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1.
Abstract

In the long term, any definition of adequacy consistent with UNFCCC Article 2 will require increased mitigation efforts from almost all countries. Therefore, an expansion of emission limitation commitments will form a central element of any future architecture of the climate regime. This expansion has two elements: deepening of quantitative commitments for Annex B countries and the adoption of commitments for those countries outside of the current limitation regime. This article seeks to provide a more analytical basis for further differentiation among non-Annex I countries. To be both fair and reflective of national circumstances, it is based on the criteria of responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate. Altogether, non-Annex I countries were differentiated in four groups, each including countries with similar national circumstances: newly industrialized countries (NICs), rapidly industrializing countries (RIDCs), ‘other developing countries’, and least developed countries (LDCs). Based on the same criteria that were used for differentiating among non-Annex I countries, a set of decision rules was developed to assign mitigation and financial transfer commitments to each group of countries (including Annex I countries). Applying these decision rules results in (strict) reduction commitments for Annex I countries, but also implies quantifiable mitigation obligations for NICs and RIDCs, assisted by financial transfers from the North. Other developing countries are obliged to take qualitative commitments, but quantifiable mitigation commitments for these countries and the LDC group would be not justifiable. As national circumstances in countries evolve over time, the composition of the groups will change according to agreed triggers.  相似文献   

2.
Equity is usually interpreted in terms of the concept of justice, such that an equitable share of the atmospheric space is understood in terms of past emissions. This emphasizes the collective nature of sharing the burden of mitigation and the duty to act for those who have emitted the most. An alternative is considered: the aggregate costs and benefits to all Parties that could result from both increasing the level of collective ambition and implementing a climate regime that supports bold actions across all Parties. The regional impacts and carbon flow costs across differentiated scenarios are assessed and it is argued that the majority of developing-country Parties would be better off if a high ambition outcome to which all contributed, but some more than others. Moreover, those with middle or low emissions would have proportionally more to gain (or lose) relative to the level of ambition compared to those that have had higher emissions. The climate regime should be built on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (CBDR&RC), in which all act early even if some do much more; one that accounts for justice but does not forget hope.

Policy relevance

Differing interpretations of equity and the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are discussed, with a focus on how these can enhance or hinder collective action. Whilst the climate change negotiations are usually taken as games in which one party gains and another loses, and interactions are dogged by continuous conflict, it is explored instead how negotiation responses can be framed in terms of cooperation. This would emphasize the gains that could be achieved by common but differentiated collective action, which could result in a collective avoidance of impacts. The possibilities that this shift of perspective could bring are explored by comparing costs under global cooperation (or lack of it). It is found that cooperation reduces the total costs for these regions. Thus, thinking in terms of cooperation focuses the options for negotiation on the means and interpretations of the UNFCCC principles that spur action and avoid climate impacts through collective action.  相似文献   

3.
Equitable access to sustainable development (EASD) is crucial for the future of the climate regime as it applies to adaptation, mitigation, and the means of implementation. An approach to allocating effort and deriving carbon budgets is presented here based on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) principles of responsibility, capability, and sustainable development. A transparent model to operationalize EASD is applied by applying quantitative proxies for these criteria, and results for selected countries and groups are presented. A robust result is that the mitigation burden calculated by the model is significantly greater for developed than developing countries. For individual countries the results vary depending on the parameters chosen. A middle value of the mitigation burden for South Africa of 15 GtCO2e over the first half of the 21st century is reported, with the greatest effort required when a starting year of 1970 is chosen and historical land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) emissions are excluded when accounting for responsibility. In a regime applicable to all, it is clear that although all countries must do more, some must do more than others.

