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1.
The United States’ decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (pending possible re-engagement under different terms) may have significant ramifications for international climate policy, but the implications of this decision remain contested. This commentary illustrates how comparative analysis of US participation in multilateral environmental agreements can inform predictions and future assessments of the decision. We compare and contrast US non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, focusing on four key areas that may condition the influence of US treaty decisions on international climate policy: (i) global momentum on climate change mitigation; (ii) the possibility of US non-participation giving rise to alternative forms of international collaboration on climate policy; (iii) the timing and circumstances of the US decision to exit; and (iv) the influence of treaty design on countries’ incentives to participate and comply. We find that differences across the two treaties relating to the first three factors are more likely to reduce the negative ramifications of US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement compared to the Kyoto Protocol. However, the increased urgency of deep decarbonization renders US non-participation a major concern despite its declining share of global emissions. Moreover, key design features of the Paris Agreement suggest that other countries may react to the US decision by scaling back their levels of ambition and compliance, even if they remain in the Agreement. Key policy insights Increasing global momentum on mitigation since 1997 means that US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is potentially less damaging than its non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol Despite the declining US share of global emissions, greater urgency of deep decarbonization means that the non-participation of a major player, such as the US, remains problematic for global cooperation and achieving the Paris Agreement’s goals Differences in the design of the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement suggest that US non-participation is more likely to prompt reluctant countries to stay within the Paris framework but reduce levels of ambition and compliance, rather than exit the Agreement altogether
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2.
The Paris Agreement is the last hope to keep global temperature rise below 2°C. The consensus agrees to holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim for 1.5°C. Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution (NDC) will represent a progression beyond the party’s then current NDC, and reflect its highest possible ambition. Using Ireland as a test case, we show that increased mitigation ambition is required to meet the Paris Agreement goals in contrast to current EU policy goals of an 80–95% reduction by 2050. For the 1.5°C consistent carbon budgets, the technically feasible scenarios' abatement costs rise to greater than €8,100/tCO 2 by 2050. The greatest economic impact is in the short term. Annual GDP growth rates in the period to 2020 reduce from 4% to 2.2% in the 1.5°C scenario. While aiming for net zero emissions beyond 2050, investment decisions in the next 5–10 years are critical to prevent carbon lock-in. Key policy insights Economic growth can be maintained in Ireland while rapidly decarbonizing the energy system. The social cost of carbon needs to be included as standard in valuation of infrastructure investment planning, both by government finance departments and private investors. Technological feasibility is not the limiting factor in achieving rapid deep decarbonization. Immediate increased decarbonization ambition over the next 3–5 years is critical to achieve the Paris Agreement goals, acknowledging the current 80–95% reduction target is not consistent with temperature goals of ‘well below’ 2°C and pursuing 1.5°C. Applying carbon budgets to the energy system results in non-linear CO2 emissions reductions over time, which contrast with current EU policy targets, and the implied optimal climate policy and mitigation investment strategy.
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3.
Reducing fossil fuel supply is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement goal to keep warming ‘well below 2°C’, yet the Agreement is silent on the topic of fossil fuels. This article outlines reasons why it is important that Parties to the Agreement find ways to more explicitly address the phasing out of fossil fuel production under the UNFCCC. It describes how countries aiming to keep fossil fuel supply in line with Paris goals could articulate and report their actions within the current architecture of the Agreement. It also outlines specific mechanisms of the Paris Agreement through which issues related to the curtailment of fossil fuel supply can be addressed. Mapping out a transition away from fossil fuels – and facilitating this transition under the auspices of the UNFCCC process – can enhance the ambition and effectiveness of national and international climate mitigation efforts. Key policy insights The international commitment to limit global average temperature increases to ‘well below 2°C’ provides a strong rationale for Parties to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC to pursue a phase-down in fossil fuel production, not just consumption. Several countries have already made commitments to address fossil fuel supply, by agreeing to phase down coal or oil exploration and production. Integrating these commitments into the UNFCCC process would link them to global climate goals, and ensure they form part of a broader global effort to transition away from fossil fuels. The Paris Agreement provides a number of new opportunities for Parties to address fossil fuel production.
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4.
