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1.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):865-882
This article analyses the implications of long-term low-carbon scenarios for the UK, and against these it assesses both the current status and the required scope of the UK energy policy. The scenarios are generated using the well-established MARKAL (acronym for MARKet ALlocation) UK energy systems model, which has already been extensively used for UK policy analysis and support. The scenarios incorporate different levels of ambition for carbon reduction, ranging from 40% to 90% cuts from 1990's level by the year 2050, to shed insights into the options for achieving the UK's current legally binding target of an 80% cut by the same date. The scenarios achieve their carbon reductions through very different combinations of demand reduction (implying behaviour change) and implementation of low-carbon and energy efficiency technologies on both the supply and demand sides. In all cases, however, the costs of achieving the reductions are relatively modest. The ensuing policy analysis suggests that while the cuts are feasible both technically and economically and while a number of new policies have been introduced in order to achieve them, it is not yet clear whether these policies will deliver the required combination of both short- and long-term technology deployment, and behaviour change for the UK Government's targets to be achieved. 相似文献
2.
The development and transfer of clean energy technologies to achieve universal energy access is challenging due to the inherent complexities of the energy sector, and the energy governance and financial systems in developing economies. Innovation is an essential part of successfully addressing these difficulties. Duplicating the energy infrastructure models of developed countries will not be sufficient to meet the needs of poor consumers. To the extent that innovation can accelerate energy access, it is important to understand the specific types of innovations that are necessary and how they might be facilitated. The general features of existing international clean energy innovation systems, which are predominantly driven by the markets and emissions reduction mechanisms of developed and rapidly growing emerging economies, are reviewed and the alignment of these systems to the innovation processes required to extend energy access globally is evaluated. Drawing on the innovation policy literature, the attributes of effective international and domestic energy innovation systems that are pro-poor and the associated policy approaches are identified. 相似文献
3.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):421-429
The employment effect of climate policy has emerged as an important concern of policy makers, not least in the USA. Yet the impact of climate policy on jobs is complex. In the short term, jobs will shift from high-carbon activities to low-carbon activities. The net effect could be job creation, as low-carbon technologies tend to be more labour-intensive, at least in the short term until efficiency gains bring down costs. In the medium term, the effect will be felt economy-wide as value chains and production patterns adjust. This effect is more difficult to gauge, particularly if climate policy is unilateral and trade effects have to be taken into account. However, the biggest effect is expected to be long term, when climate policy will trigger widespread structural adjustment. Such episodes of ‘creative destruction’ are often associated with innovation, job creation and growth. 相似文献
4.
The successful implementation of the Paris Agreement requires substantial energy policy change on the national level. In national energy policy-making, climate change mitigation goals have to be balanced with arguments on other national energy policy goals, namely limiting cost and increasing energy security. Thus far, very little is known about the relative importance of these goals and how they are related to political partisanship. In order to address this gap, we focus on parliamentary discourse around low-carbon energy futures in Germany over the past three decades and analyze the relative importance of, and partisanship around, energy policy goals. We find that the political discourse revolves around four, rather than three, goals as conventionally assumed; improving the competitiveness of the national energy technology industry is not only an additional energy policy goal, it is also highly important in the political discourse. In general, the relative importance of these goals is rather stable over time and partisanship around them is limited. Yet, a sub-analysis of the discourse on renewable energy technologies reveals a high level of partisanship, albeit decreasing over time. Particularly, the energy industry goal’s importance increases while its partisanship vanishes. We discuss how these findings can inform future energy policy research and provide a potential inroad for more ambitious national energy policies.
Key policy insights
In addition to the three classic goals of energy policy (limiting cost, securing access and reducing the environmental burden) we identify a fourth policy goal: strengthening the national energy technology industry
Conformity between the three classical energy and the industrial policy goals is a key driver explaining policy change
For renewable energy technologies, partisanship around this fourth goal is lower than around other goals and decreases over time as innovation allows these technologies to increasingly correspond to policy-makers’ high-level goals
Extant research underestimates the importance of industry policy goals, but overestimates environmental co-benefits of low-carbon energy options
Paradigmatic policy change in Germany did not depend on top-down shifts in high-level policy goals but was driven by lower-level technology-specific goals
5.