Policy relevance

Equitable access to sustainable development is crucial to the climate negotiations. Quantified allocations are presented for South Africa and other countries, based on the UNFCCC principles of responsibility, capability, and sustainable development. It is shown that the mitigation burden given these principles must be significantly greater for developed than developing countries. The results are relevant to, inter alia, the upcoming 2013–2015 review and the negotiations under the Durban Platform.  相似文献   

4.
With market-mechanisms likely to achieve emission reductions at lower cost than alternative approaches, there is a presumption that they will be embraced by those who are serious about achieving ambitious reductions. Two broad messages exist; there is already considerable activity and some ambition in many parts of the world – a fragmented but embryonic ‘global’ trading landscape is emerging – and there are efforts at UN level to provide a unifying framework for these bottom-up developments. The topography of interest and response varies considerably across groups of countries, and there have been delays in making progress on a unifying framework. This article analyses the current carbon market landscape in terms of market dynamics and market-mechanism developments whilst undertaking an examination of how climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is shaping the future carbon market landscape. This work shows that the combination of existing, emerging, and potential carbon market-mechanisms can be regarded as an emerging pre-2020 fragmented ‘global’ carbon market landscape based on differing bottom-up market based approaches. One outcome of a 2015 Climate Agreement could be a post-2020 global carbon market which would include new domestic and international market initiatives such as the Framework for Various Approaches and New Market Mechanism, together with reformed Kyoto mechanisms.

Policy relevance

With the 2015 Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) expected to see Parties commit to ambitious mitigation commitments, post-2020 could see significant Party (& industry) investment in market-mechanisms and associated emissions units in an effort to achieve some of the abatement cost minimization offered by market approaches. This article is written for those who have an interest in understanding what is happening – and what is not happening – as regards the emergence of market-related approaches to GHG mitigation globally in the run up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC which meets in Paris in December 2015, and what could be the shape of things to come post-2020.  相似文献   

5.
Equity has been at the core of the global climate debate since its inception over two decades ago, yet the current negotiations toward an international climate agreement in 2015 provide a new and critical opportunity to make forward progress on the difficult web of equity issues. These negotiations and the discussions about equity are taking place in a context that has shifted: all countries will be covered under a new agreement; growing climate impacts are being felt, especially by the most vulnerable; and there is an emergence of new institutions and increasing complexity in the international climate regime. Innovative thinking on equity, including which countries should take action and how, is therefore essential to finalizing an agreement by 2015. A broader, deeper, and more holistic view of equity is necessary, one that sees equity as a multi-dimensional challenge to be solved across all the facets of the international climate process.

Policy relevance

This article is relevant to policy makers following the development of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform as it prepares the way for a new agreement in 2015. The article focuses specifically on the issues most relevant to the debate around equity in the negotiations and how that debate is evolving with the expansion of the UNFCCC. It explains the current state of the negotiations and what issues are on the negotiating table, including the fact that negotiations on equity are now much broader than the mitigation commitments, to include the possible ‘equity reference framework’, concerns relating to adaptation and loss and damage, and the need for ambition in terms of mitigation and finance support.  相似文献   

6.
What can reasonably be expected from the UNFCCC process and the climate conference in Paris 2015? To achieve transformative change, prevailing unsustainable routines embedded in socio-economic systems have to be translated into new and sustainable ones. This article conceptualizes the UNFCCC and the associated policy processes as a catalyst for this translation by applying a structurational regime model. This model provides an analytical distinction of rules (norms and shared meaning) and resources (economic resources as well as authoritative and allocative power) and allows us to conceptualize agency on various levels, including beyond nation states. The analysis concludes that the UNFCCC's narrow focus on emission targets, which essentially is a focus on resources, has proven ineffective. In addition, the static division of industrialized and developing countries in the Convention's annexes and the consensus-based decision-making rules have impeded ambitious climate protection. The article concludes that the UNFCCC is much better equipped to provide rules for climate protection activities and should consciously expand this feature to improve its impact.

Policy relevance

The international community is negotiating a new global climate agreement, to be adopted at the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in December 2015 in Paris and to be applicable from 2020. This article analyses the successes and limitations the UNFCCC has had so far in combating climate change and it develops recommendations on how to enhance efforts within and beyond the framework of the Convention. From our analysis we derive two main recommendations for an effective and structurationally balanced treaty: First, multidimensional mitigation contributions going beyond emission targets could strongly improve countries’ abilities to tailor their contributions around national political discourses. Second, the UNFCCC regime should be complemented with another treaty outside of the UNFCCC framework. This ‘Alliance of the Ambitious’ would allow the pioneers of climate protection to move ahead and enjoy the benefits of cooperation. The dynamics generated through such a club approach could be fed back into the UNFCCC, leading to increased ambition by others in future commitment cycles.  相似文献   

