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1.
The EU accession countries have a high potential for low cost greenhouse gas emission reduction. As they cannot join the “bubble” agreement for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, project-based Joint Implementation (JI) could be a powerful strategy to integrate them into the EU climate policy strategy. An important question is whether the acquis communautaire will be used to define the baseline for the calculation of emission reductions from JI projects. A problem is that the grace periods for several environmental sectors differ considerably among countries. The EU should help accession countries to establish a predictable legal framework for JI preventing in this way the current legal uncertainty regarding JI procedures.  相似文献   

2.
Abstract

This paper examines implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without Russia. It concludes that implementation without Russia is possible, although it requires political will on the part of the countries that wish to proceed with the Protocol. It would lead to higher compliance costs for Annex B buyer regions, but other regions, except Russia, would benefit financially. Russia would forego revenue of at least $20 billion for the first commitment period. Implementation without Russia could improve the environmental performance of the Protocol. It would reduce reliance on Annex B sinks, use of surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) for compliance, and the quantity of Kyoto units banked for subsequent commitment periods. Actual emissions by Kyoto Protocol Parties would fall, but the reduction may be offset by leakage to the US and Russia.  相似文献   

3.
Abstract

A process for reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries has been initiated under the UNFCCC. Efforts to agree on a legally binding instrument to halt deforestation have previously failed in other international fora. The magnitude of the social, economic, technical and political complexities underlying deforestation have led to negotiations being challenging. What policy instruments could provide incentives to reduce deforestation, and how could these instruments be framed, under the UNFCCC? This article analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the available alternatives within and outside of the Kyoto Protocol. Staying within the Kyoto framework means low institutional development costs, established but limited incentives for action, and low flexibility. Alternatives outside the Protocol provide higher institutional development costs, uncertainties with regard to the incentives, but greater flexibility. We argue that a separate protocol may be the most viable option, as it could offer the necessary flexibility and avoid some technical and political pitfalls that would be likely to beset new efforts under the Kyoto Protocol. The article also presents the concept of ‘committed forests’ as a means of defining geographically where the reduction of emissions from deforestation can take place.  相似文献   

4.
Forest carbon sinks have been included in the Kyoto Protocol as one of the mechanisms for mitigating climate change. Consequently, credited sinks decrease the need to reduce emissions. We analyse in detail both the economywide and the sectoral effects of inclusion of carbon sinks as agreed upon in Bonn and Marrakesh for the first commitment period of 2008–2012. The focus of our analysis is the special treatment for Canada and Japan that allows them larger sinks. The analysis is performed with the multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model GTAP-E.New Zealand benefits most from the inclusion of sinks as it gains large carbon sinks from afforestation. Also in Sweden, Canada and Japan the costs of achieving the emission target are considerably reduced. Of these countries, only Canada has high costs without sinks. Thus credited sinks partly reduce the difference in economic burden of achieving the Kyoto target among countries. Even though larger sinks clearly benefit Canada and Japan, their effect on other countries, either on the economywide or on the sectoral level, remains marginal. Allowing larger sinks is, indeed, of relatively minor importance for the world economy and emission reduction, compared to the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.  相似文献   

5.
Countries with emission levels below their emission allowances have surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) or other emission credits. Under the Kyoto Protocol, these surplus credits may effectively be carried from the first to a following commitment period. In the climate negotiations, various rules for carry-over and sale of surplus allowances have been put forward. This paper analyses the effect of these options on the reduction pledges for 2020, taking into account the estimated credits from the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation projects, and land-use activities for the first commitment period. For current Kyoto Protocol rules of unlimited carry-over of surplus allowances and limited carry-over of other credits, the environmental effectiveness of reduction pledges could be seriously undermined. For the group of countries that showed a willingness to participate in a second commitment period, it could imply that instead of an aggregated 2020 target resulting from the pledges of 18 to 28?% below 1990 levels by 2020, their emissions could return to business-us-usual emission projections. For the EU, a 30?% target by 2020 could imply higher emissions compared to a 20?% target, if surplus allowances would be used for achieving the 30?% but not for the 20?% target. Restricting the use of Kyoto surplus units to domestic use only, would limit the problem, but still seriously undermine the effectiveness of 2020 reduction targets.  相似文献   