Under the Paris Agreement, countries are encouraged to submit long-term low greenhouse gas emissions development strategies. Such strategies will merge emissions goals with socio-economic objectives and enable countries to increase their ambition over time, thus offering an opportunity to close the gap between the current emissions trajectory and the Agreement’s ‘well below 2°C’ target. China is in the process of preparing its own long-term strategy. We argue in this article that non-CO 2 greenhouse gases (NCGGs) should be an essential component of China’s long-term low-emissions strategy. To incorporate NCGGs into China’s long-term low-emissions development strategy, key scientific and institutional challenges should be addressed, such as uncertainty about the accuracy of NCGG emissions inventories; uncertainty about future projections of NCGG emissions; and institutional coordination deficits and imbalanced policy approaches. Overcoming these barriers will have significant implications for climate change mitigation and can open a path for the development of concrete follow-up actions. Key policy insights Non-CO2 greenhouse gases (NCGGs) make up around 17% of China’s GHG emissions, but China has no quantified target to limit or reduce these gases. NCGG emissions mitigation should be an essential component of China's long-term low-emissions strategy, which is currently under development. Considerable uncertainty exists over both historical NCGG emissions data and forecasts. This poses challenges to developing a comprehensive multi-gas strategy. Institutional challenges must also be addressed, such as fragmentation of responsibility for NCGGs.
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5.
The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity. Key policy insights Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time. Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13. The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity. Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk – through eligibility criteria or limits – could complement these approaches.
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6.
A change in economic structure influences the total energy consumption as well as CO 2 emissions of a country, given the inherent difference in levels of energy intensity and energy fuel mix of different economic sectors. Its significance has been recognized in recent literature on China’s emission mitigation which could arguably raise China’s mitigation potential and thus the possibility of keeping the 2-degree trajectory on track. This article utilizes the past trend of economic structural change of five East Asian developed economies to project the energy consumption and CO 2 emissions of China in the coming decades. A special delineation of the economic sector is made, putting private consumption together with the three typical economic production sectors, to resolve the mismatch between the statistical data of energy consumption and economic production, in that residential energy consumption is typically merged into the tertiary sector, although it does not directly correspond to gross domestic product (GDP) output. Results suggest that the level of CO 2 emissions would be lower if China followed a development pathway emphasizing the development of the tertiary sector and continuously shrinking her secondary sector, making it possible for China to contribute more to global carbon mitigation. The impact from the rise of private consumption would be relatively insignificant compared to deindustrialization. In addition to continuous improvement in technology, economic structural change, which reduces carbon emission intensity, would be essential for China to be able to achieve the carbon emission level pledged in the Paris Agreement. Key policy insights For China, significant economic structural reform, particularly deindustrialization, is necessary to achieve the goal of ‘peak emission by 2030’. Any additional contribution from China to the global effort to maintain a 2-degree trajectory would be limited – from a ‘fair-contribution’ perspective based on share of population or GDP – because the implied mitigation targets would be almost impossible to achieve. If developing countries follow the pathway of developed economies, particularly in developing energy-intensive industries, energy consumption and CO2 emissions would significantly increase, reducing the possibility of keeping global temperature rise within the 2-degree Celsius benchmark.
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7.
The 2015 Paris Agreement requires increasingly ambitious emissions reduction efforts from its member countries. Accounting for ancillary positive health outcomes (health co-benefits) that result from implementing climate change mitigation policies can provide Parties to the Paris Agreement with a sound rationale for introducing stronger mitigation strategies. Despite this recognition, a knowledge gap exists on the role of health co-benefits in the development of climate change mitigation policies. To address this gap, the case study presented here investigates the role of health co-benefits in the development of European Union (EU) climate change mitigation policies through analysis and consideration of semi-structured interview data, government documents, journal articles and media releases. We find that while health co-benefits are an explicit consideration in the development of EU climate change mitigation policies, their influence on final policy outcomes has been limited. Our analysis suggests that whilst health co-benefits are a key driver of air pollution mitigation policies, climate mitigation policies are primarily driven by other factors, including economic costs and energy implications. Key policy insights Health co-benefits are quantified and monetized as part of the development of EU climate change mitigation policies but their influence on the final policies agreed upon is limited. Barriers, such as the immediate economic costs associated with climate action, inhibit the influence of health co-benefits on the development of mitigation policies. Health co-benefits primarily drive the development of EU air pollution mitigation policies. The separation of responsibility for GHG and non-GHG emissions across Directorate Generals has decoupled climate change and air pollution mitigation policies, with consequences for the integration of health co-benefits in climate policy.
