Using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to achieve social policy objectives: A proposed intervention |
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| Institution: | 1. Environmental Defense Fund, 123 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA 94105, USA;2. Eco-Analytics, 545 Vereda del Ciervo, Goleta, CA 93117, USA;3. Centro de Estudios de Técnicas de Dirección, Universidad de La Habana, La Habana, Cuba;4. Environmental Defense Fund, 4000 Westchase Boulevard, Suite 510, Raleigh, NC 27607, USA;1. School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, 2 George Street, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia;2. CSIRO Oceans and Atmosphere Flagship, EcoSciences Precinct, PO Box 2583, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia |
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| Abstract: | ITQs offer environmental and economic benefits, including better conservation of a fish stock and greater profitability for fishers. With some limitations, they achieve fairly good alignment between the profit incentive and stewardship objectives. Nevertheless, critics have objected to ITQ schemes because of such factors as the “armchair fishing” phenomenon, unfairness to the public (the owner of the fish), economic and social damage to remote communities, and increased concentration within the fishery. Economists generally dismiss these as distributional issues rather than matters of efficiency or economics, but economic principles are clearly not the only factors that may require attention or action from a government or regulator. This paper proposes an intervention that addresses these concerns within the context of an ITQ scheme. The intervention does not reduce the permanence or values of ITQs, and therefore retains the benefits that ITQs are designed to deliver. Nevertheless, the intervention addresses the criticisms identified above. Modifications of the intervention may enable additional goals and benefits to be achieved as well. |
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| Keywords: | Fisheries Management Schemes Individual transferable quotas Catch shares Armchair fishing Small-scale fisheries |
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