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1.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(5):494-515
A sectoral approach to GHG emissions reductions in developing countries is proposed as a key component of the post-2012 climate change mitigation framework. In this approach, the ten highest-emitting developing countries in the electricity and other major industrial sectors pledge to meet voluntary, ‘no-lose’ GHG emissions targets in these sectors. No penalties are incurred for failing to meet a target, but emissions reductions achieved beyond the target level earn emissions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be sold to industrialized nations. Participating developing countries establish initial ‘no-lose’ emissions targets, based upon their national circumstances, from sector-specific energyintensity benchmarks that have been developed by independent experts. Industrialized nations then offer incentives for the developing countries to adopt more stringent emissions targets through a ‘Technology Finance and Assistance Package’, which helps to overcome financial and other barriers to technology transfer and deployment. These sectorspecific energy-intensity benchmarks could also serve as a means for establishing national economy-wide targets in developed countries in the post-2012 regime. Preliminary modelling of a hybrid scenario, in which Annex I countries adopt economy-wide absolute GHG emissions targets and high-emitting developing countries adopt ‘no-lose’ sectoral targets, indicates that such an approach significantly improves the likelihood that atmospheric concentrations of CO2 can be stabilized at 450 ppmv by the end of the century. 相似文献
2.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):634-651
A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI's national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between ?52% and ?69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic ?35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap. 相似文献
3.
通过分析《气候与能源2030政策框架》（以下简称《框架》）方案要点,认为欧盟2030年的减排目标相对2020年承诺目标更为积极,可再生能源目标略高于之前官方预期。由于东欧国家的参与,欧盟一方面获得了这些国家盈余的排放配额,帮助欧盟作为一个整体实现减排目标;另一方面,成员国经济发展水平差异增大,导致欧盟施行相对积极的环境政策阻力加大,未来大幅调整减排目标的可能性不大。《框架》目标将可能对2020年后国际碳市场需求预估产生影响,未来国际碳市场的健康运行,将不仅需要欧盟外的发达国家提出具有雄心的减排目标,也需要欧盟提高减排目标,增加其对于国际减排配额的需求;此外,欧盟辅助实现40%减排目标的相关生产标准和措施,可能对未来全球自由贸易产生影响,其他国家尤其是对外贸易依存度较高的发展中国家需要密切关注相关动向。《框架》方案所提出的以应对气候变化引领和促进经济发展、采用组合目标且针对不同目标采取不同实现形式、展现制定目标的透明度、充分考虑成员国差异等提法和操作方式值得中国借鉴。 相似文献
4.
Many developed countries in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol have been able to report decreasing emissions, and some have officially fulfilled their CO2 reduction commitments. This is in part because current reporting and regulatory regimes allow these countries to displace emissions intensive production offshore. Using a new highly detailed account of emissions embodied in international trade we investigate this phenomenon of emissions leakage. We independently confirm previous findings that adjusting for trade, developed countries emissions have increased, not decreased. We find that the sectors successfully holding or lowering their domestic emissions are often the same as those increasing their imports of embodied CO2. We also find that the fastest growing flow paths of embodied CO2 largely originate outside the Kyoto Annex B signatory nations. Finally, we find that historically the same phenomenon of emissions displacement has already occurred for air pollution, with the result that despite aggressive legislation in major emitters total global air pollution emissions have increased. If regulatory policies do not account for embodied imports, global emissions are likely to rise even if developed countries emitters enforce strong national emissions targets. 相似文献
5.
Rob Dellink Michel den Elzen Harry Aiking Emmy Bergsma Frans Berkhout Thijs Dekker Joyeeta Gupta 《Global Environmental Change》2009,19(4):411-421
Climate change may cause most harm to countries that have historically contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions and land-use change. This paper identifies consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical principles to guide a fair international burden-sharing scheme of climate change adaptation costs. We use these ethical principles to derive political principles – historical responsibility and capacity to pay – that can be applied in assigning a share of the financial burden to individual countries. We then propose a hybrid ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ approach as a promising starting point for international negotiations on the design of burden-sharing schemes. A numerical assessment of seven scenarios shows that the countries of Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change would bear the bulk of the costs of adaptation, but contributions differ substantially subject to the choice of a capacity to pay indicator. The contributions are less sensitive to choices related to responsibility calculations, apart from those associated with land-use-related emissions. Assuming costs of climate adaptation of USD 100 billion per year, the total financial contribution by the Annex I countries would be in the range of USD 65–70 billion per year. Expressed as a per capita basis, this gives a range of USD 43–82 per capita per year. 相似文献
6.