6.
Forest carbon sinks have been included in the Kyoto Protocol as one of the mechanisms for mitigating climate change. Consequently, credited sinks decrease the need to reduce emissions.We analyse in detail both the economywide and the sectoral effects of inclusion of carbon sinks as agreed upon in Bonn and Marrakesh for the first commitment period of 2008–2012. The focus of our analysis is the special treatment for Canada and Japan that allows them larger sinks. The analysis is performed with the multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model GTAP-E.

New Zealand benefits most from the inclusion of sinks as it gains large carbon sinks from afforestation. Also in Sweden, Canada and Japan the costs of achieving the emission target are considerably reduced. Of these countries, only Canada has high costs without sinks. Thus credited sinks partly reduce the difference in economic burden of achieving the Kyoto target among countries. Even though larger sinks clearly benefit Canada and Japan, their effect on other countries, either on the economywide or on the sectoral level, remains marginal. Allowing larger sinks is, indeed, of relatively minor importance for the world economy and emission reduction, compared to the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.  相似文献   

7.
The Doha Amendment allows surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) to be carried over from the first commitment period, but limits their use for offsetting emission growth beyond commitment levels. Amendment 7ter simultaneously ‘shaves’ AAU allocation to a level equivalent to the average 2008–2010 emissions for countries that pledged a growth target under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This means that economies in transition (EITs) are not allocated headroom for growth, and makes their commitments starkly different from their original pledges. The ‘bubble’ arrangement within the EU adds uncertainty to whether new Member States will avoid the ‘shaving’ of 7ter due to their pooled target. This would put Annex I EITs into an unequal position as a result of the Doha Amendment.  相似文献   

8.
If a binding agreement can be reached on a post-2012 international climate regime, it is likely to include the phased introduction of a market-linked mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD). Under such a scheme, countries that reduce net REDD emissions below a pre-set baseline would receive credits that could be sold in carbon markets and used by purchasing nations to meet their international mitigation obligations. This paper draws on the Australian experience with deforestation to identify some of the issues that might obstruct progress on REDD. For the past 20 years, Australia has had the highest rate of deforestation in the developed world; ~416,000 ha of forests were cleared annually between 1990 and 2009, resulting in the emission of almost 80 MtCO2-e/yr. It is also the only developed country that will rely on reduced deforestation emissions as the primary way of meeting its quantified emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol. Australia’s approach to deforestation issues provides valuable insights into the difficulties an international REDD scheme might encounter.  相似文献   

9.
 由土地利用、土地利用变化和林业（LULUCF）活动产生的生态系统的固碳作用,是降低大气中温室气体浓度增加速度的重要途径之一。1997-2001年,经历了长达4 a的艰苦谈判,最终达成了第一承诺期附件一国家利用LULUCF的规则。2008年开始,国际社会开始磋商第二承诺期附件一国家如何利用LULUCF活动的规则。主要缔约方就第二承诺期LULUCF规则提出了各自的观点,发达国家的观点主要包括提高开展碳汇活动的积极性、降低LULUCF规则的复杂性和减少成本、增加《京都议定书》3.4条款下的合格活动等,其目的是在第二承诺期能够利用更多的碳汇完成减排义务;发展中国家主要提出要系统地考虑土地利用造成的温室气体排放和CO2的吸收。最后,针对附件一缔约方在第二承诺期利用LULUCF活动规则,提出了我国应采取的对策建议。  相似文献   

