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1.
Transaction costs of the Kyoto Mechanisms 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
Transaction costs will reduce the attractiveness of the Kyoto Mechanisms compared to domestic abatement options. Especially the project-based mechanisms Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are likely to entail considerable costs of baseline development, verification and certification. The Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) pilot phase and the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) programme give indications about the level of these costs. Under current estimates of world market prices for greenhouse gas emission permits, projects with annual emission reductions of less than 50,000 t CO2 equivalent are unlikely to be viable; for micro projects transaction costs can reach several hundred € per t CO2 equivalent. Thus, the Marrakech Accord rule to have special rules for small scale CDM projects makes sense, even if the thresholds chosen advantage certain project types; projects below 1000 t CO2 equivalent per year should get further exemptions. An alternative solution with no risk for the environmental credibility of the projects would be to subsidise baseline setting and charge lower, subsidised fees for small projects for the different steps of the CDM/second track JI project cycle. 相似文献
2.
应用有序样方聚类法,把普陀山旅游区32个样方分为5个群落类型,分别是马尾松-青冈+檵木群丛、马尾松-青冈+檵木+红楠+窄基红褐柃群丛、马尾松+枫香+檵木-青冈+檵木群丛、马尾松+青冈-青冈+檵木群丛、马尾松+青冈-青冈+檵木+石栎群丛,并运用TW INSPAN对上述样方进行聚类分析。两种分类方法的结果具有极显著的关联,说明有序样方聚类法很好地揭示了旅游干扰和群落类型之间的关系,它更适合于旅游干扰分析中的聚类研究,在旅游干扰的研究中是一个有益且有效的尝试。 相似文献
3.
Paula Castro 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):198-218
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ argument is analysed empirically by comparing marginal abatement cost curves. Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in most countries. Although the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped are below the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM predominantly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for the adoption of low-cost abatement options. 相似文献
4.
Review of the experience with monitoring uncertainty requirements in the Clean Development Mechanism
In order to ensure the environmental integrity of carbon offset projects, emission reductions certified under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have to be ‘real, measurable and additional’, which is ensured, inter alia, through the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) process. MRV, however, comes at a cost that ranges from several cents to €1.20 and above per tCO2e depending on the project type. This article analyses monitoring uncertainty requirements for carbon offset projects with a particular focus on the trade-off between monitoring stringency and cost. To this end, existing literature is reviewed, overarching monitoring guidelines, as well as the ten most-used methodologies are scrutinized, and finally three case studies are analysed. It is shown that there is indeed a trade-off between the stringency and the cost of monitoring, which if not addressed properly may become a major barrier for the implementation of offset projects in some sectors. It is then demonstrated that this trade-off has not been systematically addressed in the overarching CDM guidelines and that there are only limited incentives to reduce monitoring uncertainty. Some methodologies and calculation tools as well as some other offset standards, however, do incorporate provisions for a trade-off between monitoring costs and stringency. These provisions may take the form of discounting emissions reductions based on the level of monitoring uncertainty – or more implicitly through allowing a project developer to choose between monitoring a given parameter and using a conservative default value.
Policy relevance
The CDM Executive Board acknowledged that monitoring uncertainty has not been treated in a consistent manner and the draft standard on uncertainty was subsequently presented in May 2013. This article supports the implementation of this standard for more comprehensive, yet cost-efficient accounting for monitoring uncertainty in carbon offset projects. Moreover, in the light of the ongoing discussions on the New Market Mechanisms as well as the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund and different national mitigation policies, the CDM experience provides valuable insights with regards to the treatment of monitoring uncertainty and constitutes a solid basis for designing uncertainty requirements for new mechanisms to mitigate climate change. 相似文献
5.
There has been considerable debate on the merits of standardized baselines (SBLs) in the clean development mechanism (CDM), and how such baselines could reduce transaction costs for CDM projects. It has not been considered whether the voluntary versus mandatory use of SBLs by CDM project developers can affect the environmental integrity of the CDM. An example is given in which SBLs are applied to a homogeneous output industry in order to illustrate how the voluntary use of SBLs could lead – even with relatively stringent benchmarks – to over-crediting of emission reduction credits. 相似文献
6.
