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1.
How individuals perceive climate change is linked to whether individuals support climate policies and whether they alter their own climate-related behaviors, yet climate perceptions may be influenced by many factors beyond local shifts in weather. Infrastructure designed to control or regulate natural resources may serve as an important lens through which people experience climate, and thus may influence perceptions. Likewise, perceptions may be influenced by personal beliefs about climate change and whether it is human-induced. Here we examine farmer perceptions of historical climate change, how perceptions are related to observed trends in regional climate, how perceptions are related to the presence of irrigation infrastructure, and how perceptions are related to beliefs and concerns about climate change. We focus on the regions of Marlborough and Hawke’s Bay in New Zealand, where irrigation is utilized on the majority of cropland. Data are obtained through analysis of historical climate records from local weather stations, interviews (n = 20), and a farmer survey (n = 490). Across both regions, no significant historical trends in annual precipitation and summer temperatures since 1980 are observed, but winter warming trends are significant at around 0.2–0.3 °C per decade. A large fraction of farmers perceived increases in annual rainfall despite instrumental records indicating no significant trends, a finding that may be related to greater perceived water availability associated with irrigation growth. A greater fraction of farmers perceived rainfall increases in Marlborough, where irrigation growth has been most substantial. We find those classes of farmers more likely to have irrigation were also significantly more likely to perceive an increase in annual rainfall. Furthermore, we demonstrate that perceptions of changing climate – regardless of their accuracy – are correlated with increased belief in climate change and an increased concern for future climate impacts. Those farmers that believe climate change is occurring and is human induced are more likely to perceive temperature increases than farmers who believe climate change is not occurring and is not human induced. These results suggest that perceptions are influenced by a variety of personal and environmental factors, including infrastructure, which may in turn alter decisions about climate adaptation. 相似文献
2.
J. Gordon Arbuckle Jr. Linda Stalker Prokopy Tonya Haigh Jon Hobbs Tricia Knoot Cody Knutson Adam Loy Amber Saylor Mase Jean McGuire Lois Wright Morton John Tyndall Melissa Widhalm 《Climatic change》2013,117(4):943-950
A February 2012 survey of almost 5,000 farmers across a region of the U.S. that produces more than half of the nation’s corn and soybean revealed that 66 % of farmers believed climate change is occurring (8 % mostly anthropogenic, 33 % equally human and natural, 25 % mostly natural), while 31 % were uncertain and 3.5 % did not believe that climate change is occurring. Results of initial analyses indicate that farmers’ beliefs about climate change and its causes vary considerably, and the relationships between those beliefs, concern about the potential impacts of climate change, and attitudes toward adaptive and mitigative action differ in systematic ways. Farmers who believed that climate change is occurring and attributable to human activity were significantly more likely to express concern about impacts and support adaptive and mitigative action. On the other hand, farmers who attributed climate change to natural causes, were uncertain about whether it is occurring, or did not believe that it is occurring were less concerned, less supportive of adaptation, and much less likely to support government and individual mitigative action. Results suggest that outreach with farmers should account for these covariances in belief, concerns, and attitudes toward adaptation and mitigation. 相似文献
3.
This paper explores the phenomenon of local climate perception and the extent to which public perceptions match climate conditions as recorded in instrumental climate data. We further examine whether perceptions of changes in local climates are influenced by prior beliefs about global warming, through the process of motivated reasoning. Using national survey data collected in the United States in 2011, we find that subjective experiences of seasonal average temperature and precipitation during the previous winter and summer were related to recorded conditions during each season. Beliefs about global warming also had significant effects on subjective experiences with above-normal temperatures, particularly among those who believed that global warming is not happening. When asked about the summer of 2010, those who believed that global warming is not happening were significantly less likely to report that they had experienced a warmer-than-normal summer, even when controlling for demographics and local climate conditions. These results suggest that the subjective experience of local climate change is dependent not only on external climate conditions, but also on individual beliefs, with perceptions apparently biased by prior beliefs about global warming. 相似文献
4.
