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1.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(2):211-227
This paper assesses five options for targets that could be taken by all countries to meet the ultimate objective of the climate change convention: fixed, binding targets; dynamic targets; non-binding targets; sectoral targets; policies and measures. Each is evaluated according to criteria of environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, contribution to economic growth and sustainable development, and equity. While fixed, binding targets continue to be viable for industrialised countries, they do not seem suitable for many developing countries in the near future. Dynamic targets could alleviate developing countries’ concerns about constraining their development as well as broader concerns about possible introduction of “hot air” in a world trading regime; they could also be considered for some or all industrialised countries. Non-binding targets could be politically appealing to developing countries, alleviate fears about development and/or hot air, but might only allow conditional participation in emissions trading by developing countries. Sectoral targets could offer a pragmatic first step — although their cost-effectiveness might be questioned. Finally, targets based on commitments to implement specific policies and measures might drive mitigation action and be part of negotiated packages including financial and technological co-operation. All these options may coexist in the future. 相似文献
2.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):137-148
Abstract Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries. This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end. 相似文献
3.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2-3):161-177
Abstract US President Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol because, in his view, it is ‘fatally flawed in fundamental ways’. This paper evaluates seven proposals to redress the protocol according to their potential to deal with three key issues that have reinforced US intransigence: hot air, cost uncertainty and developing country participation. It argues that negotiations on intensity targets hold the most promise. Because intensity targets limit hot air, but do not limit economic growth, and a high variance of carbon intensity exists among countries with similar GDP per capita, intensity targets based on best practice levels might be agreeable to developing countries and the US. If a protocol specifying such targets were implemented, less warming would be associated with larger world GDP than would otherwise be the case, and countries' carbon intensity and emissions per capita would tend to converge to best practice levels at every stage of development. 相似文献
4.
Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries.This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end. 相似文献
5.
International carbon markets can be an important tool in achieving countries’ mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement, but they are subject to a number of environmental integrity risks. An important risk is that some countries have mitigation targets that correspond to higher levels of emissions than independent projections of their likely emissions. If such ‘hot air’ can be transferred to other countries, it could increase aggregated emissions and create a perverse incentive for countries not to enhance the ambition of future mitigation targets. Limits to international transfers of mitigation outcomes have been proposed to address this risk. This article proposes a typology for such limits, explores key design options, and tests different types of limits in the context of 15 countries. Our analysis indicates that limits to international transfers could, if designed appropriately, prevent most of the hot air contained in current mitigation targets from being transferred, but also involve trade-offs between different policy objectives. Given the risks from international transfer of hot air and the uncertainty over whether other approaches will be effective in ensuring environmental integrity, we recommend that countries take a cautious approach and pursue a portfolio of approaches to ensure environmental integrity, in which case limits could provide for additional safeguards.
Key policy insights
Limits to international transfers involve trade-offs between different policy objectives, in particular reducing the risk that countries transfer hot air and enabling participation in carbon markets.
Under ‘relative’ limits a country may transfer mitigation outcomes to the extent that its actual emissions are below the limit. Relative limits derived from historical emissions data have significant limitations, and none of the tested approaches was found to be effective for all countries. Relative limits based on emission projections could be a more valid approach, although they are also technically and politically challenging.
Under ‘absolute’ limits a country could only issue, transfer or acquire a certain amount of mitigation outcomes. Absolute limits set at sufficiently low levels could prevent countries from transferring large amounts of hot air, but are bluntly applicable to all countries, whether or not they have hot air.
6.
Abstract This article introduces and explores a new form of international commitment to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, called an action target. Action targets differ from other forms of targets, such as the Kyoto Protocol's fixed targets, in that they define a quantity of GHG abatement to be achieved, rather than a future emission level to be reached. This article explains the basic mechanics of how action targets might operate, and analyses the approach across a range of criteria, including uncertainty management and contributions to sustainable development in non-Annex I (developing) countries. The analysis suggests that action targets might improve the prospects of widening and deepening developing country participation in the international climate regime. 相似文献
7.
