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1.
China is in the process of establishing a national emissions trading system (ETS). Evaluating the implementation effectiveness of the seven pilot ETSs in China is critical for designing this national system. This study administered a questionnaire survey to assess the behaviour of enterprises covered by the seven ETS pilots from the perspective of: the strictness of compliance measures; rules for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); the mitigation pressure felt by enterprises; and actual mitigation and trading activities. The results show that the pilot MRV and compliance rules have not yet been fully implemented. The main factors involved are the lack of compulsory force of the regulations and the lack of policy awareness within the affected enterprises. Most enterprises have a shortage of free allowances and thus believe that the ETSs have increased their production costs. Most enterprises have already established mitigation targets. Some of the covered enterprises are aware of their own internal emission reduction costs and most of these have used this as an important reference in trading. Many enterprises have accounted for carbon prices in their long-term investment. The proportion of enterprises that have participated in trading is fairly high; however, reluctance to sell is quite pervasive in the market, and enterprises are mostly motivated to trade simply in order to achieve compliance. Few enterprises are willing to manage their allowances in a market-oriented manner. Different free allowance allocation methods directly affect the pathways enterprises take to control emissions. Key policy insights In the national ETS, the compulsory force of ETS provisions should be strengthened. A reasonable level of free allowance shortage should be ensured to promote emission reduction by enterprises. Sufficient information should be provided to guide enterprises in their allowance management to activate the market. To promote the implementation of mitigation technologies by enterprises, actual output-based allocation methods should be used. The government should use market adjustment mechanisms, such as a price floor and ceiling, to ensure that carbon prices are reasonable and stable, so as to guide long-term low carbon investment.
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2.
This article analyses the implementation of emissions trading systems (ETSs) in eight jurisdictions: the EU, Switzerland, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California in the US, Québec in Canada, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and pilot schemes in China. The article clarifies what is working, what isn’t and why, when it comes to the practice of implementing an ETS. The eight ETSs are evaluated against five main criteria: environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, market management, revenue management and stakeholder engagement. Within each of these categories, ETS attributes ? including abatement cost, stringency of the cap, improved allocation practices over time and the trajectory of price stability ? are assessed for each system. Institutional learning, administrative prudence, appropriate carbon revenue management and stakeholder engagement are identified as key ingredients for successful ETS regimes. Recent implementation of ETSs in regions including California, Québec and South Korea indicates significant institutional learning from prior systems, especially the EU ETS, with these regions implementing more robust administrative and regulatory structures suitable for handling unique national and sub-national opportunities and constraints. The analysis also shows that there is potential for a ‘double dividend’ in emissions reductions even with a modest carbon price, provided the cap tightens over time and a portion of the auctioned revenues are reinvested in other emissions-reduction activities. Knowledge gaps exist in understanding the interaction of pricing instruments with other climate policy instruments and how governments manage these policies to achieve optimum emissions reductions with lower administrative costs. Key policy insights Countries are learning from each other on ETS implementation. Administrative and regulatory structures of ETS jurisdictions appear to evolve and become more robust in every ETS analysed. A ‘double dividend’ for emissions reductions may also exist in cases where mitigation occurs as a result of the ETS policy and when auction revenues are reinvested in other emissions-reduction activities.
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3.
Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on how to mitigate climate change. The current carbon leakage literature focuses largely on industrial production, and less attention has been given to carbon leakage from the electricity sector (the largest source of carbon emissions in China). Moreover, very few studies have examined in detail electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading system (which leads, for example, to double counting) or addressed its implications for potential linkage between the EU and Chinese emissions trading systems (ETSs). This article seeks to fill this gap by analysing the problem of ‘carbon leakage’ from the electricity sector under the China ETS. Specifically, a Law & Economics approach is applied to scrutinize legal documents on electricity/carbon regulation and examine the economic incentive structures of stakeholders in the inter-/intra-regional electricity markets. Two forms of ‘electricity carbon leakage’ are identified and further supported by legal evidence and practical cases. Moreover, the article assesses the environmental and economic implications for the EU of potential linkage between the world’s two largest ETSs. In response, policy suggestions are proposed to address electricity carbon leakage, differentiating leakage according to its sources. Key policy insights Electricity carbon leakage in China remains a serious issue that has yet to receive sufficient attention. Such leakage arises from the current electricity/carbon regulatory framework in China and jeopardizes mitigation efforts. With the US retreat on climate efforts, evidence suggests that EU officials are looking to China and expect an expanded carbon market to reinforce EU global climate leadership. Given that the Chinese ETS will be twice the size of the EU ETS, a small amount of carbon leakage in China could have significant repercussions. Electricity carbon leakage should thus be considered in any future EU–China linking negotiations.