Previous research has demonstrated a striking difference in climate change beliefs and policy support between people who identify with the right-wing of politics and with the left-wing of politics. But are we destined to continue with this divergence? We suggest that there is movement around these differences based on the politicization of climate change and we conducted two experimental studies with 126 and 646 people, respectively, to examine this effect. We found that those people whose political identity was made salient were less likely to believe in an anthropogenic cause of climate change and less likely to support government climate change policies than those whose identity was not made salient; particularly when those people were aligned with the right-wing of politics. The results demonstrate the importance of the salience of one's political identity in determining attitudes and beliefs even for scientific facts such as climate change. Our research also identifies some ways forward in dealing with climate change-based on depoliticizing the issue. 相似文献
5.
Farmer beliefs and concerns about climate change and attitudes toward adaptation and mitigation: Evidence from Iowa 总被引：2，自引：2，他引：0
Agriculture is both vulnerable to climate change impacts and a significant source of greenhouse gases. Increasing agriculture’s resilience and reducing its contribution to climate change are societal priorities. Survey data collected from Iowa farmers are analyzed to answer the related research questions: (1) do farmers support adaptation and mitigation actions, and (2) do beliefs and concerns about climate change influence those attitudes. Results indicate that farmers who were concerned about the impacts of climate change on agriculture and attributed it to human activities had more positive attitudes toward both adaptive and mitigative management strategies. Farmers who believed that climate change is not a problem because human ingenuity will enable adaptations and who did not believe climate change is occurring or believed it is a natural phenomenon—a substantial percentage of farmers—tended not to support mitigation. 相似文献
6.
We tested two consequences of a currently influential theory based on the notion of seeing adaptations to climate change as local adjustments to deal with changing conditions within the constraints of the broader economic–social–political arrangements. The notion leaves no explicit role for the strength of personal beliefs in climate change and adaptive capacity. The consequences were: (i) adaptive action to climate change taken by an individual who is exposed to and sensitive to climate change is not influenced to a considerable degree by their strength of belief in climate change and (ii) adaptive action to climate change taken by an individual who is exposed to and sensitive to climate change is not influenced to a considerable degree by their strength of belief in an adaptive capacity. Data from a 2004 questionnaire of 1950 Swedish private individual forest owners, who were assumed exposed to and sensitive to climate change, were used. Strength of belief in climate change and adaptive capacities were found to be crucial factors for explaining observed differences in adaptation among Swedish forest owners. 相似文献
7.
Household perceptions of climate change and preferences for mitigation action: the case of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme in Australia 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
The study aims to reveal Australian households?? perceptions of climate change and their preferences for mitigation action. A web-based survey was conducted in November 2008 in which over 600 households from the state of New South Wales were asked for their willingness to bear extra household expenditure to support the ??Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme??, an emissions trading scheme proposed by the Australian government. The results of the study can be summarized in four key findings. First, respondents?? willingness to pay for climate change mitigation is significantly influenced by their beliefs of future temperature rise. Support for the policy increased at a decreasing rate as the perceived temperature change rose. Second, perceptions of policy failure have a significant negative impact on respondents?? support for the proposed mitigation measure. The higher the perceived likelihood that the measure would not deliver any outcome, the lower was the likelihood that respondents would support the policy. Third, respondent preferences for the proposed policy are influenced by the possibility of reaching a global agreement on emissions reduction. Sample respondents stated significantly higher values for the policy when the biggest polluting countries implement a similar scheme. Finally, respondents?? willingness to take action against climate change, both at the national and household level, is found to be influenced by their level of mass-media exposure. Particularly, those respondents who watched ??An Inconvenient Truth?? were significantly more likely to act for climate change mitigation than others. 相似文献
8.
Tatyana Deryugina 《Climatic change》2013,118(2):397-416
Global warming has become a controversial public policy issue in spite of broad scientific consensus that it is real and that human activity is a contributing factor. It is likely that public consensus is also needed to support policies that might counteract it. It is therefore important to understand how people form and update their beliefs about climate change. Using unique survey data on beliefs about the occurrence of the effects of global warming, I estimate how local temperature fluctuations influence what individuals believe about these effects. I find that some features of the updating process are consistent with rational updating. I also test explicitly for the presence of several heuristics known to affect belief formation and find strong evidence for representativeness, some evidence for availability, and no evidence for spreading activation. I find that very short-run temperature fluctuations (1 day–2 weeks) have no effect on beliefs about the occurrence of global warming, but that longer-run fluctuations (1 month–1 year) are significant predictors of beliefs. Only respondents with a conservative political ideology are affected by temperature abnormalities. 相似文献
9.