Abstract In the long term, any definition of adequacy consistent with UNFCCC Article 2 will require increased mitigation efforts from almost all countries. Therefore, an expansion of emission limitation commitments will form a central element of any future architecture of the climate regime. This expansion has two elements: deepening of quantitative commitments for Annex B countries and the adoption of commitments for those countries outside of the current limitation regime. This article seeks to provide a more analytical basis for further differentiation among non-Annex I countries. To be both fair and reflective of national circumstances, it is based on the criteria of responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate. Altogether, non-Annex I countries were differentiated in four groups, each including countries with similar national circumstances: newly industrialized countries (NICs), rapidly industrializing countries (RIDCs), ‘other developing countries’, and least developed countries (LDCs). Based on the same criteria that were used for differentiating among non-Annex I countries, a set of decision rules was developed to assign mitigation and financial transfer commitments to each group of countries (including Annex I countries). Applying these decision rules results in (strict) reduction commitments for Annex I countries, but also implies quantifiable mitigation obligations for NICs and RIDCs, assisted by financial transfers from the North. Other developing countries are obliged to take qualitative commitments, but quantifiable mitigation commitments for these countries and the LDC group would be not justifiable. As national circumstances in countries evolve over time, the composition of the groups will change according to agreed triggers. 相似文献
7.
Arpad Cseh 《Climate Policy》2019,19(2):139-146
The global and long-term nature of climate change conflicts with the self-interest and short-term dominated priorities of decision-makers. Climate change mitigation makes sense at the global level, but not at the level of the individual decision-maker. This conflict has been and remains the main obstacle to effective global cooperation and mitigation. This paper proposes a framework that aligns climate action with short-term self-interest through results-based payments to governments. Its key components are: determining an emission benchmark for each country as well as a price for carbon saving; paying countries annually for reducing emissions below their respective benchmark; a new international fund to finance these annual payments by borrowing capital from private investors; and repaying borrowings in the long-term through payments made by countries to the fund based on a pre-determined allocation mechanism. This framework would offer important benefits over an approach focused on allocating climate action or a carbon budget among countries. These include the improved prospect of reaching an effective climate agreement and delivering fast and dramatic mitigation thanks to stronger political commitment, the transformation of short-term self-interest from an obstacle into a driver of climate action, and the additional financing created. The paper also proposes a pilot scheme focusing on hydrofluorocarbon emissions with a considerably lower financing requirement. This offers the possibility of an alternative financing mechanism, and thus a faster and more straightforward implementation path. Short-term financial incentives offered to governments could turn policy action from a burden into an opportunity from their perspective unlocking a huge potential for timely mitigation.
Key policy insights
A new international framework that offers short-term, results-based payments to governments to promote mitigation action could lead to much more effective global mitigation and international cooperation.
The financing of such an approach could be solved through a novel financing structure, backed by the long-term commitments of participating countries and thus aligning the timeframe of the financial costs of mitigation with its climate benefits.
The effectiveness of results-based payments and the concept behind this new approach could be proven through a pilot scheme focusing on hydrofluorocarbon emissions.
8.
基于"共同但有区别的责任"原则,《联合国气候变化框架公约》对附件I和非附件I缔约方提交国家温室气体排放清单的要求不尽相同。2007年以来,发展中国家自主减缓行动透明度、以国家温室气候排放清单为核心的国家信息通报提交频率及其磋商分析问题成为气候谈判争论的焦点之一,发展中国家承担的相关义务有不断增加的趋势。通过阐述该公约对发达国家和发展中国家排放清单编制的不同要求,特别是通过对目前发达国家所接受的清单审评制度和我国国家温室气体排放清单编制情况的分析论述,明确我国国家清单编制所面临的挑战,并提出相应的对策建议。 相似文献
9.
