首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 281 毫秒
1.
This paper analyzes the transition costs of moving towards a low carbon society when the second-best nature of the economy is accounted for. We emphasize the consequences on mitigation costs of considering the interplay between a) technical systems inertia, including slow infrastructure turnover in transportation and construction; and b) imperfect foresight influencing investment decisions. To this end, the hybrid general equilibrium modeling framework Imaclim-R is employed as it allows for transitory partial adjustments of the economy and captures their impact on the dynamics of economic growth. The modeling exercise quantitatively emphasizes the a) specific risks that the interplay between inertia and imperfect foresight leads to high macroeconomic costs of carbon abatement measures; b) opportunities of co-benefits from climate policies permitted by the correction of sub-optimalities in the reference scenarios. The article draws insights for the framing of future climate architectures by studying the role of measures that act complementarily to carbon pricing in the transport sector. In particular, reallocating public investment towards low-carbon transport infrastructure significantly reduces the overall macroeconomic costs of a given GHG stabilization target and even creates the room for long-term net economic benefits from climate policies.  相似文献   

2.
Meeting Report     
Top-down economic approaches theoretically show that placing a price on carbon can reduce emissions. Responses by firms to these policies, however, are less well understood and are critical for understanding the effectiveness of price-based carbon policy. This article provides an analysis of firm-level responses to the carbon tax in British Columbia (BC) through empirical research of grey literature, industry participation, and interviews with executives of major emitting firms in BC. The article highlights the empirical responses to the tax by firms, who experience difficulty in making low-carbon changes in response to fluctuating commodity prices, the low certainty of climate policy over temporal and spatial scales, and the political economy of implementing regional climate policy. It also highlights the importance of understanding firm-level responses as a complementary approach to macro-economic policy making on carbon pricing. The article shows the importance of engaging decision makers in corporations to understand how carbon is governed in light of emerging climate policy.

Policy relevance

This article is relevant to policy makers implementing carbon-pricing initiatives by illustrating the need to complement macroeconomic models with firm-level response analysis. It also demonstrates the key concerns of executives in a resource extractive economy and the ability of a carbon price, and the need for complementary technology funds and policy, to affect change in industrial emissions.  相似文献   

3.
The main assumptions and findings are presented on a comparative analysis of three GHG long-term emissions scenarios for Brazil. Since 1990, land-use change has been the most important source of GHG emissions in the country. The voluntary goals to limit Brazilian GHG emissions pledged a reduction in between 36.1% and 38.9% of GHG emissions projected to 2020, to be 6–10% lower than in 2005. Brazil is in a good position to meet the voluntary mitigation goals pledged to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) up to 2020: recent efforts to reduce deforestation have been successful and avoided deforestation will form the bulk of the emissions reduction commitment. In 2020, if governmental mitigation goals are met, then GHG emissions from the energy system would become the largest in the country. After 2020, if no additional mitigation actions are implemented, GHG emissions will increase again in the period 2020–2030, due to population and economic growth driving energy demand, supply and GHG emissions. However, Brazil is in a strong position to take a lead in low-carbon economic and social development due to its huge endowment of renewable energy resources allowing for additional mitigation actions to be adopted after 2020.

Policy relevance

The period beyond 2020 is now relevant in climate policy due to the Durban Platform agreeing a ‘protocol, legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force’ that will have effect from 2020. After 2020, Brazil will be in a situation more similar to other industrialized countries, faced with a new challenge of economic development with low GHG energy-related emissions, requiring the adoption of mitigation policies and measures targeted at the energy system. Unlike the mitigation actions in the land-use change sector, where most of the funding will come from the national budgets due to sovereignty concerns, the huge financial resources needed to develop low-carbon transport and energy infrastructure could benefit from soft loans channelled to the country through nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs).  相似文献   

4.
A carbon tax will form the central carbon pricing instrument in South Africa. The country, however, is also in the process of setting specific short-term emissions limits at a subnational level. Additional mitigation policy instruments will thus be required to meet these targets. Although it is possible to combine sector-level quantity targets with a broad-based carbon tax, this article finds that this greatly complicates mitigation policy design, increasing both the information requirements and the likelihood of unintended consequences. The trade-offs between economic efficiency (optimized by the use of a broad-based price set by a carbon tax) and environmental effectiveness (optimized by using instruments that ensure emissions reduction targets are met) are ever present. A clear understanding of subnational quantity targets and an appreciation of the characteristics of the instruments to achieve such targets (quantity-based instruments, QBIs), the framework through which the instruments are combined, and their possible interactions, are required for effective policy making. Three possible frameworks for combining instruments are identified in the article, and some specific implications of interaction between particular QBIs and a carbon tax are suggested.