This paper proposes a global warming implementation regime which addresses the issues of equity, flexibility, cost minimization, and population growth. Previously proposed international policy instruments, such as country by country targets, carbon taxes, and tradable permits, face major difficulties as stand alone proposals. The key element of the regime proposed here is to combine annual tradable permits which are allocated based on population in a fixed year with a small carbon tax ($5–10/tonne) on emissions in excess of permits. Both permits and carbon taxes are applied to national level governments, which in turn would use whatever mix of policies desired to reduce national emissions. It is suggested that the initial number of permits correspond to total global emissions in the base year; over time, the number of permits could be reduced and the tax rate increased if improved scientific knowledge so dictates. By allocating permits based on population the equity concerns of developing countries are addressed, while taxing emissions in excess of permit holdings removes the rigidity of a quota system and limits resource transfers by effectively capping the permit trading price, which is a major concern of industrialized countries. To accommodate the difficulties of countries which have not yet achieved the demographic transition, the permit allocation scheme could be subject to a one-time adjustment after 10–15 years based on some weighting of the initial and then-current populations. The proposed scheme is based on the premise that there is a large potential for reducing emissions in developed countries or limiting emission increases in developing countries, and the intention is to create competition between national level governments in implementing cost-effective emission reduction. 相似文献
8.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2-3):129-144
Abstract Climate change does not yet feature prominently within the environmental or economic policy agendas of developing countries. Yet evidence shows that some of the most adverse effects of climate change will be in developing countries, where populations are most vulnerable and least likely to easily adapt to climate change, and that climate change will affect the potential for development in these countries. Some synergies already exist between climate change policies and the sustainable development agenda in developing countries, such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, transport and sustainable land-use policies. Despite limited attention from policy-makers to date, climate change policies could have significant ancillary benefits for the local environment. The reverse is also true as local and national policies to address congestion, air quality, access to energy services and energy diversity may also limit GHG emissions. Nevertheless there could be significant trade-offs associated with deeper levels of mitigation in some countries, for example where developing countries are dependent on indigenous coal and may be required to switch to cleaner yet more expensive fuels to limit emissions. The distributional impacts of such policies are an important determinant of their feasibility and need to be considered up-front. It follows that future agreements on mitigation and adaptation under the convention will need to recognise the diverse situations of developing countries with respect to their level of economic development, their vulnerability to climate change and their ability to adapt or mitigate. Recognition of how climate change is likely to influence other development priorities may be a first step toward building cost-effective strategies and integrated, institutional capacity in developing countries to respond to climate change. Opportunities may also exist in developing countries to use regional economic organisations to assist in the design of integrated responses and to exploit synergies between climate change and other policies such as those designed to combat desertification and preserve biodiversity. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 相似文献
9.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):353-365
Abstract The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects. This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries. 相似文献
10.
As part of the Copenhagen Accord, Annex I Parties (industrialised countries) and non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) have submitted reduction proposals (pledges) and mitigation actions to the UNFCCC secretariat. Our calculations show that if the current reduction offers of Annex I and non-Annex I countries are fully implemented, global greenhouse gas emissions could amount to 48.6-49.7 GtCO2eq by 2020. Recent literature suggests that the emission level should be between 42 and 46 GtCO2eq by 2020 to maintain a “medium” chance (50-66%) of meeting the 2 °C target. The emission gap is therefore 2.6-7.7 GtCO2eq. We have identified a combined set of options, which could result in an additional 2.8 GtCO2eq emission reduction. This would lead to an emission level just within the range needed. The options include reducing deforestation and emissions from bunker fuels, excluding emissions allowance increases from land use and forestry rules, and taking into account the national climate plans of China and India. However, there are also important risks that could widen the emissions gap, like lower reductions from countries with only a conditional pledge and the use of Kyoto and/or trading of new surplus emission allowances. 相似文献
11.