Russia has significant potential for reducing its carbon emissions. However, investment in new low-carbon technologies has significant risks. Ambiguous energy and climate policy in Russia, along with deterioration of the country's investment climate, create investment barriers that are well described in qualitative terms in the literature. This paper attempts to provide a quantitative analysis of these barriers. For this numerical experiment, we apply the RU-TIMES model. Using a real options methodology, we estimate the risk-adjusted cost of capital in the Russian energy sector (including energy production and consumption technologies represented in the TIMES framework) to be approximately 43% (including a risk-free interest rate) and demonstrate the high risk of investment into energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies. Any future low-carbon emissions pathway depends on the ability of the Russian government to reduce climate and energy policy uncertainties, and to reduce financial risks through improvements of the general investment climate.
Key policy insights
The high cost of capital investment into Russian energy production and consumption may prevent the adoption of new energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies.
These investment risks, if not addressed, will delay Russia's low-carbon transition for the coming decades.
Adopting a clear and unambiguous long-term climate and energy policy is important to reduce these risks and alleviate some of the barriers to the new technologies.
The first step could be ratification of the Paris Agreement and adoption of a long-term emission target for the period up to 2050.
6.
Dominique Finon 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):130-145
The mainstream community of energy experts is not aware of the long-term impacts that carbon policies directly concerned with promoting the development of low-carbon technologies produce on the electricity market regime. Long-term market coordination should be replaced by public coordination with long-term arrangements. The current market coordination makes carbon pricing ineffective in orienting investors towards capital-intensive low-carbon technologies. Fossil fuel generation technologies are preferred because their investment risks are much lower in the market regime, even with a high but unstable carbon price. Thus, in order to avoid delaying investment that is aimed at the decarbonization of the electricity system, a number of new market arrangements that lower the investment risk of low-carbon technologies and provide output-based subsidization have or are being selected by governments. As the use of low-carbon equipment to produce electricity develops, long-term market coordination for other technologies (e.g. peaking units, combined cycle gas turbine) will fade away because they alter the market price setting. Thus it is likely that, in the future, public coordination and planning will replace the decisions of market players not only for low-carbon technologies but also for every other type of capacity development. Policy relevance The development of renewables as promoted by both feed-in tariffs and green certificate obligations, which answer to different market failures, is well known. Similar long-term arrangements, which both subsidize and de-risk low-carbon investments for every small-sized and large-sized technology, shift learning costs and risks onto consumers. Energy experts and regulators have ignored that the expansion and generalization of these arrangements are changing the coordination function of the electricity markets. Apart from those in the UK, they are still unaware of the impacts that such technology-focused policies produce on the electricity market regime. The transition from market coordination to public coordination, which is inconsistent with the market principles of European electricity legislation, and long-term contracting is inevitable and should be anticipated. 相似文献
7.
The 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the consequent accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, have had consequences far beyond Japan itself. Reactions to the accident in three major economies Japan, the UK, and Germany, all of whom were committed to relatively ambitious climate change targets prior to the accident are examined. In Japan and Germany, the accident precipitated a major change of policy direction. In the UK, debate has been muted and there has been essentially no change in energy or climate change policies. The status of the energy and climate change policies in each country prior to the accident is assessed, the responses to the accident are described, and the possible impacts on their positions in the international climate negotiations are analysed. Finally, the three countries' responses are compared and some differences between them observed. Some reasons for their different policy responses are suggested and some themes, common across all countries, are identified Policy relevance The attraction of nuclear power has rested on the promise of low-cost electricity, low-carbon energy supply, and enhanced energy independence. The Fukushima accident, which followed the Japanese tsunami of March 2011, has prompted a critical re-appraisal of nuclear power. The responses to Fukushima are assessed for the UK, Germany, and Japan. Before the accident, all three countries considered nuclear as playing a significant part in climate mitigation strategies. Although the UK Government has continued to support nuclear new build following a prompt review of safety arrangements, Japan and Germany have decided to phase out nuclear power, albeit according to different timescales. The factors that explain the different decisions are examined, including patterns of energy demand and supply, the wider political context, institutional arrangements, and public attitudes to risk. The implications for the international climate negotiations are also assessed. 相似文献
8.
