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1.
Sharon Mascher 《Climate Policy》2018,18(8):1012-1027
The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change is designed to put Canada on track to meet its Paris commitments. A key pillar of the plan is the introduction of a pan-Canadian carbon price by the end of 2018. However, four Canadian provinces, nearly 85% of the Canadian economy and population, have already implemented carbon pricing systems. British Columbia (BC) has a carbon tax. Alberta is transitioning from an output-based allocation system for industrial emitters to a hybrid system combining a carbon levy and refined output-based system. Québec and Ontario have implemented cap-and-trade systems, linked to California. Recognizing these existing systems, rather than impose a single carbon pricing mechanism, the Pan-Canadian Approach to Carbon Pricing gives provinces and territories the flexibility to adopt a carbon tax, a hybrid system, or a cap-and-trade system. To address concerns relating to ‘fairness’ and equivalency of carbon price, a federal carbon pricing benchmark establishes criteria relating to minimum ‘common scope’ and ‘increases in stringency’ that provincial and territorial carbon pricing systems must meet. This article explores the design features of the existing Alberta, BC, Ontario and Québec carbon pricing systems, and considers how the benchmark affects stringency and addresses equivalency of carbon price across these different systems.
Key policy insights
Canada is taking advantage of its federal structure of government to introduce a minimum pan-Canadian carbon price of $10/tCO2e in 2018, rising by $10/year to $50/tCO2e in 2022.
Rather than imposing a uniform pricing mechanism, the Canadian federal government is recognizing existing subnational carbon pricing mechanisms with very different design features – BC’s carbon tax, Québec and Ontario’s cap-and-trade systems, and Alberta’s hybrid system – to deliver the pan-Canadian carbon price.
In order to deliver a minimum level of increasing stringency and to address issues of equivalency of carbon price across sub-national jurisdictions, the federal government is in the early stages of implementing a federal carbon-pricing benchmark.
The lessons learned from the Canadian experience will be relevant to harmonizing carbon pricing systems across both other federal jurisdictions and countries.
2.
A carbon tax will form the central carbon pricing instrument in South Africa. The country, however, is also in the process of setting specific short-term emissions limits at a subnational level. Additional mitigation policy instruments will thus be required to meet these targets. Although it is possible to combine sector-level quantity targets with a broad-based carbon tax, this article finds that this greatly complicates mitigation policy design, increasing both the information requirements and the likelihood of unintended consequences. The trade-offs between economic efficiency (optimized by the use of a broad-based price set by a carbon tax) and environmental effectiveness (optimized by using instruments that ensure emissions reduction targets are met) are ever present. A clear understanding of subnational quantity targets and an appreciation of the characteristics of the instruments to achieve such targets (quantity-based instruments, QBIs), the framework through which the instruments are combined, and their possible interactions, are required for effective policy making. Three possible frameworks for combining instruments are identified in the article, and some specific implications of interaction between particular QBIs and a carbon tax are suggested.Policy relevanceThis article explores the interaction of a carbon tax with mitigation policy instruments to meet subnational emissions targets in the South African context (where both a carbon tax and subnational emissions targets are currently being developed). As international negotiations progress towards countries accepting binding GHG emissions restrictions, quantity-based mitigation policy approaches become more important. In countries where a broad-based emissions trading scheme (ETS) is not feasible in the short to medium term, combining a broad-based carbon tax with subnational emission targets provides an alternative mechanism for achieving the economic efficiency and emissions certainty benefits derived from an ETS. This paper considers the mechanisms through which such a combination of instruments can be achieved. Three possible frameworks for combining instruments are identified, some specific implications of interaction between particular QBIs and a carbon tax are suggested, and guidelines and concept tools are presented to assist policy-makers in designing efficient and coherent mitigation policy. 相似文献
3.
