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1.
Global climate change governance has changed substantially in the last decade, with a shift in focus from negotiating globally agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets to nationally determined contributions, as enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This paper analyses trends in adoption of national climate legislation and strategies, GHG targets, and renewable and energy efficiency targets in almost all UNFCCC Parties, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2017. The uniqueness and added value of this paper reside in its broad sweep of countries, the more than decade-long coverage and the use of objective metrics rather than normative judgements. Key results show that national climate legislation and strategies witnessed a strong increase in the first half of the assessed decade, likely due to the political lead up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but have somewhat stagnated in recent years, currently covering 70% of global GHG emissions (almost 50% of countries). In comparison, the coverage of GHG targets increased considerably in the run up to adoption of the Paris Agreement and 89% of global GHG emissions are currently covered by such targets. Renewable energy targets saw a steady spread, with 79% of the global GHG emissions covered in 2017 compared to 45% in 2007, with a steep increase in developing countries. Key policy insights The number of countries that have national legislation and strategies in place increased strongly up to 2012, but the increase has levelled off in recent years, now covering 70% of global emissions by 2017 (48% of countries and 76% of global population). Economy-wide GHG reduction targets witnessed a strong increase in the build up to 2015 and are adopted by countries covering 89% of global GHG emissions (76% not counting USA) and 90% of global population (86% not counting USA) in 2017. Renewable energy targets saw a steady increase throughout the last decade with coverage of countries in 2017 comparable to that of GHG targets. Key shifts in national measures coincide with landmark international events – an increase in legislation and strategy in the build-up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference and an increase in targets around the Paris Agreement – emphasizing the importance of the international process to maintaining national momentum.
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2.
Although climate change is an urgent problem, behavioural and policy responses have not yet been sufficient to either reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to a disrupted climate system. Significant efforts have been made to raise public awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. One reason why these efforts might not be sufficient is rooted in people’s need to feel efficacy to solve complex problems; the belief that climate change is unstoppable might thwart action even among the concerned. This paper tests for the effect of fatalistic beliefs on behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change using two cross-national surveys representing over 50,000 people in 48 nations. Key policy insights The perception that climate change poses a risk or danger increases the likelihood of behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change. The belief that climate change is unstoppable reduces the behavioural and policy response to climate change and moderates risk perception. Communicators and policy leaders should carefully frame climate change as a difficult, yet solvable, problem to circumvent fatalistic beliefs.
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3.
Globally, adaptation policies and programmes are being formulated to address climate change issues. However, in the agricultural sector, and particularly in least developed countries (LDCs), concerns remain as to whether these policies and programmes are consistent with farmers’ preferences. This study empirically investigates Nepalese farmers’ willingness to support the implementation of adaptation programmes. To this end, we first developed suggested adaptation programmes in accordance with the adaptation measures identified by LDCs in their National Adaptation Programmes of Actions. We then employed a choice experiment framework to estimate farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for adaptation benefits. The findings indicate that the substantial benefits of the adaptation programmes for farmers result in a sizeable WTP to participate, which would appear to justify the programmes’ widespread implementation. Key policy insights Farmers are willing to participate in, and contribute to, the suggested adaptation programmes in the form of increased access to climate adaptive crop species and varieties, improved soil quality and irrigation and the provision of training in climate adaptive farming. Key socio-economic factors influence farmers’ support of adaptation programmes. Older farmers, those households closer to government extension services, larger land holders, those involved in household labour exchange, farmers located in drought and flood-prone regions and those who perceive that the climate has changed are more likely to participate. The more farmers are aware of climate change impacts, the greater their preference for adaptation programmes. Increasing farmer awareness prior to implementation of such programmes is therefore an obvious means of further raising participation rates.
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4.
