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1.
Fishing limitations to protect fish stocks can develop to different types of property rights. A move towards full private rights is promoted by some authors. The article questions whether such a move is desirable and it also investigates whether private rights are indeed becoming more important in EU fisheries. A study on property rights in the Danish, Dutch and UK fishery (WP Davidse, ed., Property Rights in Fishing, LEI-DLO, The Hague, 1997, OV159) sector forms the background of this approach.Bromley’s definition of property rights (D W Bromley, Environment and Economy: Property Rights & Public Policy, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991), including ‘a right to a benefit stream’, has been used to identify rights in these three EU fishing sectors. These property rights regimes vary from a domination of state property, the Danish one, to a complete system of individual rights, the Dutch case. The UK position is between these extremes, showing characteristics of common property, apart from kinds of state- and individual property of fishing rights.The article ends with a consideration of the review of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2002 from the viewpoint of property rights. Negotiations in the run up to 2002 will demonstrate conflicts between views on state property and on private property rights. This regards the tension between the principle of relative stability of quota allocations and the EU principle of free movement of capital, goods and services. Finally, two possibilities are suggested to combine both these principles. 相似文献
2.
《Marine Policy》2017
The Netherlands was one of the first nations to introduce ITQs in their fisheries to manage national yearly Total Allowable Catches (TACs). These ITQs have gradually developed from an individual quota system in 1976 to an ITQ system in the 1980s. In 1993 the system was reformed into a co-management system. In this paper it is argued that many of the usual negative socio-economic consequences of ITQs mentioned in the literature have been largely absent, due to the embeddedness of ITQs in co-management arrangements. However, cracks have appeared lately in this combined management system, allowing an identification of its vulnerabilities. These findings show that the social and economic structure of Dutch fisheries is changing from a rather cooperative to a more competitive and exclusive system, more like conventional ITQs. 相似文献
3.
《Marine Policy》2014
The push for catch shares is on in the United States, nationwide generally, and in the western Pacific specifically. The prevailing understanding of catch shares emphasizes individual private property rights and changes in fisher behavior are understood to result from changes in rights in accordance with a long-established canon in fisheries economics. It is argued that this orthodoxy misses the causal factor in catch shares and thus constricts the range of policy options for catch shares. Moreover, this standard understanding of catch shares fosters opposition. Opposition to catch shares in the western Pacific can be understood as a specific variant of a generic pattern of opposition that is often centered on concerns for distributional impacts. Blind to the fact that their own misunderstanding fuels opposition, proponents of privatization resort to explaining opposition in terms of a simple, but inaccurate, for-or-against-catch-shares dichotomy. Perpetuation of this dichotomy has become a tool in the promotion of one particular ideological conception of catch shares and is a disservice to the public policy process. A possible path forward in the context of the western Pacific is presented that is based on diminishing the role of outside policy experts while encouraging local design of programs to meet local goals. Such an approach is consistent with the nature of development as local people adopt and adapt outside influences on their own terms. 相似文献
4.
In a widely received study Costello and his colleagues found that catch shares give better stock persistence and higher catch for fishermen. The conclusions made by Costello et al. were further supported by Grafton and McIlgorm where they suggested a framework in order to determine the costs and benefits of separate ITQ management in seven Australian commonwealth fisheries, and what the alternatives should be if the net benefits do not justify ITQs. This raises the question why we do not see catch shares being used more often. We explore at a global scale which countries would have the potential to, and indeed do, fulfil the conditions necessary to implement such a management strategy. 相似文献
5.