Michael Grubb 《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):475-477
Top-down economic approaches theoretically show that placing a price on carbon can reduce emissions. Responses by firms to these policies, however, are less well understood and are critical for understanding the effectiveness of price-based carbon policy. This article provides an analysis of firm-level responses to the carbon tax in British Columbia (BC) through empirical research of grey literature, industry participation, and interviews with executives of major emitting firms in BC. The article highlights the empirical responses to the tax by firms, who experience difficulty in making low-carbon changes in response to fluctuating commodity prices, the low certainty of climate policy over temporal and spatial scales, and the political economy of implementing regional climate policy. It also highlights the importance of understanding firm-level responses as a complementary approach to macro-economic policy making on carbon pricing. The article shows the importance of engaging decision makers in corporations to understand how carbon is governed in light of emerging climate policy.Policy relevanceThis article is relevant to policy makers implementing carbon-pricing initiatives by illustrating the need to complement macroeconomic models with firm-level response analysis. It also demonstrates the key concerns of executives in a resource extractive economy and the ability of a carbon price, and the need for complementary technology funds and policy, to affect change in industrial emissions. 相似文献
4.
This paper employs a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) to analyse how a carbon tax and/or a national Emissions Trading System (ETS) would affect macroeconomic parameters in Turkey. The modelling work is based on three main policy options for the government by 2030, in the context of Turkey’s mitigation target under its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), that is, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by up to 21% from its Business as Usual (BAU) scenario in 2030: (i) improving the productivity of renewable energy by 1% per annum, a target already included in the INDC, (ii) introducing a new flat rate tax of 15% per ton of CO2 (of a reference carbon price in world markets) imposed on emissions originating from carbon-intensive sectors, and (iii) introducing a new ETS with caps on emission permits. Our base path scenario projects that GHG emissions in 2030 will be much lower than Turkey’s BAU trajectory of growth from 430 Mt CO2-eq in 2013 to 1.175 Mt CO2-eq by 2030, implying that the government’s commitment is largely redundant. On the other hand, if the official target is assumed to be only a simple reduction percentage in 2030 (by 21%), but based on our more realistic base path, the government’s current renewable energy plans will not be sufficient to reach it.
Turkey’s official INDC is based on over-optimistic assumptions of GDP growth and a highly carbon-intensive development pathway;
A carbon tax and/or an ETS would be required to reach the 21% reduction target over a realistic base path scenario for 2030;
The policy options considered in this paper have some effects on major sectors’ shares in total value-added. Yet the reduction in the shares of agriculture, industry, and transportation does not go beyond 1%, while the service sector seems to benefit from most of the policy options;
Overall employment would be affected positively by the renewable energy target, carbon tax, and ETS through the creation of new jobs;
Unemployment rates are lower, economic growth is stronger, and households become better off to a larger extent under an ETS than carbon taxation.
5.
Erik Haites 《Climate Policy》2018,18(8):955-966
Systematic evidence relating to the performance of carbon pricing – carbon taxes and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs) – is sparse. In 2015, 17 ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions while 18 jurisdictions collected a carbon tax. The papers in this special thematic section review the performance of many of these instruments over the 2005–2015 period. The performance of existing carbon taxes and GHG ETSs can help policy makers make informed choices about whether to introduce these instruments and to improve their design. The purpose of carbon pricing instruments is to reduce GHG emissions cost effectively. Assessing their performance is difficult because emissions are also affected by other policies and exogenous factors such as economic conditions. Carbon taxes in Europe prior to 2008 and in British Columbia reduced emissions from business-as-usual but actual emissions continued to rise. Since 2008 emissions subject to European carbon taxes have declined, but in most countries, other mitigation policies have probably contributed more to the reductions than the carbon taxes. Emissions subject to ETSs, with the exception of four systems without emissions caps, have declined. The ETSs contributed to the emissions reductions, but their share of the overall reduction is not known. Most tax rates are low relative to levels thought to be needed to achieve climate change objectives. Few jurisdictions regularly adjust their tax rates. All ETSs have accumulated surplus allowances and implemented measures to reduce these surpluses. The largest ETSs now specify annual reductions in their emissions cap several years into the future. Emissions trading system allowance prices are generally lower than the tax rates.
Key policy insights
Theoretical discussions usually portray carbon taxes and GHG ETSs as alternatives. In practice, a jurisdiction often implements both instruments to address emissions by different sources.
Designs of ETSs have evolved based on experience shared bilaterally and via dedicated institutions.
Carbon tax designs, in contrast, have hardly evolved and there are no institutions dedicated to sharing experience.
Every jurisdiction with an ETS and/or carbon tax also has other policies that affect its GHG emissions.
6.