Transaction costs (TCs) must be taken into account when assessing the performance of policy instruments that create markets for the diffusion and commercialization of low-carbon technologies (LCTs). However, there are no comprehensive studies on the development and application of transaction cost analysis to LCTs. In this meta-analysis, a wide-ranging evaluation of TCs associated with energy efficiency, renewable energy, and carbon market technologies is provided. There is a plethora of different definitions of, and measurement techniques to estimate, TCs. There is wide variation in the quantitative estimates, which can be attributed to factors such as the definition used, data collection, quantification methods, the type and size of technologies, the regulatory frameworks, the complexity of transactions, and the maturity of policy instruments. It is concluded that TCs are highly specific to both LCTs and policy instruments and that a common methodological approach is needed to avoid misleading policy analysis of the extant and future assessments. Policy relevance Transaction costs (TCs) accrued by, for instance, the search for information, due diligence, monitoring and verification (M&V) activities, must be considered in the design, implementation, and assessment of policy instruments. Such costs can have a negative effect on the performance of policy instruments aimed at the diffusion and commercialization of low-carbon technologies. It is shown here that TC analysis is mostly technology and policy context-specific and hence that it is not advisable to make generalizations about sources and estimates. The nature and scale of TCs are likely to differ due to a variety of endogenous determinants (e.g. size and performance of technologies), exogenous drivers (e.g. regulatory policy frameworks), and methodological aspects (e.g. quantification techniques). Several measures and strategies have the potential to reduce TCs, including standardized full cost accounting systems, an ex ante M&V approach, project bundling, and streamlining of procedures. 相似文献
9.
The feasibility of two low-carbon society (LCS) scenarios, one with and one without nuclear power and carbon capture and storage (CCS), is evaluated using the AIM/Enduse[Global] model. Both scenarios suggest that achieving a 50% emissions reduction target (relative to 1990 levels) by 2050 is technically feasible if locally suited technologies are introduced and the relevant policies, including necessary financial transfers, are appropriately implemented. In the scenario that includes nuclear and CCS options, it will be vital to consider the risks and acceptance of these technologies. In the scenario without these technologies, the challenge will be how to reduce energy service demand. In both scenarios, the estimated investment costs will be higher in non-Annex I countries than in Annex I countries. Finally, the enhancement of capacity building to support the deployment of locally suited technologies will be central to achieving an LCS. Policy relevance Policies to reduce GHG emissions up to 2050 are critical if the long-term target of stabilizing the climate is to be achieved. From a policy perspective, the cost and social acceptability of the policy used to reduce emissions are two of the key factors in determining the optimal pathways to achieve this. However, the nuclear accident at Fukushima highlighted the risk of depending on large-scale technologies for the provision of energy and has led to a backlash against the use of nuclear technology. It is found that if nuclear and CCS are used it will be technically feasible to halve GHG emissions by 2050, although very costly. However, although the cost of halving emissions will be about the same if neither nuclear nor CCS is used, a 50% reduction in emissions reduction will not be achievable unless the demand for energy service is substantially reduced. 相似文献
10.
