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1.
The evolving architecture of global climate change adaptation finance is shifting towards fund mechanisms with competitive application and allocation principles. At the same time, prioritization of the most vulnerable countries is a key goal within this emerging architecture. The paper analyses whether the Green Climate Fund (GCF), by far the largest climate change fund, has so far delivered on its promise to prioritize the most vulnerable countries. For our analysis, we consider the USD 2.5 billion GCF funding allocated until the end of the first mobilization phase and disaggregate it project-by-project into its mitigation and adaptation related amounts. We then analyze the adaptation flows in terms of the recipient country’s level of vulnerability and institutional capacity. We further analyze whether funds are being accessed through independent national entities or international intermediaries and whether recipient countries have developing country priority status. The results show that funds-based adaptation finance creates an ambiguous picture: On the one hand, the GCF is on track in allocating its funds largely to country groups which its statutes aim to prioritize, particularly LDCs, African countries and SIDS. At the same time, the proposal process results in the fact that many countries with the highest climate vulnerability but weak government institutions and fragile state-bureaucracies have missed out and not been able to access project funding, mostly LDCs in Africa and conflict-ridden countries. Further, most countries have not yet been able to access project funds independently through their national entities, limiting direct access and country ownership – the strengthening of which is a major goal of the fund. The findings suggest that simplified approval tracks need to be strengthened in the emerging climate finance architecture so that populations in countries with the lowest institutional capacity but highest vulnerability are not being left behind in the long-run.  相似文献   

2.
This paper provides an overview of the thunderstorm climate of the Baltic countries during the period of 1951–2000. Our study area is in northeastern Europe and encompasses Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Visual thunderstorm observations at 59 weather stations were used as a data source. The mean annual number of thunderstorm days was 12–29.5. The seasonal cycle of thunderstorm hours with a daily step unexpectedly showed two maxima, whereas the monthly numbers of thunderstorm days had one clear mid-latitude specific peak between June and August. The diurnal cycle of thunderstorm hours showed a peak between 1400 and 1800 local time and a minimum between 0400 and 1000 hours local time. The average annual duration of thunderstorm events was 112 min. The average number of thunderstorm events per thunderstorm day was around 1.1–1.2. Our results showed that the thunderstorm climate of the Baltic countries generally resembles that of other mid-latitude study sites.  相似文献   

3.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):233-248
Abstract

Developing countries are vulnerable to extremes of normal climatic variability, and climate change is likely to increase the frequency and magnitude of some extreme weather events and disasters. Adaptation to climate change is dependent on current adaptive capacity and the development models that are being pursued by developing countries. Various frameworks are available for vulnerability and adaptation (V&A) assessments, and they have both advantages and limitations. Investments in developing countries are more focused on recovery from a disaster than on the creation of adaptive capacity. Extreme climatic events create a spiral of debt burden on developing countries. Increased capacity to manage extreme weather events can reduce the magnitude of economic, social and human damage and eventually, investments, in terms of borrowing money from the lending agencies. Vulnerability to extreme weather events, disaster management and adaptation must be part of long-term sustainable development planning in developing countries. Lending agencies and donors need to reform their investment policies in developing countries to focus more on capacity building instead of just investing in recovery operations and infrastructure development.  相似文献   

4.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):634-651
A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI's national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between ?52% and ?69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic ?35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap.  相似文献   

5.
We have compiled historical greenhouse gas emissions and their uncertainties on country and sector level and assessed their contribution to cumulative emissions and to global average temperature increase in the past and for a the future emission scenario. We find that uncertainty in historical contribution estimates differs between countries due to different shares of greenhouse gases and time development of emissions. Although historical emissions in the distant past are very uncertain, their influence on countries?? or sectors?? contributions to temperature increase is relatively small in most cases, because these results are dominated by recent (high) emissions. For relative contributions to cumulative emissions and temperature rise, the uncertainty introduced by unknown historical emissions is larger than the uncertainty introduced by the use of different climate models. The choice of different parameters in the calculation of relative contributions is most relevant for countries that are different from the world average in greenhouse gas mix and timing of emissions. The choice of the indicator (cumulative GWP weighted emissions or temperature increase) is very important for a few countries (altering contributions up to a factor of 2) and could be considered small for most countries (in the order of 10%). The choice of the year, from which to start accounting for emissions (e.g. 1750 or 1990), is important for many countries, up to a factor of 2.2 and on average of around 1.3. Including or excluding land-use change and forestry or non-CO2 gases changes relative contributions dramatically for a third of the countries (by a factor of 5 to a factor of 90). Industrialised countries started to increase CO2 emissions from energy use much earlier. Developing countries?? emissions from land-use change and forestry as well as of CH4 and N2O were substantial before their emissions from energy use.  相似文献   

