A review of game-theoretic models of fishing |
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| Institution: | 1. Faculty of Mathematics, Wroc?aw University of Technology, Wybrze?e Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wroc?aw, Poland;2. Department of Business Administration, Aichi University, Nagoya Campus, Hiraike 4-60-6, Nakamura, Nagoya, Aichi, 453-8777, Japan;1. Florence School of Regulation (FSR), European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole I-50014, Italy;2. Institute for Research in Technology (IIT), Technical School of Engineering (ICAI), Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid E-28015, Spain;1. Department of Computer Science, University of Cyprus, 1678 Nicosia, Cyprus;2. Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, United Kingdom;1. School of Economics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266061, China;2. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072, China;3. China Center for Social Computing and Analytics, Tianjin, 300072, China |
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| Abstract: | Game theory is a formal tool for analysing strategic interaction between a finite number of agents. The fact that usually more than one entity or agent has property rights to fishery resources, has led to an explosion in the use of game theory and applications thereof to analyse fishery management problems. This review shows that game-theoretic modelling has made significant contributions to our understanding of the problems of fishery resource management. However, many challenges still remain. For instance, models of straddling stocks are yet to be fully developed. In addition, fisheries economists have not yet fully exploited the opportunity provided by computational methods now available, and the ever increasing power of computers, to develop more empirical game-theoretic models for practical fisheries management. |
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