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4.
In 2013, China launched its domestic pilot emissions trading scheme (ETS) as a cost-effective strategy to reduce CO 2 emissions. Theoretically, the ETS can interact with the feed-in tariffs (FITs) applied to renewable energies (REN). This article presents a simple method to demonstrate how FITs can be adjusted based on the evolution of ETS carbon prices in order to provide a cost-effective climate policy package in China. First, by using provincial data and wind and solar power as examples, it calculates the implicit carbon prices that FITs generate in different Chinese provinces and finds that they are much higher than current carbon prices in the pilot ETS. This shows the necessity of using both instruments to guarantee current level incentives to develop REN for climate change purposes, at least in the short and medium terms. Second, by keeping the annual total carbon price level stable (the sum of the implicit FIT carbon price and the ETS carbon price), and taking into account the cost evolution of REN development, this article demonstrates, for the 2018–2020 period, that FIT should decrease at an annual rate of 3.04–4.63% (for wind) and 7.84–8.87% (for solar) based on different growth rates for progressive national ETS carbon prices. Policy relevance There are a number of studies and debates on the interactions between climate policies in Europe in particular, ETS and subsidies for REN. The key issue is that a climate policy package should be cost-efficient and the implementation of one policy should not jeopardise the performance of another. For a country like China, a considerable scale effect on climate target achievement and total cost savings could be produced by the careful design of the climate policy package. FIT and ETS, which are cost-efficient policies if implemented separately, will very probably constitute a major climate policy package in the future in China, which is aiming to limit the use of command-and-control policies. So far, there is some debate on how to reduce FIT for wind power in China due to development cost changes. But discussions are lacking on the linkage between FIT and ETS. This paper fills this gap. 相似文献
5.
There is a substantial literature on optimal emissions trading system (ETS) designs, but relatively little on how organized political interests affect the design and operation of these economic instruments. This article looks systematically at the political economy of the diffusion of ETS designs and explores the implications for carbon-market linking. Contrary to expectations of convergence – as has been observed in many areas where economic policy diffuses across markets – we found substantial divergence in the design and implementation of ETS across the nine systems examined. The architects of these different systems are aware of other designs, but they have purposely adjusted designs to reflect local political and administrative goals. Divergence has sobering implications for visions of ubiquitous linkages and the emergence of a global carbon market that, to date, have been predicated on the assumption that designs would converge. More such ‘real world’ political economy analysis is needed to understand how political forces, mainly within countries, act as strong intervening variables that affect instrument design, implementation and effectiveness. Key policy insights Our finding of design divergence indicates that policy efforts aimed at achieving integrated international markets are unlikely to be successful. Visions of carbon market linkage will need to confront the reality that there are well-organized political coalitions, anchored in the status quo, that prefer divergence. In linking ETS, policy-makers should devote more attention to preventing excessive capital flows that can undermine political support for linkage, while also creating incentives for convergence in trading rules over time.
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6.