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8.
On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US intends to leave the Paris Agreement if no alternative terms acceptable to his administration can be agreed upon. In this article, an agent-based model of bottom-up climate mitigation clubs is used to derive the impact that lack of US participation may have on the membership of such clubs and their emissions coverage. We systematically analyse the prospects for climate mitigation clubs, depending on which of three conceivable roles the US takes on: as a leader (for benchmarking), as a follower (i.e. willing to join climate mitigation clubs initiated by others if this is in its best interest) or as an outsider (i.e. staying outside of any climate mitigation club no matter what). We investigate these prospects for three types of incentives for becoming a member: club goods, conditional commitments and side-payments. Our results show that lack of US leadership significantly constrains climate clubs’ potential. Lack of US willingness to follow others’ lead is an additional, but smaller constraint. Only in a few cases will US withdrawal entail widespread departures by other countries. We conclude that climate mitigation clubs can function without the participation of an important GHG emitter, given that other major emitters show leadership, although these clubs will rarely cover more than 50% of global emissions. Key policy insights The US switching from being a leader to being a follower substantially reduces the emissions coverage of climate mitigation clubs. The US switching from being a follower to being an outsider sometimes reduces coverage further, but has a smaller impact than the switch from leader to follower. The switch from follower to outsider only occasionally results in widespread departures by other countries; in a few instances it even entices others to join. Climate mitigation clubs can function even without the participation of the US, provided that other major emitters show leadership; however, such clubs will typically be unable to cover more than 50% of global emissions. Climate mitigation clubs may complement the Paris Agreement and can also serve as an alternative in case Paris fails.
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9.
In principle, many climate policymakers have accepted that large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement’s mitigation targets, but they have avoided proposing by whom CDR might be delivered. Given its role in international climate policy, the European Union (EU) might be expected to lead the way. But among EU climate policymakers so far there is little talk on CDR, let alone action. Here we assess how best to ‘target’ CDR to motivate EU policymakers exploring which CDR target strategy may work best to start dealing with CDR on a meaningful scale. A comprehensive CDR approach would focus on delivering the CDR volumes required from the EU by 2100, approximately at least 50 Gigatonnes (Gt) CO 2, according to global model simulations aiming to keep warming below 2°C. A limited CDR approach would focus on an intermediate target to deliver the CDR needed to reach ‘net zero emissions’ (i.e. the gross negative emissions needed to offset residual positive emissions that are too expensive or even impossible to mitigate). We argue that a comprehensive CDR approach may be too intimidating for EU policymakers. A limited CDR approach that only addresses the necessary steps to reach the (intermediate) target of ‘net zero emissions’ is arguably more achievable, since it is a better match to the existing policy paradigm and would allow for a pragmatic phase-in of CDR while avoiding outright resistance by environmental NGOs and the broader public. Key policy insights Making CDR an integral part of EU climate policy has the potential to significantly reshape the policy landscape. Burden sharing considerations would probably play a major role, with comprehensive CDR prolonging the disparity and tensions between progressives and laggards. Introducing limited CDR in the context of ‘net zero’ pathways would retain a visible primary focus on decarbonization but acknowledge the need for a significant enhancement of removals via ‘natural’ and/or ‘engineered’ sinks. A decarbonization approach that intends to lead to a low level of ‘residual emissions’ (to be tackled by a pragmatic phase-in of CDR) should be the priority of EU climate policy.
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10.