Policy relevance

This article explores the interaction of a carbon tax with mitigation policy instruments to meet subnational emissions targets in the South African context (where both a carbon tax and subnational emissions targets are currently being developed). As international negotiations progress towards countries accepting binding GHG emissions restrictions, quantity-based mitigation policy approaches become more important. In countries where a broad-based emissions trading scheme (ETS) is not feasible in the short to medium term, combining a broad-based carbon tax with subnational emission targets provides an alternative mechanism for achieving the economic efficiency and emissions certainty benefits derived from an ETS. This paper considers the mechanisms through which such a combination of instruments can be achieved. Three possible frameworks for combining instruments are identified, some specific implications of interaction between particular QBIs and a carbon tax are suggested, and guidelines and concept tools are presented to assist policy-makers in designing efficient and coherent mitigation policy.  相似文献   

5.
Although agriculture could contribute substantially to European emission reductions, its mitigation potential lies untapped and dormant. Market-based instruments could be pivotal in incentivizing cost-effective abatement. However, sector specificities in transaction costs, leakage risks and distributional impacts impede its implementation. The significance of such barriers critically hinges on the dimensions of policy design. This article synthesizes the work on emissions pricing in agriculture together with the literature on the design of market-based instruments. To structure the discussion, an options space is suggested to map policy options, focusing on three key dimensions of policy design. More specifically, it examines the role of policy coverage, instruments and transfers to farmers in overcoming the barriers. First, the results show that a significant proportion of agricultural emissions and mitigation potential could be covered by a policy targeting large farms and few emission sources, thereby reducing transaction costs. Second, whether an instrument is voluntary or mandatory influences distributional outcomes and leakage. Voluntary instruments can mitigate distributional concerns and leakage risks but can lead to subsidy lock-in and carbon price distortion. Third, the impact on transfers resulting from the interaction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with emissions pricing will play a key role in shaping political feasibility and has so far been underappreciated.

POLICY RELEVANCE

Following the 2015 Paris Agreement, European climate policy is at a crossroads. Achieving cost-effectively the 2030 and 2050 European targets requires all sectors to reduce their emissions. Yet, the cornerstone of European climate policy, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), covers only about half of European emissions. Major sectors have been so far largely exempted from carbon pricing, in particular transport and agriculture. While transport has been increasingly under the spotlight as a possible candidate for an EU ETS sectoral expansion, policy discussions on pricing agricultural emissions have been virtually absent. This article attempts to fill this gap by investigating options for market-based instruments to reduce agricultural emissions while taking barriers to implementation into account.  相似文献   


6.
A practitioner's guide to a low-carbon economy: lessons from the UK   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Drawing primarily on the UK experience, five practical lessons are identified for policy makers who seek to decarbonize their economies. First, decarbonization needs a solid legal basis to give it credibility and overcome time inconsistency problems. Second, putting a price on carbon is essential, but low-carbon policies also have to address wider market, investment, and behavioural failures. This in turn raises issues of policy complexity and coordination. Third, the low-carbon economy is likely to be highly electrified. Clean electricity could be a cost-effective way of decarbonizing many parts of the economy, including transport, heating, and parts of industry. Decarbonization therefore starts in the power sector. Fourth, the low-carbon transition is primarily a revolution of production and not consumption. Both supply-side innovation and demand-side adjustments in lifestyle and behaviour are needed, though the former should dominate. Fifth, the transition to a low-carbon economy is economically and technologically feasible. Achieving it is a question of policy competence and having the political will to drive economic and social change.

