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1.
Mobilizing climate finance for climate change mitigation is a crucial part of meeting the ‘well-below’ 2°C goal of the Paris Agreement. Climate finance refers to investments specifically in climate change mitigation and adaptation activities, which involve public finance and the leveraging of private finance. A large proportion of climate finance is Official Development Assistance (ODA) from OECD countries to ODA-eligible countries. The evidence shows that the largest proportion of climate finance for climate change mitigation has been channelled to the development of renewable energy, with a much smaller proportion flowing to other crucial forms of clean energy-related measures, such as demand-side management (DSM) (particularly sustainable cooling) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS). This forms the rationale and aim of this synthesis paper: to review the role of climate finance to develop clean energy beyond renewables. In doing so, the paper draws on practical policy and programme experiences of some donor countries, such as the UK, and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). This paper argues that a greater amount of climate finance from OECD countries to ODA-eligible fossil fuel-intensive emerging economies and developing countries is required for sustainable cooling and CCUS, particularly in the form of technical assistance and clean energy innovation. Key policy insights Demand-side management (DSM) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) are underfunded in climate finance compared with the promotion of renewables. Climate finance for sustainable cooling, in particular, represents just 0.04% of total ODA, despite cooling projected to represent 13% of global emissions by 2030. Public investment in CCUS is limited at US $28 billion since 2007, despite the costs of meeting the Paris Agreement estimated to be 40-128% more expensive without CCUS. Additional climate finance for these sectors should not come at the expense of funding for renewables but should be complementary to it.
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2.
While carbon pricing is widely seen as a crucial element of climate policy and has been implemented in many countries, it also has met with strong resistance. We provide a comprehensive overview of public perceptions of the fairness of carbon pricing and how these affect policy acceptability. To this end, we review evidence from empirical studies on how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural aspects of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade. In addition, we examine preferences for particular redistributive and other uses of revenues generated by carbon pricing and their role in instrument acceptability. Our results indicate a high concern over distributional effects, particularly in relation to policy impacts on poor people, in turn reducing policy acceptability. In addition, people show little trust in the capacities of governments to put the revenues of carbon pricing to good use. Somewhat surprisingly, most studies do not indicate clear public preferences for using revenues to ensure fairer policy outcomes, notably by reducing its regressive effects. Instead, many people prefer using revenues for ‘environmental projects’ of various kinds. We end by providing recommendations for improving public acceptability of carbon pricing. One suggestion to increase policy acceptability is combining the redistribution of revenue to vulnerable groups with the funding for environmental projects, such as on renewable energy. Key policy insights If people perceive carbon pricing instruments as fair, this increases policy acceptability and support. People’s satisfaction with information provided by the government about the policy instrument increases acceptability. While people express high concern over uneven distribution of the policy burden, they often prefer using carbon pricing revenues for environmental projects instead of compensation for inequitable outcomes. Recent studies find that people’s preferences shift to using revenues for making policy fairer if they better understand the functioning of carbon pricing, notably that relatively high prices of CO2-intensive goods and services reduce their consumption. Combining the redistribution of revenue to support both vulnerable groups and environmental projects, such as on renewable energy, seems to most increase policy acceptability.
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3.
This paper examines power relations, coalitions and conflicts that drive and hinder institutional change in South African climate policy. The analysis finds that the most contested climate policies are those that create distributional conflicts where powerful, non-poor actors will potentially experience real losses to their fossil fuel-based operations. This finding opposes the assumption of competing objectives between emissions and poverty reduction. Yet, actors use discourse that relates to potentially competing objectives between emissions reductions, jobs, poverty reduction and economic welfare. The analysis relates to the broader questions on how to address public policy problems that affect the two objectives of mitigating climate change and simultaneously boosting socio-economic development. South Africa is a middle-income country that represents the challenge of accommodating simultaneous efforts for emissions and poverty reduction. Institutional change has been constrained especially in the process towards establishing climate budgets and a carbon tax. The opposing coalitions have succeeded in delaying the implementation of these processes, as a result of unequal power relations. Institutional change in South African climate policy can be predominantly characterized as layering with elements of policy innovation. New policies build on existing regulations in all three cases of climate policy examined: the climate change response white paper, the carbon tax and the renewable energy programme. Unbalanced power relations between coalitions of support in government and civil society and opposition mainly from the affected industry result in very fragile institutional change. Key policy insights The South African government has managed to drive institutional change in climate policy significantly over the past 7 years. Powerful coalitions of coal-related industries and their lobbies have constrained institutional change and managed to delay the implementation of carbon pricing measures. A successfully managed renewable energy programme has started to transform a coal- and nuclear-powered electricity sector towards integrating sustainable energy technologies. The programme is vulnerable to intergovernmental opposition and requires management at the highest political levels. Potential conflict with poverty reduction measures is not a major concern that actively hinders institutional change towards climate objectives. Predominantly non-poor actors frequently use poverty-related discourse to elevate their interests to issues of public concern.