In June 2017, the Trump administration decided to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement, a landmark climate agreement adopted in 2015 by 195 nations. The exit of the US has not just raised concern that the US will miss its domestic emission reduction targets, but also that other parties to the Paris Agreement might backtrack on their initial pledges regarding emission reductions or financial contributions. Here we assess the magnitude of the threat that US non-cooperation poses to the Paris Agreement from an international relations perspective. We argue that US non-cooperation does not fundamentally alter US emissions, which are unlikely to rise even in the absence of new federal climate policies. Nor does it undermine nationally determined contributions under pledge and review, as the Paris Agreement has introduced a new logic of domestically driven climate policies and the cost of low-carbon technologies keeps falling. However, US non-participation in raising climate finance could raise high barriers to global climate cooperation in the future. Political strategies to mitigate these threats include direct engagement by climate leaders such as the European Union with key emerging economies, notably China and India, and domestic climate policies that furnish benefits to traditional opponents of ambitious climate policy. Key policy insights US non-cooperation need not be a major threat to pledge and review under the Paris Agreement. US non-cooperation is a serious threat to climate finance. Deeper engagement with emerging economies offers new opportunities for global climate policy.
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11.
Studies show that the ‘well below 2°C’ target from the Paris Agreement will be hard to meet without large negative emissions from mid-century onwards, which means removing CO 2 from the atmosphere and storing the carbon dioxide in biomass, soil, suitable geological formations, deep ocean sediments, or chemically bound to certain minerals. Biomass energy combined with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) is the negative emission technology (NET) given most attention in a number of integrated assessment model studies and in the latest IPCC reports. However, less attention has been given to governance aspects of NETs. This study aims to identify pragmatic ways forward for BECCS, through synthesizing the literature relevant to accounting and rewarding BECCS, and its relation to the Paris Agreement. BECCS is divided into its two elements: biomass and CCS. Calculating net negative emissions requires accounting for sustainability and resource use related to biomass energy production, processing and use, and interactions with the global carbon cycle. Accounting for the CCS element of BECCS foremost relates to the carbon dioxide capture rate and safe underground storage. Rewarding BECCS as a NET depends on the efficiency of biomass production, transport and processing for energy use, global carbon cycle feedbacks, and safe storage of carbon dioxide, which together determine net carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere. Sustainable biomass production is essential, especially with regard to trade-offs with competing land use. Negative emissions have an added value compared to avoided emissions, which should be reflected in the price of negative emission ‘credits’, but must be discounted due to global carbon cycle feedbacks. BECCS development will depend on linkages to carbon trading mechanisms and biomass trading. Key policy insights A standardized framework for sustainable biomass should be adopted. Countries should agree on a standardized framework for accounting and rewarding BECCS and other negative emission technologies. Early government support is indispensable to enable BECCS development, scale-up and business engagement. BECCS projects should be designed to maximize learning across various applications and across other NETs. BECCS development should be aligned with modalities of the Paris Agreement and market mechanisms.
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12.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a significant and potentially innovative addition to UNFCCC frameworks for mobilizing increased finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet the GCF faces challenges of operationalization not only as a relatively new international fund but also as a result of US President Trump’s announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Consequently the GCF faces a major reduction in actual funding contributions and also governance challenges at the levels of its Board and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), to which it is ultimately accountable. This article analyzes these challenges with reference to the GCF’s internal regulations and its agreements with third parties to demonstrate how exploiting design features of the GCF could strengthen its resilience in the face of such challenges. These features include linkages with UNFCCC constituted bodies, particularly the Technology Mechanism, and enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially through its Private Sector Facility. The article posits that deepening GCF interlinkages would increase both the coherence of climate finance governance and the GCF’s ability to contribute to ambitious climate action in uncertain times. Key policy insights The Trump Administration’s purported withdrawal from the Paris Agreement creates challenges for the GCF operating model in three key domains: capitalization, governance and guidance. Two emerging innovations could prove crucial in GCF resilience to fulfil its role in Paris Agreement implementation: (1) interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and (2) engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially private sector actors such as large US investors and financiers. There is also an emerging soft role for the GCF as interlocutor between policy-makers and non-Party actors to help bridge the communication divide that often plagues cross-sectoral interactions. This role could develop through: (a) the GCF tripartite interface between the Private Sector Facility, Accredited Entities and National Designated Authorities; and (b) strengthened collaborations between the UNFCCC Technical and Financial Mechanisms.
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13.