Policy relevance

Practically all major GHG emitters now have climate change legislation on their statute books. Given what is at stake, and the complexity of the task at hand, it is important that policy makers learn from each other and establish a code of good low-carbon practice. The main lessons from the UK are distilled and presented. Carbon policy is considered for key sectors, such as electricity, buildings, and transport, and possible decarbonization paths are also outlined. It is shown that the transition to a low-carbon economy is economically and technologically feasible. Achieving it is primarily a question of policy competence and political will. This in turn means that climate change action needs a strong legislative basis to give the reforms statutory legitimacy. Low-carbon policies will have to address a wide range of market, investment and behavioural failures. Putting a price on carbon is an essential starting point, but only one of many policy reforms.  相似文献   

7.
An assessment of the post-Kyoto climate change negotiations, and the altered role of climate finance post-financial crisis, is presented. First, the paradigm shift of the Cancun Agreements is examined from an historical perspective and it is shown that the impasse in the negotiations, caused by the underlying over-emphasis on burden sharing reductions in emissions, can be overcome. Second, using information from two modelling exercises, it is demonstrated how climate finance can encourage the decoupling of carbon emissions from economic growth and thereby help align the development pattern with global climate goals. Third, a framework to place carbon finance within current discussions is sketched regarding both the reformation of the world financial systems and the facilitation of a sustainable economic recovery that is beneficial for North and South while addressing the low-carbon transition. It is concluded that upgrading climate finance is the key to triggering the shift to a low-carbon society and a system is proposed in which an agreed social cost of carbon is used to support the establishment of carbon emissions certificates to reorient a significant portion of global savings towards low-carbon investments.

Policy relevance

Investments that align development and climate objectives are shown to substantially lower the social cost of carbon and deliver long-term carbon emissions reductions. These reductions are greater than those contributed by the sole carbon price signal generated by a world cap-and-trade system. Carbon finance, as a part of the broader reform of financial systems and overseas aid, can help overcome the dual adversity of climate and financial crisis contexts. The carbon certificate, with an upfront agreed social cost of carbon, can be used as its instrument. The portion of the banking system that intends to reorient a significant part of world savings towards low-carbon investments could thus issue such carbon certificates. By giving carbon assets the status of a reserve currency, the system could even respond to the need of emerging countries to diversify their foreign exchange reserves and trigger a wave of worldwide sustainable growth through infrastructure markets.  相似文献   

8.
Brazil's nationally determined contribution (NDC) pledged under the Paris Agreement has marked a new stage in its climate policy towards strengthening low-carbon economic development beyond the recent drastic cuts in emissions from deforestation. Brazil especially means to limit oil consumption driven by future economic growth and to increase energy efficiency and biofuel use in the transport sector. On the other hand, Brazil still aspires to become a major petroleum province given its huge reserves of ‘pre-salt’ oil. This article aims to clarify under what conditions low-carbon economic development and oil exploration can possibly be combined in Brazil and what would be the energy system, environmental and macroeconomic implications of enabling policies for doing so. To address these questions, an energy–economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Brazilian economy is used to simulate alternative scenarios up to 2030. The results first show that implementing the most recent energy plans, which take into account the new economic reality in Brazil, should lead to over 20% lower domestic CO2 emissions in 2030 than the indicative NDC target, and to the export of the bulk of newfound crude oil. Second, with the same level of oil production, deeper domestic decarbonization, triggered by additional carbon pricing and sustainable efficiency measures, appears achievable with very small gross domestic product (GDP) loss and maximum oil exports, while being aligned with a 2°C emission pathway. However, (i) extra oil exports may induce net additional emissions outside Brazil and be seen as a perverse incentive and (ii) the economic growth strategy based on high oil exports may hinder the necessary diversification of the Brazilian economy.

Key policy insights

  • Low-carbon development goals will strongly interact with oil policy in Brazil.

  • The 2030 NDC target should be easy to achieve considering the new economic reality in Brazil.

  • Deeper domestic decarbonization is achievable with very limited GDP loss and significant oil exports, while being aligned with a 2°C emission pathway.

  • A broad strategic vision is needed to reconcile climate policy, energy policy and other economic development objectives.

  相似文献   

9.
In the recent climate change negotiations it was declared that the increase in global temperature should be kept below 2°C by 2100, relative to pre-industrial levels. China's CO2 emissions from energy and cement processes already account for nearly 24% of global emissions, a trend that is expected to keep increasing. Thus the role of China in global GHG mitigation is crucial. A scenario analysis of China's CO2 emissions is presented here and the feasibility of China reaching a low-carbon scenario is discussed. The results suggest that recent and continued technological progress will make it possible for China to limit its CO2 emissions and for these emissions to peak before 2025 and therefore that the global 2°C target can be achieved.