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4.
Governments are major investors in climate change mitigation, but aversion to public indebtedness has led to reliance on private finance to deliver public assets. Compounding this challenge, financing through Energy Service Contracts is ruled out by accounting rules. With public and traditional private funding avenues closed, government departments have sought contracts that do not disclose the full cost of borrowing, such as the Public–Private Partnership (PPP) described in this case study. We unpack the utility contract filed with the provincial regulator to show that circumventing budgetary constraints cost the Delta School Board (DSB) 8.75% per annum on borrowed private funds while public finance would have cost 4%pa. All levels of the public sector are keen to play their role in climate mitigation. Climate policy is about not passing our burden of unbridled fossil fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions to future generations. If we do not exempt public sector capital investments for decarbonization from deficit regulations, we risk passing an unnecessary economic burden to future generations. Key policy insights Transition to a low-carbon economy requires public sector investments that exceed budget deficit regulations and political aversion in many jurisdictions; Private–Public Partnerships are currently viewed as the solution to this self-imposed fiscal constraint; PPPs without clear performance targets or contractual templates will expose less experienced public sector investors to high costs and emissions above expectations.
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5.
Most countries implementing an emissions trading system (ETS), such as EU member states, California in the US, or South Korea, are generally targeting large sized companies, which consume energy above a specific threshold. However, previous studies using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have analyzed climate policies without considering company size. This may have led to inaccurate results because the impacts of climate policy would differ depending on the coverage of regulated companies. Accordingly, this study examines the environmental and economic impacts of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies, assuming policy results vary by firm size, as covered by the Korean emission trading system. To this end, a CGE model with a separate social accounting matrix based on company size is used to compare three scenarios that reflect different types of carbon pricing methods. The results show that greenhouse gases will be reduced to a lower extent and utility will decrease more if mitigation policies are only imposed to large companies. Key policy insights Carbon pricing policies should consider the different impacts on companies of different sizes and industry sectors. Without considering the different sizes of companies covered by an ETS, the expected carbon price and its economic impact will be underestimated. Small and medium-sized companies will face more negative impacts than large companies in some industry sectors under an ETS, even if the mitigation burden is only faced by large companies.
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6.
The Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set ambitious targets for environmental, economic and social progress. Climate change mitigation policies play a central role in this process. To maximize the benefits and minimize the negative effects of climate change mitigation policies, policymakers need to be aware of the indirect and often complex social and inequality impacts that these policies may have and the pathways through which these impacts emerge. Better understanding of the distributional and inequality impacts is important to avoid negative social and distributional outcomes as countries ratchet up their climate policy ambition in the post-Paris context. This paper synthesizes evidence from the existing literature on social co-impacts of climate change mitigation policy and their implications for inequality. The analysis shows that most policies are linked to both co-benefits and adverse side-effects, and can compound or lessen inequalities depending on contextual factors, policy design and policy implementation. The risk of negative outcomes is greater in contexts characterized by high levels of poverty, corruption and economic and social inequalities, and where limited action is taken to identify and mitigate potentially adverse side-effects. Key policy insights The risk of adverse social outcomes associated with climate change mitigation policies, including worsening inequality, increases as countries ratchet up their ambition to meet the Paris Agreement targets. Many policies that have so far only been piloted will need to be up-scaled. Negative inequality impacts of climate policies can be mitigated (and possibly even prevented), but this requires conscious effort, careful planning and multi-stakeholder engagement. Best results can be achieved when potential inequality impacts are taken into consideration in all stages of policy making, including policy planning, development and implementation. Climate change mitigation policies should take a pro-poor approach that, in best case scenarios, can also lead to a reduction of existing inequalities.