Governmental climate change mitigation targets are typically developed with the aid of forecasts of greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions. The robustness and credibility of such forecasts depends, among other issues, on the extent to which forecasting approaches can reflect prevailing uncertainties. We apply a transparent and replicable method to quantify the uncertainty associated with projections of gross domestic product growth rates for Mexico, a key driver of GHG emissions in the country. We use those projections to produce probabilistic forecasts of GHG emissions for Mexico. We contrast our probabilistic forecasts with Mexico’s governmental deterministic forecasts. We show that, because they fail to reflect such key uncertainty, deterministic forecasts are ill-suited for use in target-setting processes. We argue that (i) guidelines should be agreed upon, to ensure that governmental forecasts meet certain minimum transparency and quality standards, and (ii) governments should be held accountable for the appropriateness of the forecasting approach applied to prepare governmental forecasts, especially when those forecasts are used to derive climate change mitigation targets. POLICY INSIGHTS No minimum transparency and quality standards exist to guide the development of GHG emission scenario forecasts, not even when these forecasts are used to set national climate change mitigation targets. No accountability mechanisms appear to be in place at the national level to ensure that national governments rely on scientifically sound processes to develop GHG emission scenarios. Using probabilistic forecasts to underpin emission reduction targets represents a scientifically sound option for reflecting in the target the uncertainty to which those forecasts are subject, thus increasing the validity of the target. Setting up minimum transparency and quality standards, and holding governments accountable for their choice of forecasting methods could lead to more robust emission reduction targets nationally and, by extension, internationally.
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5.
Carbon pricing, including carbon taxes and emissions trading, has been adopted by different kinds of polities worldwide. Yet, beyond the increasing adoption over time, little is known about what polities – countries as well as sub- and supranational entities – adopt carbon pricing and why. This paper explores patterns of adoption (both implemented policies and those scheduled to be) through cluster analysis, with the purpose of investigating factors that could explain polities’ decisions to adopt carbon pricing. The study contributes empirically by studying carbon taxes and emissions trading together and by ordering the polities adopting carbon pricing into clusters. It also contributes theoretically, by exploring constellations of variables that drive the adoption of carbon pricing within individual clusters. We investigated 66 adopted policies of carbon pricing, which were divided into five clusters: early adopters, North-American subnational entities, Chinese pilot provinces, second-wave developed polities, and second-wave developing polities. The analysis indicates that the reasons for adopting carbon pricing have shifted over time. While international factors (climate commitments or influences from polities within the same region) are increasingly salient, domestic factors (including crises and income levels) were more important for the early adopters. Key policy insights Carbon pricing has become a global mainstream policy instrument. Economic and fiscal crises provide windows of opportunity for promoting carbon pricing. The international climate regime can support the adoption of carbon pricing through mitigation commitments and international financial and technical assistance. Learning between polities from the same region is a useful tool for promoting carbon pricing. Carbon intensive economies tend to prefer emissions trading over carbon taxes.
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6.
On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US intends to leave the Paris Agreement if no alternative terms acceptable to his administration can be agreed upon. In this article, an agent-based model of bottom-up climate mitigation clubs is used to derive the impact that lack of US participation may have on the membership of such clubs and their emissions coverage. We systematically analyse the prospects for climate mitigation clubs, depending on which of three conceivable roles the US takes on: as a leader (for benchmarking), as a follower (i.e. willing to join climate mitigation clubs initiated by others if this is in its best interest) or as an outsider (i.e. staying outside of any climate mitigation club no matter what). We investigate these prospects for three types of incentives for becoming a member: club goods, conditional commitments and side-payments. Our results show that lack of US leadership significantly constrains climate clubs’ potential. Lack of US willingness to follow others’ lead is an additional, but smaller constraint. Only in a few cases will US withdrawal entail widespread departures by other countries. We conclude that climate mitigation clubs can function without the participation of an important GHG emitter, given that other major emitters show leadership, although these clubs will rarely cover more than 50% of global emissions. Key policy insights The US switching from being a leader to being a follower substantially reduces the emissions coverage of climate mitigation clubs. The US switching from being a follower to being an outsider sometimes reduces coverage further, but has a smaller impact than the switch from leader to follower. The switch from follower to outsider only occasionally results in widespread departures by other countries; in a few instances it even entices others to join. Climate mitigation clubs can function even without the participation of the US, provided that other major emitters show leadership; however, such clubs will typically be unable to cover more than 50% of global emissions. Climate mitigation clubs may complement the Paris Agreement and can also serve as an alternative in case Paris fails.
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7.