China is by far the largest host of projects implemented under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, earlier studies shed little light on the determinants of the distribution of CDM projects across Chinese provinces. Given China's large size and political-economic diversity, this dearth of research is troubling. We provide an empirical analysis of 2097 CDM projects in 30 Chinese provinces, 2004–2009. We find that high electricity consumption, low per capita income, and a lack of foreign direct investment are all associated with CDM project implementation. The findings are particularly strong for electricity and foreign direct investment. These findings are consistent with the economic theory of CDM project implementation. Project developers focus on minimizing the cost of carbon abatement. Moreover, they suggest that the CDM can, despite its limitations, contribute to reducing economic inequality and uneven development in China. 相似文献
7.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(2-3):179-196
The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM’s share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market. 相似文献
8.
Martin Weiss 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):229-231
Abstract This article provides a first-cut estimate of the potential impacts of the clean development mechanism (CDM) on electricity generation and carbon emissions in the power sector of non-Annex 1 countries. We construct four illustrative CDM regimes that represent a range of approaches under consideration within the climate community. We examine the impact of these CDM regimes on investments in new generation, under illustrative carbon trading prices of US$ 10 and 100/t C. In the cases that are most conducive to CDM activity, roughly 94% of new generation investments remains identical to the without-CDM situation, with only 6% shifting from higher to lower carbon intensity technologies.We estimate that the CDM would bolster renewable energy generation by as little as 15% at US$ 10/t C, or as much as 300% at US$ 100/t C. A striking finding comes from our examination of the potential magnitude of the “free-rider” problem, i.e. crediting of activities that will occur even in the absence of the CDM. The CDM is intended to be globally carbon-neutral—a project reduces emissions in the host country but generates credits that increase emissions in the investor country. However, to the extent that unwarranted credits are awarded to non-additional projects, the CDM would increase global carbon emissions above the without-CDM emissions level. Under two of the CDM regimes considered, cumulative free-riders credits total 250–600 MtC through the end of the first budget period in 2012. This represents 10–23% of the likely OECD emissions reduction requirement during the first budget period. Since such a magnitude of free-rider credits from non-additional CDM projects could threaten the environmental integrity of the Kyoto protocol, it is imperative that policy makers devise CDM rules that encourage legitimate projects, while effectively screening out non-additional activities. 相似文献
9.
Axel Michaelowa 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):353-371
Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have traditionally served as an indirect link between cap and trade systems around the world. However, since 2010, import restrictions have increased. Reasons for import limitations include the supplementarity principle, genuine concerns about the environmental integrity of CERs and social benefits of CDM projects, pressure from domestic emissions mitigation industries, concerns about competition in the industries in which reductions take place, as well as the attempt to pressure advanced developing countries to accept national emissions commitments under a future international climate policy regime. It is shown that import limitations lead to a decrease in CER prices and a race to generate CERs as quickly as possible. Such effects are visible in the CDM market after the EU announced its import limitations. The exclusion of CERs from specific project types will distort the CDM supply curve and increase the CER price unless the marginal abatement costs of the excluded project type are above the CER world market price. Similarly, exclusion of CERs from specific host countries will increase the price. Substantial differences are found in CER access to national carbon markets around the world.Policy relevanceCDM regulators could try to improve access of CERs to cap and trade schemes through improvements to additionality testing, standardizing baseline and monitoring methodologies and stakeholder consultation. However, regulators should be aware that standardization is no panacea, and controversies may resurface if standardized additionality determination (e.g. through benchmarks or positive lists) are applied for a certain period and found to be problematic. However, domestic policy concerns such as an unwillingness to send money abroad to buy credits, an inability to control market prices, and competitiveness impacts cannot be resolved by CDM reforms. If, despite such reforms of the CDM, blatant protectionism continues, a challenge before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be launched to stop discrimination of service exports from specific countries. 相似文献
10.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):62-74
What is the potential for developing small-scale CDM projects in India to reduce enteric methane emissions from cattle and buffaloes? The issue of baseline setting for prospective CDM projects is a complex one in the Indian context. The baselines constructed on the basis of aggregate emission rates at the national level are unlikely to be precise as methane emission rates are influenced by the livestock and feed characteristics, which vary widely across regions in an agro-climatically diverse country like India. This calls for establishing a project specific baseline underpinned with regional methane emission rates. The various aspects of sustainable development that merit consideration in formulating a CDM project in the Indian dairy sector include; increasing the productivity of animals, increasing the net income of producers, decreasing the cost of milk production and the transfer of safe technologies. The projects in the sector would be able to meet the ‘additionality’ conditions of the CDM. However, there are a number of constraints in implementing the enteric methane mitigation strategies through a CDM project at the field level. The article discusses these technical, financial, socio-cultural and institutional barriers along with possible responses to these constraints. 相似文献