Policy relevance

In signing the Copenhagen Accord, China agreed to the global 2°C target. Results from this article could be used to justify low-carbon development policies and negotiations. While many still doubt the feasibility of a low-carbon pathway to support the global 2°C target, the results suggest that such a pathway can be realistically achieved. This conclusion should increase confidence and guide the policy framework further to make possible China's low-carbon development. Related policies and measures, such as renewable energy development, energy efficiency, economic structure optimization, technology innovation, low-carbon investment, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) development, should be further enhanced. Furthermore, China can play a larger role in the international negotiations process. In the global context, the 2°C target could be reaffirmed and a global regime on an emissions mitigation protocol could be framed with countries’ emissions target up to 2050.  相似文献   

10.
This paper compares the results of the three state of the art climate-energy-economy models IMACLIM-R, ReMIND-R, and WITCH to assess the costs of climate change mitigation in scenarios in which the implementation of a global climate agreement is delayed or major emitters decide to participate in the agreement at a later stage only. We find that for stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450?ppm CO2-only, postponing a global agreement to 2020 raises global mitigation costs by at least about half and a delay to 2030 renders ambitious climate targets infeasible to achieve. In the standard policy scenario??in which allocation of emission permits is aimed at equal per-capita levels in the year 2050??regions with above average emissions (such as the EU and the US alongside the rest of Annex-I countries) incur lower mitigation costs by taking early action, even if mitigation efforts in the rest of the world experience a delay. However, regions with low per-capita emissions which are net exporters of emission permits (such as India) can possibly benefit from higher future carbon prices resulting from a delay. We illustrate the economic mechanism behind these observations and analyze how (1) lock-in of carbon intensive infrastructure, (2) differences in global carbon prices, and (3) changes in reduction commitments resulting from delayed action influence mitigation costs.  相似文献   

11.
Emissions from the production of iron and steel could constitute a significant share of a 2°C global emissions budget (around 19% under the IEA 2DS scenario). They need to be reduced, and this could be difficult under nationally based climate policy approaches. We compare a new set of nationally based modelling (the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project) with best practice and technical limit benchmarks for iron and steel and cement emissions. We find that 2050 emissions from iron and steel and cement production represent an average 0.28?tCO2 per capita in nationally based modelling results, very close to the technical limit benchmark of 0.21?tCO2 per capita, and over 2.5 times lower than the best practice benchmark of 0.72?tCO2 per capita. This suggests that national projections may be overly optimistic about achievable emissions reductions in the absence of global carbon pricing and an international research and development effort to develop low emissions technologies for emissions-intensive products. We also find that equal per capita emissions targets, often the basis of proposals for how global emissions budgets should be allocated, would be inadequate without global emissions trading. These results show that a nationally based global climate policy framework, as has been confirmed in the Paris Agreement, could lead to risks of overshooting global emissions targets for some countries and carbon leakage. Tailored approaches such as border taxes, sectoral emissions trading or carbon taxes, and consumption-based carbon pricing can help, but each faces difficulties. Ultimately, global efforts are needed to improve technology and material efficiency in emissions-intensive commodities manufacturing and use. Those efforts could be supported by technology standards and a globally coordinated R&D effort, and strengthened by the adoption of global emissions budgets for emissions-intensive traded goods.

Policy relevance

This article presents new empirical findings on global iron and steel and cement production in a low-carbon world economy, demonstrates the risks associated with a nationally based global climate policy framework as has been confirmed in the Paris Agreement, and analyses policy options to deal with those risks.  相似文献   

12.
All sectors face decarbonization for a 2 °C temperature increase to be avoided. Nevertheless, meaningful policy measures that address rising CO2 from international aviation and shipping remain woefully inadequate. Treated with a similar approach within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they are often debated as if facing comparable challenges, and even influence each others’ mitigation policies. Yet their strengths and weaknesses have important distinctions. This article sheds light on these differences so that they can be built upon to improve the quality of debate and ensuing policy development. The article quantifies ‘2 °C’ pathways for these sectors, highlighting the need for mitigation measures to be urgently accelerated. It reviews recent developments, drawing attention to one example where a change in aviation mitigation policy had a direct impact on measures to cut CO2 from shipping. Finally, the article contrasts opportunities and barriers towards mitigation. The article concludes that there is a portfolio of opportunities for short- to medium-term decarbonization for shipping, but its complexity is its greatest barrier to change. In contrast, the more simply structured aviation sector is pinning too much hope on emissions trading to deliver CO2 cuts in line with 2 °C. Instead, the solution remains controversial and unpopular – avoiding 2 °C requires demand management.