6.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ argument is analysed empirically by comparing marginal abatement cost curves. Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in most countries. Although the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped are below the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM predominantly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for the adoption of low-cost abatement options.  相似文献   

7.
In the context of the post-Kyoto policy debate, the question was raised whether the current practice of production-based emissions accounting should be replaced by a consumption-based approach. In this paper, we qualify the conditions under which the way of carbon accounting makes a difference, and show how this affects the incentive of countries to opt for one or the other alternative. Two main insights are presented: First, it is emphasized—and formally shown with a general equilibrium trade model—that the way of accounting has neither efficiency nor distributive effects in the presence of a global cap-and-trade regime with full coverage and given national emission caps. Second, the accounting scheme does matter whenever the initial allocation rule for emission rights is related to past emissions. However, for a net exporter of carbon such as China, the preference for one or the other turns out to be ambiguous, since the current production-based accounting would be favored under grandfathering, whereas consumed carbon would be the preferred measure whenever higher current or historic emissions imply a lower initial allowance, as e.g. under the principle of historical responsibility.  相似文献   

8.
9.
A large portion of foreign assistance for climate change mitigation in developing countries is directed to clean energy facilities. To support international mitigation goals, however, donors must make investments that have effects beyond individual facilities. They must reduce barriers to private-sector investment by generating information for developers, improving relevant infrastructure, or changing policies. We examine whether donor agencies target financing for commercial-scale wind and solar facilities to countries where private investment in clean energy is limited and whether donor investments lead to more private investments. On average, we find no positive evidence for these patterns of targeting and impact. Coupled with model results that show feed-in tariffs increase private investment, we argue that donor agencies should reallocate resources to improve policies that promote private investment in developing countries, rather than finance individual clean energy facilities.

Policy relevance

We suggest that international negotiations could usefully shift the focus of climate change finance towards adaptation in exchange for mitigation-improving policy reforms in developing countries. There is little evidence that mitigation-related financing is having broader effects on energy production, so new financial arrangements should be the focus of future negotiations. Additionally, international donors should focus efforts on reforming policies to attract private investment.  相似文献   

10.
This empirical study assesses the relationship between the characteristics of developing countries and the amount of official climate mitigation finance inflow. A two-part model and robustness checks were used to analyse 1998–2010 Rio Marker data on 180 developing countries. The results show that developing countries with higher CO2 intensity, larger carbon sinks, lower per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and good governance tend to be selected as recipients of climate mitigation finance, and receive more of it. CO2 emission is not used as a determinant of mitigation finance until the actual financial disbursement. Poverty aid tends to be allocated to countries with low CO2 emissions, possibly to avoid diverting aid from poorer developing countries. However, such a diversion is unavoidable if the share of mitigation finance in climate finance and in overall official development assistance (ODA) continues to escalate. This study calls for an equitable allocation of total ODA mitigation and adaptation finance in addition to the 0.7% ODA/gross national income target, and for transparent criteria and the verification of reporting on the allocation of mitigation finance.  相似文献   

11.
Does civil society lobbying affect states’ policies on climate change? Does it facilitate or hamper cooperation towards ‘greener’ policies? Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and business lobbying groups alike are increasingly seeking to access states’ negotiation delegations at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in order to affect or even change official delegates’ policies. Previous studies have failed to control for the fact that the set of states that have granted civil society access to their delegations is unlikely to be a random sample. Moreover, the fact that a delegation's policy outputs may converge with the preferences of a civil society group cannot be taken as evidence that it was caused by civil society lobbying. A matching approach that addresses both problems is proposed, which corrects for the non-random assignment of civil society organizations to state delegations and forms quasi-experimental contrasts by sampling a set of ‘most similar’ cases that only differ in their treatment; i.e. civil society lobbying. This approach facilitates a causal interpretation of lobbying efforts. The results indicate that only business groups are likely to exert a causal influence on states’ climate delegations. However, contrary to expectations, these groups appear to have enhanced states’ efforts towards environmentally friendly policies.