Kathryn T. Stevenson M. Nils Peterson Howard D. Bondell Susan E. Moore Sarah J. Carrier 《Climatic change》2014,126(3-4):293-304
Though many climate literacy efforts attempt to communicate climate change as a risk, these strategies may be ineffective because among adults, worldview rather than scientific understanding largely drives climate change risk perceptions. Further, increased science literacy may polarize worldview-driven perceptions, making some climate literacy efforts ineffective among skeptics. Because worldviews are still forming in the teenage years, adolescents may represent a more receptive audience. This study examined how worldview and climate change knowledge related to acceptance of anthropogenic global warming (AGW) and in turn, climate change risk perception among middle school students in North Carolina, USA (n?=?387). We found respondents with individualistic worldviews were 16.1 percentage points less likely to accept AGW than communitarian respondents at median knowledge levels, mirroring findings in similar studies among adults. The interaction between knowledge and worldview, however, was opposite from previous studies among adults, because increased climate change knowledge was positively related to acceptance of AGW among both groups, and had a stronger positive relationship among individualists. Though individualists were 24.1 percentage points less likely to accept AGW than communitarians at low levels (bottom decile) of climate change knowledge, there was no statistical difference in acceptance levels between individualists and communitarians at high levels of knowledge (top decile). Non-White and females also demonstrated higher levels of AGW acceptance and climate change risk perception, respectively. Thus, education efforts specific to climate change may counteract divisions based on worldviews among adolescents. 相似文献
10.
Flood damages have increased in many regions around the world, and they are expected to continue to rise in the future due to climate change. To reverse this trend, awareness of flood risk among the population is required to support flood risk management policies and improve flood preparedness. However, empirical studies on the drivers of flood risk perceptions conducted thus far have reported mixed and contradictory results. The aim of this study is to provide insights into the factors that influence perceptions of various dimensions of flood risk to draw lessons to guide flood risk communication strategies. We test a variety of hypotheses of possible factors of influence on flood risk perceptions that are motivated by theoretical concepts and previous empirical studies, whilst also controlling for socio-demographic variables. A representative sample of 2,976 residents answered our survey assessing the role that past flood experiences and risk communication play in shaping flood risk perceptions. Besides exploring flood risk perceptions more robustly, this large sample also facilitates the systematic study of ‘don’t know’ answers, which are often dismissed as missing data in many studies. Rather in this study we analyze what ‘don’t know’ answers reflect in terms of knowledge about particular dimensions of flood risk. The study finds that older people, as well as those who have higher levels of income and education, are significantly more likely to express their flood risk perceptions, respondents who are unable to answer the questions on flood risk perceptions face a lower flood risk, report to have been living in their neighbourhood for a shorter period of time and have less first-hand flood experience. Previous studies might thus be biased by an implicit selection effect. Finally, we show that findings are highly dependent on other explicit choices made by researchers, including the apparently self-fulfilling impact of selecting one explanatory framework over another. New insights emerge from the role that information campaigns and social vulnerability play in the ability to answer the questions. Based on our findings, we offer recommendations for improving flood risk communication policies, specifically increasing the frequency of communication, ensuring that campaigns are focused in terms of the content they provide and the subgroups of the population they target. 相似文献
11.
Political conservatives are less likely to adopt climate change-mitigating behaviors, at least compared to their politically liberal counterparts. There thus have been extensive research explaining the so-called left–right divide. In the current research, we propose and test a novel explanation for this divide within the United States. Specifically, it is hypothesized that conservatives are more likely to see the world as fixed and unmalleable, in the sense that what they (as human beings) do to it will have little impact on diminishing the impacts of climate change. This perception and consequence of behavior should be independent of whether or not conservatives believe that global climate change is real and happening. In a study with 1,096 Americans, we find evidence for our hypotheses. Mediation analyses show that greater political conservatism predicts fewer climate change-mitigating behaviors due to greater fixed world beliefs and, consequently, lower perceptions of instrumentality of one’s actions to fight climate change, independent of climate change beliefs. Our work provides the first empirical evidence for a novel insight into why conservatives are less likely to act against climate change. Doing so, we also discuss the theoretical and practical contributions. 相似文献
12.