Systematic evidence relating to the performance of carbon pricing – carbon taxes and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs) – is sparse. In 2015, 17 ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions while 18 jurisdictions collected a carbon tax. The papers in this special thematic section review the performance of many of these instruments over the 2005–2015 period. The performance of existing carbon taxes and GHG ETSs can help policy makers make informed choices about whether to introduce these instruments and to improve their design. The purpose of carbon pricing instruments is to reduce GHG emissions cost effectively. Assessing their performance is difficult because emissions are also affected by other policies and exogenous factors such as economic conditions. Carbon taxes in Europe prior to 2008 and in British Columbia reduced emissions from business-as-usual but actual emissions continued to rise. Since 2008 emissions subject to European carbon taxes have declined, but in most countries, other mitigation policies have probably contributed more to the reductions than the carbon taxes. Emissions subject to ETSs, with the exception of four systems without emissions caps, have declined. The ETSs contributed to the emissions reductions, but their share of the overall reduction is not known. Most tax rates are low relative to levels thought to be needed to achieve climate change objectives. Few jurisdictions regularly adjust their tax rates. All ETSs have accumulated surplus allowances and implemented measures to reduce these surpluses. The largest ETSs now specify annual reductions in their emissions cap several years into the future. Emissions trading system allowance prices are generally lower than the tax rates. Key policy insights Theoretical discussions usually portray carbon taxes and GHG ETSs as alternatives. In practice, a jurisdiction often implements both instruments to address emissions by different sources. Designs of ETSs have evolved based on experience shared bilaterally and via dedicated institutions. Carbon tax designs, in contrast, have hardly evolved and there are no institutions dedicated to sharing experience. Every jurisdiction with an ETS and/or carbon tax also has other policies that affect its GHG emissions.
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7.
Korea’s domestic emissions trading scheme commenced in January 2015. It targeted mainly industrial and power sectors, and compelled companies to transform how they manage energy efficiency and mitigate GHGs. This study sets out to explore how Korean companies evaluated their allocation position and engaged in emissions trading in the first compliance period, and to identify their views on trading barriers and policy expectations at the start of emissions trading. Questionnaire surveys and on-site interviews targeting Korean companies under the Korean emissions trading scheme were conducted at the start of operations (February to March 2015) and after the first compliance year (May 2016), respectively. Actual operation results are observed and compared with the survey findings. This study extrapolates implications for policy and presents suggestions for the government and the target companies in terms of how to improve the current emissions trading scheme in order to further stimulate emissions trading. POLICY RELEVANCE This study attempts to bridge the gap between companies and government policy in operating the domestic emission trading scheme in Korea. Empirical results, based on analysis of company-level data, reveal how businesses perceive K-ETS and how this relates to the operating results, which saw only limited trading of surplus emissions taking place in the early phase. Key barriers to active trading identified in the study include supply–demand imbalance, policy uncertainty and lack of preparedness of companies over carbon pricing. These barriers could be addressed by improved transparency of allowance allocation methods, possibly restricting carry-over of surplus allowances, ending policy uncertainty and providing more information to companies that can support companies’ policy understanding of the carbon pricing based on the market mechanism. Targeted companies should proactively participate in emissions trading in the early phase, in order to learn from it and prepare for the future introduction of auctioning. 相似文献
8.
简要介绍欧盟排放交易体系（EU ETS）的发展情况,调研EU ETS对欧洲电力行业影响的研究现状,认为EU ETS将增加发电企业的生产成本,迅速提高电力市场价格,大幅增加发电企业利润,刺激能源技术投资和创新。同时简要评述EU ETS引发的争议问题,包括当前EU ETS对发电企业和电力市场的实际影响、发电企业巨额利润问题的产生原因等。在此基础上,对比中国和欧盟之间的差异,初步分析建设国内碳交易市场将对我国电力行业产生的影响,最后对我国建设碳交易市场提出建议。 相似文献
9.