Policy relevance

What impact can non-governmental actors have in influencing states’ policies at the climate change negotiations? This question is addressed empirically using a matching approach, which corrects potential challenges in the research on interest group influence. It is shown that business groups are likely to influence states’ policies at the UNFCCC – unlike green interest groups or civil society in general. In light of these findings, three policy implications are derived that might be of importance for states and non-governmental decision makers alike. Most importantly, ENGOs should refocus their efforts for exerting their influence. ENGOs could make their lobbying more effective by first identifying the states that may be more receptive to their preferences and positions.  相似文献   

12.
Le-Yin Zhang 《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):1159-1176
The implications of climate change for economic development strategies in developing countries are explored, in particular whether industrialization still represents a viable development strategy in the context of climate change. Synthesizing the relevant literature and drawing insights from a comparison of Chinese and Indian experiences, it is argued that industrialization still represents an effective and, to some extent, indispensable development strategy, especially for those low- and low–middle-income countries that are affected by deindustrialization.  相似文献   

13.
What potential effect do flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol have on energy efficiency, fuel switching and the development of renewable energy sources for the eight post-communist EU Member States that accessed in 2004? These countries are chief candidates for hosting Joint Implementation (JI) projects and for participating in international emission trading, which may assist the implementation and financing of projects in these target areas. The potentials and barriers to Joint Implementation are reviewed, as well as the conditions under which international emission trading can influence the energy use of the selling country. Different strategies adopted by the host countries towards the application of these instruments, and their impact on sustainable energy development, are examined. The article concludes that the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms may play a positive, but rather limited, role in the sustainable energy development of the region, but the barriers to Joint Implementation may shift the emphasis towards transactions under the framework of international emission trading. If innovative mechanisms are tied to sustainable development goals, this may mobilize the energyefficiency potentials of these countries. An attractive opportunity exists to achieve energy efficiency and emission reductions, utilizing the revenues from allowance sales through ‘green investment’ schemes.  相似文献   

14.
Climate change disproportionately impacts the world’s poorest countries. A recent World Bank report highlighted that over 100 million people are at risk of falling into extreme poverty as a result of climate change. There is currently a lack of information about how to simultaneously address climate change and poverty. Climate change challenges provide an opportunity for those impacted most to come up with new and innovative technologies and solutions. This article uses an example from Mozambique where local and international partners are working side-by-side, to show how developing countries can simultaneously address climate change and poverty reduction using an ecosystem-based adaptation approach. Using ecosystem-based adaptation, a technique that uses the natural environment to help societies adapt to climate change, developing countries can lead the way to improve climate adaptation globally. This paradigm shift would help developing countries become leaders in ecosystem-based adaptation and green infrastructure techniques and has implications for climate policy worldwide.

POLICY RELEVANCE

The Paris Agreement resulting from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) in December 2015 was rightly lauded for its global commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions. However, COP 21 was also historic because of its call for non-party stakeholders to address climate change, inclusion of a global goal of ‘enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability’, and the United States’ commitment of $800 million to adaptation funding. The combination of recognizing the need for new stakeholders to commit to climate change adaptation, the large impact climate change will have on the developing world, and providing access to funds for climate change adaptation creates a unique opportunity for developing countries to pave the way in adaptation policies in practices. Currently, developing countries are creating National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) for the UNFCCC. Through including a strong component of ecosystem-based adaptation in NAPs, developing countries can shape their countries’ policies, improve local institutions and governments, and facilitate a new generation of innovative leaders. Lessons learned in places like Mozambique can help lead the way in other regions facing similar climatic risks.  相似文献   


15.
Brazil is the first major developing country to pledge for absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. This article explores the extent to which fiscal policies could contribute to this reduction and to greening the Brazilian economy. It was found that the use of green fiscal policies is at an early stage in Brazil, but a growing number of measures have been adopted in recent years led by subnational-level policies. An econometric analysis of 24 Brazilian manufacturing sectors for the years 2001–2008 shows that some fiscal instruments, such as low-cost (subsidized) finance for innovation and fiscal incentives for sustainable practices, have been effective in inducing green innovation. However, less than 14% of more than 100 thousand companies included in the study have adopted greener technologies. Even though Brazilian green fiscal policies have been rather uncoordinated and ad hoc, their significant impact on the uptake of green technologies indicates these can play an important role in a transition to a green economy.