What would the shape of a realistic, yet ambitious, package for the climate regime after 2012 look like? How do we obtain a package deal starting in Bali but building bridges to a post-2020 climate regime? A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive package deal has to strike a core balance between development and climate imperatives (mitigation, adaptation, dealing with the impacts of response measures, technology transfer, investment and finance) to create bargaining space and establish a conceptual contract zone. Within a continuum of possible packages, two packages in the contract zone are identified: ‘multi-stage’ and ‘ambitious transitional’. The latter is ambitious, combining domestic cap-and-trade for the USA, deeper cuts for Annex B countries, and quantifiable mitigation actions by developing countries. It is transitional as a possible bridge to a more inclusive regime beyond 2020. Multi-stage is defined around mechanisms by which countries move through increasingly stringent levels of participation, and must be based upon agreed triggers. Our assessment of political dynamics is that multi-stage is not yet in the political contract zone. Key to this is the absence of a ‘trigger from the North’, in that the largest historical emitter must act earlier and most decisively. But progress will also depend on continued leadership from Annex B countries, as well as more proactive, incentivized leadership in the South. Agreeing on the transitional stage is the critical next step in the evolution of the climate regime. Negotiating any package will require an institutional space for bargaining, political leadership and trust, and a clear time-frame. 相似文献
10.
International carbon markets can be an important tool in achieving countries’ mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement, but they are subject to a number of environmental integrity risks. An important risk is that some countries have mitigation targets that correspond to higher levels of emissions than independent projections of their likely emissions. If such ‘hot air’ can be transferred to other countries, it could increase aggregated emissions and create a perverse incentive for countries not to enhance the ambition of future mitigation targets. Limits to international transfers of mitigation outcomes have been proposed to address this risk. This article proposes a typology for such limits, explores key design options, and tests different types of limits in the context of 15 countries. Our analysis indicates that limits to international transfers could, if designed appropriately, prevent most of the hot air contained in current mitigation targets from being transferred, but also involve trade-offs between different policy objectives. Given the risks from international transfer of hot air and the uncertainty over whether other approaches will be effective in ensuring environmental integrity, we recommend that countries take a cautious approach and pursue a portfolio of approaches to ensure environmental integrity, in which case limits could provide for additional safeguards.
Key policy insights
Limits to international transfers involve trade-offs between different policy objectives, in particular reducing the risk that countries transfer hot air and enabling participation in carbon markets.
Under ‘relative’ limits a country may transfer mitigation outcomes to the extent that its actual emissions are below the limit. Relative limits derived from historical emissions data have significant limitations, and none of the tested approaches was found to be effective for all countries. Relative limits based on emission projections could be a more valid approach, although they are also technically and politically challenging.
Under ‘absolute’ limits a country could only issue, transfer or acquire a certain amount of mitigation outcomes. Absolute limits set at sufficiently low levels could prevent countries from transferring large amounts of hot air, but are bluntly applicable to all countries, whether or not they have hot air.
11.
Global climate negotiations have been characterized by a divide between developed and developing nations – a split which has served as a persistent barrier to international agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. Notable progress in bridging this division was achieved at the 21st Conference of the Parties meeting in Paris through the introduction of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). However, the collective ambition of submitted INDCs falls short of a global 2°C target, requiring an effective ratchet mechanism to review and increase national commitments. Inequitable distribution of additional responsibilities risks re-opening historic divisions between parties. This article presents a flexible ratchet framework which shares mitigation commitments on the basis of per capita equity in line with emerging requirements for a 2°C target. The framework has been designed through convergence between developed and developing nations; developed nation targets are based on an agreed standardized percentage reduction wherever emissions are above per capita equity; developing nations are required to peak emissions at or below per capita equity levels by an agreed convergence date. The proposed framework has the flexibility to be integrated with current INDCs and to evolve in line with shifting estimates of climate sensitivity.Policy relevanceThe outcome of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) negotiations in Paris offered mixed results in terms of level of ambition and submitted national commitments. A global agreement to keep average global temperature rise below two degrees was maintained; however, current pledged Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are projected to result in an average warming of close to three degrees. The implementation of a global ratchet mechanism to scale-up national commitments will remain key to closing this ambition gap to reach this two degree target. How this upscaling of responsibility is shared between parties will be a defining discussion point within future negotiations. This study presents a standardized, equity-based framework for how this ratchet mechanism can be implemented – a framework designed to be flexible for evolution in line with better understanding of climate sensitivity, and adaptable for integrations with current INDC proposals. 相似文献
12.