This article contributes to the controversial debate over the effect of spatial organization on CO2 emissions by investigating the potential of infrastructure measures that favour lower mobility in achieving the transition to a low-carbon economy. The energy–economy–environment (E3) IMACLIM-R model is used to provide a detailed representation of passenger and freight transportation. Unlike many of the E3 models used to simulate mitigation options, IMACLIM-R represents both the technological and behavioural determinants of mobility. By comparing business-as-usual, carbon price only, and carbon price combined with transport policy scenarios, it is demonstrated that the measures that foster a modal shift towards low-carbon modes and a decoupling of mobility needs from economic activity significantly modify the sectoral distribution of mitigation efforts and reduce the level of carbon tax necessary to reach a given climate target relative to a ‘carbon price only’ policy. Policy relevance Curbing carbon emissions from transport activities is necessary in order to reach mitigation targets, but it poses a challenge for policy makers. The transport sector has two peculiarities: a weak ability to react to standard pricing measures (which encourages richer policy interventions) and a dependence on long-lived infrastructure (which imposes a delay between policy interventions and effective action). To address these problems, a framework is proposed for analysing the role of transport-specific measures adopted complementarily to carbon pricing in the context of international climate policies. Consideration is given to alternative approaches such as infrastructure measures designed to control mobility through less mobility-intensive denser agglomerations, investment reorientation towards public mode, and logistics reorganization towards less mobility-dependent production processes. Such measures can significantly reduce transport emissions in the long term and hence would moderate an increase in the carbon price and reduce its more important detrimental impacts on the economy. 相似文献
7.
Alex Y. Lo 《Climate Policy》2016,16(1):109-124
China has introduced several pilot emission trading schemes to build the basis for a national scheme. The potential scale of this initiative raises prospects for a regional carbon trading network as a way to further engage other major Asian economies. However, the Chinese carbon markets rest upon a unique political-economic context and institutional environment that are likely to limit their development and viability. This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints. Four main challenges are identified, namely, inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. The first two challenges concern economic dimensions and may be partially addressed by the incentives created by the newly introduced emission trading schemes. The other two are more deeply entrenched in the dominant political system and governing practice. They require fundamental changes to the ways in which the state and the market interact. The success of China's carbon market reform depends crucially on the ability of the ongoing efforts to transform the distorted state–market relationship.
Policy relevance
The burgeoning carbon markets offer opportunities for emissions mitigation at lower costs and enable circulation of a new form of capital, i.e. carbon credits, across borders. China accounts for a gigantic share of global GHG emissions and has the potential to significantly scale up these opportunities. There are clear implications for market developers and participants worldwide, including climate policy makers who attempt to link their emission trading schemes to other schemes, firms who seek to take advantage of the inexpensive carbon offsets generated in developing countries, international financial institutions who endeavour to establish their business in an emerging major carbon market, etc. This article can inform their decisions by identifying key issues that may undermine their ability to achieve these goals. Policy makers and stakeholders will benefit from this analysis, which shows how the Chinese carbon markets operate in ways that may be different from their experience elsewhere. 相似文献
8.
Potential impact of albedo incorporation in boreal forest sector climate change policy effectiveness
Forests have an important role to play in climate change mitigation through carbon sequestration and wood supply. However, the lower albedo of mature forests compared to bare land implies that focusing only on GHG accounting may lead to biased estimates of forestry's total climatic impacts. An economic model with a high degree of detail of the Norwegian forestry and forest industries is used to simulate GHG fluxes and albedo impacts for the next decades. Albedo is incorporated in a carbon tax/subsidy scheme in the Norwegian forest sector using a partial, spatial equilibrium model. While a price of EU€100/tCO2e that targets GHG fluxes only results in reduced harvests, the same price including albedo leads to harvest levels that are five times higher in the first five years, with 39% of the national productive forest land base being cleared. The results suggest that policies that only consider GHG fluxes and ignore changes in albedo will not lead to an optimal use of the forest sector for climate change mitigation.Policy relevanceBare land reflects a larger share of incoming solar energy than dense forest and thus has higher albedo. Earlier research has suggested that changes in albedo caused by management of boreal forest may be as important as carbon fluxes for the forest's overall global warming impacts. The presented analysis is the first attempt to link albedo to national-scale forest climate policies. A policy with subsidies to forest owners that generate carbon sequestration and taxes levied on carbon emissions leads to a reduced forest harvest. However, including albedo in the policy alongside carbon fluxes yields very different results, causing initial harvest levels to increase substantially. The inclusion of albedo impacts will make harvests more beneficial for climate change mitigation as compared to a carbon-only policy. Hence, it is likely that carbon policies that ignore albedo will not lead to optimal forest management for climate change mitigation. 相似文献
9.