ABSTRACTThe Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of ‘hot air’ generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC’s ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain ‘hot air’, or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time.Key policy insights
Without additionality testing, market mechanisms under the Paris Agreements might lead to an international diffusion of ‘hot air’. To avoid this, an independent assessment of NDC ambition is in order. Otherwise, activities under the mechanisms need to undergo specific additionality tests.
Additionality testing of projects and programmes should build on the experience developed under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms.
Bold approaches are needed for assessing additionality of policies. To avoid cumbersome assessment of all activities triggered by such policies, highly aggregated approaches are suggested, ranging from payback period thresholds for technologies mandated by regulation to minimum price levels triggered by carbon pricing policies. Over time, the stringency of threshold values should increase.
12.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):293-304
One problem in international climate policy is the refusal of large developing countries to accept emission reduction targets. Brazil, China and India together account for about 20% of today's CO2 emissions. We analyse the case in which there is no international agreement on emission reduction targets, but countries do have domestic targets, and trade permits across borders. We contrast two scenarios. In one scenario, Brazil, China and India adopt their business as usual emissions as their target. In this scenario, there are substantial exports of emission permits from developing to developed countries, and substantial economic gains for all. In the second scenario, Brazil, China and India reduce their emissions target so that they have no net economic gain from permit trade. Here, developing countries do not accept responsibility for climate change (as they bear no net costs), but they do contribute to an emission reduction policy by refusing to make money out of it. Adopting such break-even targets can be done at minor cost to developed and developing countries (roughly $2 bn/year each in extra costs and forgone benefits), while developing countries are still slightly better off than in the case without international emissions trade. This result is robust to variations in scenarios and parameters. It contrasts with Stewart and Wiener (2003) who propose granting ‘hot air’ to developing countries to seduce them to accept targets. In 2020, China and India could reduce their emissions by some 10% from the baseline without net economic costs. 相似文献
13.
ZHONGXIANG ZHANG 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):166-170
Although many economic studies suggest that China would reap significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime, China has consistently refused to participate in international negotiations on this issue. Understanding China's underlying concerns is a key to explaining why China has not embraced an international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. This is explored as a potential basis for including China in future negotiations and schemes. This issue is considered from the following perspectives that impact upon China: (a) fairness: how do developing countries perceive emissions caps? (b) why have China and India been sceptical about international emissions trading? (c) what would China's political perceptions be of an inflow of CDM investment in comparison with the exports of emissions permits to the USA? (d) what are the implications of ‘lock in’ to an emissions cap, particularly when no rules and principles exist for setting emissions targets for post-2012? (e) the complex question of establishing future emissions caps for developing countries. 相似文献
14.
Methane emissions from livestock enteric fermentation and manure management represent about 40% of total anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions from the agriculture sector and are projected to increase substantially in the coming decades, with most of
the growth occurring in non-Annex 1 countries. To mitigate livestock methane, incentive policies based on producer-level emissions
are generally not feasible because of high administrative costs and producer transaction costs. In contrast, incentive policies
based on sectoral emissions are likely administratively feasible, even in developing countries. This study uses an economic
model of global agriculture to estimate the effects of two sectoral mitigation policies: a carbon tax and an emissions trading
scheme based on average national methane emissions per unit of commodity. The analysis shows how the composition and location
of livestock production and emissions change in response to the policies. Results illustrate the importance of global mitigation
efforts: when policies are limited to Annex 1 countries, increased methane emissions in non-Annex 1 countries offset approximately
two-thirds of Annex 1 emissions reductions. While non-Annex 1 countries face substantial disincentives to enacting domestic
carbon taxes, developing countries could benefit from participating in a global sectoral emissions trading scheme. We illustrate
one scheme in which non-Annex 1 countries collectively earn USD 2.4 billion annually from methane emission permit sales when
methane is priced at USD 30/t CO2-eq. 相似文献
15.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(2-3):129-144