Globally, the metals and mining sector is a major contributor to GHG emissions. Climate change also poses significant challenges for the industry in a number of ways, including risks to infrastructure and equipment, transport routes and the cost of energy supplies. The sector is of particular importance to Russia, and yet very little is known about how the sector positions itself in relation to this key issue. This article conducts an in-depth look at the response of the Russian metals and mining sector to climate change. It looks at the key actors, their willingness to engage with the issue of climate change, preferred policy options and the strategies adopted to further their interests. The role of companies, prominent individuals and business associations is considered. The evidence suggests that, although there is widespread acceptance of climate change as a phenomenon, there is significant variation within the sector, with some companies proactive on climate policy, and others more reluctant. Different responses are attributed to reputational factors and the disproportionate influence of international and domestic policy developments on companies. Russian coal companies, directly threatened by any international attempts to reduce coal consumption, display the strongest opposition to efforts aimed at curbing emissions. The Russian government, far from thinking of transitioning to a low carbon future, is vigorously trying to expand the coal industry. Key policy insights Understanding how Russia’s domestic position on climate policy is formed is fundamental for understanding the factors driving its international engagement on climate policy. The Russian government has no plans to phase out coal and is instead actively seeking to expand the coal industry. This highlights the obstacles to Russia’s commitment to climate policy at both the domestic and international levels. The socio-economic consequences of climate policy for the Russian coal industry are a key consideration for the government, with some regions heavily dependent on the industry for employment and electricity generation.
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8.
The majority of emissions of nitrous oxide – a potent greenhouse gas (GHG) – are from agricultural sources, particularly nitrogen fertilizer applications. A growing focus on these emission sources has led to the development in the United States of GHG offset protocols that could enable payment to farmers for reducing fertilizer use or implementing other nitrogen management strategies. Despite the development of several protocols, the current regional scope is narrow, adoption by farmers is low, and policy implementation of protocols has a significant time lag. Here we utilize existing research and policy structures to propose an ‘umbrella’ approach for nitrogen management GHG emissions protocols that has the potential to streamline the policy implementation and acceptance of such protocols. We suggest that the umbrella protocol could set forth standard definitions common across multiple protocol options, and then modules could be further developed as scientific evidence advances. Modules could be developed for specific crops, regions, and practices. We identify a policy process that could facilitate this development in concert with emerging scientific research and conclude by acknowledging potential benefits and limitations of the approach. Key policy insights Agricultural greenhouse gas market options are growing, but are still underutilized Streamlining protocol development through an umbrella process could enable quicker development of protocols across new crops, regions, and practices Effective protocol development must not compromise best available science and should follow a rigorous pathway to ensure appropriate implementation
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9.
Worldwide carbon dioxide emissions continue to increase driven by fossil fuel consumption and industrial discharges. Progress on carbon emission reduction requires firms to adopt clean technologies which minimize material and energy consumption. Technological change is particularly required in developing countries, where industrial emissions often lead to chronic urban pollution problems. In this study, we explore the antecedents of clean technology strategy by firms in developing countries. We combine the contingent natural resource-based view with the relational view to examine how network embeddedness, market incentives and slack resources influence adoption of clean technology. The empirical support for our hypotheses comes from data obtained from 342 firms that operated in the carbon-offset market during the years 2007 to 2009. We find that a firm’s relational network structure influences adoption of clean technologies, particularly when market incentives are low. Contrary to one of the hypotheses, the results of our paper suggest a negative relationship between a firm’s slack resources and its clean technology strategy. Our study highlights the benefits of networks in fostering adoption of clean technology in developing countries. Furthermore, we find that high market incentives (carbon price) decrease the probability of clean technology adoption, so adding to the view that firms respond to carbon-offset rules to realize high carbon revenues at the lowest cost. Key policy insights High market incentives (carbon price) decrease the probability that firms in developing countries will adopt clean technology. This adds to concerns about the capability of the Clean Development Mechanism to deliver sustainable development. Even where market incentives are low, firms in developing countries are more likely to adopt clean technologies when they are embedded in a closed network of connected partners. To stimulate adoption of clean technology in developing countries, policy makers should focus on initiatives to facilitate partnerships between organizations operating in the carbon market and create opportunities for knowledge sharing and learning. By changing the policy focus to networks of organizations, the carbon market can bring about positive change in terms of shifting the firm behaviour.
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10.