碳税和碳交易机制是控制温室气体排放的环境管理工具,对工业行业的减排成本造成不同的影响。以污染控制政策的稳态总期望社会成本函数为基础构建碳减排成本函数,比较碳税和碳交易机制下水泥行业减排成本,发现影响两种环境管理工具成本的要素。以广东和山东水泥行业的实证数据进行模拟分析,得到如下结论：当碳价和碳税税率差距不大时,由于碳交易机制需要较高的建设成本,碳税更具成本优势;短期内,由于减排技术投入成本较高,与强制性的行政管理手段相比,碳交易机制更具成本效益;碳价、碳税税率、最佳可获得技术的价格、企业预期、碳交易建设与管理成本都会影响碳交易机制和碳税在减排成本上的比较优势。建议设计互补型碳排放管理政策组合,使碳税和碳交易机制发挥各自的制度优势。 相似文献
10.
Aviation constitutes about 2.5% of all energy-related CO2 emissions and in addition there are non-CO2 effects. In 2016, the ICAO decided to implement a Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and in 2017 the EU decided on faster emission reductions in its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which since 2012 includes the aviation sector. The effects of these policies on the expected development of air travel emissions from 2017 to 2030 have been analyzed. For the sample country Sweden, the analysis shows that when emissions reductions in other sectors are attributed to the aviation sector as a result of the EU ETS and CORSIA, carbon emissions are expected to reduce by ?0.8% per year (however if non-CO2 emissions are included in the analysis, then emissions will increase). This is much less than what is needed to achieve the 2°C target. Our analysis of potential national aviation policy instruments shows that there are legally feasible options that could mitigate emissions in addition to the EU ETS and CORSIA. Distance-based air passenger taxes are common among EU Member States and through increased ticket prices these taxes can reduce demand for air travel and thus reduce emissions. Tax on jet fuel is an option for domestic aviation and for international aviation if bilateral agreements are concluded. A quota obligation for biofuels is a third option.Key policy insights
Existing international climate policies for aviation will not deliver any major emission reductions.
Policymakers who want to significantly push the aviation sector to contribute to meeting the 2°C target need to work towards putting in place tougher international policy instruments in the long term, and simultaneously implement temporary national policy instruments in the near-term.
Distance-based air passenger taxes, carbon taxes on jet fuel and quota obligations for biofuels are available national policy options; if they are gradually increased, and harmonized with other countries, they can help to significantly reduce emissions.
11.
Asbjørn Torvanger 《Climate Policy》2019,19(3):329-341
Studies show that the ‘well below 2°C’ target from the Paris Agreement will be hard to meet without large negative emissions from mid-century onwards, which means removing CO2 from the atmosphere and storing the carbon dioxide in biomass, soil, suitable geological formations, deep ocean sediments, or chemically bound to certain minerals. Biomass energy combined with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) is the negative emission technology (NET) given most attention in a number of integrated assessment model studies and in the latest IPCC reports. However, less attention has been given to governance aspects of NETs. This study aims to identify pragmatic ways forward for BECCS, through synthesizing the literature relevant to accounting and rewarding BECCS, and its relation to the Paris Agreement. BECCS is divided into its two elements: biomass and CCS. Calculating net negative emissions requires accounting for sustainability and resource use related to biomass energy production, processing and use, and interactions with the global carbon cycle. Accounting for the CCS element of BECCS foremost relates to the carbon dioxide capture rate and safe underground storage. Rewarding BECCS as a NET depends on the efficiency of biomass production, transport and processing for energy use, global carbon cycle feedbacks, and safe storage of carbon dioxide, which together determine net carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere. Sustainable biomass production is essential, especially with regard to trade-offs with competing land use. Negative emissions have an added value compared to avoided emissions, which should be reflected in the price of negative emission ‘credits’, but must be discounted due to global carbon cycle feedbacks. BECCS development will depend on linkages to carbon trading mechanisms and biomass trading.
Key policy insights
A standardized framework for sustainable biomass should be adopted.