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7.
The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement propose a country’s contribution to global mitigation efforts and domestic adaptation initiatives. This paper provides a systematic analysis of NDCs submitted by South Asian nations, in order to assess how far their commitments might deliver meaningful contributions to the global 2°C target and to sustainable broad-based adaptation benefits. Though agriculture-related emissions are prominent in emission profiles of South Asian countries, their emission reduction commitments are less likely to include agriculture, partly because of a concern over food security. We find that income-enhancing mitigation technologies that do not jeopardize food security may significantly augment the region’s mitigation potential. In the case of adaptation, analysis shows that the greatest effort will be directed towards protecting the cornerstones of the ‘green revolution’ for ensuring food security. Development of efficient and climate-resilient agricultural value chains and integrated farming bodies will be important to ensuring adaptation investment. Potentially useful models of landscape level climate resilience actions and ecosystem-based adaptation are also presented, along with estimates of the aggregate costs of agricultural adaptation. Countries in the region propose different mixes of domestic and foreign, and public and private, adaptation finance to meet the substantial gaps. Key policy insights Though substantial potential for mitigation of agricultural emissions exists in South Asia, governments in the region do not commit to agricultural emissions reductions in their NDCs. Large-scale adoption of income-enhancing technologies is the key to realizing agricultural mitigation potential in South Asia, whilst maintaining food security. Increasing resilience and profitability through structural changes, value chain interventions, and landscape-level actions may provide strong options to build adaptive capacity and enhance food security. Both private finance (autonomous adaptation) and international financial transfers will be required to close the substantial adaptation finance gap
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8.
Adaptation finance is primarily allocated to multilateral entities and national governments, rather than local organizations. This means that the social, political and economic processes that create and sustain inequalities within a country will be the same processes that determine how adaptation finance is used. Using an urban lens, we consider the obstacles currently faced by local governments and local civil society groups in accessing adaptation finance, and show that these are a function of systemic power imbalances between levels of government, and between government and vulnerable communities. We argue that even relatively small amounts of adaptation finance could have a catalytic effect on the capacities and impacts of local organizations, contributing to greater levels of both distributive and procedural justice. We analyse different financial intermediaries and planning systems that could be used to make disbursements from multilateral climate funds fairer and more effective. This could potentially create political opportunities both to respond to direct climate threats and to address underlying drivers of vulnerability, such as marginalization and exclusion. In this way, channelling adaptation finance to the local level could deliver more just processes and outcomes. Key policy insights More multilateral climate funds should establish direct access modalities, and introduce ‘fit-for-purpose’ accreditation procedures and approval processes. Those that have already established such enabling frameworks should prioritize providing readiness support to local organizations, and incentivize state and citizen collaboration in adaptation projects. National governments should consider clearly enshrining the rights and responsibilities of local authorities in National Adaptation Plans, and help them to collect the information, build the capacities and acquire the resources needed to plan and implement adaptation measures. National governments should further encourage local authorities to adopt participatory planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation procedures to encourage citizen participation. Local civil society groups should identify or establish collective entities that can seek accreditation with multilateral funds and then disburse money to their members. Collaboration between groups can facilitate up-scaling through replication (particularly where peer-to-peer learning is embedded in the network) and reduce the transaction costs associated with myriad small projects.
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9.
