidentified and poorly modeled. After accounting for this, 90% ellipses shrank to 2–3?km2 and true-depth mislocation vectors became more consistent with confidence-ellipse orientations. These results suggest that a high level of precision could be provided by a tripartite array of calibration shots in cases where models are poorly known. We hope that the successful relocation of these small Balapan shots will support the role of calibration explosions in verification monitoring and special event studies, including on-site inspection.  相似文献   

13.
Summary Short-period vertical-componentP-wave spectra have been determined for twelve Nevada underground nuclear explosions recorded by the Swedish seismic station network. Selected events cover the magnitude range fromm b =5.9 tom b =7.0 and the shot-depth range from 460 m to 1400 m. All explosion spectra show pronounced minima near 1 sec period. Within individual test areas the period at which the minimum occurs increases systematically with increasing shot-depth. This dependence makes it possible to interpret the observed minima in terms of interference betweenP- andpP-waves. One atmospheric explosion from Novaya Zemlya is analyzed to verify the inferred minima intrpretation.The minimum-period shows also a systematic linear dependence upon the magnitude. However, the physical explanation for this dependence is not evident and it may just be a consequence of a magnitude-depth relation.On leave from the Geophysical Institute, Czechosl. Acad. Sci., Prague 4-Spoilov, Boni II.  相似文献   

14.
—?A statistical procedure is described for estimating the yields of underground nuclear tests at the former Soviet Semipalatinsk test site using the peak amplitudes of short-period surface waves observed at near-regional distances (Δ < 150 km) from these explosions. This methodology is then applied to data recorded from a large sample of the Semipalatinsk explosions, including the Soviet JVE explosion of September 14, 1988, and it is demonstrated that it provides seismic estimates of explosion yield which are typically within 20% of the yields determined for these same explosions using more accurate, non-seismic techniques based on near-source observations.  相似文献   

15.
We re-examine the utility of teleseismic seismic complexity discriminants in a multivariate setting using United Kingdom array data. We measure a complexity discriminant taken on array beams by simply taking the logarithm of the ratio of the P-wave coda signal to that of the first arriving direct P wave (βCF). The single station complexity discriminant shows marginal performance with shallow earthquakes having more complex signatures than those from explosions or deep earthquakes. Inclusion of secondary phases in the coda window can also degrade performance. However, performance improves markedly when two-station complexity discriminants are formed showing false alarm rates similar to those observed for network mbMs. This suggests that multistation complexity discriminants may ameliorate some of the problems associated with mbMs discrimination at lower magnitudes. Additionally, when complexity discriminants are combined with mbMs there is a tendency for explosions, shallow earthquakes and deep earthquakes to form three distinct populations. Thus, complexity discriminants may follow a logic that is similar to mbMs in terms of the separation of shallow earthquakes from nuclear explosions, although the underlying physics of the two discriminants is significantly different.  相似文献   

16.
—?Experimental seismic event-screening capabilities are described, based on the difference of body-and surface-wave magnitudes (denoted as M s :m b ) and event depth. These capabilities have been implemented and tested at the prototype International Data Center (PIDC), based on recommendations by the IDC Technical Experts on Event Screening in June 1998. Screening scores are presented that indicate numerically the degree to which an event meets, or does not meet, the M s :m b and depth screening criteria. Seismic events are also categorized as onshore, offshore, or mixed, based on their 90% location error ellipses and an onshore/offshore grid with five-minute resolution, although this analysis is not used at this time to screen out events.¶Results are presented of applications to almost 42,000 events with m b ?≥?3.5 in the PIDC Standard Event Bulletin (SEB) and to 121 underground nuclear explosions (UNE's) at the U.S. Nevada Test Site (NTS), the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya test sites in the Former Soviet Union, the Lop Nor test site in China, and the Indian, Pakistan, and French Polynesian test sites. The screening criteria appear to be quite conservative. None of the known UNE's are screened out, while about 41 percent of the presumed earthquakes in the SEB with m b ?≥?3.5 are screened out. UNE's at the Lop Nor, Indian, and Pakistan test sites on 8 June 1996, 11 May 1998, and 28 May 1998, respectively, have among the lowest M s :m b scores of all events in the SEB.¶To assess the validity of the depth screening results, comparisons are presented of SEB depth solutions to those in other bulletins that are presumed to be reliable and independent. Using over 1600 events, the comparisons indicate that the SEB depth confidence intervals are consistent with or shallower than over 99.8 percent of the corresponding depth estimates in the other bulletins. Concluding remarks are provided regarding the performance of the experimental event-screening criteria, and plans for future improvements, based on recent recommendations by the IDC Technical Experts on Event Screening in May 1999.  相似文献   

17.
Seismic Source Characteristics of Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosions   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
—?During the period 1965 to 1988, the former Soviet Union (FSU) conducted over 120 peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) at locations widely dispersed throughout the territories of the FSU. These explosions sample a much wider range of source conditions than do the historical explosions at the known nuclear test sites and, therefore, seismic data recorded from these PNE tests provide a unique resource for use in deriving improved quantitative bounds on the ranges of seismic signal characteristics which may require consideration in global monitoring of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In this paper we summarize the results of a detailed statistical analysis of broadband seismic data recorded at the Borovoye Geophysical Observatory from 21 of these PNE tests at regional distances extending from about 7 to 19 degrees, as well as the results of theoretical waveform simulation analyses of near-regional (Δ?相似文献   