评估中国试点碳排放权交易体系(ETS)碳减排效果的现有研究普遍存在处理组样本选取范围明显大于试点ETS实际覆盖范围的问题。因此,文中对研究样本进行了更为严格的甄别：将2005—2017年各省的六大高耗能工业子行业中纳入试点企业的体量占相应子行业体量60%及以上的工业子行业作为处理组,将非试点地区的工业子行业作为对照组。基于双重差分法的分析表明,相较于对照组,试点ETS在启动后不仅促进了处理组工业子行业碳排放绝对量的下降,还促进了其碳排放强度的下降,说明试点ETS具有明显的碳减排效果。工业子行业的总产值和人均总产值分别与其碳排放量和碳排放强度呈现出一定的库兹涅茨曲线效应,工业子行业资产的流动性越强、盈利能力越强、面临的环境规制强度越大,越有利于碳减排。建议主管部门坚定依靠市场手段来控制温室气体排放,尽快将更多行业纳入全国ETS;另外,应提高体系运行相关数据的公开力度,定期对体系进行分析评估,并及时公布评估结果。 相似文献
10.
This article empirically investigates the impact of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions on companies regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in Germany. Based on a unique panel dataset, we investigate if MRV costs are dependent on the amount of annual emissions of regulated companies and if there are differences in transaction costs between economic sectors. The results indicate that administrative costs are dependent on the amount of annual emissions for larger companies, which has implications for the economic efficiency of the EU ETS. The most important finding, however, is that there are significant differences in MRV transaction costs dependent on the type and size of companies. This implies the existence of considerable economies of scale. Overall, the EU ETS could benefit from reforms by means of a push towards upstream regulation as this would likely increase administrative efficiency. Policy relevance statementTransaction costs are, among other things, an important aspect of market-based climate policy design. A policy instrument with low transaction costs is preferred over instruments with larger transaction costs under equal conditions. This is occasionally referred to as administrative efficiency, and its importance was acknowledged in directive 2009/29/EC of the European Commission. Thoughtful empirical examination of transaction costs is essential in order to inform about the extent and impact of these costs. This article provides an analysis of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions in the EU ETS. It is shown that administrative costs will likely have negative effects on the cost efficiency of the EU ETS. However, the most relevant finding is that small companies (<250 employees) or firms emitting small amounts of carbon dioxide per year face far higher average transaction costs compared with larger firms or emitters. Thus, there is a tendency for the EU ETS to cause MRV transaction costs that are disadvantageous for small companies. A regulation that is more upstream-oriented could mitigate this negative effect to some extent. The EU ETS could initiate a reform that is targeted on putting a price on the carbon content of fossil fuels instead of directly regulating emissions in a so-called ‘end-of-the-pipe’ way at the installation level. 相似文献
11.
Many different approaches are needed to achieve reductions in GHG emissions from the transportation sector. Carbon emissions trading schemes (ETSs) are widely used in industry and are effective in reducing the overall social cost of emissions abatement. This article reports the development of a downstream ETS for the transportation sector and its application in Shenzhen, China. The ETS was devised as a mandatory cap-and-trade scheme and, as a first step, was applied to public transportation. An integrated cap was set on the total emissions from buses and taxis: an absolute cap for existing vehicles and a relative increment for new entrants. Allowances were allocated by grandfathering or benchmarking and a ‘reverse mechanism’ was established to encourage the transformation of urban transportation to a low-carbon system. Online fuel consumption monitoring was used to quantify the emissions from vehicles, and the operators were required to surrender enough allowances or credits to account for their verified annual emissions. The mechanisms for allowance trading and carbon offsets provided sufficient flexibility to make emissions abatement and the use of new-energy vehicles and environmentally friendly travel within Shenzhen's urban transportation system economically attractive. Policy relevance The transportation sector is becoming a major contributor to the growth in China's GHG emissions. Achieving large reductions in GHG emissions from the transportation sector is a great challenge and requires both technology and policy innovation. The tradable carbon permit is a popular concept in mitigating climate change, but the introduction of a cap-and-trade ETS into the transportation sector is a relatively innovative concept. Shenzhen has launched the first cap-and-trade ETS in a developing country and is currently exploring ways to mitigate carbon emissions by a downstream cap-and-trade ETS for the transportation sector. This article considers the main institutional arrangements and regulatory framework of Shenzhen's transportation carbon ETS. It not only refreshes the theoretical analysis and practical application of downstream cap-and-trade carbon emissions trading in urban transportation, but also provides developing countries with a cost-effective instrument to mitigate their rapid growth in traffic carbon emissions during urbanization. 相似文献
12.