Feeling affected by climate change related disasters has the potential to mobilize belief in climate change, concern about the issue, and support for mitigation policies – even when accounting for the effects of physically living through a disaster. In this study we use a two-wave survey design where respondents in the United States were interviewed before and after Hurricane Florence to better understand who feels affected by such disasters. First, we find that being worried about climate change increases the feeling of being affected by the hurricane among those who regularly discuss climate change. Second, we find that those who are high in perspective taking are more likely to feel affected. However, those who are high in empathic concern, but feel obligated to help victims of disasters, are less likely to feel affected. This suggests that hurricanes may cause a collapse of compassion, where those who are especially sensitive to the suffering of others down-regulate their emotional response to costly disasters. 相似文献
13.
Identifying historical patterns of fluctuation in climate change skepticism guides researchers, policy makers, and science communicators in efforts to catalyze change in the future. We analyzed data from 25 nationally representative polls collected in Australia from 2009 to 2019 (N = 20,655). Although it remains concerningly high, climate skepticism trended down in that 10-year period, particularly among conservatives. Multilevel analyses identified two variables that stood out as being relevant in explaining that trajectory. First, climate change skepticism was positively associated with support for conservative political parties in national polls. Second, climate change skepticism was negatively associated with the annual global temperatures the previous year. There was little evidence that climate change beliefs were associated with economic variables or with seasonal variations in temperature. Furthermore, there was only weak evidence that climate change beliefs were associated with national temperatures. This suggests that global temperatures in the previous year are impactful because of their informational value (as a communication heuristic for the urgency and immediacy of climate change) more so than for their experiential value (in the sense of people actually experiencing warmer weather). Importantly, the effect of previous global temperature was particularly pronounced among those with the strongest levels of skepticism: political conservatives. This suggests that rising global annual temperatures have the power to update beliefs among those most in need of converting to the climate cause. 相似文献
14.
Although climate change is an urgent problem, behavioural and policy responses have not yet been sufficient to either reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to a disrupted climate system. Significant efforts have been made to raise public awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. One reason why these efforts might not be sufficient is rooted in people’s need to feel efficacy to solve complex problems; the belief that climate change is unstoppable might thwart action even among the concerned. This paper tests for the effect of fatalistic beliefs on behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change using two cross-national surveys representing over 50,000 people in 48 nations.
Key policy insights
The perception that climate change poses a risk or danger increases the likelihood of behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change.
The belief that climate change is unstoppable reduces the behavioural and policy response to climate change and moderates risk perception.
Communicators and policy leaders should carefully frame climate change as a difficult, yet solvable, problem to circumvent fatalistic beliefs.
15.
The need to adapt to climate change impacts, whilst simultaneously limiting greenhouse gas emissions, requires that the government’s efforts are joined by public action. In England and Wales, housing contributes significantly to the emissions and many properties are at risk of flooding. This paper investigates the preparedness of homeowners in England and Wales to make changes to their homes in response to the predicted effects of climate change. A telephone survey of 961 homeowners investigated their interest in purchasing mitigation and adaptation improvements against their concern about climate change, awareness of flood risk and attribution of responsibility for action. Whilst the majority of homes had some energy-saving improvements, few were found to have property-level flood protection. The high levels of awareness about climate change and flooding were coupled with the perception of risks as low. Whilst some respondents accepted personal responsibility for action, most believed that the authorities were responsible for flood protection, and would not pay the costs required to make their home more energy-efficient and better prepared for the eventuality of floods. The results suggest that there is scope for further improvement of energy-saving measures, and that the levels of adoption of flood-protection measures are very low. Multi-faceted strategies, including more effective communication of risks and responsibilities, incentives, and material support for the poorest, will need to be developed to overcome the current reluctance by homeowners to invest in flood-protection measures and further energy conservation solutions in the future. 相似文献
16.
