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1.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(2-3):179-196
The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM’s share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market. 相似文献
2.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):353-365
Abstract The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects. This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries. 相似文献
3.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(4):353-365
The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries. 相似文献
4.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(1):111-117
This article evaluates the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol after the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakesh Accords. The US withdrawal has by far the greatest impact in reducing the environmental effectiveness, lowering the price of traded emission permits and reducing Annex I abatement costs. The decisions on sinks imply that the Annex I CO2-equivalent emissions without the US will come out at about 1/2% below base-year level, instead of over 4% below base-year level. Without US participation, the emission permit price is estimated to be low. Therefore, banking hot air by Russia and the Ukraine is of absolute importance for the development of a viable emissions trading market, and would also enhance the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. 相似文献
5.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):111-117
Abstract This article evaluates the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol after the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakesh Accords. The US withdrawal has by far the greatest impact in reducing the environmental effectiveness, lowering the price of traded emission permits and reducing Annex I abatement costs. The decisions on sinks imply that the Annex I CO2-equivalent emissions without the US will come out at about 1/2% below base-year level, instead of over 4% below base-year level. Without US participation, the emission permit price is estimated to be low. Therefore, banking hot air by Russia and the Ukraine is of absolute importance for the development of a viable emissions trading market, and would also enhance the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. 相似文献
6.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(1):27-40
Atmospheric CO2 concentration can be decreased not only by reducing fossil fuel burning but also by increasing the terrestrial ecosystems that serve as sinks for CO2. The Kyoto Protocol allows countries that are burdened with emission reduction commitments to use carbon sequestration by terrestrial sinks. However, opinions differ widely on how the inclusion of terrestrial carbon sinks in the legally binding framework (Article 3.3) will affect the demand for emission reduction during the commitment period. We approach this issue by combining a simulation model of the carbon stock change with that of land-use change. The result of the simulation shows that the Annex I countries in total may potentially claim for a net carbon offset as high as 0.2 GtC per year by carrying out ARD (Afforestation, Reforestation and Deforestation) activities. In order to come up with an effective long-term climate regime, political decisions are necessary to realize an appropriate balance between the sink enhancement and the emission reduction. Sink activities should not be too large to eliminate the efforts for emission reduction, nor too small to discourage the efforts in enhancing sinks. Although prediction of sink activities is an extremely difficult venture, several estimates of the potential should be carefully considered before political decisions. Appropriate inclusion of sink activities is also crucial for ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. 相似文献
7.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):27-40
Abstract Atmospheric CO2 concentration can be decreased not only by reducing fossil fuel burning but also by increasing the terrestrial ecosystems that serve as sinks for CO2. The Kyoto Protocol allows countries that are burdened with emission reduction commitments to use carbon sequestration by terrestrial sinks. However, opinions differ widely on how the inclusion of terrestrial carbon sinks in the legally binding framework (Article 3.3) will affect the demand for emission reduction during the commitment period. We approach this issue by combining a simulation model of the carbon stock change with that of land-use change. The result of the simulation shows that the Annex I countries in total may potentially claim for a net carbon offset as high as 0.2 GtC per year by carrying out ARD (Afforestation, Reforestation and Deforestation) activities. In order to come up with an effective long-term climate regime, political decisions are necessary to realize an appropriate balance between the sink enhancement and the emission reduction. Sink activities should not be too large to eliminate the efforts for emission reduction, nor too small to discourage the efforts in enhancing sinks. Although prediction of sink activities is an extremely difficult venture, several estimates of the potential should be carefully considered before political decisions. Appropriate inclusion of sink activities is also crucial for ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. 相似文献
8.
Abstract This paper examines implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without Russia. It concludes that implementation without Russia is possible, although it requires political will on the part of the countries that wish to proceed with the Protocol. It would lead to higher compliance costs for Annex B buyer regions, but other regions, except Russia, would benefit financially. Russia would forego revenue of at least $20 billion for the first commitment period. Implementation without Russia could improve the environmental performance of the Protocol. It would reduce reliance on Annex B sinks, use of surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) for compliance, and the quantity of Kyoto units banked for subsequent commitment periods. Actual emissions by Kyoto Protocol Parties would fall, but the reduction may be offset by leakage to the US and Russia. 相似文献
9.