7.
In order to address the pressing challenge of climate change, countries are now submitting long-term climate strategies to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. These strategies include within them potential future use of ‘negative emissions technologies’ (NETs). NETs are interventions that remove carbon from the atmosphere, ranging from large-scale terrestrial carbon sequestration in forests, wetlands and soils, to use of carbon capture and storage technologies. We assess here how NETs are discussed in 29 long-term climate strategies, in order to ascertain the risk that including the promise of future NETs may delay the taking of short-term mitigation actions. Our analysis shows that almost all countries plan to rely on NETs, particularly enhanced use of natural carbon sinks, even as a wide array of challenges and trade-offs in doing so are highlighted. Many strategies call for improved accounting systems and market incentives in realizing future NETs. While no strategy explicitly suggests that NETs can be a substitute for short-term mitigation, most estimate substantial potential for future use of NETs even in the face of acknowledged uncertainties. This, we suggest, may have the consequence of resulting in what we describe here as ‘a spiral of delay’ characterized by the promise of future NET options juxtaposed with the simultaneous uncertainty around these future options. Our analysis highlights that this inter-connected delaying dynamic may be intrinsic to what we term ‘governing-by-aspiration’ within global climate politics, wherein the voicing of lofty future ambition risks replacing current action and accountability.  相似文献   

8.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):465-480
Abstract

This paper aims at exploring options for differentiation of future commitments in global greenhouse gas emissions control, linked to climate targets. This is done on the basis of theEUtarget of a maximum global temperature increase of 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. The Framework to Assess International Regimes for the differentiation of commitments (FAIR) is used to explore the implications of two possible climate regimes: (1) increasing participation (i.e. a gradual increase in the number of parties involved and their level of commitment according to participation and differentiation rules) and (2) ‘contraction and convergence’ (C&C) with universal participation and a convergence of per capita emission permits. It is found that in a regime of increasing participation, stabilising the CO2 concentration at 450 ppmv by 2100 requires participation of major developing countries before 2050 in global emission control, irrespective of the participation and differentiation rules chosen. In the case of stringent climate targets, a convergence regime seems to provide more incentives for a timely participation of developing countries, and opportunities for an effective and efficient regime for controlling global emissions than increasing participation.  相似文献   

9.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(4):465-480
This paper aims at exploring options for differentiation of future commitments in global greenhouse gas emissions control, linked to climate targets. This is done on the basis of the EU target of a maximum global temperature increase of 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. The Framework to Assess International Regimes for the differentiation of commitments (FAIR) is used to explore the implications of two possible climate regimes: (1) increasing participation (i.e. a gradual increase in the number of parties involved and their level of commitment according to participation and differentiation rules) and (2) ‘contraction and convergence’ (C&C) with universal participation and a convergence of per capita emission permits. It is found that in a regime of increasing participation, stabilising the CO2 concentration at 450 ppmv by 2100 requires participation of major developing countries before 2050 in global emission control, irrespective of the participation and differentiation rules chosen. In the case of stringent climate targets, a convergence regime seems to provide more incentives for a timely participation of developing countries, and opportunities for an effective and efficient regime for controlling global emissions than increasing participation.  相似文献   

10.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(4):481-497
This paper presents a new sector-based framework — called the multi-sector convergence approach — for negotiating binding national GHG mitigation targets after the first budget period defined by the Kyoto Protocol (2008–2012). The major characteristics of this approach are that: (i) it is based on the distinction of different sectors within the national economy; (ii) it prescribes that, in principle, the amount of per capita emission assignments should ultimately converge to the same level for all countries; (iii) it accounts for differences in national circumstances by offering the opportunity to grant additional emission allowances to countries facing specific circumstances that justify higher emission assignments; and (iv) it offers a framework for negotiating mitigation commitments among parties of the UNFCCC, including a (gradual) participation of developing countries that pass a certain threshold level of per capita emissions. In addition to briefly discussing the underlying principles of promising proposals to differentiate future GHG mitigation commitments, the paper outlines the methodology and major characteristics of the multi-sector convergence (MSC) approach, followed by some numerical illustrations. The paper is concluded by a preliminary assessment of the MSC approach.  相似文献   

