排序方式： 共有102条查询结果，搜索用时 31 毫秒
61.
802．1 x是IEEE为解决基于端口的接入控制而定义的一个标准。介绍基于802．1 x的认证体系,对EAP-MD5、EAP-TLS、PEAP、LEAP等算法进行比较,总结实践中遇到的问题。 相似文献
62.
Carbon sequestration in Africa: The land tenure problem 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
The prospect of using tropical forest projects to sequester significant amounts of atmospheric carbon as one mitigation approach to climate change has received considerable attention. In the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) aspires to make such projects viable. This article examines the prospect of these projects in Africa, and argues that land tenure is much more than just a set of variables to be changed, and that instead it exists as a prohibitive obstacle to the implementation of afforestation and reforestation sequestration approaches. Five primary tenure problems are examined: (1) the disconnect between customary and statutory land rights, (2) legal pluralism, (3) tree planting as land claim, (4) expansion of treed areas in smallholder land use systems, and (5) the difficulty of using the ‘abandoned land’ category. The pervasiveness of these tenurial issues mean that the prospects for successfully implementing afforestation and reforestation projects in Africa are in reality quite weak. The current project approach to carbon storage in Africa needs to be significantly realigned with African reality in order for sequestration expectations to be practical. 相似文献
63.
生物多样性相关传统知识的类型与惠益分享 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
薛达元 《资源与生态学报(英文版)》2011,2(1):29-33
2010年在日本名古屋召开的《生物多样性公约》第10次缔约方大会通过《名古屋议定书》,而与生物多样性相关传统知识的获取与惠益分享成为该议定书的核心内容。然而,国际上对传统知识的概念尚未一致,将影响其获取与惠益分享的实施。本文根据国际公约的相关概念和中国传统知识的实际,将生物多样性相关传统知识分为5个类型。进而介绍和分析了《名古屋议定书》有关传统知识获取与惠益分享的条款与规定,特别是分析了土著与地方社区之外获得的、历史上已文献化并进入公知的传统知识其惠益分享问题。还阐述了中国在传统知识保护方面的国家战略,提出了保护、传承和推广应用传统知识的措施。 相似文献
64.
The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comply without consequence. The alternative compliance enforcement systems that have been proposed in the literature also face substantial problems. A simple, flexible, potent, and credible compliance enforcement system for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, based on deposits, is proposed here: at ratification, each country deposits a significant amount of money, and continues to do so in the preparation stage each year until the start of the commitment period. At the end of this period, those countries that meet their emissions limitation targets receive a full refund of their deposit, while those that fail to do so forfeit part or all of it. A simplified two-country model of the deposit system and a numerical example of an agreement involving the US, Japan, Russia, and Europe is also provided. If each country's deposit is no less than its abatement costs, there is a strong incentive for participating countries to avoid non-compliance. 相似文献
65.
Britta Horstmann 《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):1086-1096
The Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol marks a change in the international climate change financing architecture due to its independence from official development assistance, direct access and the majority of developing countries in governance. A major goal of the Adaptation Fund is to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The presented analysis considers the results of operationalization of the fund between 2008 and 2010, and the role vulnerability had in the allocation of funds. The definition of ‘vulnerability’ remains broad and currently does not allow for a prioritization in the allocation of funds. Criteria like ‘level of vulnerability’ or ‘adaptive capacity’ still need to be specified. The possibilities for the Adaptation Fund Board to implement a vulnerability-oriented funding approach are limited by the legal basis of the Kyoto Protocol and the principle of a country-driven approach. The effective support of vulnerable communities primarily depends on the institutional capacities and the institutional arrangement at the national level and the quality of analysis the adaptation projects and programmes are based on. 相似文献
66.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):353-365
Abstract The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects. This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries. 相似文献
67.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):51-70
Abstract To reduce the risk of overselling in the context of international greenhouse gas trading under the Kyoto Protocol, Parties have agreed to a commitment period reserve requirement. The commitment period reserve requires each Annex B Party to hold in its national registry quota equal to the lower of (a) X% of five times the Party's most recently reviewed emissions inventory; and (b) Y% of the Party's initial assigned amount. The agreement reached at the resumed sixth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) sets X = 100% and Y = 90%. This paper analyses different specifications (values of X and Y) of the commitment period reserve in terms of potential non-compliance due to overselling and restricted sales of quota surplus to compliance needs of the seller. To eliminate potential non-compliance due to overselling, Y must be equal to 100% and X must be greater than 105%. Specifications that limit potential non-compliance due to overselling, may temporarily restrict sales of quota surplus to the compliance of some countries. The Annex II Parties are less likely to face restrictions on sales of surplus quota than other Annex B countries. The risk of temporarily restricted sales is reduced to less than 10% for almost all countries for a value of X close to 90%. 相似文献
68.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):306-315
Consideration of incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is now formally part of the post-2012 climate change negotiations. A significant amount of financing will be required to make REDD a success, but the design of the REDD architecture can determine the availability of capital. Therefore, in negotiations this should be considered at the same time and on an equal basis with methodological and political considerations. Detailed consideration is given to the type of commitment, the financing mechanism, the level of incentive allocation, and the fungibility of carbon credits, in the context of experience from existing carbon markets. We conclude that a financially successful REDD mechanism would be based on a strong regulatory framework with mandatory targets, market-based, with some degree of project-level crediting, creating fungible REDD credits, subject to a cap. 相似文献
69.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):752-767
Policy-makers and scientists have raised concerns about the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in particular regarding its low contribution to sustainable development, unbalanced regional and sectoral distribution of projects, and its limited contribution to global emission reductions. Differentiation between countries or project types has been proposed as a possible way forward to address these problems. An overview is provided of the different ways in which CDM differentiation could be implemented. The implications for the actors involved in the CDM are analysed, along with a quantitative assessment of the impacts on the carbon market, using bottom-up marginal abatement cost curves. The discounting of CDM credits, quota systems, or differentiated eligibility of countries could help to address several of the concerns raised. Preferential treatment may also make a limited contribution to achieving the aims of CDM differentiation by increasing opportunities for under-represented host countries. The impact on the carbon market appears to be limited for most options. 相似文献
70.
Bjart Holtsmark 《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):399-415
After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the extension of national quotas in the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements, meagre environmental effects and a low price of emission permits are likely to be the outcome of implementation. This paper attempts to analyze this scenario, mainly in relation to the Russian case. I discuss on the basis of certain key assumptions the strategic options open to the supply side of the permit market and Russia's potentially incompatible interests as a producer of oil and gas on the one hand and a dominating seller of emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol on the other. The analysis shows that Russian oil and gas interests are likely to boost Russia's inclination to sell permits, ultimately resulting in lower permit prices. 相似文献