The successful implementation of the Paris Agreement requires substantial energy policy change on the national level. In national energy policy-making, climate change mitigation goals have to be balanced with arguments on other national energy policy goals, namely limiting cost and increasing energy security. Thus far, very little is known about the relative importance of these goals and how they are related to political partisanship. In order to address this gap, we focus on parliamentary discourse around low-carbon energy futures in Germany over the past three decades and analyze the relative importance of, and partisanship around, energy policy goals. We find that the political discourse revolves around four, rather than three, goals as conventionally assumed; improving the competitiveness of the national energy technology industry is not only an additional energy policy goal, it is also highly important in the political discourse. In general, the relative importance of these goals is rather stable over time and partisanship around them is limited. Yet, a sub-analysis of the discourse on renewable energy technologies reveals a high level of partisanship, albeit decreasing over time. Particularly, the energy industry goal’s importance increases while its partisanship vanishes. We discuss how these findings can inform future energy policy research and provide a potential inroad for more ambitious national energy policies. Key policy insights In addition to the three classic goals of energy policy (limiting cost, securing access and reducing the environmental burden) we identify a fourth policy goal: strengthening the national energy technology industry Conformity between the three classical energy and the industrial policy goals is a key driver explaining policy change For renewable energy technologies, partisanship around this fourth goal is lower than around other goals and decreases over time as innovation allows these technologies to increasingly correspond to policy-makers’ high-level goals Extant research underestimates the importance of industry policy goals, but overestimates environmental co-benefits of low-carbon energy options Paradigmatic policy change in Germany did not depend on top-down shifts in high-level policy goals but was driven by lower-level technology-specific goals
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10.
Stable forests – those not already significantly disturbed nor facing predictable near-future risks of anthropogenic disturbance – may play a large role in the climate solution, due to their carbon sequestration and storage capabilities. Their importance is recognized by the Paris Agreement, but stable forests have received comparatively little attention through existing forest protection mechanisms and finance. Instead, emphasis has been placed on targeting locations where deforestation and forest degradation are happening actively. Yet stopping deforestation and forest degradation does not guarantee durable success, especially outside the geographic scope of targeted efforts. As a result, today’s stable forests may be at risk without additional efforts to secure their long-term conservation. We synthesize the gaps in existing policy efforts that could address the climate-related benefits derived from stable forests, noting several barriers to action, such as uncertainty around the level of climate services that stable forests provide and difficulties describing the real level of threat posed. We argue that resource and finance allocation for stable forests should be incorporated into countries’ and donors’ comprehensive portfolios aimed at tackling deforestation and forest degradation as well as resulting emissions. A holistic and forward-looking approach will be particularly important, given that success in tackling deforestation and forest degradation where it is currently happening will need to be sustained in the long term. Key policy insights Climate policies, finance, and implementation have tended to focus on areas of recent forest loss and near-term threats of anthropogenic disturbance, resulting in an imbalance of effort that fails to adequately address stable forests. In some contexts, policy measuresintended to secure the climate-related benefits of stable forests have competed poorly against more urgent threats. Policymakers and finance mechanisms should view stable forests as a complementary element within a holistic, long-term approach to resource management. International mechanisms and national frameworks should be adjusted and resourced to promote the long-term sustainability and permanence of stable forests. Beyond additional resources, the climate benefits of stable forests may be best secured by pro-actively designing implementing policies that recognize the rights and interests of stakeholders who are affected by land management decisions.
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11.
Research on policy support or public acceptability of climate change policies is proliferating. There is, however, a great diversity in how these evaluative responses have been defined, operationalized, and measured across studies. In order to shed some light on this subject, we reviewed 118 studies published over the last 15 years aiming at measurement of policy acceptability, acceptance, support, and other responses to climate change mitigation policies. We found that conceptual vagueness and weak theoretical embedding are pervasive in the field, which leads to uncertainty over what is being measured, ambiguity of policy recommendations, and difficulties in comparing empirical results. In response, we propose a construct of policy attitudes as an overarching concept comprising the diversity of measures and constructs already in use. The purpose of the construct is to serve as a common basis for operationalization and survey design. In order to inform policy makers, researchers should be clear in how they formulate surveys with a focus on questions of importance to research and policy-making. Key policy insights Acceptability, acceptance, and support are defined as distinct and possibly empirically distinguishable classes of responses evaluating a policy proposal. These responses are expressions of underlying policy attitudes. People may respond to policies in other ways as well, including lack of interest. There is no popularity threshold for a policy to be safe to implement, but instead it is a matter of identifying the conditions of policy support or other responses. Results obtained using different measures of mitigation policy attitudes vary widely with respect to the characteristics of the policy in question and the measured response. Thus, great care must be taken when designing surveys and interpreting their results.