Axel Michaelowa 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):353-371
Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have traditionally served as an indirect link between cap and trade systems around the world. However, since 2010, import restrictions have increased. Reasons for import limitations include the supplementarity principle, genuine concerns about the environmental integrity of CERs and social benefits of CDM projects, pressure from domestic emissions mitigation industries, concerns about competition in the industries in which reductions take place, as well as the attempt to pressure advanced developing countries to accept national emissions commitments under a future international climate policy regime. It is shown that import limitations lead to a decrease in CER prices and a race to generate CERs as quickly as possible. Such effects are visible in the CDM market after the EU announced its import limitations. The exclusion of CERs from specific project types will distort the CDM supply curve and increase the CER price unless the marginal abatement costs of the excluded project type are above the CER world market price. Similarly, exclusion of CERs from specific host countries will increase the price. Substantial differences are found in CER access to national carbon markets around the world.Policy relevanceCDM regulators could try to improve access of CERs to cap and trade schemes through improvements to additionality testing, standardizing baseline and monitoring methodologies and stakeholder consultation. However, regulators should be aware that standardization is no panacea, and controversies may resurface if standardized additionality determination (e.g. through benchmarks or positive lists) are applied for a certain period and found to be problematic. However, domestic policy concerns such as an unwillingness to send money abroad to buy credits, an inability to control market prices, and competitiveness impacts cannot be resolved by CDM reforms. If, despite such reforms of the CDM, blatant protectionism continues, a challenge before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be launched to stop discrimination of service exports from specific countries. 相似文献
10.
In the first Kyoto commitment period Russia could be the major supplier for the greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions market. Potential Russian supply depends on the ability of Russia to keep GHG emissions lower than the Kyoto target. In the literature there is no common understanding of the total trading potential of Russia at the international carbon market. In this paper we focus on CO2 emission, which constituted nearly 80%of Russian GHG emission. We compare different projections of Russian CO2emission and analyze the most important factors, which predetermine the CO2emission growth. In a transition economy these factors are: Gross Domestic Product(GDP) dynamic, changes of GDP structure, innovation activity, transformation of export-import flows and response to the market signals. The input-output macroeconomic model with the two different input-output tables representing old and new production technologies has been applied for the analysis to simulate technological innovations and structural changes in the Russian economy during transition period. The Russian supply at the international GHG market without forest sector may be up to 3 billion metric ton of CO2 equivalent. Earlier actions to reduce CO2 emission are critical to insure theRussiansupply at the international carbon market. With regard to the current status of the Russian capital market, the forward trading with OECD countries is only the possibility to raise initial investments to roll no-regret and low-cost GHG reduction. This paper discusses uncertainties of RussianCO2emission dynamics and analyzes the different incentives to lower the emission pathway. 相似文献
11.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(4):273-292
The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties have important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are particularly relevant, because these variables have the largest impact on the overall abatement cost to be borne by Annex B countries in the short and in the long run. This paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol both on technological innovation and on the price of emission permits (and, as a consequence, on abatement costs). In particular, the analysis highlights mechanisms and feedbacks related to technological innovation, technological spillovers and R&D which could be relevant and which modify some policy relevant conclusions. First, we identify two feedback effects which explain why our results lead to a less significant fall in the price of permits than in most empirical analyses recently circulated. We show that the US defection from the Kyoto Protocol, by inducing a decline in the demand and price of emission permits, lowers the incentives to undertake energy-saving R&D. As a consequence, emissions increase and feed back on the demand and supply of permits, thus implying a lower decline in the price of permits than previously estimated. At the same time, as a result of the reduced R&D investments and the augmented emissions, climate change damages intensify and require an increase in investments that are again coupled with a growth of emissions. By thus again increasing the demand for permits and reducing their supply, this effect enhances the previous mechanism. Notwithstanding the lower decline in the price of permits, the paper still identifies a smaller price than would occur with a US participation. Therefore, we emphasise in a second step the crucial role of Russia in climate negotiations due to a large increase in Russia’s bargaining power. 相似文献
12.