Food-insecure households in many countries depend on international aid to alleviate acute shocks and chronic shortages. Some food security programmes (including Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program–PSNP – which provides a case study for this article) have integrated aid in exchange for labour on public works to reduce long-term dependence by investing in the productive capacity and resilience of communities. Using this approach, Ethiopia has embarked upon an ambitious national programme of land restoration and sustainable land management. Although the intent was to reduce poverty, here we show that an unintended co-benefit is the climate-change mitigation from reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increased landscape carbon stocks. The article first shows that the total reduction in net GHG emissions from PSNP’s land management at the national scale is estimated at 3.4 million?Mg?CO 2e?y ?1 – approximately 1.5% of the emissions reductions in Ethiopia’s Nationally Determined Contribution for the Paris Agreement. The article then explores some of the opportunities and constraints to scaling up of this impact. Key policy insights Food security programmes (FSPs) can contribute to climate change mitigation by creating a vehicle for investment in land and ecosystem restoration. Maximizing mitigation, while enhancing but not compromising food security, requires that climate projections, and mitigation and adaptation responses should be mainstreamed into planning and implementation of FSPs at all levels. Cross-cutting oversight is required to integrate land restoration, climate policy, food security and disaster risk management into a coherent policy framework. Institutional barriers to optimal implementation should be addressed, such as incentive mechanisms that reward effort rather than results, and lack of centralized monitoring and evaluation of impacts on the physical environment. Project implementation can often be improved by adopting best management practices, such as using productive living livestock barriers where possible, and increasing the integration of agroforestry and non-timber forest products into landscape regeneration.
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11.
Under the Paris Agreement, countries are encouraged to submit long-term low greenhouse gas emissions development strategies. Such strategies will merge emissions goals with socio-economic objectives and enable countries to increase their ambition over time, thus offering an opportunity to close the gap between the current emissions trajectory and the Agreement’s ‘well below 2°C’ target. China is in the process of preparing its own long-term strategy. We argue in this article that non-CO 2 greenhouse gases (NCGGs) should be an essential component of China’s long-term low-emissions strategy. To incorporate NCGGs into China’s long-term low-emissions development strategy, key scientific and institutional challenges should be addressed, such as uncertainty about the accuracy of NCGG emissions inventories; uncertainty about future projections of NCGG emissions; and institutional coordination deficits and imbalanced policy approaches. Overcoming these barriers will have significant implications for climate change mitigation and can open a path for the development of concrete follow-up actions. Key policy insights Non-CO2 greenhouse gases (NCGGs) make up around 17% of China’s GHG emissions, but China has no quantified target to limit or reduce these gases. NCGG emissions mitigation should be an essential component of China's long-term low-emissions strategy, which is currently under development. Considerable uncertainty exists over both historical NCGG emissions data and forecasts. This poses challenges to developing a comprehensive multi-gas strategy. Institutional challenges must also be addressed, such as fragmentation of responsibility for NCGGs.
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12.
The recent change in US presidential administrations has introduced significant uncertainty about both domestic and international policy support for continued reductions in GHG emissions. This brief analysis estimates the potential climate ramifications of changing US leadership, contrasting the Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization (MCS) released under the Obama Administration, with campaign statements, early executive actions, and prevailing market conditions to estimate potential emission pathways under the Trump Administration. The analysis highlights areas where GHG reductions are less robust to changing policy conditions, and offers brief recommendations for addressing emissions in the interim. It specifically finds that continued reductions in the electricity sector are less vulnerable to changes in federal policy than those in the built environment and land use sectors. Given the long-lived nature of investments in these latter two sectors, however, opportunities for near-term climate action by willing cities, states, private landowners, and non-profit organizations warrant renewed attention in this time of climate uncertainty. Key policy insightsThe recent US presidential election has already impacted mitigation goals and practices, injecting considerable uncertainty into domestic and international efforts to address climate change. A strategic assessment issued in the final days of the Obama Administration for how to reach long-term climate mitigation objectives provides a baseline from which to gauge potential changes under the Trump Administration. Though market trends may continue to foster emission declines in the energy sector, emission reductions in the land use sector and the built environment are subject to considerable uncertainty. Regardless of actions to scale back climate mitigation efforts, US emissions are likely to be flat in the coming years. Assuming that emissions remain constant under President Trump and that reductions resume afterwards to meet the Obama Administration mid-century targets in 2050, this near-term pause in reductions yields a difference in total emissions equivalent to 0.3–0.6 years of additional global greenhouse gas emissions, depending on the number of terms served by a Trump Administration.