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12.
State governments in the United States are well placed to identify opportunities for mitigation and the needs for adaptation to climate change. However, the cost of these efforts can have important implications for budgets that already face pressures from diverse areas such as unfunded pensions and growing health care costs. In this work, the current level of spending on climate-related activities at the state level are evaluated and policy recommendations are developed to improve financial management practices as they relate to climate risk. An examination of state budgets reveals that climate mitigation and adaptation activities represent less than 1% of spending in most states. The data collection highlights the obstacles to collecting accurate spending data and the lack of budgetary and accounting procedures in place. More importantly, the difficulty in benchmarking these activities poses challenges for the analysis of state-level policies as well as planning and modelling future climate-related spending. Other policy contexts, including public pensions and infrastructure, can provide guidance on budgetary and accounting tools that may help states prepare for and more efficiently manage climate-related expenditures. Key policy insights Climate change mitigation and adaptation will require substantial investments across many levels of government on a wide range of activities. Currently, US states are not clearly demarcating climate expenditures, hindering the identification of climate-related budgetary risks. In the absence of guidelines, these longer term fiscal outlays may remain chronically underfunded in favour of more near-term spending priorities. Establishing appropriate financial management and data collection practices is important for more sophisticated cost-effectiveness and policy analyses.
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13.
We examine the participation of stakeholders in the rule-making process leading to the design of the US Clean Power Plan (CPP), which was the cornerstone regulation developed during the Obama administration to lower GHG emissions from power plants in the US. Using publicly available information, we identify the core stakeholders that participated in the different stages of the rulemaking process, from the early draft of the rule to its publication in final form, and examine variables that could help explain their decisions to litigate, either against or in favour of the final version of the rule. We show that the ‘pro-CPP’ stakeholders were (a) more likely to participate during the early stages of the rule-making process, attending meetings with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) staff to discuss rule content, and (b) less likely to get involved during the litigation process. ‘Anti-CPP’ stakeholders, on the other hand, did the opposite, being in general less active during the rulemaking stages, and more active during the litigation stage. However, we also find that the ‘anti-CPP’ stakeholders were more tightly organized as a coalition when compared to the ‘pro-CPP’ stakeholders throughout the process (even in the early stages when they participated less). Our results shed new light on the way advocacy coalitions operate in the climate policy subsystem in the US, and help inform debates about the likelihood of conflict and cooperation across a variety of environmental policy topics. Key policy insights The design of the Clean Power Plan was a long and contentious process in which ‘Pro’ and ‘Anti-CPP’ coalitions operated to support and undermine the rule, respectively. ‘Pro-CPP’ stakeholders were more active in meetings organized to discuss the CPP with EPA staff, and in submitting written comments. ‘Anti-CPP’ stakeholders were more active during litigation, in response to perceived EPA overreach in designing the rule and negative financial impacts on states’ economies. Joint participation by ‘Anti-CPP’ stakeholders in meetings conveyed by the EPA to discuss the potential content of the rule helps explain their joint litigation efforts, which hints at their considerable capacity to self-organize as a coalition throughout the process.
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14.
The 2015 Paris Agreement requires increasingly ambitious emissions reduction efforts from its member countries. Accounting for ancillary positive health outcomes (health co-benefits) that result from implementing climate change mitigation policies can provide Parties to the Paris Agreement with a sound rationale for introducing stronger mitigation strategies. Despite this recognition, a knowledge gap exists on the role of health co-benefits in the development of climate change mitigation policies. To address this gap, the case study presented here investigates the role of health co-benefits in the development of European Union (EU) climate change mitigation policies through analysis and consideration of semi-structured interview data, government documents, journal articles and media releases. We find that while health co-benefits are an explicit consideration in the development of EU climate change mitigation policies, their influence on final policy outcomes has been limited. Our analysis suggests that whilst health co-benefits are a key driver of air pollution mitigation policies, climate mitigation policies are primarily driven by other factors, including economic costs and energy implications. Key policy insights Health co-benefits are quantified and monetized as part of the development of EU climate change mitigation policies but their influence on the final policies agreed upon is limited. Barriers, such as the immediate economic costs associated with climate action, inhibit the influence of health co-benefits on the development of mitigation policies. Health co-benefits primarily drive the development of EU air pollution mitigation policies. The separation of responsibility for GHG and non-GHG emissions across Directorate Generals has decoupled climate change and air pollution mitigation policies, with consequences for the integration of health co-benefits in climate policy.