As the number of instruments applied in the area of energy and climate policy is rising, the issue of policy interaction needs to be explored further. This article analyses the interdependencies between the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the German feed-in tariffs (FITs) for renewable electricity in a quantitative manner using a bottom-up energy system model. Flexible modelling approaches are presented for both instruments, with which all impacts on the energy system can be evaluated endogenously. It is shown that national climate policy measures can have an effect on the supranational emissions trading system by increasing emission reduction in the German electricity sector by up to 79 MtCO 2 in 2030. As a result, emission certificate prices decline by between 1.9 €/tCO 2 and 6.1 €/tCO 2 and the burden sharing between participating countries changes, but no additional emission reduction is achieved at the European level. This also implies, however, that the cost efficiency of such a cap-and-trade system is distorted, with additional costs of the FIT system of up to €320 billion compared with lower costs for ETS emission certificates of between €44 billion and €57 billion (cumulated over the period 2013–2020). Policy relevanceIn order to fulfil ambitious emission reduction targets a large variety of climate policy instruments are being implemented in Europe. While some, like the EU ETS, directly address CO 2 emissions, others aim to promote specific low-carbon technologies. The quantitative analysis of the interactions between the EU ETS and the German FIT scheme for renewable sources in electricity generation presented in this article helps to understand the importance of such interaction effects. Even though justifications can be found for the implementation of both types of instrument, the impact of the widespread use of support mechanisms for renewable electricity in Europe needs to be taken into account when fixing the reduction targets for the EU ETS in order to ensure a credible long-term investment signal. 相似文献
13.
2017年底中国全国碳市场启动,全球正式运行的碳排放权交易体系达到21个。伴随碳排放权交易的广泛开展,加之产品市场不确定性的冲击,控排企业的违约行为也日益多样化和复杂化。基于此,根据中国碳市场试点地区的通行交易规则,通过在产品市场中引入随机冲击,分析在具有储蓄机制且存在不确定性需求的碳交易体系中,企业违约行为的方式以及监管强度对企业违约行为的影响。研究结果表明:抽查比例较高的强监管设置下被试不会产生系统动机来排放违约,弱监管设置下明显的报告违约会导致排放总量上升。即使面临不确定性冲击,储蓄机制依然能促进控排企业以一个相对有效的方式跨期分配生产量。因此给出如下建议:违约处罚应该分级,报告违约处罚力度应大于排放违约;为提高实际履约率,各地应提高排放报告抽查比例;完善配额储蓄机制。 相似文献
14.
The establishment of a carbon market assumes that there is an effective means of transforming price information into technical carbon reduction measures. However, empirical evidence reveals that the links between price information and carbon management strategies are far from obvious. To understand how delegating CO 2 responsibility affects CO 2 trading behaviour, this article proposes a neo-institutionalist approach to answering the question of why companies became sellers, buyers or a combination of both during phase I of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Original data from a survey on companies that participated in this scheme were collected and analysed. It was assumed that the trading scheme offered two ways to delegate decisions regarding emissions trading: decoupling from technical knowledge and financialization (i.e. delegating to financial departments) or coupling using technicalization (i.e. delegating to manufacturing departments). The results support the hypothesis that a company that adopts a decoupling strategy is more likely to buy certificates to fulfil their emissions targets. Adopting a coupling strategy indicates that a company is more likely to become a seller, all else equal. Professional identity is the theoretical basis for this relationship. Delegating carbon management to different departments represents either a stronger coupling or a stronger decoupling from core technological processes. Policy relevanceThe transaction data from phase I of the EU ETS open new questions and possibilities regarding the reasons that drive selling and buying in companies. It is important to look not only at the traditional sources of transaction costs, but rather also at the reasons for these tensions. One important source is the professional education of the people in charge of the EU ETS. Tailored information that directly addresses the different professional backgrounds of managers working in both financial departments and more technical departments might help to lower these types of transaction costs. In today's context, important emitter countries, such as China and Korea, have launched their own emissions markets, copying many aspects of the EU ETS. For the positive development of these markets and as a way of establishing a global emissions market, these new schemes should learn from the EU ETS experience. 相似文献
15.