Countries should agree on a standardized framework for accounting and rewarding BECCS and other negative emission technologies.
Early government support is indispensable to enable BECCS development, scale-up and business engagement.
BECCS projects should be designed to maximize learning across various applications and across other NETs.
BECCS development should be aligned with modalities of the Paris Agreement and market mechanisms.
12.
Addressing climate change requires the synergy of technological, behavioural and market mechanisms. This article proposes a policy framework that integrates the three, deploying personal carbon trading as a key element within a policy portfolio to reduce personal carbon footprints. It draws on policy and human motivation literatures that address the behavioural changes that may be needed in the context of a long-term threat such as climate change. This proposal builds on an analysis of the British Columbia carbon tax, international examples of carbon pricing instruments and strategies for behavioural change such as social networks, loyalty management, mobile apps and gamification. Interviews were conducted with experts in financial services, energy conservation and clean technology, as well as with specialists in climate, health and taxation policy. Their input, together with a review of the theoretical literature and practical case studies, informed the proposed design of a Carbon, Health and Saving System for promoting individual engagement and collective action by linking long-term climate mitigation measures with short-term personal and social goals, including health, recreation and social reinforcement.Policy RelevanceThis article identifies areas for climate policy innovation and recommends policies that can support, promote and enable personal carbon budgeting and collective action. Although this study is focused on British Columbia, both the input provided by key opinion leaders and the proposed framework are applicable to other jurisdictions.This policy proposal shows how personal carbon trading could work in the context of a Canadian province with an existing climate mitigation policy. It also specifies a minimum viable product approach to establishing the economic, social and technological foundations for personal carbon trading.The Carbon, Health and Saving System identifies the technologies and stakeholders needed to implement personal carbon trading, and offers the possibility of motivating a widespread conscious human response in the event that carbon taxation proves insufficient to generate economic adaptation in a changing climate. 相似文献
13.
Research on air travellers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for climate change mitigation has focussed on voluntary emissions offsetting so far. This approach overlooks policy relevant knowledge as it does not consider that people may value public goods higher if they are certain that others also contribute. To account for potential differences, this study investigates Swedish adults’ WTP for a mandatory air ticket surcharge both for short- and long-distance flights. Additionally, policy relevant factors influencing WTP for air travel emissions reductions were investigated. The results suggest that mean WTP is higher in the low-cost setting associated with short-distance flights (495 SEK/ tCO2; 50 EUR/ tCO2) than for long-distance flights (295 SEK/ tCO2; 30 EUR/t CO2). The respondents were more likely to be willing to pay the air ticket tax if they were not frequent flyers, if they were women, had a left political view, if they had a sense of responsibility for their emissions and if they preferred earmarking revenues from the tax for climate change mitigation and sustainable transport projects.
Key policy insights
A mandatory air ticket tax is a viable policy option that might receive majority support among the population.
While a carbon-based air ticket tax promises to be an effective tool to generate revenues, its potential steering effect appears to be lower for low cost contexts (short-distance flights) than for high cost contexts (long-distance flights).
Policy consistency regarding the tax base and its revenue use may increase public acceptability of (higher) air ticket taxes. Earmarking revenues is clearly preferred to tax recycling or general budget use.
Insights about the personal drivers behind WTP for emissions reductions from air travel can help to inform targeting and segmentation of policy interventions.
14.
ABSTRACTThe inherently global, connected nature of aviation means that carbon leakage from aviation policy does not necessarily behave similarly to leakage from other sectors. We model carbon leakage from a range of aviation policy test cases applied to a specific country (the United Kingdom), motivated by a desire to reduce aviation CO2 faster than achievable by currently-planned global mitigation efforts in pursuit of a year-2050 net zero CO2 target. We find that there are two main components to leakage: one related to passenger behaviour, which tends to result in emissions reductions outside the policy area (negative leakage), and one related to airline behaviour, which tends to result in emissions increases outside the policy area (positive leakage). The overall leakage impact of a policy, and whether it is positive or negative, depends on the balance of these two components and the geographic scope used, and varies for different policy types. In our simulations, carbon pricing-type policies were associated with leakage of between +50 and ?150% depending on what is assumed about scope and the values of uncertain parameters. Mandatory biofuel use was associated with positive leakage of around 0–40%, and changes in airport landing costs to promote more fuel-efficient aircraft were associated with positive leakage of 50–150%.Key policy insights
Carbon leakage in aviation policy arises from airline responses (typically positive leakage) and passenger responses (typically negative leakage).