Policy relevance

The governance arrangements around the CO2 produced by international aviation and shipping are different from other sectors because their emissions are released in international airspace and waters. Instead, through the Kyoto Protocol, the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were charged with developing policies towards mitigating their emissions. Slow progress to date, coupled with strong connections with rapidly growing economies, has led to the CO2 from international transport growing at a higher rate than the average rate from all other sectors. This article considers this rapid growth, and the potential for future CO2 growth in the context of avoiding a 2 °C temperature rise above pre-industrial levels. It explores similarities and differences between these two sectors, highlighting that a reliance on global market-based measures to deliver required CO2 cuts will likely leave both at odds with the overarching climate goal.  相似文献   

13.
This paper synthesizes the results from the model intercomparison exercise among regionalized global energy-economy models conducted in the context of the RECIPE project. The economic adjustment effects of long-term climate policy are investigated based on the cross-comparison of the intertemporal optimization models ReMIND-R and WITCH as well as the recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model IMACLIM-R. A number of robust findings emerge. If the international community takes immediate action to mitigate climate change, the costs of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 450?ppm (roughly 530?C550?ppm-e) discounted at 3% are estimated to be 1.4% or lower of global consumption over the twenty-first century. Second best settings with either a delay in climate policy or restrictions to the deployment of low-carbon technologies can result in substantial increases of mitigation costs. A delay of global climate policy until 2030 would render the 450?ppm target unachievable. Renewables and CCS are found to be the most critical mitigation technologies, and all models project a rapid switch of investments away from freely emitting energy conversion technologies towards renewables, CCS and nuclear. Concerning end use sectors, the models consistently show an almost full scale decarbonization of the electricity sector by the middle of the twenty-first century, while the decarbonization of non-electric energy demand, in particular in the transport sector remains incomplete in all mitigation scenarios. The results suggest that assumptions about low-carbon alternatives for non-electric energy demand are of key importance for the costs and achievability of very low stabilization scenarios.  相似文献   

14.
In the context of the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its accompanying Kyoto Protocol, participating nations have recognized the need for formulating Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). These NAMAs allow countries to take into account their national circumstances and to construct measures to mitigate GHG emissions across economic sectors. Israel has declared to the UN that it would strive to reduce its GHG emissions by 20% in the year 2020 relative to a ‘business as usual' scenario. With its growing population and an expanding economy, the national GHG mitigation plan was developed to draw a course for steering the Israeli economy into a low-carbon future while accommodating continued economic growth. The article describes relevant policy measures, designed to aid in the implementation of the plan and compares them with measures being undertaken by different countries. Emphasis is placed on analysing the progress to date, opportunities and barriers to attaining the ultimate GHG emissions reduction goals. The objective of this article is to contribute to the knowledge base of effective approaches for GHG emissions reduction. We emphasize the integrated approach of planning and implementation that could be especially useful for developing countries or countries with economies in transition, as well as for developed countries. Yet, in the article we argue that NAMAs’ success hinges on structured tracking of progress according to emerging global consensus standards such as the GHG Protocol Mitigation Goals Standard.

Policy relevance:

The study is consistent with the NAMA concept, enabling a country to adopt a ‘climate action plan’ that contributes to its sustainable development, while enabled by technology and being fiscally sound.

