Transferable quotas,efficiency and crew ownership in Whalsay,Shetland |
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| Institution: | 1. Oxford University Centre for the Environment, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QY, UK;2. NAFC Marine Centre, University of the Highlands and Islands, Port Arthur, Scalloway, Shetland ZE1 0UN, UK;1. Escuela Superior de Ciencias Marinas, Universidad Nacional del Comahue - CONICET, San Martín 247, San Antonio Oeste, Argentina;2. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Intendente Güiraldes 2160, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina;3. Instituto de Investigaciones Marinas y Costeras (IIMyC), UNMDP-CONICET, Rodriguez Peña 4046, Nivel 1. CC 1260, Mar del Plata, Argentina;1. Formerly Pelagic Advisory Council and now Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, the Netherlands;2. Innovative Fisheries Management (IFM) - an Aalborg University Research Center, Aalborg, Denmark;1. NOAA Fisheries Office of Science and Technology, Economic and Social Analysis Division, Northeast Fisheries Science Center, 166 Water Street, Woods Hole, MA, United States;2. Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries, Quest Center, 1213 Purchase St., New Bedford, MA 02740, United States;1. Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Girona, E-17071 Girona, Spain;2. Centro Universitario Regional Este, Universidad de la República, Campus de Maldonado, 20000, Uruguay;3. Wildlife Conservation Society—Gabon Program, Batterie IV, Entre l’Ecole Franco-Britannique et CIMA, BP 7847 Libreville, Gabon;4. Área Biodiversidad y Conservación, Museo Nacional de Historia Natural, Montevideo, Uruguay;1. Reykjavik University, Reykjavik, Iceland;2. Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, U.S.A.;1. Department of Agriculture, Food and Environment, University of Pisa, Via del Borghetto, 80, 56124 Pisa, Italy;2. Countryside and Community Research Institute, University of Gloucestershire, Oxstalls Campus, Oxstalls Lane, Longlevens, Gloucester GL2 9HW, UK |
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| Abstract: | The resource economic theory tells us that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) improve efficiency in the fishing industry by removing the least efficient actors from a fishery and allowing ownership to concentrate in the hands of the most efficient operators. Assertions about the nature of this allocative efficiency are, however, often based on purely theoretical assumptions. This paper presents a case study of the efficient operators remaining in the UK pelagic fishing fleet. After over 30 years of rights-based management (RBM) and 12 years of ITQs, the UK pelagic fleet numbers only 31 large-scale boats. Seven of these operate from the island of Whalsay in Shetland, which, with a population of approximately 1000 people (0.000016% of the population of the UK), is entitled to land around 22% of the UK pelagic catch. A key characteristic of the economically efficient Whalsay fleet is a crew ownership structure. This is now under threat from the long-term dynamics of the UK's ITQ system, as the high price of quota prevents the renewal of the fishery through new entrants. In the majority of global fisheries, where vessel ownership structures do not follow an assumed economic norm, fully marketised transferable rights may not be the most efficient method of management. |
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