11.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):481-497
Abstract

This paper presents a new sector-based framework—called the multi-sector convergence approach—for negotiating binding national GHG mitigation targets after the first budget period defined by the Kyoto Protocol (2008–2012). The major characteristics of this approach are that: (i) it is based on the distinction of different sectors within the national economy; (ii) it prescribes that, in principle, the amount of per capita emission assignments should ultimately converge to the same level for all countries; (iii) it accounts for differences in national circumstances by offering the opportunity to grant additional emission allowances to countries facing specific circumstances that justify higher emission assignments; and (iv) it offers a framework for negotiating mitigation commitments among parties of the UNFCCC, including a (gradual) participation of developing countries that pass a certain threshold level of per capita emissions. In addition to briefly discussing the underlying principles of promising proposals to differentiate future GHG mitigation commitments, the paper outlines the methodology and major characteristics of the multi-sector convergence (MSC) approach, followed by some numerical illustrations. The paper is concluded by a preliminary assessment of the MSC approach.  相似文献   

12.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):634-651
A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI's national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between ?52% and ?69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic ?35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap.  相似文献   

13.
What would the shape of a realistic, yet ambitious, package for the climate regime after 2012 look like? How do we obtain a package deal starting in Bali but building bridges to a post-2020 climate regime? A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive package deal has to strike a core balance between development and climate imperatives (mitigation, adaptation, dealing with the impacts of response measures, technology transfer, investment and finance) to create bargaining space and establish a conceptual contract zone. Within a continuum of possible packages, two packages in the contract zone are identified: ‘multi-stage’ and ‘ambitious transitional’. The latter is ambitious, combining domestic cap-and-trade for the USA, deeper cuts for Annex B countries, and quantifiable mitigation actions by developing countries. It is transitional as a possible bridge to a more inclusive regime beyond 2020. Multi-stage is defined around mechanisms by which countries move through increasingly stringent levels of participation, and must be based upon agreed triggers. Our assessment of political dynamics is that multi-stage is not yet in the political contract zone. Key to this is the absence of a ‘trigger from the North’, in that the largest historical emitter must act earlier and most decisively. But progress will also depend on continued leadership from Annex B countries, as well as more proactive, incentivized leadership in the South. Agreeing on the transitional stage is the critical next step in the evolution of the climate regime. Negotiating any package will require an institutional space for bargaining, political leadership and trust, and a clear time-frame.  相似文献   

14.
在应对气候变化问题上,发达国家有率先减排和为发展中国家提供气候资金支持的义务。根据《联合国气候变化框架公约》相关成果,发达国家做出了到2020年减排温室气体和每年动员1000亿美元气候资金的承诺,综合相关数据信息盘点了上述承诺的实施进展,结果显示发达国家2020年减排目标力度不足,核算规则不清晰,部分国家缺乏减排进展,气候资金的概念和范围尚有争议,现有气候资金规模与承诺仍有较大差距,《联合国气候变化框架公约》下资金机制作用仍待加强,并且发展中国家需要更大规模的气候资金支持。发达国家2020年承诺兑现不力不利于巩固多边进程各方互信,且有向发展中国家转嫁责任之嫌。为此,建议中国在国际气候谈判进程中,依托谈判联盟,进一步敦促发达国家履行2020年承诺并提高力度。  相似文献   

15.
Reducing fossil fuel supply is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement goal to keep warming ‘well below 2°C’, yet the Agreement is silent on the topic of fossil fuels. This article outlines reasons why it is important that Parties to the Agreement find ways to more explicitly address the phasing out of fossil fuel production under the UNFCCC. It describes how countries aiming to keep fossil fuel supply in line with Paris goals could articulate and report their actions within the current architecture of the Agreement. It also outlines specific mechanisms of the Paris Agreement through which issues related to the curtailment of fossil fuel supply can be addressed. Mapping out a transition away from fossil fuels – and facilitating this transition under the auspices of the UNFCCC process – can enhance the ambition and effectiveness of national and international climate mitigation efforts.