Despite the ambitious temperature goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement, the pace of reducing global CO 2 emissions remains sluggish. This creates conditions in which the idea of temperature ‘overshoot and peak-shaving’ is emerging as a possible strategy to meet the Paris goal. An overshoot and peak-shaving scenario rests upon the ‘temporary’ use of speculative solar radiation management (SRM) technologies combined with large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Whilst some view optimistically the strategic interdependence between SRM and CDR, we argue that this strategy comes with a risk of escalating ‘climate debt’. We explain our position using the logic of debt and the analogy of subprime mortgage lending. In overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios, the role of CDR and SRM is to compensate for delayed mitigation, placing the world in a double debt: ‘emissions debt’ and ‘temperature debt’. Analogously, this can be understood as a combination of ‘subprime mortgage’ (i.e. large-scale CDR) and ‘home-equity-line-of-credit’ (i.e. temporary SRM). With this analogy, we draw some important lessons from the 2007–2009 US subprime mortgage crisis. The analogy signals that the efficacy of temporary SRM cannot be evaluated in isolation of the feasibility of large-scale CDR and that the failure of the overshoot promise will lead to prolonged peak-shaving, masking an ever-rising climate debt. Overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios should not be presented as a secured feasible investment, but rather as a high-risk speculation betting on insecure promises. Obscuring the riskiness of such scenarios is a precipitous step towards escalating a climate debt crisis. Key policy insights The slow progress of mitigation increases the attraction of an ‘overshoot and peak-shaving’ scenario which combines temporary SRM with large-scale CDR Following the logic of debt, the role of CDR and SRM in this scenario is to compensate for delayed mitigation, creating a double debt of CO2 emissions and global temperature Using the analogy of subprime lending, this strategy can be seen as offering a combination of subprime mortgage and open-ended ‘line-of-credit’ Because the ‘success’ of peak-shaving by temporary SRM hinges critically on the overshoot promise of large-scale CDR, SRM and CDR should not be discussed separately
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14.
The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement propose a country’s contribution to global mitigation efforts and domestic adaptation initiatives. This paper provides a systematic analysis of NDCs submitted by South Asian nations, in order to assess how far their commitments might deliver meaningful contributions to the global 2°C target and to sustainable broad-based adaptation benefits. Though agriculture-related emissions are prominent in emission profiles of South Asian countries, their emission reduction commitments are less likely to include agriculture, partly because of a concern over food security. We find that income-enhancing mitigation technologies that do not jeopardize food security may significantly augment the region’s mitigation potential. In the case of adaptation, analysis shows that the greatest effort will be directed towards protecting the cornerstones of the ‘green revolution’ for ensuring food security. Development of efficient and climate-resilient agricultural value chains and integrated farming bodies will be important to ensuring adaptation investment. Potentially useful models of landscape level climate resilience actions and ecosystem-based adaptation are also presented, along with estimates of the aggregate costs of agricultural adaptation. Countries in the region propose different mixes of domestic and foreign, and public and private, adaptation finance to meet the substantial gaps. Key policy insights Though substantial potential for mitigation of agricultural emissions exists in South Asia, governments in the region do not commit to agricultural emissions reductions in their NDCs. Large-scale adoption of income-enhancing technologies is the key to realizing agricultural mitigation potential in South Asia, whilst maintaining food security. Increasing resilience and profitability through structural changes, value chain interventions, and landscape-level actions may provide strong options to build adaptive capacity and enhance food security. Both private finance (autonomous adaptation) and international financial transfers will be required to close the substantial adaptation finance gap
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15.
After the successful conclusion of the Paris Climate Conference (Conference of the Parties (COP) 21), countries are now attempting to identify implementation measures. An important consensus has been reached on the necessity of putting in place both mitigation and adaptation measures. In this context, this article builds a three-sector China and rest of the world model based on the DE-carbonization Model with Endogenous Technologies for Emission Reductions (DEMETER) and World Induced Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH) models. It assesses China’s mitigation and adaptation investment strategies by 2050 with an optimization including climate externalities. By making the 450?ppm target and China’s 2030 CO 2 emissions peak exogenous, it assesses two scenarios: (1) investment only in mitigation and (2) investment in both mitigation and adaptation. The article finds the following: First, the policy package with investment in both mitigation and adaptation can ensure lower CO 2 emissions and avoid more climate damage. Second, investment in adaptation should be massively injected by around 2040, whereas mitigation efforts should be continuous. Third, the CO 2 emissions peak in the tertiary sector should come prior to 2030 while the emissions pathway of the secondary sector could be allowed to increase slowly until 2035. POLICY RELEVANCE The necessity of engaging in both mitigation and adaptation has been widely accepted since the Paris Climate Conference (COP21), yet few studies exist in this regard concerning China. Substantial investment in adaptation needs to be introduced by 2040 while the investment on mitigation should peak by 2030. The CO2 emissions peak in the tertiary sector would be reached prior to 2030 while the peak in the secondary sector is achieved around 2035. This provides an alternative in China to the existing argument of an earlier peak in the secondary sector.