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15.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a significant and potentially innovative addition to UNFCCC frameworks for mobilizing increased finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet the GCF faces challenges of operationalization not only as a relatively new international fund but also as a result of US President Trump’s announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Consequently the GCF faces a major reduction in actual funding contributions and also governance challenges at the levels of its Board and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), to which it is ultimately accountable. This article analyzes these challenges with reference to the GCF’s internal regulations and its agreements with third parties to demonstrate how exploiting design features of the GCF could strengthen its resilience in the face of such challenges. These features include linkages with UNFCCC constituted bodies, particularly the Technology Mechanism, and enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially through its Private Sector Facility. The article posits that deepening GCF interlinkages would increase both the coherence of climate finance governance and the GCF’s ability to contribute to ambitious climate action in uncertain times. Key policy insights The Trump Administration’s purported withdrawal from the Paris Agreement creates challenges for the GCF operating model in three key domains: capitalization, governance and guidance. Two emerging innovations could prove crucial in GCF resilience to fulfil its role in Paris Agreement implementation: (1) interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and (2) engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially private sector actors such as large US investors and financiers. There is also an emerging soft role for the GCF as interlocutor between policy-makers and non-Party actors to help bridge the communication divide that often plagues cross-sectoral interactions. This role could develop through: (a) the GCF tripartite interface between the Private Sector Facility, Accredited Entities and National Designated Authorities; and (b) strengthened collaborations between the UNFCCC Technical and Financial Mechanisms.
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16.
Carbon pricing, including carbon taxes and emissions trading, has been adopted by different kinds of polities worldwide. Yet, beyond the increasing adoption over time, little is known about what polities – countries as well as sub- and supranational entities – adopt carbon pricing and why. This paper explores patterns of adoption (both implemented policies and those scheduled to be) through cluster analysis, with the purpose of investigating factors that could explain polities’ decisions to adopt carbon pricing. The study contributes empirically by studying carbon taxes and emissions trading together and by ordering the polities adopting carbon pricing into clusters. It also contributes theoretically, by exploring constellations of variables that drive the adoption of carbon pricing within individual clusters. We investigated 66 adopted policies of carbon pricing, which were divided into five clusters: early adopters, North-American subnational entities, Chinese pilot provinces, second-wave developed polities, and second-wave developing polities. The analysis indicates that the reasons for adopting carbon pricing have shifted over time. While international factors (climate commitments or influences from polities within the same region) are increasingly salient, domestic factors (including crises and income levels) were more important for the early adopters. Key policy insights Carbon pricing has become a global mainstream policy instrument. Economic and fiscal crises provide windows of opportunity for promoting carbon pricing. The international climate regime can support the adoption of carbon pricing through mitigation commitments and international financial and technical assistance. Learning between polities from the same region is a useful tool for promoting carbon pricing. Carbon intensive economies tend to prefer emissions trading over carbon taxes.
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17.