10.
由土地利用、土地利用变化和林业（LULUCF）活动产生的生态系统的固碳作用,是降低大气中温室气体浓度增加速度的重要途径之一。1997-2001年,经历了长达4 a的艰苦谈判,最终达成了第一承诺期附件一国家利用LULUCF的规则。2008年开始,国际社会开始磋商第二承诺期附件一国家如何利用LULUCF活动的规则。主要缔约方就第二承诺期LULUCF规则提出了各自的观点,发达国家的观点主要包括提高开展碳汇活动的积极性、降低LULUCF规则的复杂性和减少成本、增加《京都议定书》3.4条款下的合格活动等,其目的是在第二承诺期能够利用更多的碳汇完成减排义务;发展中国家主要提出要系统地考虑土地利用造成的温室气体排放和CO2的吸收。最后,针对附件一缔约方在第二承诺期利用LULUCF活动规则,提出了我国应采取的对策建议。  相似文献   

11.
This article provides an ex post analysis of the compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period (2008–2012) based on the final data for national GHG emissions and exchanges in carbon units that became available at the end of 2015. On the domestic level, among the 36 countries that fully participated in the Kyoto Protocol, only nine countries emitted higher levels of GHGs than committed and therefore had to resort to flexibility mechanisms. On the international level – i.e. after the use of flexibility mechanisms – all Annex B Parties are in compliance. Countries implemented different compliance strategies: purchasing carbon units abroad, stimulating the domestic use of carbon credits by the private sector and incentivizing domestic emission reductions through climate policies.

Overall, the countries party to the Protocol surpassed their aggregate commitment by an average 2.4 GtCO2e yr–1. Of the possible explanations for this overachievement, ‘hot-air’ was estimated at 2.2 GtCO2e yr–1, while accounting rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) further removed 0.4 GtCO2e yr–1 from the net result excluding LULUCF. The hypothetical participation of the US and Canada would have reduced this overachievement by a net 1 GtCO2e yr–1. None of these factors – some of which may be deemed illegitimate – would therefore on its own have led to global non-compliance, even without use of the 0.3 GtCO2e of annual emissions reductions generated by the Clean Development Mechanism. The impact of domestic policies and ‘carbon leakage’ – neither of which is quantitatively assessed here – should not be neglected either.

Policy relevance

Given the ongoing evolution of the international climate regime and the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, we believe that there is a need to evaluate the results of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. To our knowledge there has been no overarching quantitative ex post assessment of the Kyoto Protocol based on the final emissions data for 2008–2012, which became available in late 2015. This article attempts to fill this gap, focusing on the domestic and international compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period.  相似文献   


12.
第二承诺期LULUCF有关议题谈判进展与对策建议   总被引：2，自引：1，他引：1       下载免费PDF全文
自2005年作为《京都议定书》缔约方会议的《联合国气候变化框架公约》（以下简称《公约》）缔约方会议第一届会议（CMP.1）决定启动《京都议定书》第二承诺期进程以来,国际社会通过《京都议定书》缔约方特设工作组（AWG-KP）针对第二承诺期的谈判紧锣密鼓地进行。在第二承诺期如何利用LULUCF活动（包括与LULUCF活动有关的清洁发展机制项目）,也是谈判中的主要议题之一。通过调研,概述了AWG-KP的谈判进展,结合第一承诺期LULUCF有关规则的不足,对LULUCF有关的关键问题进行了综合分析,提出了关于第二承诺期LULUCF规则的建议。  相似文献   