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16.
Brazil's nationally determined contribution (NDC) pledged under the Paris Agreement has marked a new stage in its climate policy towards strengthening low-carbon economic development beyond the recent drastic cuts in emissions from deforestation. Brazil especially means to limit oil consumption driven by future economic growth and to increase energy efficiency and biofuel use in the transport sector. On the other hand, Brazil still aspires to become a major petroleum province given its huge reserves of ‘pre-salt’ oil. This article aims to clarify under what conditions low-carbon economic development and oil exploration can possibly be combined in Brazil and what would be the energy system, environmental and macroeconomic implications of enabling policies for doing so. To address these questions, an energy–economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Brazilian economy is used to simulate alternative scenarios up to 2030. The results first show that implementing the most recent energy plans, which take into account the new economic reality in Brazil, should lead to over 20% lower domestic CO 2 emissions in 2030 than the indicative NDC target, and to the export of the bulk of newfound crude oil. Second, with the same level of oil production, deeper domestic decarbonization, triggered by additional carbon pricing and sustainable efficiency measures, appears achievable with very small gross domestic product (GDP) loss and maximum oil exports, while being aligned with a 2°C emission pathway. However, (i) extra oil exports may induce net additional emissions outside Brazil and be seen as a perverse incentive and (ii) the economic growth strategy based on high oil exports may hinder the necessary diversification of the Brazilian economy. Key policy insights Low-carbon development goals will strongly interact with oil policy in Brazil. The 2030 NDC target should be easy to achieve considering the new economic reality in Brazil. Deeper domestic decarbonization is achievable with very limited GDP loss and significant oil exports, while being aligned with a 2°C emission pathway. A broad strategic vision is needed to reconcile climate policy, energy policy and other economic development objectives.
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17.
In this study, a long-range energy alternative planning (LEAP) model was built to evaluate the relative priority of three kinds of policies expected to be implemented for the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors (EIMS) in China to achieve CO 2 mitigation and energy conservation targets. These policies encourage (1) the use of more electricity instead of coal; (2) the continuous improvement of energy efficiency; and (3) a shift to other less energy-demanding sectors. The results indicate that the policy of shifting economic activity from the EIMS to other sectors is most helpful for China to achieve its targets of mitigating CO 2 emissions and conserving energy. Encouraging the EIMS to use more electricity can help China to achieve a higher proportion of non-fossil-fuel based energy in its overall primary energy consumption. No single policy will allow China to achieve all the targets, emphasizing the need for an integrated policy design that combines all types of policies. Key policy insights The policy of encouraging a shift to less energy intensive industries should receive the highest priority in aiming to peak China's energy-related CO2 emissions as early as possible, and lower overall CO2 emissions, coal consumption and primary energy consumption in the long run. Encouraging a shift to electricity should go hand-in-hand with greater energy efficiency, otherwise such a policy cannot help China significantly reduce energy-related CO2 emissions. Encouraging the EIMS to use more electricity should receive the highest priority in helping China achieve a higher proportion of non-fossil-fuel based energy in its overall primary energy consumption.
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18.