Depending on the geographical scope, policy type and values for uncertain parameters, leakage may be between around ?150 to +150%.
Of the policies investigated in this study, leakage was typically most negative for carbon pricing and most positive for environmental landing charges.
Absolute values of leakage are smallest where policies are considered on the basis of all arriving and departing flights.
15.
Achieving a successful transition to a low carbon economy, in the UK and other countries, will require sufficient people with appropriate qualifications and skills to manufacture, install, and operate the low carbon technologies and approaches. The actual numbers and types of skills required are uncertain and will depend on the speed and direction of the transition pathways, but there are reasons to doubt that market mechanisms will deliver the necessary skilled workers in a timely manner. The range of market, government, and governance failures relating to the provision of low carbon skills are examined, particularly for their potential to cause a slower, costlier, and less employment-intensive transition. The potential policy responses to these failures are considered, including standardization of funding for training; formalization of transferable qualifications; legally binding targets for carbon emissions reductions and low carbon technology deployment; framework contracts and agreements between actors in key sectors; licensing and accreditation schemes for key technology sectors; government support for skills academies and training centres; support for first movers in niches; increasing mobility of workers; and providing a clear long-term cross-sectoral framework for a low carbon transition, including skills training. Policy relevance The article argues for the importance of skills issues for a successful transition to a low carbon economy. It outlines the potential causes of skills shortages, both generic and those specific to low carbon, as well as the probable impact of these types of shortages. By changing existing sectoral and occupational patterns, the transition will disrupt the existing market and government mechanisms to identify and remedy skills shortages in specific sectors. The nature and required pace of the low carbon transition also means that there are pressures that could induce greater skills shortages. These shortages, in turn, could critically delay elements of the transition and increase its cost and duration. The article outlines approaches taken to address these causes of skills shortages, drawing on examples from UK low carbon policy. The article ends with an argument that skills issues need to be more central to transitions debates. 相似文献
16.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):309-326
Abstract Carbon dioxide emissions from UK energy use have fallen by more than 20% over the last 30 years, and carbon intensity—carbon emissions per unit of GDP—has halved. These reductions have been achieved by a combination of decarbonisation of the energy system and substantial improvements in energy efficiency. Use of natural gas in power generation has been a big factor in recent years, but energy efficiency improvements in households and particularly industry have been more important over a longer period. Government policies designed primarily to address climate change have not been important contributors, until recently. Future reductions in emissions will require more proactive policies. However, they are possible without any economic difficulties, notably by adopting cost-effective energy efficiency measures, using new renewable energy sources and reducing dependence on private cars. These policies will improve economic efficiency. The new UK Climate Change Programme includes policies that combine regulation, investment, fiscal measures and other economic instruments. By working with the grain of other social, environmental and economic policies, they can achieve far more than a carbon tax alone, set at any politically acceptable level. Modelling the costs of emission reductions using a carbon tax as the only instrument would not only massively over-estimate costs, it would bear little resemblance to real world politics. The paper demonstrates that a more diverse set of policy instruments is likely to be an effective and politically acceptable approach in a mature industrial economy. It is concluded that the UK's Kyoto target of a 12.5% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is not challenging. The UK Government's target of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20% between 1990 and 2010 is also achievable. By 2010 per capita emissions from the UK will be well below 2.5 tC per year. Claims that some countries, notably the USA, could not reduce per capita emissions below 6 tC per year seem inconsistent with this experience. 相似文献
17.
Clayton Munnings William Acworth Oliver Sartor Yong-Gun Kim Karsten Neuhoff 《Climate Policy》2019,19(1):92-107
Nearly every carbon price regulates the production of carbon emissions, typically at midstream points of compliance such as power plants, consistent with typical advice from the literature. Since the early 2010s however, policymakers in Australia, California, China, Japan and Korea have implemented carbon prices that regulate the consumption of carbon emissions, where points of compliance are further downstream, such as distributors or final consumers. This article identifies the pivot towards placing the point of compliance for carbon prices further downstream as an emerging international trend, describes the designs of different prices on carbon consumption around the world, and explains the various motivations of the policymakers implementing them. Findings reveal that policymakers tend to layer prices on carbon consumption on top of prices on carbon production in an effort to improve economic outcomes by addressing incomplete pass-through of the carbon price from producer to consumer, thereby facilitating more cost-effective abatement. Policymakers also use prices on carbon consumption to reduce emissions leakage or because large producers of carbon are not within their jurisdiction. The prevalence of prices on carbon consumption will likely increase as evidenced by proposals in China and Europe.
