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1.
While carbon pricing is widely seen as a crucial element of climate policy and has been implemented in many countries, it also has met with strong resistance. We provide a comprehensive overview of public perceptions of the fairness of carbon pricing and how these affect policy acceptability. To this end, we review evidence from empirical studies on how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural aspects of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade. In addition, we examine preferences for particular redistributive and other uses of revenues generated by carbon pricing and their role in instrument acceptability. Our results indicate a high concern over distributional effects, particularly in relation to policy impacts on poor people, in turn reducing policy acceptability. In addition, people show little trust in the capacities of governments to put the revenues of carbon pricing to good use. Somewhat surprisingly, most studies do not indicate clear public preferences for using revenues to ensure fairer policy outcomes, notably by reducing its regressive effects. Instead, many people prefer using revenues for ‘environmental projects’ of various kinds. We end by providing recommendations for improving public acceptability of carbon pricing. One suggestion to increase policy acceptability is combining the redistribution of revenue to vulnerable groups with the funding for environmental projects, such as on renewable energy.
Key policy insights
If people perceive carbon pricing instruments as fair, this increases policy acceptability and support.
People’s satisfaction with information provided by the government about the policy instrument increases acceptability.
While people express high concern over uneven distribution of the policy burden, they often prefer using carbon pricing revenues for environmental projects instead of compensation for inequitable outcomes.
Recent studies find that people’s preferences shift to using revenues for making policy fairer if they better understand the functioning of carbon pricing, notably that relatively high prices of CO2-intensive goods and services reduce their consumption.
Combining the redistribution of revenue to support both vulnerable groups and environmental projects, such as on renewable energy, seems to most increase policy acceptability.
2.
Over the last decade, cap-and-trade emissions schemes have emerged as one of the favoured policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions. An inherent design feature of cap-and-trade schemes is that, once the cap on emissions has been set, no additional reductions beyond this level can be provided by the actions of those individuals, organizations and governments within the covered sectors. Thus, the emissions cap constitutes an emissions floor. This feature has been claimed by some to have undesirable implications, in that it discourages ethically motivated mitigation actions and preempts the possibility that local, state and national governments can take additional mitigation action in the context of weak national or regional targets. These criticisms have become prominent in Australia and the US within the public debate regarding the adoption of an emissions trading scheme (ETS). These criticisms and their potential solutions are reviewed. A set-aside reserve is proposed to automatically retire ETS permits, which would correspond to verified and additional emissions reductions. This minimizes the possibility that ethically motivated mitigation actions are discouraged, allows for additional action by other levels of government, while providing transparency to other market participants on the level of permit retirements. 相似文献
3.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):277-292
California is considering the adoption of a cap-and-trade regulatory mechanism for regulating the greenhouse gas emissions from electricity and perhaps other industries. Two options have been widely discussed for implementing cap-and-trade in the electricity industry. The first is to regulate the emissions from electricity at the load-serving entity (LSE) level. The second option for implementation of cap-and-trade has been called the ‘first-seller’ approach. Conceptually, under first-seller, individual sources (i.e. power plants) within California would be responsible for their emissions, as with traditional cap-and-trade systems. Emissions from imports would be assigned to the ‘importing firm’. An option that has not been as widely discussed is to implement a pure source-based system within California, effectively excluding imports from the cap-and-trade system altogether. This article examines these three approaches to implementing cap-and-trade for California's electricity sector. The article discusses many of the issues relating to measurement and the impacts on bidding and scheduling incentives that are created by the various regulatory regimes. 相似文献
4.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):731-751
Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price. 相似文献
5.
This article analyses the implementation of emissions trading systems (ETSs) in eight jurisdictions: the EU, Switzerland, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California in the US, Québec in Canada, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and pilot schemes in China. The article clarifies what is working, what isn’t and why, when it comes to the practice of implementing an ETS. The eight ETSs are evaluated against five main criteria: environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, market management, revenue management and stakeholder engagement. Within each of these categories, ETS attributes ? including abatement cost, stringency of the cap, improved allocation practices over time and the trajectory of price stability ? are assessed for each system. Institutional learning, administrative prudence, appropriate carbon revenue management and stakeholder engagement are identified as key ingredients for successful ETS regimes. Recent implementation of ETSs in regions including California, Québec and South Korea indicates significant institutional learning from prior systems, especially the EU ETS, with these regions implementing more robust administrative and regulatory structures suitable for handling unique national and sub-national opportunities and constraints. The analysis also shows that there is potential for a ‘double dividend’ in emissions reductions even with a modest carbon price, provided the cap tightens over time and a portion of the auctioned revenues are reinvested in other emissions-reduction activities. Knowledge gaps exist in understanding the interaction of pricing instruments with other climate policy instruments and how governments manage these policies to achieve optimum emissions reductions with lower administrative costs.Key policy insights
Countries are learning from each other on ETS implementation.