13.
This study reports the first assessment of the compounding effects of land-use change and greenhouse gas warming effects on our understanding of projections of future climate. An AGCM simulation of the potential impacts of tropical deforestation and greenhouse warming on climate, employing a version of NCAR Community Climate Model (CCM1-Oz), is presented. The joint impacts of tropical deforestation and greenhouse warming are assessed by an experiment in which removal of tropical rainforests is imposed into a greenhouse-warmed climate. Results show that the joint climate changes over tropical rainforest regions comprise large reductions in surface evapotranspiration (by about –180 mm yr–1) andprecipitation (by about –312 mm yr–1) over the Amazon Basin, along with anincrease of surface temperature by +3.0 K. Over Southeast Asia, similar but weaker changes are found in this study. Precipitation is decreased by –172 mmyr–1, together with the surface warming of 2.1 K. Over tropical Africa, changes in regional climate is much weaker and with some different features, such as the increase of precipitation by 25 mm yr–1. Energy budgetanalyses demonstrates that the large increase of surface temperature in the joint experiment is not solely produced by the increase of CO2concentration, but is a joint effect of the reduction of surface evaporation (due to deforestation) and the increase of downward atmospheric longwave radiation (due to the doubling of CO2 concentration). Furthermore, impactsof tropical deforestation on the greenhouse-warmed climate are estimated by comparing a pair of tropical deforestation simulations. It is found that in CCM1-Oz, deforestation has very similar impacts on greenhouse-warmed regional climates as on current climates over tropical rainforest regions. The extra-tropical climatic response to tropical deforestation is identified in both sets of tropical deforestation experiments. Statistically significant responses are seen in the large-scale atmospheric circulation such as changes in the velocity potential and vertically integrated kinetic and potential energy fields. Wave propagation patterns are identified in the large-scale circulation anomalies, which provides a mechanism for interpreting the model responses in the extra-tropics. In addition, this study suggests that land-use change such as tropical deforestation may affect projections of future climate.  相似文献   

14.
Despite accounting for 17–25% of anthropogenic emissions, deforestation was not included in the Kyoto Protocol. The UN Convention on Climate Change is considering its inclusion in future agreements and asked its scientific board to study methodological and scientific issues related to positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation. Here we present an empirically derived mechanism that offers a mix of incentives to developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation, conserve and possibly enhance their ecosystem's carbon stocks. We also use recent data to model its effects on the 20 most forested developing countries. Results show that at low CO2 prices (～US$ 8/t CO2) a successful mechanism could reduce more than 90% of global deforestation at an annual cost of US$ 30 billion.  相似文献   

15.
基于各附件I缔约方2011年提交的年度国家温室气体排放清单、《京都议定书》第一承诺期森林管理活动的温室气体源/汇数据,以及森林管理活动的基准线数据,分析了森林管理活动在第一承诺期履约中的贡献,以及按各方提交的基准线,预计森林管理活动在未来承诺期履约中的作用。结果表明,《京都议定书》第一承诺期的最初两年（2008—2009年）,附件I缔约方可从合格的森林管理活动中获得年均2.46亿t CO2当量（CO2-eq）的信用额,相当于相应缔约方基准年（1990年）源排放的2.3%,对减限排目标的贡献率达53%,不合理的规则使一些缔约方在履约中可过度地利用森林管理的汇清除。各附件I缔约方提交的2013—2020年森林管理活动的基准线（约2.52亿t CO2-eq/a的净汇清除）远低于目前和过去的水平,使其可从中获得的用于抵消减排目标的信用额约为第一承诺期的4倍,对未来承诺期履约的贡献率将更大,一些缔约方提交的减排目标中的大部分可通过森林管理活动的信用额来抵消。因此,本文建议在未来的谈判中,要严格控制可用的森林管理活动的信用额,避免森林管理活动被滥用。  相似文献   

16.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):148-166
The negotiation strategy of the European Union was analysed with respect to the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. Game theory was employed to explore the incentives for key players in the climate policy arena to join future climate agreements. A ?20% unilateral commitment strategy by the EU was compared with a multilateral ?30% emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate—economy simulation model, we found that leakage, in the sense of strategic policy reactions on emissions, was negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared with 1990 levels) by 2020, if other Annex-B countries follow suit, does not induce the participation of the USA with a comparable reduction commitment. However, we argue that the original EU proposal can be reshaped so as to stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.  相似文献   

17.
The outcome from the December 2012 climate negotiations in Doha has clarified the rules regarding surplus units for the Kyoto Protocol. We summarize these new rules and estimate the resulting effective emissions during the second commitment period using our unit trade model. Other options to deal with surplus emission allowances are employed as benchmarks to assess the Doha outcome. The effective emissions for developed countries as a group under the Doha outcome could be 10–11 % below 1990 levels or 4–5 % points below business-as-usual levels for the second commitment period if we assume that non-Kyoto Protocol countries domestically achieve their targets. However, if mechanisms exist where non-Kyoto Protocol countries can trade units, their emissions could increase and effective emissions for developed countries could be 7–8 % below 1990 levels. In this low-ambition situation we find the main impact of the Doha surplus rules to be the introduction of the historical cap on emissions allowances. Without the effect of the cap, the Doha outcome allows the Parties to the second commitment period to emit at business-as-usual levels until 2020, while still leaving surplus units at the end of the second commitment period.  相似文献   