Key policy insights
The recent surge in the number of jurisdictions implementing prices on carbon consumption represents an emerging international trend.
Policymakers use prices on carbon consumption in an effort to improve economic outcomes and capture environmental benefits.
While this article offers insights that detail initial challenges and successes, whether these prices on carbon consumption actually achieve their intended goals is an academically rich topic that requires further research on individual policies.
18.
Andrew G. Keeler 《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):419-425
Abstract Carbon rental has been suggested as a way of providing incentives to sequester carbon in biomass in the context of emissions trading systems for GHG emissions. A rental system works by issuing a credit for sequestered carbon that must be repaid after some fixed term. Rental systems avoid many of the difficulties of ensuring the permanence of sequestered carbon that exist in other institutional arrangements. This article adapts the results of Herzog et al. (2003) to argue that a rental system requires that carbon prices rise more slowly than the value of alternative investments in order to provide adequate incentives, and that there are good reasons to believe that this may not happen. Proponents need to directly address this potential difficulty in advancing arguments that carbon rental should be adopted as policy. 相似文献
19.
Reducing GHG emissions and mitigating climate change would require significant investments in renewable energy technologies. Foreign direct investments (FDI) in renewable energy (RE) have increased over the last years, contributing to the diffusion of RE globally. In the field of climate policy, there are multiple policy instruments aimed at attracting investments in renewable energy. This article aims to map the FDI flows globally including source and destination countries. Furthermore, the article investigates which policy instruments attract more FDI in RE sectors such as solar, wind and biomass, based on an econometric analysis of 137 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries. The results show that Feed in Tariffs (FIT) followed by Fiscal Measures (FM), such as tax incentives and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), are the most significant policy instrument that attract FDI in the RE sector globally. Regarding carbon pricing instruments, based on our analysis, carbon tax proved to be correlated with high attraction of FDI in OECD countries, whereas Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) proved to be correlated with high attraction of FDI mainly in non-OECD countries.
Key policy insights
Feed in Tariffs is the most significant policy instrument that attracts FDI in the Renewable Energy sector globally.
Fiscal Measures (FM), such as tax incentives, show a significant and positive impact on renewable energy projects by foreign investors, and particularly on solar energy.
Carbon pricing instruments, such as carbon taxation and emissions trading, proved to attract FDI in OECD and non-OECD countries respectively.
Public investments, such as government funds for renewable energy projects, proved not as attractive to foreign private investors, perhaps because public funds are not perceived as stable in the long run.
20.
Upon completion, China’s national emissions trading scheme (C-ETS) will be the largest carbon market in the world. Recent research has evaluated China’s seven pilot ETSs launched from 2013 on, and academic literature on design aspects of the C-ETS abounds. Yet little is known about the specific details of the upcoming C-ETS. This article combines currently understood details of China’s national carbon market with lessons learned in the pilot schemes as well as from the academic literature. Our review follows the taxonomy of Emissions Trading in Practice: A Handbook on Design and Implementation (Partnership for Market Readiness & International Carbon Action Partnership. (2016). Retrieved from www.worldbank.org): The 10 categories are: scope, cap, distribution of allowances, use of offsets, temporal flexibility, price predictability, compliance and oversight, stakeholder engagement and capacity building, linking, implementation and improvements.
Key policy insights
Accurate emissions data is paramount for both design and implementation, and its availability dictates the scope of the C-ETS.
The stakeholder consultative process is critical for effective design, and China is able to build on its extensive experience through the pilot ETSs.
Current policies and positions on intensity targets and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits constrain the market design of the C-ETS.
Most critical is the nature of the cap. The currently discussed rate-based cap with ex post adjustment is risky. Instead, an absolute, mass-based emissions cap coupled with the conditional use of permits would allow China to maintain flexibility in the carbon market while ensuring a limit on CO2 emissions.