Ahead of the Conference of Parties (COP) 24 where countries will first take stock of climate action post Paris, this paper assesses India’s progress on its nationally determined contribution (NDC) targets and future energy plans. We find that, although India is well on track to meet its NDC pledges, these targets were extremely modest given previous context. Furthermore, there is considerable uncertainty around India’s energy policy post 2030 and if current plans for energy futures materialise, the Paris Agreement’s 2 degrees goal will be almost certainly unachievable. India’s role in international climate politics has shifted from obstructionism to leadership particularly following the announcement of withdrawal by the United States from the Paris Agreement, but analysis reveals that India’s ‘hard’ actions on the domestic front are inconsistent with its ‘soft’ actions in the international climate policy arena. Going forward, India is likely to face increasing calls for stronger mitigation action and we suggest that this gap can be bridged by strengthening the links between India’s foreign policy ambitions, international climate commitments, and domestic energy realities. Key policy insights India’s NDC pledges on carbon intensity and share of non-fossil fuel capacity are relatively modest given domestic context and offer plenty of room to increase ambition of action. India’s ‘soft’ leadership in global climate policy can be matched by ‘hard’ commitments by bringing NDC pledges in line with domestic policy realities. There is significant uncertainty around future plans for coal power in India which have the potential to exceed the remaining global carbon budget for 2 degrees.
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19.
Food-insecure households in many countries depend on international aid to alleviate acute shocks and chronic shortages. Some food security programmes (including Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program–PSNP – which provides a case study for this article) have integrated aid in exchange for labour on public works to reduce long-term dependence by investing in the productive capacity and resilience of communities. Using this approach, Ethiopia has embarked upon an ambitious national programme of land restoration and sustainable land management. Although the intent was to reduce poverty, here we show that an unintended co-benefit is the climate-change mitigation from reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increased landscape carbon stocks. The article first shows that the total reduction in net GHG emissions from PSNP’s land management at the national scale is estimated at 3.4 million?Mg?CO 2e?y ?1 – approximately 1.5% of the emissions reductions in Ethiopia’s Nationally Determined Contribution for the Paris Agreement. The article then explores some of the opportunities and constraints to scaling up of this impact. Key policy insights Food security programmes (FSPs) can contribute to climate change mitigation by creating a vehicle for investment in land and ecosystem restoration. Maximizing mitigation, while enhancing but not compromising food security, requires that climate projections, and mitigation and adaptation responses should be mainstreamed into planning and implementation of FSPs at all levels. Cross-cutting oversight is required to integrate land restoration, climate policy, food security and disaster risk management into a coherent policy framework. Institutional barriers to optimal implementation should be addressed, such as incentive mechanisms that reward effort rather than results, and lack of centralized monitoring and evaluation of impacts on the physical environment. Project implementation can often be improved by adopting best management practices, such as using productive living livestock barriers where possible, and increasing the integration of agroforestry and non-timber forest products into landscape regeneration.
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20.
The role of agriculture in the context of climate change is a complex issue. On the one hand, concerns about food security highlight the need to prioritize adaptation; on the other hand, the target of the Paris Agreement (keeping global temperature rise well below 2°C) cannot be achieved without a significant decrease in agricultural emissions. Various analyses of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement show how countries intend to prioritize the needs for adaptation and mitigation in the agricultural sector. This paper focuses on 46 countries that contribute 90% of global agricultural emissions and asks how they are addressing the agricultural sector in their climate mitigation policies. It takes into account that conditions and circumstances in countries vary significantly but might also indicate similar patterns. The analysis is based on information provided by countries in their NDCs, as well as their Biennial Reports (BRs) or Biennial Update Reports (BURs) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It further includes data on national agricultural emissions. By applying a mixed methods approach, which combines qualitative content analysis and comparative cluster analysis, we find that countries vary in their progress on agriculture and climate mitigation for many different reasons. These reasons include the national perception of the problem, divergent starting points for climate policy, particularities of the agricultural sector and, correspondingly, the availability of cost-effective mitigation technologies. Key policy insights While for many countries the NDCs signify the beginning of their climate policy, UNFCCC biennial reports can be used to learn more about the policies that countries have already implemented. Mitigation action in the agricultural sector is emphasized most prominently in cases where co-benefits are possible and production is not impacted negatively. Policies and measures in the agricultural sector often do not align with the UNFCCC system of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). In addition to improving MRV-systems, it seems equally important to exchange national experiences with implemented measures and policies. The Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture could take into account the problem of different definitions of sector boundaries and thus the importance of different mitigation measures.
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