Key policy insights

  • The international commitment to limit global average temperature increases to ‘well below 2°C’ provides a strong rationale for Parties to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC to pursue a phase-down in fossil fuel production, not just consumption.

  • Several countries have already made commitments to address fossil fuel supply, by agreeing to phase down coal or oil exploration and production.

  • Integrating these commitments into the UNFCCC process would link them to global climate goals, and ensure they form part of a broader global effort to transition away from fossil fuels.

  • The Paris Agreement provides a number of new opportunities for Parties to address fossil fuel production.

  相似文献   

16.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(2):211-227
This paper assesses five options for targets that could be taken by all countries to meet the ultimate objective of the climate change convention: fixed, binding targets; dynamic targets; non-binding targets; sectoral targets; policies and measures. Each is evaluated according to criteria of environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, contribution to economic growth and sustainable development, and equity. While fixed, binding targets continue to be viable for industrialised countries, they do not seem suitable for many developing countries in the near future. Dynamic targets could alleviate developing countries’ concerns about constraining their development as well as broader concerns about possible introduction of “hot air” in a world trading regime; they could also be considered for some or all industrialised countries. Non-binding targets could be politically appealing to developing countries, alleviate fears about development and/or hot air, but might only allow conditional participation in emissions trading by developing countries. Sectoral targets could offer a pragmatic first step — although their cost-effectiveness might be questioned. Finally, targets based on commitments to implement specific policies and measures might drive mitigation action and be part of negotiated packages including financial and technological co-operation. All these options may coexist in the future.  相似文献   

17.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ argument is analysed empirically by comparing marginal abatement cost curves. Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in most countries. Although the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped are below the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM predominantly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for the adoption of low-cost abatement options.  相似文献   

18.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):534-547
The climate negotiations up to Copenhagen will need to elaborate on measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) mitigation commitments and actions as part of the future of the climate regime. The conceptual, political, scientific, financial and institutional principles for MRV are explored for (1) mitigation commitments in developed countries, (2) mitigation actions in developing countries, supported by (3) means of implementation. For developed countries, the procedures in Articles 5, 7, 8 and 18 of the Kyoto Protocol will be critical in order to ensure comparability of commitments, both in effort and compliance. Outcomes should be reportable and verifiable through Annex I national communications and in-depth review. Existing procedures could be enhanced and need to apply across Protocol and Convention. MRV mitigation actions by developing countries should result in measurable deviations below baseline. Inventories will be important to measure, and enhanced national communications for reporting. The challenge will be to make mitigation actions verifiable, and options include verification by domestic institutions working to internationally agreed guidelines. A critical distinction is to be made between unilateral mitigation actions and those with international support. MRV applies to the provision of the means of implementation, including technology and finance. Investment in technology can be measured, so that institutional arrangements for technology and finance should be aligned. Verification of funds raised at international level would be simpler than raising funds nationally.  相似文献   

19.
详细介绍了《联合国气候变化框架公约》缔约方会议第13次会议通过的"巴厘路线图"的具体内容。"巴厘路线图"规划了未来两年将要谈判的重要议题,包括发达国家在2012年后减排温室气体义务;发展中国家未来温室气体减排行动;适应气候变化;发达国家未来向发展中国家提供技术转让、资金支持和能力建设等。这些议题谈判的成败,将对未来保护气候的国际努力、对未来全球的气候环境产生决定性影响,从而对谈判前景做了分析  相似文献   

20.
 详细介绍了《联合国气候变化框架公约》缔约方会议第13次会议通过的"巴厘路线图"的具体内容。"巴厘路线图"规划了未来两年将要谈判的重要议题,包括发达国家在2012年后减排温室气体义务;发展中国家未来温室气体减排行动;适应气候变化;发达国家未来向发展中国家提供技术转让、资金支持和能力建设等。这些议题谈判的成败,将对未来保护气候的国际努力、对未来全球的气候环境产生决定性影响,从而对谈判前景做了分析  相似文献   

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