Climate change adaptation in Australian mining communities: comparing mining company and local government views and activities 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Effective climate change adaptation in mining communities is reliant on action by both local authorities and mining operations. This article reports the findings of two surveys conducted in late 2010, with Australian mining companies and local government authorities respectively, investigating their perceptions and activities related to climate change adaptation. The research identified the main types of weather and climate-related impacts experienced in the past and expected under future climate conditions for the two groups. There were significantly differing levels of concern about weather and climate-related impacts between the two types of organisations. Mining company respondents reported lower levels of severity of impact from both past and (expected) future weather events, as well as lower levels of belief in climate change and of adaptation activities to prepare for it. Interestingly, mining companies generally reported less concern about future impacts than those experienced in the past, suggesting discounting of risks due to climate change scepticism. The article reports on a range of factors relevant to adaptation in mining communities, including perceived barriers, collaboration and further information needs. The research findings are discussed in the context of other recent research on climate change adaptation by Australian organisations and studies of mining industry adaptation in other countries. 相似文献
17.
Connie Roser-Renouf Edward W. Maibach Anthony Leiserowitz Xiaoquan Zhao 《Climatic change》2014,125(2):163-178
Climate change activism has been uncommon in the U.S., but a growing national movement is pressing for a political response. To assess the cognitive and affective precursors of climate activism, we hypothesize and test a two-stage information-processing model based on social cognitive theory. In stage 1, expectations about climate change outcomes and perceived collective efficacy to mitigate the threat are hypothesized to influence affective issue involvement and support for societal mitigation action. In stage 2, beliefs about the effectiveness of political activism, perceived barriers to activist behaviors and opinion leadership are hypothesized to influence intended and actual activism. To test these hypotheses, we fit a structural equation model using nationally representative data. The model explains 52 percent of the variance in a latent variable representing three forms of climate change activism: contacting elected representatives; supporting organizations working on the issue; and attending climate change rallies or meetings. The results suggest that efforts to increase citizen activism should promote specific beliefs about climate change, build perceptions that political activism can be effective, and encourage interpersonal communication on the issue. 相似文献
18.
The film The Age of Stupid depicts the world in 2055 devastated by climate change, combining this with documentary footage which illustrates many facets of the problems of climate change and fossil-fuel dependency. This study investigates the effects of the film on UK viewers’ attitudes and behaviour through a three-stage survey. Analysis of changes in attitudes focussed particularly on respondents’ concern about climate change, motivation to act, fear about the potential for catastrophe, beliefs about responsibility for action, and sense of agency. The film increased concern about climate change, motivation to act, and viewers’ sense of agency, although these effects had not persisted 10-14 weeks after seeing it. It was also successful in promoting some mitigation actions and behavioural change, although respondents reported barriers to further action, such as limited options for improving home energy efficiency among those in rented accommodation. However, filmgoers were atypical of the general public in that they exhibited very high levels of concern about climate change, knowledge about how to reduce their carbon emissions, and contact with organisations campaigning about climate change, before they saw the film. The paper considers how these factors may have enabled viewers to respond to the film as they did, as well as policy implications for those seeking to develop effective climate change communications. 相似文献
19.
In this paper, we examine for a sample of Los Angeles residents their willingness to pay to prevent significant climate change. We employ a fractional factorial design in which various climate change scenarios differing in ways consistent with existing variation in climate are presented to respondents. These are contrasted to respondents' current climate before willingness to pay is elicited. Thus, the focus is on climate change as it may be experienced locally. We also try to determine the kinds of value that are driving respondents' concerns. Among the key findings are that for these respondents, climate change leading to warmer local temperatures is a greater worry than climate change leading to colder local temperatures. In addition, climate change leading to less precipitation locally is of more concern that climate change leading to more precipitation locally. Finally, use value may be the most important kind of value, but a more cautious interpretation is that respondents are not yet able to clearly distinguish between different climate change consequences. 相似文献
20.
Politicians who proclaim both their skepticism about global warming and their conservative religious credentials leave the impression that conservative Protestants may be more skeptical about scientists’ claims regarding global warming than others. The history of the relationship between conservative Protestantism and science on issues such as evolution also suggests that there may be increased skepticism. Analyzing the 2006 and 2010 General Social Survey, we find no evidence that conservative Protestantism leads respondents to have less belief in the conclusiveness of climate scientists’ claims. However, a second type of skepticism of climate scientists is an unwillingness to follow scientists’ public policy recommendations. We find that conservative Protestantism does lead to being less likely to want environmental scientists to influence the public policy debate about what to do about climate change. Existing sociological research on the relationship between religion and science suggests that this stance is due to a long-standing social/moral competition between conservative Protestantism and science. 相似文献