《Marine Policy》2015
This paper explores the failures of the quota allocation system in the hake fishery in Walvis Bay, Namibia through an examination of the complex processes that link commodities, labour, production, markets, and knowledge in the industrial setting. The relationships between state regulations and public nature point to a specific engagement in which nature is divided, distributed, and owned, namely through the market driven prospects of transferable quotas. This article examines fishing quota as a set of relations that links the transformation of fish from biological organism to global product and thus weaves science, the state, markets, and social relationships into an entanglement of different forms of capital. In this context, the tension between the quota holder, the value of that quota, and their participation in the industry reflects a complex network of capital mediated through various strategies. Based on ethnographic research in the Namibian trawl sector, this article surfaces these modes of capital in the dynamics of the fishing operations. As such, the fishing industry, the company that holds the fishing rights, the government׳s role in quota allocations, the vessels, gear, and technologies, and the relationships and roles of the crewmembers and skippers׳ knowledge all contribute to a particular formulation of fishing practices. Fisher׳s knowledge in industrial fishing practices becomes a site in which to explore the consequences of ITQs that may also begin to destabilise the neoliberal business model for fisheries in times of crisis. 相似文献
6.
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been introduced in a number of different countries, including Australia. Using seven Australian commonwealth fisheries the paper undertakes an ex ante cost–benefit analysis whether to introduce ITQs into these fisheries. The analysis uses five cost–benefit criteria, and in particular the gross value of production (GVP), to evaluate whether ITQs should be introduced or not. For fisheries where the net benefits do not currently justify ITQs, a pathway is provided to improve management outcomes with the use of individual transferable efforts units (ITEs). 相似文献
7.
Individual transferable quota (ITQ) markets are being used successfully to distribute quotas in single region and single species fisheries. In many parts of the world, the development of well crafted markets for multispecies or multiregional fisheries is still evolving. As a result, there exists an opportunity to inform policy by providing research insights into the relative merits of alternative market designs for such fisheries.This study explored the relative merits of a simultaneous ascending auction design and an iterative combinatorial auction design for a hypothetical multiple region quota market. In a simultaneous auction, separate auctions are run in parallel for individual species or regions. During intermediate rounds, fishers can adjust their bids in auction depending on their position in the other auction. In a combinatorial auction, a fisher can purchase a combination of quotas (or a package quota) for different fish species or regions in the same auction. Being able to acquire bundles of species or regions allows fishers to take advantage of complementarities. To date, the potentials of such auctions have not been thoroughly tested in fisheries quota markets. This study found that while a simultaneous auction design was more efficient than combinatorial auction design overall, combinatorial market design took fewer rounds to make final allocations and performed better in high synergy environments. 相似文献
8.
《Marine Policy》2017
After many years of Common Fisheries Policies in the European Union, 88% of stocks are still being fished beyond their Maximum Sustainable Yield. While several Member States and the European Commission are moving toward Individual Transferable Quotas as a solution, France has declared its opposition to such marketization of fishing access rights and a national law has classified fisheries resources as a collective heritage. This paper discusses the evolution of the French system, principally its distribution of access rights by the Producer Organizations instead of the market. However, the Producer Organizations, which are more linked to the industrial fleet organizations, have not always modified their sharing formulae to include small-scale fisheries, resulting in a demand for more transparency and equity. 相似文献
9.
Some economists have questioned the need for retaining boat licences in fisheries managed through rights-based systems on the assumption that licences act as an impediment to autonomous adjustment. In this paper, the role of boat licences in fisheries managed through rights-based instruments is explored through examining their use in several fisheries in Australian and elsewhere. The study concludes that any impediment to autonomous adjustment that is produced by boat licences is likely to be small relative to other factors. Further, boat licences play an important role in offsetting imperfections in the rights-based management systems that exist in most countries. 相似文献
10.
The literature on catch shares is dominated by analyses of programs in developed countries. To address this research gap, this paper identifies and discusses programs in developing countries. The paper also investigates differences between countries that have and have not implemented programs across a number of relevant dimensions, including governance and resource value, and characterizes the relationship between catch share type (e.g., quota-based or space-based systems) and the species characteristics. The paper identifies programs in about 20 percent of coastal and developing countries and finds that countries with catch shares have higher governance rankings, stronger economies, more valuable fishery export industries, and fewer people employed in fisheries. For example, the average governance effectiveness rank is 38.7 for all coastal and developing countries and 60.8 for countries with quota-based fishing rights. Species managed under quota-based systems are also found to have the potential for strong recruitment externalities. The results support ideas from the fisheries economics literature on the pre-conditions that are more likely to lead to the adoption of a catch share program. 相似文献