Abstract The Kyoto Protocol allows a group of Annex B countries to fulfill their emissions limitation commitments jointly by forming a “bubble” equal to their collective commitment. Annex B countries, whether members of a bubble or not, can use the Kyoto mechanisms to help meet their emissions limitation commitments. I argue that Kyoto mechanism rules should be applied to Parties individually regardless of their membership in a bubble. This means there are virtually no advantages to joining a bubble, but it is not clear that the option to form a bubble should confer benefits on the members relative to other Annex B Parties that do not join a bubble. 相似文献
The clean development mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows industrialized countries to use credits from greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement projects in developing countries. A key requirement of the CDM is that the emission reductions be real, measurable and additional. This article uses data from registered projects to evaluate the extent to which these objectives are met by projects that reduce hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) emissions in the production of hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22). The data show that HCFC-22 plants produced significantly less HFC-23 during periods when no emission credits could be claimed compared with periods when HFC-23 destruction could be credited under the CDM. Moreover, the total amount of HCFC-22 produced appears to be determined mainly by CDM rules. This suggests that the claimed emission reductions may partly not be real and that the CDM provides perverse incentives to generate more HFC-23. The accelerated phase-out of HCFCs under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer could worsen this situation. To address these issues an ambitious emission benchmark for the baseline HFC-23 emissions is proposed. 相似文献
The impacts of plastic debris on the marine environment have gained the attention of the global community. Although the plastic debris problem presents in the oceans, the failure to control land-based plastic waste is the primary cause of these marine environmental impacts. Plastics in the ocean are mainly a land policy issue, yet the regulation of marine plastic debris from land-based sources is a substantial gap within the international policy framework. Regulating different plastics at the final product level is difficult to implement. Instead, the Montreal Protocol may serve as a model to protect the global ocean common, by reducing the production of virgin material within the plastics industry and by regulating both the polymers and chemical additives as controlled substances at a global level. Similar to the Montreal Protocol, national production and consumption of this virgin content can be calculated, providing an opportunity for the introduction of phased targets to reduce and eliminate the agreed substances to be controlled. The international trade of feedstock materials that do not meet the agreed minimum standards can be restricted. The aim of such an agreement would be to encourage private investment in the collection, sorting and recycling of post-consumer material for reuse as feedstock, thereby contributing to the circular economy. The proposed model is not without its challenges, particularly when calculating costs and benefits, but is worthy of further consideration by the international community in the face of the global threats posed to the ocean by plastics. 相似文献
The United States’ decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (pending possible re-engagement under different terms) may have significant ramifications for international climate policy, but the implications of this decision remain contested. This commentary illustrates how comparative analysis of US participation in multilateral environmental agreements can inform predictions and future assessments of the decision. We compare and contrast US non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, focusing on four key areas that may condition the influence of US treaty decisions on international climate policy: (i) global momentum on climate change mitigation; (ii) the possibility of US non-participation giving rise to alternative forms of international collaboration on climate policy; (iii) the timing and circumstances of the US decision to exit; and (iv) the influence of treaty design on countries’ incentives to participate and comply. We find that differences across the two treaties relating to the first three factors are more likely to reduce the negative ramifications of US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement compared to the Kyoto Protocol. However, the increased urgency of deep decarbonization renders US non-participation a major concern despite its declining share of global emissions. Moreover, key design features of the Paris Agreement suggest that other countries may react to the US decision by scaling back their levels of ambition and compliance, even if they remain in the Agreement.
Key policy insights
Increasing global momentum on mitigation since 1997 means that US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is potentially less damaging than its non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol
Despite the declining US share of global emissions, greater urgency of deep decarbonization means that the non-participation of a major player, such as the US, remains problematic for global cooperation and achieving the Paris Agreement’s goals
Differences in the design of the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement suggest that US non-participation is more likely to prompt reluctant countries to stay within the Paris framework but reduce levels of ambition and compliance, rather than exit the Agreement altogether
This article provides an ex post analysis of the compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period (2008–2012) based on the final data for national GHG emissions and exchanges in carbon units that became available at the end of 2015. On the domestic level, among the 36 countries that fully participated in the Kyoto Protocol, only nine countries emitted higher levels of GHGs than committed and therefore had to resort to flexibility mechanisms. On the international level – i.e. after the use of flexibility mechanisms – all Annex B Parties are in compliance. Countries implemented different compliance strategies: purchasing carbon units abroad, stimulating the domestic use of carbon credits by the private sector and incentivizing domestic emission reductions through climate policies.
Overall, the countries party to the Protocol surpassed their aggregate commitment by an average 2.4 GtCO2e yr–1. Of the possible explanations for this overachievement, ‘hot-air’ was estimated at 2.2 GtCO2e yr–1, while accounting rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) further removed 0.4 GtCO2e yr–1 from the net result excluding LULUCF. The hypothetical participation of the US and Canada would have reduced this overachievement by a net 1 GtCO2e yr–1. None of these factors – some of which may be deemed illegitimate – would therefore on its own have led to global non-compliance, even without use of the 0.3 GtCO2e of annual emissions reductions generated by the Clean Development Mechanism. The impact of domestic policies and ‘carbon leakage’ – neither of which is quantitatively assessed here – should not be neglected either.
Policy relevance
Given the ongoing evolution of the international climate regime and the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, we believe that there is a need to evaluate the results of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. To our knowledge there has been no overarching quantitative ex post assessment of the Kyoto Protocol based on the final emissions data for 2008–2012, which became available in late 2015. This article attempts to fill this gap, focusing on the domestic and international compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period. 相似文献
Dialogues on global climate policy are increasingly discussing the sustainable energy transition, with Goal 7 of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals highlighting the importance of affordable and clean energy. This study looks at foreign aid as a carrier of global climate policy and examines donor behaviour in the energy sector. By examining donor behaviour when giving energy aid, one can grasp how the donor community helps recipients achieve a sustainable energy transition. A panel of donor–recipient pairs, covering 29 donors and 99 recipients, was constructed for the period between 1996 and 2013, using data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Creditor Reporting System (OECD CRS), International Energy Agency (IEA) and World Development Indicators (WDI). The pair-year panel data were empirically analysed using a two-part model to test whether energy aid donors respond to recipients’ needs with regard to renewable energy and residential electricity. The findings demonstrate that donors respond to recipients’ sustainable energy needs, both renewable and residential, when selecting recipients. Moreover, donors tend to increase the amount of aid based on renewable energy needs. The findings also highlight the significant role of international climate policy, as donors have changed their energy aid-giving patterns since the start of the Kyoto Protocol. Contrary to the common belief in the aid-giving literature, this study shows that, with regard to energy aid, donor interests are more weakly related to recipient selection than are recipient needs.
Key policy insights
Donors are influenced by the residential energy needs of recipients when giving energy aid, which aligns with the Sustainable Development Goals.
Donors’ energy aid-giving patterns changed between the periods before and after entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, highlighting the significant role of international climate change policy.
Policy makers and aid practitioners can steer donors to continue to allocate resources to the development of recipients’ energy policy and to help recipients prepare institutional structures to attract private investment in sustainable energy.