An innovative approach is introduced for helping developing countries to make their development more sustainable, and also to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a co-benefit. Such an approach is proposed as part of the multilateral framework on climate change. The concept of sustainable development policies and measures (SD-PAMs) is outlined, making clear that it is distinct from many other approaches in starting from development rather than explicit climate targets. The potential of SD-PAMs is illustrated with a case-study of energy efficiency in South Africa, drawing on energy modelling for the use of electricity in industry. The results show multiple benefits both for local sustainable development and for mitigating global climate change. The benefits of industrial energy efficiency in South Africa include significant reductions in local air pollutants; improved environmental health; creation of additional jobs; reduced electricity demand; and delays in new investments in electricity generation. The co-benefit of reducing GHG emissions could result in a reduction of as much as 5% of SA's total projected energy CO2 emissions by 2020. Institutional support and policy guidance is needed at both the international and national level to realize the potential of SD-PAMs. This analysis demonstrates that if countries begin to act early to move towards greater sustainability, they will also start to bend the curve of their emissions path. 相似文献
13.
One of the key issues in international climate negotiations is the formulation of targets for emissions reduction for all countries based on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities". This formulation depends primarily on the quantitative attribution of the responsibilities of developed and developing countries for historical climate change. Using the Commuity Earth System Model(CESM), we estimate the responsibilities of developed countries and developing countries for climatic change from 1850 to 2005 using their carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide emissions. The results indicate that developed countries contribute approximately 53%–61%, and developing countries approximately 39%–47%, to the increase in global air temperature, upper oceanic warming, sea-ice reduction in the NH, and permafrost degradation. In addition, the spatial heterogeneity of these changes from 1850 to 2005 is primarily attributed to the emissions of greenhouse gases(GHGs)in developed countries. Although uncertainties remain in the climate model and the external forcings used, GHG emissions in developed countries are the major contributor to the observed climate system changes in the 20 th century. 相似文献
14.
Little progress has been made in climate negotiations on technology since 1992. Yet the diffusion of climate change mitigation technologies to developing countries (non-Annex I) has increased dramatically over the last twenty years. The shift has mostly concerned emerging economies, which are now reasonably well connected to international technology flows. This is good news, as the bulk of emissions increases are expected to take place in these countries in the near future. In contrast, the least developed countries still appear to be excluded from international technology flows, mostly because of their negligible participation in the recent economic globalization. This article focuses on the policy implications of the contribution of climate negotiations to international technology diffusion.Policy relevanceThe discrepancy between the small amount of progress made in climate negotiations on technology since 1992 and the steady increase in the international diffusion of climate mitigation technologies leads to the perhaps controversial view that the diffusion of climate mitigation technologies does not need strong international coordination over technology issues under the UNFCCC. However, climate negotiations can play a key role in stimulating the demand for low-carbon technologies by setting ambitious emission reductions targets and policies. 相似文献
15.
Climate change is a serious threat to all nations. This raises the question of why continuous treaty negotiations for more than two decades have failed to create a viable or adequate international climate regime. The current strategy of addressing climate change misdiagnoses the issue as a pollution problem by focusing on symptoms (emissions) and not on underlying causes (unsustainable development). In short, the wrong treaty is being negotiated. Drawing on negotiation analysis, it is argued that the existing and proposed climate treaties fail to meet the national interests of any party. An alternative strategy for addressing climate change is proposed that reframes the overall approach to reflect all countries’ development needs and links climate protection goals to the development structure of the treaty. The current deadlock over emissions reductions might be overcome and a mutual gains agreement reached by directing international cooperation towards promoting the provision of clean energy services for development and ensuring universal access to those services as part of an ‘early action’ agenda that will complement efforts to utilize forests and reduce other GHGs from multiple sectors. 相似文献
16.
Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity.
Key policy insights
Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time.
Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13.
The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity.
Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk – through eligibility criteria or limits – could complement these approaches.
17.
Even without internationally concerted action on climate change mitigation, there are important incentives for countries to put a price on their domestic emissions, including public finance considerations, internalizing the climate impacts of their own emissions, and co-benefits, such as clean air or energy security. Whereas these arguments have been mostly discussed in separate strands of literature, this article carries out a synthesis that exemplifies how policies to put a price on emissions can be conceptualized in a multi-objective framework. Despite considerable uncertainty, empirical evidence suggests that different countries may face quite different incentives for emission pricing. For instance, avoided climate damages and co-benefits of reduced air pollution appear to be the main motivation for emission pricing in China, while for the US generating public revenue dominates and for the EU all three motivations are of intermediate importance. We finally argue that such unilateral incentives could form the basis for incremental progress in international climate negotiations toward a realistic climate treaty based on national interest and differentiated emission pricing and describe how such an agreement could be put into practice. 相似文献
18.
Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh 《Climate Policy》2018,18(1):76-85
This study explores the implications of shifting the narrative of climate policy evaluation from one of costs/benefits or economic growth to a message of improving social welfare. Focusing on the costs of mitigation and the associated impacts on gross domestic product (GDP) may translate into a widespread concern that a climate agreement will be very costly. This article considers the well-known Human Development Index (HDI) as an alternative criterion for judging the welfare effects of climate policy. We estimate what the maximum possible annual average increase in HDI welfare per tons of CO2 would be within the carbon budget associated with limiting warming to 2°C over the period 2015–2050. Emission pathways are determined by a policy that allows the HDI of poor countries and their emissions to increase under a business-as-usual development path, while countries with a high HDI value (>0.8) have to restrain their emissions to ensure that the global temperature rise does not exceed 2°C. For comparison, the well-known multi-regional RICE model is used to assess GDP growth under the same climate change policy goals.
Policy relevance
This is the first study that shifts the narrative of climate policy evaluation from one of GDP growth to a message of improving social welfare, as captured by the HDI. This could make it easier for political leaders and climate negotiators to publicly commit themselves to ambitious carbon emission reduction goals, such as limiting global warming to 2°C, as in the (non-binding) agreement made at COP 21 in Paris in 2015. We find that if impacts are framed in terms of growth in HDI per t CO2 emission per capita instead of in GDP, the HDI of poor countries and their emissions are allowed to increase under a business-as-usual development path, whereas countries with a high HDI (>0.8) must control emissions so that global temperature rise remains within 2°C. Importantly, a climate agreement is more attractive for rich countries under the HDI than the GDP frame. This is good news, as these countries have to make the major contribution to emissions reductions. 相似文献
19.
This paper presents an alternative framework to the approach currently embodied in the Kyoto Protocol for managing global climate change post-2012. The framework has two key provisions. The first is that each person in the world would be ‘allowed’ an equal amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This is labeled the equity-first provision. The second provision focuses on incorporating risk concepts into the setting of GHG emission reductions. It is proposed that the global climate be managed as to avoid three categories of risks: (I) Substantial regional economic, political, and/or biological impacts; (II) Severe global economic, political, and/or biological impacts; and (III) Extinction of humans. Acceptable risk thresholds are suggested to be one-in-a-million, one-in-one-hundred-million, and one-in-ten-billion, respectively. This equity-first, risk-based framework overcomes many criticisms of the current Kyoto Protocol: it explicitly involves all countries on earth; it avoids several administrative issues that are anticipated to plague a global carbon emissions trading market; and it avoids several contentious issues associated with pegging carbon emission reductions to 1990 levels. Because the framework is risk-based and emissions are tied to population and not historic emission levels, the basic framework would not have to be frequently renegotiated, as will be needed for the Kyoto-style approach to take the world past that agreement's 2012 endpoint. 相似文献
20.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):293-304
One problem in international climate policy is the refusal of large developing countries to accept emission reduction targets. Brazil, China and India together account for about 20% of today's CO2 emissions. We analyse the case in which there is no international agreement on emission reduction targets, but countries do have domestic targets, and trade permits across borders. We contrast two scenarios. In one scenario, Brazil, China and India adopt their business as usual emissions as their target. In this scenario, there are substantial exports of emission permits from developing to developed countries, and substantial economic gains for all. In the second scenario, Brazil, China and India reduce their emissions target so that they have no net economic gain from permit trade. Here, developing countries do not accept responsibility for climate change (as they bear no net costs), but they do contribute to an emission reduction policy by refusing to make money out of it. Adopting such break-even targets can be done at minor cost to developed and developing countries (roughly $2 bn/year each in extra costs and forgone benefits), while developing countries are still slightly better off than in the case without international emissions trade. This result is robust to variations in scenarios and parameters. It contrasts with Stewart and Wiener (2003) who propose granting ‘hot air’ to developing countries to seduce them to accept targets. In 2020, China and India could reduce their emissions by some 10% from the baseline without net economic costs. 相似文献