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13.
Strong and rapid greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, far beyond those currently committed to, are required to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. This allows no sector to maintain business as usual practices, while application of the precautionary principle requires avoiding a reliance on negative emission technologies. Animal to plant-sourced protein shifts offer substantial potential for GHG emission reductions. Unabated, the livestock sector could take between 37% and 49% of the GHG budget allowable under the 2°C and 1.5°C targets, respectively, by 2030. Inaction in the livestock sector would require substantial GHG reductions, far beyond what are planned or realistic, from other sectors. This outlook article outlines why animal to plant-sourced protein shifts should be taken up by the Conference of the Parties (COP), and how they could feature as part of countries’ mitigation commitments under their updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to be adopted from 2020 onwards. The proposed framework includes an acknowledgment of ‘peak livestock’, followed by targets for large and rapid reductions in livestock numbers based on a combined ‘worst first’ and ‘best available food’ approach. Adequate support, including climate finance, is needed to facilitate countries in implementing animal to plant-sourced protein shifts. Key policy insights Given the livestock sector’s significant contribution to global GHG emissions and methane dominance, animal to plant protein shifts make a necessary contribution to meeting the Paris temperature goals and reducing warming in the short term, while providing a suite of co-benefits. Without action, the livestock sector could take between 37% and 49% of the GHG budget allowable under the 2°C and 1.5°C targets, respectively, by 2030. Failure to implement animal to plant protein shifts increases the risk of exceeding temperate goals; requires additional GHG reductions from other sectors; and increases reliance on negative emissions technologies. COP 24 is an opportunity to bring animal to plant protein shifts to the climate mitigation table. Revised NDCs from 2020 should include animal to plant protein shifts, starting with a declaration of ‘peak livestock’, followed by a ‘worst first’ replacement approach, guided by ‘best available food’.
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14.
The 2015 Paris Agreement requires increasingly ambitious emissions reduction efforts from its member countries. Accounting for ancillary positive health outcomes (health co-benefits) that result from implementing climate change mitigation policies can provide Parties to the Paris Agreement with a sound rationale for introducing stronger mitigation strategies. Despite this recognition, a knowledge gap exists on the role of health co-benefits in the development of climate change mitigation policies. To address this gap, the case study presented here investigates the role of health co-benefits in the development of European Union (EU) climate change mitigation policies through analysis and consideration of semi-structured interview data, government documents, journal articles and media releases. We find that while health co-benefits are an explicit consideration in the development of EU climate change mitigation policies, their influence on final policy outcomes has been limited. Our analysis suggests that whilst health co-benefits are a key driver of air pollution mitigation policies, climate mitigation policies are primarily driven by other factors, including economic costs and energy implications. Key policy insights Health co-benefits are quantified and monetized as part of the development of EU climate change mitigation policies but their influence on the final policies agreed upon is limited. Barriers, such as the immediate economic costs associated with climate action, inhibit the influence of health co-benefits on the development of mitigation policies. Health co-benefits primarily drive the development of EU air pollution mitigation policies. The separation of responsibility for GHG and non-GHG emissions across Directorate Generals has decoupled climate change and air pollution mitigation policies, with consequences for the integration of health co-benefits in climate policy.
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15.
This article shows the potential impact on global GHG emissions in 2030, if all countries were to implement sectoral climate policies similar to successful examples already implemented elsewhere. This assessment was represented in the IMAGE and GLOBIOM/G4M models by replicating the impact of successful national policies at the sector level in all world regions. The first step was to select successful policies in nine policy areas. In the second step, the impact on the energy and land-use systems or GHG emissions was identified and translated into model parameters, assuming that it would be possible to translate the impacts of the policies to other countries. As a result, projected annual GHG emission levels would be about 50 GtCO 2e by 2030 (2% above 2010 levels), compared to the 60 GtCO 2e in the ‘current policies’ scenario. Most reductions are achieved in the electricity sector through expanding renewable energy, followed by the reduction of fluorinated gases, reducing venting and flaring in oil and gas production, and improving industry efficiency. Materializing the calculated mitigation potential might not be as straightforward given different country priorities, policy preferences and circumstances. Key policy insights Considerable emissions reductions globally would be possible, if a selection of successful policies were replicated and implemented in all countries worldwide. This would significantly reduce, but not close, the emissions gap with a 2°C pathway. From the selection of successful policies evaluated in this study, those implemented in the sector ‘electricity supply’ have the highest impact on global emissions compared to the ‘current policies’ scenario. Replicating the impact of these policies worldwide could lead to emission and energy trends in the renewable electricity, passenger transport, industry (including fluorinated gases) and buildings sector, that are close to those in a 2°C scenario. Using successful policies and translating these to policy impact per sector is a more reality-based alternative to most mitigation pathways, which need to make theoretical assumptions on policy cost-effectiveness.