Calculating the cost effectiveness of projects and policies with respect to reducing carbon emissions provides a simple way for local government agencies to consider the climate impacts of their actions. Yet, defining a metric for cost-effectiveness in relation to climate change is not straightforward for several reasons. In this paper, we focus primarily on dynamics, reflecting the time value of money and how the benefits of reducing carbon emissions may change over time. We define a cost-effectiveness metric called Levelized Cost of Carbon (LCC) that carefully accounts for these dynamics. We also investigate the theoretical and practical implications and limitations of using a cost-effectiveness metric as an approach to rank projects. We apply our metric to a set of transportation projects to illustrate the insights that can be gained by such a process. Key policy insights: Levelized Cost of Carbon (LCC) provides a simple way for local governments to consider climate change mitigation in decision making. LCC is a cost-effectiveness metric that carefully accounts for the time value of money and possible changes in the value of reducing emissions through time, thus helping local governments to make better decisions. LCC can be used to rank projects, with some caveats, even in the absence of a specific value for the benefits of reducing GHG emissions, thus providing flexibility in the face of uncertainty and political constraints.
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18.
The Paris Agreement establishes a global goal on adaptation which will be assessed through the global stocktake, the first attempt by the international climate change regime to measure collective progress on adaptation. This policy analysis identifies four main challenges to designing a meaningful assessment. These are: designing a system that can aggregate results; managing the dual mandate of reviewing collective progress and informing the enhancement of national level actions; methodological challenges in adaptation; and political challenges around measurement. We propose a mixed-methods approach to addressing these challenges, combining short-term needs for reporting with longer-term aims of enhancing national adaptation actions. Key policy insights Broad domains of adaptation activity could be identified within each of the objectives of the adaptation goal and progress could be measured and aggregated through simple scorecards. The goal should have both process and outcome indicators as well as some narrative linking activities to outcomes over time. Reporting could be a compilation of national data using qualitative and quantitative sources, aligning with the global stocktake’s aim of enhancing national actions over time and reducing immediate reporting burdens. There would be a complementary role at least in the short term for an expert assessment of priority areas.
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19.
In June 2017, the Trump administration decided to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement, a landmark climate agreement adopted in 2015 by 195 nations. The exit of the US has not just raised concern that the US will miss its domestic emission reduction targets, but also that other parties to the Paris Agreement might backtrack on their initial pledges regarding emission reductions or financial contributions. Here we assess the magnitude of the threat that US non-cooperation poses to the Paris Agreement from an international relations perspective. We argue that US non-cooperation does not fundamentally alter US emissions, which are unlikely to rise even in the absence of new federal climate policies. Nor does it undermine nationally determined contributions under pledge and review, as the Paris Agreement has introduced a new logic of domestically driven climate policies and the cost of low-carbon technologies keeps falling. However, US non-participation in raising climate finance could raise high barriers to global climate cooperation in the future. Political strategies to mitigate these threats include direct engagement by climate leaders such as the European Union with key emerging economies, notably China and India, and domestic climate policies that furnish benefits to traditional opponents of ambitious climate policy. Key policy insights US non-cooperation need not be a major threat to pledge and review under the Paris Agreement. US non-cooperation is a serious threat to climate finance. Deeper engagement with emerging economies offers new opportunities for global climate policy.
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20.
This study reports survey results of American and Chinese citizens administered to determine the effect of reciprocity and the absence of reciprocity on public support of international climate treaties. American and Chinese college students and adults were surveyed about their support for signing an international climate treaty including commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, conditional on the other country signing the same treaty or not. This study finds knowledge of other-country non-support on average decreases cooperative behaviour among all age groups in both the US and China. Knowledge of China’s support for the treaty is found on average to increase support among American adults, while having no noticeable effect on average support among American college students. Chinese citizens are found to not respond positively to reciprocity. Although not statistically significant at conventional significance levels, knowledge of the US’s support is found on average to decrease support among Chinese college students and adults. Key policy insights To increase support for international climate treaties, knowledge that another major emitter will sign the treaty does not unanimously increase domestic support. Knowing the other country will not sign the treaty decreases domestic support for signing an international climate treaty for both Americans and Chinese, relative to not being told about the other country’s decision to sign the treaty. Knowing China will sign an international climate treaty on average increases American adult support for signing the same treaty, while American college student support is unaffected. Although not statistically significant at conventional significance levels, knowing the US will sign an international climate treaty on average decreases Chinese support for signing the same treaty. Policy-makers pursuing increased international support of climate treaties by first getting support from countries with substantial historical emissions might deter international support if little attention to fairness concerns is given.
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