RAE KWON CHUNG 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):171-176
We can generate a net global GHG emission reduction from developing countries (in an UNFCCC term, non-Annex 1 Parties) without imposing targets on them, if we discount CERs generated from CDM projects. The CER discounting scheme means that a part or all of CDM credits, i.e., CERs, made by developing countries through unilateral CDM projects will be retired rather than sold to developed countries to increase their emissions. It is not feasible to impose certain forms of target (whether sectoral or intensity targets) on non-Annex 1 whose emission trend is hard to predict and whose industrial structure is undergoing a rapid change. Instead of imposing targets (a command and control approach), we should apply market instruments in generating a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. Since April 2005 when the first unilateral CDM was approved by the CDM Executive Board, CDM has been functioning as a market mechanism to provide incentives for developing countries to initiate their own emission reduction projects. As CDM is the only market mechanism engaging developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, we should try to re-design CDM so that it can generate net global emission reductions by introducing the idea of discounting CERs. But in order to produce meaningful GHG emission reductions by discounting CERs, the project scope of CDM has to be expanded by relaxing project additionality criteria while maintaining strict technical additionality criteria. Agreeing on the CERs Discounting Scheme will have a better political chance than agreeing on imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries. 相似文献
13.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):251-268
Abstract The objective of this paper is to show that the investments through the clean development mechanism (CDM) can exert a leverage effect to (i) make attractive to developing countries non-binding commitments and the adoption of national policies and measures; this comes as a guarantee of non-conditionally of the mechanism to strictly environmental concerns and (ii) create a flow of additional investments and technological transfer from Annex B countries to non-Annex B countries. The Indian power sector has been chosen as an example of a sector where institutional barriers, market imperfections, and tariff distortions create a great space for Pareto improvements and leave an important potential for no-regret measures: technological transfer, air conditioned systems, transport infrastructures and removal of subsidies on consumption. This paper presents a micro-economic formalisation on (i) the evolution of profitability of current emitting technologies used in the power sector under the adoption of national policies and measures and (ii) the impact on renewable energy technologies competitiveness of emission credits in the context of CDM. This formalisation has been developed to enable quantitative simulation. A first exercise using the Markal model (used in 77 countries) on the electric sector in India enabled us to simulate the leverage effect of emission credits on additional incomes taken as a proxy for development. 相似文献
14.
Transition countries are expected to become important players in the emerging market for greenhouse gas emission reductions, as they can cut emissions at a relatively low cost. However, the attractiveness of the region as a supplier of emission reductions will not only depend on its cost advantage. It will also depend on the business climate offered to carbon investors—factors like a well-functioning legal and regulatory system, economic and political stability and the capacity to process emission reduction projects efficiently. This paper looks at the carbon investment climate in the transition countries eligible for Joint Implementation (JI)—Russia, Ukraine, Croatia and the EU accession countries. It concludes that JI investors will face a clear trade-off between the scope for cheap JI on the one hand, and the quality of the business environment and JI institutions on the other. The countries with the highest potential for cheap emission reductions also tend to be the countries with the most difficult business climate and the least institutional capacity for JI. The most attractive JI locations may be median countries with a reasonable JI potential and an acceptable business climate, such as Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic. 相似文献
15.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(2):251-268
The objective of this paper is to show that the investments through the clean development mechanism (CDM) can exert a leverage effect to (i) make attractive to developing countries non-binding commitments and the adoption of national policies and measures; this comes as a guarantee of non-conditionally of the mechanism to strictly environmental concerns and (ii) create a flow of additional investments and technological transfer from Annex B countries to non-Annex B countries.The Indian power sector has been chosen as an example of a sector where institutional barriers, market imperfections, and tariff distortions create a great space for Pareto improvements and leave an important potential for no-regret measures: technological transfer, air conditioned systems, transport infrastructures and removal of subsidies on consumption.This paper presents a micro-economic formalisation on (i) the evolution of profitability of current emitting technologies used in the power sector under the adoption of national policies and measures and (ii) the impact on renewable energy technologies competitiveness of emission credits in the context of CDM. This formalisation has been developed to enable quantitative simulation. A first exercise using the Markal model (used in 77 countries) on the electric sector in India enabled us to simulate the leverage effect of emission credits on additional incomes taken as a proxy for development. 相似文献
16.