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16.
Hydropower is the dominant renewable energy source to date, providing over two-thirds of all renewable electricity globally. For countries with significant hydropower potential, the technology is expected to play a major role in the energy transition needed to meet nationally determined contributions (NDCs) for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions as laid out in the Paris Agreement. For the Republic of Ecuador, large hydropower is currently considered as the main means for attaining energy security, reducing electricity prices and mitigating GHG emissions in the long-term. However, uncertainty around the impacts of climate change, investment cost overruns and restrictions to untapped resources may challenge the future deployment of hydropower and consequently impact decarbonization efforts for Ecuador’s power sector. To address these questions, a partial equilibrium energy system optimization model for Ecuador (TIMES-EC) is used to simulate alternative electricity capacity expansion scenarios up to 2050. Results show that the share of total electricity supplied by hydropower in Ecuador might vary significantly between 53% to 81% by 2050. Restricting large hydropower due to social-environmental constraints can cause a fourfold increase in cumulative emissions compared to NDC implied levels, while a 25% reduction of hydropower availability due to climate change would cause cumulative emissions to double. In comparison, a more diversified power system (although more expensive) which limits the share of large hydropower and natural gas in favour of other renewables could achieve the expected NDC emission levels. These insights underscore the critical importance of undertaking detailed whole energy system analyses to assess the long-term challenges for hydropower deployment and the trade-offs among power system configuration, system costs and expected GHG emissions in hydropower-dependent countries, states and territories. Key policy insights Ecuador’s hydropower-based NDC is highly vulnerable to the occurrence of a dry climate scenario and restrictions to deployment of large hydropower in the Amazon region. Given Ecuador’s seasonal runoff pattern, fossil-fuel or renewable thermoelectric backup will always be required, whatever the amount of hydropower installed. Ecuador’s NDC target for the power sector is achievable without the deployment of large hydropower infrastructure, through a more diversified portfolio with non-hydro renewables.
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17.
Systematic evidence relating to the performance of carbon pricing – carbon taxes and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs) – is sparse. In 2015, 17 ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions while 18 jurisdictions collected a carbon tax. The papers in this special thematic section review the performance of many of these instruments over the 2005–2015 period. The performance of existing carbon taxes and GHG ETSs can help policy makers make informed choices about whether to introduce these instruments and to improve their design. The purpose of carbon pricing instruments is to reduce GHG emissions cost effectively. Assessing their performance is difficult because emissions are also affected by other policies and exogenous factors such as economic conditions. Carbon taxes in Europe prior to 2008 and in British Columbia reduced emissions from business-as-usual but actual emissions continued to rise. Since 2008 emissions subject to European carbon taxes have declined, but in most countries, other mitigation policies have probably contributed more to the reductions than the carbon taxes. Emissions subject to ETSs, with the exception of four systems without emissions caps, have declined. The ETSs contributed to the emissions reductions, but their share of the overall reduction is not known. Most tax rates are low relative to levels thought to be needed to achieve climate change objectives. Few jurisdictions regularly adjust their tax rates. All ETSs have accumulated surplus allowances and implemented measures to reduce these surpluses. The largest ETSs now specify annual reductions in their emissions cap several years into the future. Emissions trading system allowance prices are generally lower than the tax rates. Key policy insights Theoretical discussions usually portray carbon taxes and GHG ETSs as alternatives. In practice, a jurisdiction often implements both instruments to address emissions by different sources. Designs of ETSs have evolved based on experience shared bilaterally and via dedicated institutions. Carbon tax designs, in contrast, have hardly evolved and there are no institutions dedicated to sharing experience. Every jurisdiction with an ETS and/or carbon tax also has other policies that affect its GHG emissions.