The analysis shows that although NAMAs have been framed in terms of projects, policies, and goals, current methodologies allow only the calculation of emission reductions that can be attributed to distinct projects. Currently, no international guidance exists for quantifying emissions reduction from policy-based NAMAs, making it difficult to track and validate progress. This gap could be addressed by an assessment framework that we have tested, as part of a World Resources Institute pilot study for an emerging voluntary global standard.  相似文献   

15.
Carbon pricing, including carbon taxes and emissions trading, has been adopted by different kinds of polities worldwide. Yet, beyond the increasing adoption over time, little is known about what polities – countries as well as sub- and supranational entities – adopt carbon pricing and why. This paper explores patterns of adoption (both implemented policies and those scheduled to be) through cluster analysis, with the purpose of investigating factors that could explain polities’ decisions to adopt carbon pricing. The study contributes empirically by studying carbon taxes and emissions trading together and by ordering the polities adopting carbon pricing into clusters. It also contributes theoretically, by exploring constellations of variables that drive the adoption of carbon pricing within individual clusters. We investigated 66 adopted policies of carbon pricing, which were divided into five clusters: early adopters, North-American subnational entities, Chinese pilot provinces, second-wave developed polities, and second-wave developing polities. The analysis indicates that the reasons for adopting carbon pricing have shifted over time. While international factors (climate commitments or influences from polities within the same region) are increasingly salient, domestic factors (including crises and income levels) were more important for the early adopters.

Key policy insights

  • Carbon pricing has become a global mainstream policy instrument.

  • Economic and fiscal crises provide windows of opportunity for promoting carbon pricing.

  • The international climate regime can support the adoption of carbon pricing through mitigation commitments and international financial and technical assistance.

  • Learning between polities from the same region is a useful tool for promoting carbon pricing.

  • Carbon intensive economies tend to prefer emissions trading over carbon taxes.

  相似文献   

16.
Company cars have received considerable attention because of their partial tax-exemption and the changes in travel behaviour they stimulate, including car model choices, distances driven, and car ownership patterns. This paper is the first to present evidence on actual transport behaviour change, based on mobility and fuel diaries, and comparing a sample of 624 company cars and 9328 private cars in Germany. Analysis confirms that company cars belong to the more heavily motorized car segments (with an average 97?kW, as opposed to 79?kW of private cars), and are driven more than private cars (24,672?km per year, compared to 12,828?km per year for private cars). Company car benefits also increase average household vehicle numbers by 25%. Results show that it is imperative to distinguish company cars of company owners relative to those driven by employees, as negative externalities increase significantly where company cars are used by the latter. Abolishing company car benefits could significantly reduce emissions from passenger road transport and stimulate change in the country’s automotive industries towards a lower-carbon path. As Germany is not currently on track to meet its climate mitigation targets, this would be a timely policy shift.

Key policy insights
  • Company car benefits increase transport demand, car ownership, and average vehicle fleet engine power. These effects are particularly relevant for employees.

  • Company cars have, in spite of their larger size and greater engine power, a (modestly) better fuel economy than private cars, possibly because they represent more recent and hence more efficient car models.

  • A policy focus on vehicle fuel efficiency improvements will fail to reduce the German car fleet’s CO2 emissions to a sustainable level.

  • Abolishing company car benefits could yield a significant reduction in GHG emissions from passenger road transport.

  • Company car subsidies are an out-dated mode of support for the fossil-fuel based automotive industry.

  相似文献   

17.
China is now the world's biggest annual emitter of greenhouse gases with 7467 million tons (Mt) carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) in 2005, with agriculture accounting for 11% of this total. As elsewhere, agricultural emissions mitigation policy in China faces a range of challenges due to the biophysical complexity and heterogeneity of farming systems, as well as other socioeconomic barriers. Existing research has contributed to improving our understanding of the technical potential of mitigation measures in this sector (i.e. what works). But for policy purposes it is important to convert these measures into a feasible economic potential, which provides a perspective on whether agricultural emissions reduction (measures) are low cost relative to mitigation measures and overall potential offered by other sectors of the economy. We develop a bottom-up marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) representing the cost of mitigation measures applicable in addition to business-as-usual agricultural practices. The MACC results demonstrate that while the sector offers a maximum technical potential of 402 MtCO2e in 2020, a reduction of 135 MtCO2e is potentially available at zero or negative cost (i.e. a cost saving), and 176 MtCO2e (approximately 44% of the total) can be abated at a cost below a threshold carbon price ≤¥ 100 (approximately €12) per tCO2e. Our findings highlight the relative cost effectiveness of nitrogen fertilizer and manure best management practices, and animal breeding practices. We outline the assumptions underlying MACC construction and discuss some scientific, socioeconomic and institutional barriers to realizing the indicated levels of mitigation.  相似文献   