Administrative and regulatory structures of ETS jurisdictions appear to evolve and become more robust in every ETS analysed.
A ‘double dividend’ for emissions reductions may also exist in cases where mitigation occurs as a result of the ETS policy and when auction revenues are reinvested in other emissions-reduction activities.
6.
美国碳排放权交易体系评析 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
通过评析当前美国最主要的两类碳排放交易体系--自愿减排和总量控制与交易体系的发展现状与前景得到,自愿减排终因需求不足而难以维系,只有建立碳排放的总量控制与交易体系,才能进行持续的碳交易,完成减碳目标。借鉴美国区域温室气体行动、西部气候倡议和加州总量控制与交易体系的经验,建议中国选择具有一定基础的省份或行业试行总量控制与交易体系,初期排放配额的分配以免费发放为主,拍卖为辅,并严格控制碳抵消的数量和范围等,然后再逐步过渡到拍卖方式。 相似文献
7.
Greenhouse gas (GHG) offsets are a central feature of most regional and national cap-and-trade systems. A greenhouse offset credit represents a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) reduced, avoided or sequestered by a project implemented specifically to compensate for emissions occurring elsewhere. Several existing modelling studies estimate the technically and economically achievable supply of GHG offsets from uncapped sources in the US. This analysis is among the few that consider how the design of offset protocols – and the corresponding rules for eligibility, measuring, verifying and awarding offsets – might impact actual offset crediting and the realization of GHG mitigation potential. The presented analysis demonstrates how rules for each of these factors could impact the supply of offset credits, as well as the emissions-reduction benefits of an offset programme. Findings indicate that although lenient offset rules and protocols may bring several times more credits to market than a conservative approach, these gains in offset supply would come at a significant cost to the effectiveness of the cap-and-trade system in achieving its central purpose: reducing overall GHG emissions. In particular, lenient rules and protocols could conceivably lead US emissions to exceed legislative targets by as much as 500 million tonnes CO2e in 2020. 相似文献
8.
Brian F. Snyder 《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):743-750
This article describes a ‘tax and trade' emission regulations system that controls both emission costs and emission quantities. Emitters are taxed at a fixed price on carbon emissions and the government uses the tax revenue to buy carbon offsets on existing emissions markets. Unlike a traditional carbon tax, regulated firms may also produce carbon credits which may be sold to the government. Thus, the government bears the compliance cost risk rather than an individual firm and has control over the number of offsets purchased and the effective emission reduction. This unusual form of hybrid has potential political advantages of creating an economic incentive on corporate choices (at the margin) substantially greater than the actual trading price, and with lower financial transfers than in most schemes.Policy relevanceThe article presents a hybrid carbon emissions system that adds to the growing discussion of hybrid policy instruments which could be implemented by policy makers, particularly in nations without current cap and trade policies. 相似文献
9.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):232-238
US policy makers are currently evaluating options to reduce domestic carbon dioxide emissions, and several economy-wide cap-and-trade proposals have been put forward in the 111th Congress. Despite mounting enthusiasm for cap-and-trade, advocates of this approach have had to defend such proposals against the criticisms that prices in the resulting carbon market will be unstable and that the implied costs of policy might exceed society's willingness to pay for the expected environmental benefits. Allowance borrowing has been proposed as one solution to both of these concerns, with firm-level borrowing intended to mitigate the impacts of transient cost shocks, and system-level borrowing intended to hedge against the risk of early technology bottlenecks. Each of these mechanisms, as proposed, relies upon prescribed constraints, such as interest payments or quantity limits, to protect against overuse. This article introduces a novel mechanism that offers qualitatively similar protection—a firm-level deposit on borrowed allowances that is refundable upon repayment of the emissions debt. However, the deposit mechanism is shown to be both more economically efficient and more effective in mitigating performance risk, when compared to the existing alternatives. 相似文献
10.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):883-900
Balancing a legitimate fear that carbon leakage could undermine the impact of any global climate change agreement is a countervailing fear that leakage could be the excuse for protectionism in the guise of ‘border carbon adjustments’. This would be dangerous for the world trading system, risking disputes due to ambiguities in the details of World Trade Organization rules over what types of border measures are potentially and actually admissible. Even with good-quality data, there is considerable potential for judgemental discretion, and hence opportunistic manipulation, in estimating the carbon charges to levy on an imported product. This is true even given agreement on whether to use importer or exporter coefficients. A clear distinction needs to be made between environmental and competitiveness motives for border adjustments. The key argument is that the traditional symmetry, between origin (production)-based taxes and other charges (e.g. due to a cap-and-trade scheme) and those based on the destination (consumption) principle, breaks down in the case of carbon charges. The potential is explored for regional agreements to ensure origin as the basis for carbon levies, while recognizing the challenges this poses for the mutual recognition of emissions regimes in particular. 相似文献