Climate change does not yet feature prominently within the environmental or economic policy agendas of developing countries. Yet evidence shows that some of the most adverse effects of climate change will be in developing countries, where populations are most vulnerable and least likely to easily adapt to climate change, and that climate change will affect the potential for development in these countries. Some synergies already exist between climate change policies and the sustainable development agenda in developing countries, such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, transport and sustainable land-use policies. Despite limited attention from policy-makers to date, climate change policies could have significant ancillary benefits for the local environment. The reverse is also true as local and national policies to address congestion, air quality, access to energy services and energy diversity may also limit GHG emissions. Nevertheless there could be significant trade-offs associated with deeper levels of mitigation in some countries, for example where developing countries are dependent on indigenous coal and may be required to switch to cleaner yet more expensive fuels to limit emissions. The distributional impacts of such policies are an important determinant of their feasibility and need to be considered up-front. It follows that future agreements on mitigation and adaptation under the convention will need to recognise the diverse situations of developing countries with respect to their level of economic development, their vulnerability to climate change and their ability to adapt or mitigate. Recognition of how climate change is likely to influence other development priorities may be a first step toward building cost-effective strategies and integrated, institutional capacity in developing countries to respond to climate change. Opportunities may also exist in developing countries to use regional economic organisations to assist in the design of integrated responses and to exploit synergies between climate change and other policies such as those designed to combat desertification and preserve biodiversity. 相似文献
16.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):251-268
Abstract The objective of this paper is to show that the investments through the clean development mechanism (CDM) can exert a leverage effect to (i) make attractive to developing countries non-binding commitments and the adoption of national policies and measures; this comes as a guarantee of non-conditionally of the mechanism to strictly environmental concerns and (ii) create a flow of additional investments and technological transfer from Annex B countries to non-Annex B countries. The Indian power sector has been chosen as an example of a sector where institutional barriers, market imperfections, and tariff distortions create a great space for Pareto improvements and leave an important potential for no-regret measures: technological transfer, air conditioned systems, transport infrastructures and removal of subsidies on consumption. This paper presents a micro-economic formalisation on (i) the evolution of profitability of current emitting technologies used in the power sector under the adoption of national policies and measures and (ii) the impact on renewable energy technologies competitiveness of emission credits in the context of CDM. This formalisation has been developed to enable quantitative simulation. A first exercise using the Markal model (used in 77 countries) on the electric sector in India enabled us to simulate the leverage effect of emission credits on additional incomes taken as a proxy for development. 相似文献
17.
The contribution that no-lose target schemes for non-Annex I (NAI) countries could make to achieve the 2°C target is explored by accounting for the incentives of 18 NAI countries’ participation in no-lose target schemes. Using various scenarios, it is shown that implementing uniform no-lose targets as part of the burden-sharing will not lead to global emissions levels compatible with the 2°C target, because uniform no-lose targets will only be beneficial to a few NAI countries. Employing more lenient uniform no-lose targets or individual no-lose targets for large emitters could increase participation by NAI countries and decrease global emissions, global compliance costs, rents by NAI countries, and compliance costs for Annex I (AI) countries. However, the resulting global emissions levels will not be compatible with attaining the 2°C target. Achieving this target will require more stringent emissions targets for AI countries and more lenient no-lose targets for NAI countries. As such, no-lose targets should account for 20% to 47% of global emissions reductions, while due to emissions trading around two-thirds of global emissions reductions should be realized in NAI countries. Indeed, an effective solution may only require no-lose targets for five to seven of the largest NAI countries. Policy relevance No-lose targets are one of a number of instruments discussed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change New Market Mechanism to integrate NAI countries in global emissions reduction efforts. In contrast to binding reduction targets, which apply penalties if a target is not met, no-lose targets provide incentives for meeting a target, e.g. in the form of excess emissions certificates that can be sold on the global carbon market. The presented simulations show that no-lose targets can result in contributions from NAI countries to global emissions reduction efforts. However, the simulations also show that the necessary incentives for no-lose targets need to be adjusted. AI countries require more ambitious targets and NAI countries require less ambitious no-lose targets than proposed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report. Effective no-lose targets may only be required for five to seven of the largest NAI countries. 相似文献
18.