Transition countries are expected to become important players in the emerging market for greenhouse gas emission reductions, as they can cut emissions at a relatively low cost. However, the attractiveness of the region as a supplier of emission reductions will not only depend on its cost advantage. It will also depend on the business climate offered to carbon investors—factors like a well-functioning legal and regulatory system, economic and political stability and the capacity to process emission reduction projects efficiently. This paper looks at the carbon investment climate in the transition countries eligible for Joint Implementation (JI)—Russia, Ukraine, Croatia and the EU accession countries. It concludes that JI investors will face a clear trade-off between the scope for cheap JI on the one hand, and the quality of the business environment and JI institutions on the other. The countries with the highest potential for cheap emission reductions also tend to be the countries with the most difficult business climate and the least institutional capacity for JI. The most attractive JI locations may be median countries with a reasonable JI potential and an acceptable business climate, such as Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic. 相似文献
17.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):273-292
Abstract The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties have important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are particularly relevant, because these variables have the largest impact on the overall abatement cost to be borne by Annex B countries in the short and in the long run. This paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol both on technological innovation and on the price of emission permits (and, as a consequence, on abatement costs). In particular, the analysis highlights mechanisms and feedbacks related to technological innovation, technological spillovers and R&D which could be relevant and which modify some policy relevant conclusions. First, we identify two feedback effects which explain why our results lead to a less significant fall in the price of permits than in most empirical analyses recently circulated. We show that the US defection from the Kyoto Protocol, by inducing a decline in the demand and price of emission permits, lowers the incentives to undertake energy-saving R&D. As a consequence, emissions increase and feed back on the demand and supply of permits, thus implying a lower decline in the price of permits than previously estimated. At the same time, as a result of the reduced R&D investments and the augmented emissions, climate change damages intensify and require an increase in investments that are again coupled with a growth of emissions. By thus again increasing the demand for permits and reducing their supply, this effect enhances the previous mechanism. Notwithstanding the lower decline in the price of permits, the paper still identifies a smaller price than would occur with a US participation. Therefore, we emphasise in a second step the crucial role of Russia in climate negotiations due to a large increase in Russia's bargaining power. 相似文献
18.
附件一国家温室气体排放趋势及其履约进展 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
对《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处最新公布的温室气体排放数据进行统计分析,结果显示：相对于基准年（1990年）,附件一国家温室气体排放总量整体呈下降趋势。其中,经济转型期国家温室气体排放总量总体上呈逐年下降趋势,非经济转型期国家的温室气体排放总量有逐年增长的趋势。美国和加拿大能源部门的温室气体排放量增长最为显著,相对于1990年,2005年其增幅分别为19.2%和28.6%;英国和德国能源部门温室气体减排量最为显著,其减幅分别为7.8%和17.4%。在2005年,有超过一半的附件一国家的实际排放量低于其目标排放量,履约进展状况良好。 相似文献
19.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):752-767
Policy-makers and scientists have raised concerns about the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in particular regarding its low contribution to sustainable development, unbalanced regional and sectoral distribution of projects, and its limited contribution to global emission reductions. Differentiation between countries or project types has been proposed as a possible way forward to address these problems. An overview is provided of the different ways in which CDM differentiation could be implemented. The implications for the actors involved in the CDM are analysed, along with a quantitative assessment of the impacts on the carbon market, using bottom-up marginal abatement cost curves. The discounting of CDM credits, quota systems, or differentiated eligibility of countries could help to address several of the concerns raised. Preferential treatment may also make a limited contribution to achieving the aims of CDM differentiation by increasing opportunities for under-represented host countries. The impact on the carbon market appears to be limited for most options. 相似文献
20.
对《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处最新公布的温室气体排放数据进行统计分析,结果显示：相对于基准年（1990年）,附件一国家温室气体排放总量整体呈下降趋势。其中,经济转型期国家温室气体排放总量总体上呈逐年下降趋势,非经济转型期国家的温室气体排放总量有逐年增长的趋势。美国和加拿大能源部门的温室气体排放量增长最为显著,相对于1990年,2005年其增幅分别为19.2%和28.6%;英国和德国能源部门温室气体减排量最为显著,其减幅分别为7.8%和17.4%。在2005年,有超过一半的附件一国家的实际排放量低于其目标排放量,履约进展状况良好。 相似文献