18.
Seismic source characteristics of low-yield (0.5–5 kt) underground explosions are inferred from hydrodynamic simulations using a granite material model on high-performance (parallel) computers. We use a non-linear rheological model for granite calibrated to historical near-field nuclear test data. Equivalent elastic P-wave source spectra are derived from the simulated hydrodynamic response using reduced velocity potentials. Source spectra and parameters are compared with the models of Mueller and Murphy (Bull Seism Soc Am 61:1675–1692, 1971, hereafter MM71) and Denny and Johnson (Explosion source phenomenology, pp 1–24, 1991, hereafter DJ91). The source spectra inferred from the simulations of different yields at normal scaled depth-of-burial (SDOB) match the MM71 spectra reasonably well. For normally buried nuclear explosions, seismic moments are larger for the hydrodynamic simulations than MM71 (by 25 %) and for DJ91 (by over a factor of 2), however, the scaling of moment with yield across this low-yield range is consistent for our calculations and the two models. Spectra from our simulations show higher corner frequencies at the lower end of the 0.5–5.0 kt yield range and stronger variation with yield than the MM71 and DJ91 models predict. The spectra from our simulations have additional energy above the corner frequency, probably related to non-linear near-source effects, but at high frequencies the spectral slopes agree with the f ?2 predictions of MM71. Simulations of nuclear explosions for a range of SDOB from 0.5 to 3.9 show stronger variations in the seismic moment than predicted by the MM71 and DJ91 models. Chemical explosions are found to generate higher moments by a factor of about two compared to nuclear explosions of the same yield in granite and at normal depth-of-burial, broadly consistent with comparisons of nuclear and chemical shots at the US Nevada Test Site (Denny, Proceeding of symposium on the non-proliferation experiment, Rockville, Maryland, 1994). For all buried explosions, the region of permanent deformation and material damage is not spherical but extends along the free surface above and away from the source. The effect of damage induced by a normally buried nuclear explosion on seismic radiation is explored by comparing the motions from hydrodynamic simulations with those for point-source elastic Green’s functions. Results show that radiation emerging at downward takeoff angles appears to be dominated by the expected isotropic source contribution, while at shallower angles the motions are complicated by near-surface damage and cannot be represented with the addition of a simple secondary compensated linear vector dipole point source above the shot point. The agreement and differences of simulated source spectra with the MM71 and DJ91 models motivates the use of numerical simulations to understand observed motions and investigate seismic source features for underground explosions in various emplacement media and conditions, including non-linear rheological effects such as material strength and porosity.  相似文献   

19.
—?Accurate discrimination of seismic events with a regional network requires detailed knowledge of the propagation characteristics of seismic waves in the region. At present, such propagation characteristics are reasonably well known for P and S waves in the European Arctic, however much work remains to be done regarding surface wave propagation and magnitude estimation.¶Regional long-period or broadband seismic data in digital form has been available in the European Arctic for only a few years. In order to assess regional surface wave propagation, and in particular to evaluate the M s :m b discriminant at regional distances, it is therefore necessary to take advantage of the historic analog recordings. The station APA in Apatity forms a unique source of such data, with high-quality long-period seismic recordings of regional earthquakes and nuclear explosions dating back about 30 years.¶This paper presents initial results from a project to digitize APA surface waves of selected regional events. The recordings for recent years have been compared to a colocated broadband Guralp three-component seismometer in order to verify the response characteristics and the quality of the digitization process. It turns out that the quality of the digitized records is excellent, and can be used over a spectral band ranging from 5?seconds to at least 30?seconds period.¶We demonstrate the capabilities of the APA surface wave recordings to provide a promising separation of earthquakes and explosions in the European Arctic over a range of frequencies using the M s :m b discriminant, although we note that additional work is required in regionalization of the propagation paths to take into account the major tectonic features in the region. We also note that the body-wave magnitudes provided by international agencies are not always reliable for events in this region, and must be reassessed in order to make full use of the earthquake-explosion discrimination potential.  相似文献   

20.
The purpose of this work is to define a seismic regionalization of Mexico for seismic hazard and risk analyses. This seismic regionalization is based on seismic, geologic, and tectonic characteristics. To this end, a seismic catalog was compiled using the more reliable sources available. The catalog was made homogeneous in magnitude in order to avoid the differences in the way this parameter is reported by various agencies. Instead of using a linear regression to converts from m b and M d to M s or M w , using only events for which estimates of both magnitudes are available (i.e., paired data), we used the frequency-magnitude relations relying on the a and b values of the Gutenberg-Richter relation. The seismic regions are divided into three main categories: seismicity associated with the subduction process along the Pacific coast of Mexico, in-slab events within the down-going COC and RIV plates, and crustal seismicity associated to various geologic and tectonic regions. In total, 18 seismic regions were identified and delimited. For each, the a and b values of the Gutenberg-Richter relation were determined using a maximum likelihood estimation. The a and b parameters were repeatedly estimated as a function of time for each region, in order to confirm their reliability and stability. The recurrence times predicted by the resulting Gutenberg-Richter relations obtained are compared with the observed recurrence times of the larger events in each region of both historical and instrumental earthquakes.  相似文献   

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