18.
开展交通领域大气污染物与温室气体协同减排研究对于实现能源、环境和气候变化综合管理具有重要意义。文中以我国交通部门污染物与温室气体协同治理为切入点,开展道路、铁路、水运、航空和管道运输等各子部门未来需求预测,并运用长期能源可替代规划系统模型(LEAP),通过构建基准情景、污染减排情景、绿色低碳情景和强化低碳情景,模拟分析我国交通领域能源需求、污染物及碳排放趋势。结果表明,强化低碳情景下,我国交通部门能源消费将在2037年达峰,CO2排放将在2035年达峰;绿色低碳情景下,CO2排放将在2040年达峰;淘汰老旧汽车、“公转铁”“公转水”等政策性措施将有效减少NOx、PM2.5等污染物排放,发展氢燃料、生物航油等技术性措施将进一步减少污染物排放;要实现交通领域绿色低碳发展,需分别对客运、货运交通从节能降碳与协同减排两方面实施相关措施,综合施策是完成能源消费与碳排放达峰目标的重要保证。  相似文献   

19.
Global climate change mitigation action is hampered by systematic under-assessment of national ‘fair shares’, largely on the basis of perceived national interests. This paper aims to inform discussions centred on South Africa’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) by estimating (1) emissions reduction pathways for the country using the Climate Equity Reference Calculator (CERC) assuming a maximum 2°C aggregate warming target and (2) the likely economy-wide net mitigation costs or savings associated with reaching these pathways if known lower-cost mitigation measures, identified through the national mitigation potential analysis, are prioritised. The cumulative net savings associated with achieving the CERC ‘fair share’ emissions pathway, assuming the moderate use of low carbon power generation measures, would reach $5.3 billion by 2030. Net savings could be substantially greater reaching $46.8 billion by 2030 assuming power generation focuses on moving towards full decarbonisation. An unconditional commitment to the mitigation action implied by the ‘fair share’ emissions pathway therefore seems reasonable and prudent purely from the point of view of net country-wide savings. Only if power generation moves towards full decarbonisation would there be a reasonable chance of achieving the more ambitious CERC domestic emissions pathway. However, the significant additional cost associated with achieving the domestic emissions pathway should be conditional on international assistance.

Key policy insights

  • South Africa can only achieve its ‘fair share’ of the global mitigation effort if greater use is made of renewable energy options, and can realise significant net savings if it does so.

  • Further emissions reductions would incur costs and require significant upscaling of the share of renewable energy and full implementation of all non-power generation mitigation measures available.

  • Committing to this further mitigation action contingent on international finance would both strengthen the nation’s position in climate negotiations and support the provision of finance for those vulnerable developing nations that bear little or no responsibility for climate change.

  相似文献   

20.
A growing body of literature suggests that an economic case may exist for investment in large-scale climate change mitigation. At the same time, however, investment is persistently falling well short of the levels required to prevent dangerous climate change, suggesting that economically attractive mitigation opportunities are being missed. To understand whether and where these opportunities exist, this article contrasts macro-level analyses of climate finance with micro-level bottom-up analyses of the scale and composition of low-carbon investment opportunities in four case study developing world cities. This analysis finds that there are significant opportunities to redirect existing finance streams towards more cost-effective, lower-carbon options. This would mobilize substantial new investment in climate mitigation. Two key explanations are proposed for the failure to exploit these opportunities. First, the composition of cost-effective measures is highly context-specific, varying from place to place and sector to sector. Macro-level analyses of climate finance flows are therefore poor indicators of the micro-level landscape for low-carbon investment. Specific local research is therefore needed to understand the opportunities for cost-effective mitigation at that level. Second, many opportunities require enabling governance arrangements that are not currently in place. Mobilizing new low-carbon investment and closing the ‘climate finance gap' therefore requires attention to policy frameworks and financing mechanisms that can facilitate the exploitation of cost-effective low-carbon options.

Policy relevance

The importance of increasing investment in climate mitigation, especially in developing nations, is well established. This article scrutinizes four city-level studies of the scope for cost-effective low-carbon investment, and finds that significant opportunities are not being exploited in developing world cities. Enabling governance structures may help to mainstream climate considerations into investments by local actors (households, businesses and government agencies). While climate finance distributed through international bodies such as the Green Climate Fund may not always be a suitable vehicle to invest directly in disaggregated, local-level measures, it can provide the incentives to develop these governance arrangements.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号