China has introduced several pilot emission trading schemes to build the basis for a national scheme. The potential scale of this initiative raises prospects for a regional carbon trading network as a way to further engage other major Asian economies. However, the Chinese carbon markets rest upon a unique political-economic context and institutional environment that are likely to limit their development and viability. This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints. Four main challenges are identified, namely, inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. The first two challenges concern economic dimensions and may be partially addressed by the incentives created by the newly introduced emission trading schemes. The other two are more deeply entrenched in the dominant political system and governing practice. They require fundamental changes to the ways in which the state and the market interact. The success of China's carbon market reform depends crucially on the ability of the ongoing efforts to transform the distorted state–market relationship. Policy relevance The burgeoning carbon markets offer opportunities for emissions mitigation at lower costs and enable circulation of a new form of capital, i.e. carbon credits, across borders. China accounts for a gigantic share of global GHG emissions and has the potential to significantly scale up these opportunities. There are clear implications for market developers and participants worldwide, including climate policy makers who attempt to link their emission trading schemes to other schemes, firms who seek to take advantage of the inexpensive carbon offsets generated in developing countries, international financial institutions who endeavour to establish their business in an emerging major carbon market, etc. This article can inform their decisions by identifying key issues that may undermine their ability to achieve these goals. Policy makers and stakeholders will benefit from this analysis, which shows how the Chinese carbon markets operate in ways that may be different from their experience elsewhere. 相似文献
16.
Abstract The European Commission is mandated to consider the inclusion of credits from land-use projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), beginning with the second period of the European Union's emission trading scheme (ETS) in its report due in July 2006. Temporary credits from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM are seen by many as posing a technical problem for their use under the ETS. This article summarizes three feasible, efficient and environmentally sound alternatives for achieving the integration of such temporary credits in the European emissions trading market starting in 2008. The first proposal integrates tCERs and lCERs (temporary credits) into the EU ETS by allowing for their direct use for compliance purposes. The second proposal builds on the idea of swapping temporary credits for EU allowances (EUAs) by Member States. The third proposal would not require a political decision at the EU level. Instead supportive Member States or private carbon fund operators would agree to swap temporary credits for the CERs or ERUs they hold in their accounts. All three solutions would be linked to a risk-mitigation strategy based on levying a fee or fixing an exchange rate, which would allow governments to hedge the risk of losing temporary credits. 相似文献
17.
Seven emissions trading scheme (ETS) pilots have been established in China. They have introduced some unique methods to set emissions caps and allocate allowances, different from textbook models and their counterparts in the EU, California, and many other regions. This article provides a detailed introduction to the methods for cap setting and allowance allocation adopted by the pilots, and presents detailed comparisons of these methods. In terms of cap setting, the pilots adopt flexible caps that can be adjusted where necessary, which primarily depends on the outcomes of the bottom-up approach, namely aggregating the allowances allocated to participants. As for allowance allocation, the pilots not only adopt such methods as grandfathering and benchmarking, which are also widely applied in other existing schemes, but also some special methods that require ex post adjustment, such as those based on enterprises’ historical emissions intensity (including both physical quantity and added-value intensity) and current production/output. The factors influencing the design are further analysed, including the impacts of theory and experience from foreign systems, concerns about economic development, traditions regarding intensity targets and policy, constraints from data availability and preparation time, tight regulation of the electricity and heat generation sector, and concerns regarding price stability. The practice of pilots presents an improvement opportunity and a challenge for China to further balance the theoretical and practical requirements in ETS design in establishing its national system. Policy relevance China is piloting emissions trading in seven regions, as part of efforts to try to rely more on market-based instruments to achieve GHG emissions control targets. All seven pilots have been confronted with special issues in the design process when compared with existing foreign schemes. This article analyses in depth the special issues related to cap setting and allowance allocation and the approaches adopted to address these issues. Flexible cap setting through a bottom-up approach and different types of allocation methods with or without ex post adjustment are adopted in the pilots. The flexible and innovative approaches the pilots have developed could provide useful experience for designing the nationwide ETS in China and promoting emissions trading policy in other parts of the world. 相似文献
18.