18.
This paper presents a new accounting mechanism in the context of the UNFCCC issue on reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries, including technical options for determining baselines of forest conversions. This proposal builds on the recent scientific achievements related to the estimation of tropical deforestation rates and to the assessment of ‘intact’ forest areas. The distinction between ‘intact’ and ‘non intact’ forests used here arises from experience with satellite-based deforestation measurements and allows accounting for carbon losses from forest degradation. The proposed accounting system would use forest area conversion rates as input data. An optimal technical solution to set baselines would be to use historical average figures during the time period from 1990 to 2005. The system introduces two different schemes to account for preserved carbon: one for countries with high forest conversion rates where the desired outcome would be a reduction in their rates, and another for countries with low rates. A ‘global’ baseline rate would be used to discriminate between these two country categories (high and low rates). For the hypothetical accounting period 2013–2017 and considering 72% of the total tropical forest domain for which data are available, the scenario of a 10% reduction of the high rates and of the preservation of low rates would result in approximately 1.6 billion tCO2 of avoided emissions. The resulting benefits of this reduction would be shared between those high-rate countries which reduced deforestation and those low-rate countries which did not increase their deforestation over an agreed threshold (e.g., half of “global” baseline rate).  相似文献   

19.
Our study is a preparatory exercise. We focus on the analysis of uncertainty in greenhouse gas emission inventories. Inventory uncertainty is monitored, but not regulated, under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Under the Convention, countries publish annual or periodic national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions and removals. Policymakers use these inventories to develop strategies and policies for emission reductions and to track the progress of these policies. However, greenhouse gas inventories contain uncertainty for a variety of reasons, and these uncertainties have important scientific and policy implications. For most countries, the emission changes agreed under the Protocol are of the same order of magnitude as the uncertainty that underlies their combined (carbon dioxide equivalent) emissions estimates. Here we apply and compare six available techniques to analyze the uncertainty in the emission changes that countries agreed to realize by the end of the Protocol’s first commitment period 2008–2012. Any such technique, if implemented, could “make or break” claims of compliance, especially in cases where countries claim fulfillment of their commitments to reduce or limit emissions. The techniques all perform differently and can thus have a different impact on the design and execution of emission control policies. A thorough comparison of the techniques has not yet been made but is needed when expanding the discussion on how to go about dealing with uncertainty under the Kyoto Protocol and its successor.  相似文献   

20.
This paper presents an alternative framework to the approach currently embodied in the Kyoto Protocol for managing global climate change post-2012. The framework has two key provisions. The first is that each person in the world would be ‘allowed’ an equal amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This is labeled the equity-first provision. The second provision focuses on incorporating risk concepts into the setting of GHG emission reductions. It is proposed that the global climate be managed as to avoid three categories of risks: (I) Substantial regional economic, political, and/or biological impacts; (II) Severe global economic, political, and/or biological impacts; and (III) Extinction of humans. Acceptable risk thresholds are suggested to be one-in-a-million, one-in-one-hundred-million, and one-in-ten-billion, respectively. This equity-first, risk-based framework overcomes many criticisms of the current Kyoto Protocol: it explicitly involves all countries on earth; it avoids several administrative issues that are anticipated to plague a global carbon emissions trading market; and it avoids several contentious issues associated with pegging carbon emission reductions to 1990 levels. Because the framework is risk-based and emissions are tied to population and not historic emission levels, the basic framework would not have to be frequently renegotiated, as will be needed for the Kyoto-style approach to take the world past that agreement's 2012 endpoint.  相似文献   

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