Developing countries like India are under international pressure to sign a legally binding emissions treaty to avert catastrophic climatic change. Developing countries, however, have argued that any international agreement must be based on historic and per capita carbon emissions, with developed countries responsible for reducing their emissions first and funding mitigation and adaptation in other countries. Recently, however, several scholars have argued that Indian government climate change discourses are shifting, primarily by recognizing the “co-benefits” of an alignment between its development and climate change objectives, and by displaying increasing “flexibility” on mitigation targets. This study investigates the factors driving shifting Indian discourses of climate change by conducting and analyzing 25 interviews of Indian climate policy elites, including scientists, energy policy experts, leading government officials, journalists, business leaders, and advocates, in addition to analysis of articles published in Economic and Political Weekly (a prominent Indian policy journal), and reports published by the government and other agencies. Our analysis suggests that India’s concerns about increasing energy access and security, along with newer concerns about vulnerability to climate change and the international leadership aspirations of the Indian government, along with emergence of new actors and institutions, has led to plurality of discourses, with potential implications for India’s climate change policies. 相似文献
19.
Emissions from the production of iron and steel could constitute a significant share of a 2°C global emissions budget (around 19% under the IEA 2DS scenario). They need to be reduced, and this could be difficult under nationally based climate policy approaches. We compare a new set of nationally based modelling (the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project) with best practice and technical limit benchmarks for iron and steel and cement emissions. We find that 2050 emissions from iron and steel and cement production represent an average 0.28?tCO2 per capita in nationally based modelling results, very close to the technical limit benchmark of 0.21?tCO2 per capita, and over 2.5 times lower than the best practice benchmark of 0.72?tCO2 per capita. This suggests that national projections may be overly optimistic about achievable emissions reductions in the absence of global carbon pricing and an international research and development effort to develop low emissions technologies for emissions-intensive products. We also find that equal per capita emissions targets, often the basis of proposals for how global emissions budgets should be allocated, would be inadequate without global emissions trading. These results show that a nationally based global climate policy framework, as has been confirmed in the Paris Agreement, could lead to risks of overshooting global emissions targets for some countries and carbon leakage. Tailored approaches such as border taxes, sectoral emissions trading or carbon taxes, and consumption-based carbon pricing can help, but each faces difficulties. Ultimately, global efforts are needed to improve technology and material efficiency in emissions-intensive commodities manufacturing and use. Those efforts could be supported by technology standards and a globally coordinated R&D effort, and strengthened by the adoption of global emissions budgets for emissions-intensive traded goods.Policy relevanceThis article presents new empirical findings on global iron and steel and cement production in a low-carbon world economy, demonstrates the risks associated with a nationally based global climate policy framework as has been confirmed in the Paris Agreement, and analyses policy options to deal with those risks. 相似文献
20.
Abstract In the coming years the international debate on commitments for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol will intensify. In this study, the Global Triptych approach is put forward as an input for international decision-making concerning the differentiation of commitments by 2020. It is a sector- and technology-oriented approach, and we calculated quantitative emission limitation objectives and global emissions starting from bottomup information on long-term reduction opportunities. Central to the calculations were long-term sustainability targets for the year 2050, formulated for (1) energy efficiency in the energy-intensive industry, (2) greenhouse gas intensity of electricity production, and (3) per capita emissions in the domestic sectors. Calculated emission limitation objectives for 13 world regions ranged from about ?30% to more than +200%. The ranking of world regions in the differentiation turned out to be independent of the levels chosen for the long-term sustainability targets. The objectives seem sufficient to maintain the long-term possibility of stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at about 550 ppm CO2-eq, but will require severe emission reductions. These may be relaxed to a certain degree if stabilization at 650 ppm CO2-eq is aimed for. We conclude that the bottom-up character of the approach made it possible to examine important basic principles of the Climate Convention, including equity, the needs and circumstances of developing countries, cost-effectiveness and sustainable development. 相似文献