Germany's National Allocation Plans (NAP I and NAP II) for implementing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are critically analysed. Emissions trading has created a new scarcity, and grandfathering constitutes a subsidy that is used to reach additional policy goals related to energy and distribution policy. With respect to energy policy, the objective was to protect the German coal industry; but in terms of distribution policy the hidden agenda was to allocate as many emissions allowances as possible to the industries involved. The whole discussion is based on the false premise that a generous, or at least ‘needs-based’, allocation of costless emissions allowances increases an industry's competitiveness. As a consequence, NAP I is overburdened with several complex special rules and exemptions which distort the incentive effect of emissions trading, thus making climate change mitigation in Germany more costly than necessary. The attempted continuation of this policy, in particular with regard to new installations and an over-generous cap, has led to the European Commission's rejection of these rules in the German NAP II in November 2006. Despite significant improvements since then, some important shortfalls remain. Unfortunately, the economic literature available on this topic refers to highly stylized models of allocation rules and neglects the concrete details of the German NAP II. This article tries to close this gap in the literature by analysing the most distorting rules as well as the most important and arguments of the misguided debate on competitiveness. 相似文献
19.
The idea of market-based carbon emission trading and carbon taxes is gaining in popularity as a global climate change policy instrument. However, these mechanisms might not necessarily have a positive outcome unless their value reflects socioeconomic and environmental impacts and regulations. Moreover, the fact that they have various inherent exogenous and endogenous uncertainties raises serious concerns about their ability to reduce emissions in a cost-effective way. This paper aims to introduce a simple stochastic model that allows the robustness of economic mechanisms for emission reduction under multiple natural and human-related uncertainties to be analyzed. Unlike standard equilibrium state analysis, the model shows that the explicit introduction of uncertainties regarding emissions, abatement costs, and equilibrium states makes it almost impossible for existing market-based trading and carbon taxes to be environmentally safe and cost-effective. Here we propose a computerized multi-agent trading model. This can be viewed as a prototype to simulate an emission trading market that is regulated in a decentralized way. We argue that a market of this type is better equipped to deal with long-term emission reductions, their direct regulation, irreversibility, and “lock-in” equilibria. 相似文献
20.
Upon completion, China’s national emissions trading scheme (C-ETS) will be the largest carbon market in the world. Recent research has evaluated China’s seven pilot ETSs launched from 2013 on, and academic literature on design aspects of the C-ETS abounds. Yet little is known about the specific details of the upcoming C-ETS. This article combines currently understood details of China’s national carbon market with lessons learned in the pilot schemes as well as from the academic literature. Our review follows the taxonomy of Emissions Trading in Practice: A Handbook on Design and Implementation (Partnership for Market Readiness & International Carbon Action Partnership. (2016). Retrieved from www.worldbank.org): The 10 categories are: scope, cap, distribution of allowances, use of offsets, temporal flexibility, price predictability, compliance and oversight, stakeholder engagement and capacity building, linking, implementation and improvements. Key policy insights Accurate emissions data is paramount for both design and implementation, and its availability dictates the scope of the C-ETS. The stakeholder consultative process is critical for effective design, and China is able to build on its extensive experience through the pilot ETSs. Current policies and positions on intensity targets and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits constrain the market design of the C-ETS. Most critical is the nature of the cap. The currently discussed rate-based cap with ex post adjustment is risky. Instead, an absolute, mass-based emissions cap coupled with the conditional use of permits would allow China to maintain flexibility in the carbon market while ensuring a limit on CO2 emissions.
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