POLICY RELEVANCE

Faced with the challenge of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions in absolute terms, Brazil now needs to put in place policies to help deliver the country’s pledge. This article analyses which fiscal policies should be adopted and how these policies could form part of a low carbon policy framework in the country. Among our policy-relevant findings is that subnational green fiscal policies are relatively less complex to introduce and encourage uptake of green technologies. Thus, they could be an entry point to a wider green fiscal policy strategy. We also found that fiscal incentives for green innovation projects can present more than proportional impact on the uptake of green technologies owing to positive feedbacks, increasing returns to scale and spill-overs. These are attractive features of green innovations to developing countries in addition to environmental benefits, as they favour the accumulation of indigenous technological capabilities that are critical for long-term technological and economic development. These lessons learned from green fiscal policies in Brazil are applicable to other developing countries.  相似文献   


16.
In response to substantial deforestation over many decades, large scale reforestation programs are being implemented across many tropical developing countries. Examples include the United Nations Billion Trees Campaign, the National Greening Program in the Philippines, and the 5 million ha reforestation program in Vietnam. However, while substantial investments are being made in reforestation, little information exists on the drivers influencing reforestation success and how these interact to determine environmental and socio-economic outcomes. In this study we surveyed 43 reforestation projects on Leyte Island, The Philippines to identify the drivers that most influence reforestation success as measured by key indicators drawn from the literature, including interactions between drivers and between drivers and indicators. We investigated 98 potential success drivers, including technical and biophysical factors; socio-economic factors; institutional, policy and management factors; and reforestation project characteristics. We also measured 12 success indicators, including forest establishment, forest growth, environmental and socio-economic success indicators. Stepwise multiple regressions were used to identify significant relationships among drivers and indicators and this analysis was used to develop a system of driver and indicator relationships. Based on this we found that revegetation method, funding source, education and awareness campaigns, the dependence of local people on forests, reforestation incentives, project objectives, forest protection mechanisms and the condition of road infrastructure were highly connected drivers that influenced multiple success indicators either directly or indirectly. We conclude that policies targeting revegetation methods, socioeconomic incentives, forest protection mechanisms, sustainable livelihoods, diversification of funding and partnerships, technical support, and infrastructure development are likely to have a broad systemic and beneficial effect on the success of reforestation programs in tropical developing countries.  相似文献   

17.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):731-751
Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price.  相似文献   

18.
This article attempts to disentangle the determinants of the adoption of renewable energy support policies in developing and emerging countries. By analyzing policies already implemented in industrialized countries, we focus on the diffusion but not the invention of climate-relevant policies. We look at four different types of policies (renewable energy targets, feed-in tariffs, other financial incentives and framework policies) and consider both domestic factors and international diffusion mechanisms utilizing a discrete-time events history model with a logit link on a self-compiled dataset of grid-based electricity policy adoption in 112 developing and emerging countries from 1998 to 2009. In general, we find stronger support for the domestic determinants of policy adoption, but also substantial influence of international factors. Countries with a larger population and more wealth have a higher probability of adopting renewable energy policies. Only in some specific cases do natural endowments for producing renewable energy encourage governments to adopt policies, and hydro power resources even correlate negatively with the adoption of targets. Among the international determinants, emulation from colonial peers and membership within the EU seem to facilitate policy adoption. International climate finance is less relevant, as the Global Environmental Facility and the Clean Development Mechanism may only increase the adoption of frameworks and targets, but they have no influence on tariffs and incentives.  相似文献   

19.
Floods are challenging the resilience of societies all over the world. In many countries there are discussions on diversifying the strategies for flood risk management, which implies some sort of policy change. To understand the possibilities of such change, a thorough understanding of the forces of stability and change of underlying governance arrangements is required. It follows from the path dependency literature that countries which rely strongly on flood infrastructures, as part of flood defense strategies, would be more path dependent. Consequently there is a higher chance to find more incremental change in these countries than in countries that have a more diversified set of strategies. However, comparative and detailed empirical studies that may help scrutinize this assumption are lacking.To address this knowledge gap, this paper investigates how six European countries (Belgium, England, France, The Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) essentially differ with regard to their governance of flood risks. To analyze stability and change, we focus on how countries are responding to certain societal and ecological driving forces (ecological turn; climate change discourses; European policies; and the increasing prevalence of economic rationalizations) that potentially affect the institutional arrangements for flood risk governance. Taking both the variety of flood risk governance in countries and their responses to driving forces into account, we can clarify the conditions of stability or change of flood risk governance arrangements more generally. The analysis shows that the national-level impact of driving forces is strongly influenced by the flood risk governance arrangements in the six countries. Path dependencies are indeed visible in countries with high investments in flood infrastructure accompanied by strongly institutionalized governance arrangements (Poland, the Netherlands) but not only there. Also more diversified countries that are less dependent on flood infrastructure and flood defense only (England) show path dependencies and mostly incremental change. More substantial changes are visible in countries that show moderate diversification of strategies (Belgium, France) or countries that ‘have no strong path yet’ in comprehensive flood risk governance (Sweden). This suggests that policy change can be expected when there is both the internal need and will to change and a barrage of (external) driving forces pushing for change.  相似文献   

20.
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