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18.
ABSTRACTChanges in agricultural practices can play a pivotal role in climate change mitigation by reducing the need for land use change as one of the biggest sources of GHG emissions, and by enabling carbon sequestration in farmers’ fields. Expansion of smallholder and commercial agriculture is often one of the main driving forces behind deforestation and forest degradation. However, mitigation programmes such as REDD+ are geared towards conservation efforts in the forestry sector without prominently taking into account smallholder agricultural interests in project design and implementation. REDD+ projects often build on existing re- and afforestation projects without major changes in their principles, interests and assumptions. Informed by case study research and interviews with national and international experts, we illustrate with examples from Ethiopia and Indonesia how REDD+ projects are implemented, how they fail to adequately incorporate the demands of smallholder farmers and how this leads to a loss of livelihoods and diminishing interest in participating in REDD+ by local farming communities. The study shows how the conservation-based benefits and insecure funding base in REDD+ projects do not compensate for the contraction in livelihoods from agriculture. Combined with exclusive benefit-sharing mechanisms, this results in an increased pressure on forest resources, diverging from the principal objective of REDD+. We note a gap between the REDD+ narratives at international level (i.e. coupling development with a climate agenda) and the livelihood interests of farming communities on the ground. We argue that without incorporating agricultural interests and a review of financial incentives in the design of future climate finance mechanisms, objectives of both livelihood improvements and GHG emission reductions will be missed. Key policy insights REDD+ is positioned as a promising tool to meet climate, conservation and development targets. However, these expectations are not being met in practice as the interests of smallholder farmers are poorly addressed. REDD+ policy developers and implementers need more focus on understanding the interests and dynamics of smallholder agriculturalists to enable inclusive, realistic and long-lasting projects. For REDD+ to succeed, funders need to consider how to better ensure long-term livelihood security for farming communities.
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19.
Calculating the cost effectiveness of projects and policies with respect to reducing carbon emissions provides a simple way for local government agencies to consider the climate impacts of their actions. Yet, defining a metric for cost-effectiveness in relation to climate change is not straightforward for several reasons. In this paper, we focus primarily on dynamics, reflecting the time value of money and how the benefits of reducing carbon emissions may change over time. We define a cost-effectiveness metric called Levelized Cost of Carbon (LCC) that carefully accounts for these dynamics. We also investigate the theoretical and practical implications and limitations of using a cost-effectiveness metric as an approach to rank projects. We apply our metric to a set of transportation projects to illustrate the insights that can be gained by such a process. Key policy insights: Levelized Cost of Carbon (LCC) provides a simple way for local governments to consider climate change mitigation in decision making. LCC is a cost-effectiveness metric that carefully accounts for the time value of money and possible changes in the value of reducing emissions through time, thus helping local governments to make better decisions. LCC can be used to rank projects, with some caveats, even in the absence of a specific value for the benefits of reducing GHG emissions, thus providing flexibility in the face of uncertainty and political constraints.
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20.
The Paris Agreement, which entered into force in 2016, sets the ambitious climate change mitigation goal of limiting the global temperature increase to below 2°C and ideally 1.5°C. This puts a severe constraint on the remaining global GHG emissions budget. While international shipping is also a contributor to anthropogenic GHG emissions, and CO 2 in particular, it is not included in the Paris Agreement. This article discusses how a share of a global CO 2 budget over the twenty-first century could be apportioned to international shipping, and, using a range of future trade scenarios, explores the requisite cuts to the CO 2 intensity of shipping. The results demonstrate that, under a wide range of assumptions, existing short-term levers of efficiency must be urgently exploited to achieve mitigation commensurate with that required from the rest of the economy, with virtually full decarbonization of international shipping required as early as before mid-century. Key policy insights Regulatory action is key to ensuring the international shipping sector’s long-term sustainability. For the shipping industry to deliver mitigation in line with the Paris Agreement, virtually full decarbonization needs to be achieved. In the near term, immediate and rapid exploitation of available mitigation measures is of critical importance. Any delay in the transition will increase the risk of stranded assets, or diminish the chances of meeting the Paris Agreement's temperature commitments.
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