The amount of capital required to transition energy systems to low-carbon futures is very large, yet analysis of energy systems change has been curiously quiet on the role of capital markets in financing energy transitions. This is surprising given the huge role finance and investment must play in facilitating transformative change. We argue this has been due to a lack of suitable theory to supplant neoclassical notions of capital markets and innovation finance. This research draws on the notion from Planetary economics: Energy, climate change and the three domains of sustainable development, by Grubb and colleagues, that planetary economics is defined by three ‘domains’, which describe behavioural, neoclassical, and evolutionary aspects of energy and climate policy analysis. We identify first- and second-domain theories of finance that are well established, but argue that third-domain approaches, relating to evolutionary systems change, have lacked a compatible theory of capital markets. Based on an analysis of electricity market reform and renewable energy finance in the UK, the ‘adaptive market hypothesis' is presented as a suitable framework with which to analyse energy systems finance. Armed with an understanding of financial markets as adaptive, scholars and policy makers can ask new questions about the role of capital markets in energy systems transitions.Policy relevanceThis article explores the role of financial markets in capitalising low-carbon energy systems and long-term change. The authors demonstrate that much energy and climate policy assumes financial markets are efficient, meaning they will reliably capitalise low-carbon transitions if a rational return is created by subsidy regimes or other market mechanisms. The authors show that the market for renewable energy finance does not conform to the efficient markets hypothesis, and is more in line with an ‘adaptive’ markets understanding. Climate and energy policy makers that design policy, strategy, and regulation on the assumption of efficient financial markets will not pay attention to structural and behavioural constraints on investment; they risk falling short of the investment levels needed for long-term systems change. In short, by thinking of financial markets as adaptive, the range of policy responses to enable low-carbon investment can be much broader. 相似文献
11.
Emilio Lèbre La Rovere Carolina Burle Dubeux Amaro Olimpio Pereira Jr William Wills 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):70-86
The main assumptions and findings are presented on a comparative analysis of three GHG long-term emissions scenarios for Brazil. Since 1990, land-use change has been the most important source of GHG emissions in the country. The voluntary goals to limit Brazilian GHG emissions pledged a reduction in between 36.1% and 38.9% of GHG emissions projected to 2020, to be 6–10% lower than in 2005. Brazil is in a good position to meet the voluntary mitigation goals pledged to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) up to 2020: recent efforts to reduce deforestation have been successful and avoided deforestation will form the bulk of the emissions reduction commitment. In 2020, if governmental mitigation goals are met, then GHG emissions from the energy system would become the largest in the country. After 2020, if no additional mitigation actions are implemented, GHG emissions will increase again in the period 2020–2030, due to population and economic growth driving energy demand, supply and GHG emissions. However, Brazil is in a strong position to take a lead in low-carbon economic and social development due to its huge endowment of renewable energy resources allowing for additional mitigation actions to be adopted after 2020. Policy relevance The period beyond 2020 is now relevant in climate policy due to the Durban Platform agreeing a ‘protocol, legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force’ that will have effect from 2020. After 2020, Brazil will be in a situation more similar to other industrialized countries, faced with a new challenge of economic development with low GHG energy-related emissions, requiring the adoption of mitigation policies and measures targeted at the energy system. Unlike the mitigation actions in the land-use change sector, where most of the funding will come from the national budgets due to sovereignty concerns, the huge financial resources needed to develop low-carbon transport and energy infrastructure could benefit from soft loans channelled to the country through nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs). 相似文献
12.
Patricia Fortes Sofia Simões Júlia Seixas Denise Van Regemorter Francisco Ferreira 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):285-304
Bottom-up and top-down models are used to support climate policies, to identify the options required to meet GHG abatement targets and to evaluate their economic impact. Some studies have shown that the GHG mitigation options provided by economic top-down and technological bottom-up models tend to vary. One reason for this is that these models tend to use different baseline scenarios. The bottom-up TIMES_PT and the top-down computable general equilibrium GEM-E3_PT models are examined using a common baseline scenario to calibrate them, and the extend of their different mitigation options and its relevant to domestic policy making are assessed. Three low-carbon scenarios for Portugal until 2050 are generated, each with different GHG reduction targets. Both models suggest close mitigation options and locate the largest mitigation potential to energy supply. However, the models suggest different mitigation options for the end-use sectors: GEM-E3_PT focuses more on energy efficiency, while TIMES_PT relies on decrease carbon intensity due to a shift to electricity. Although a common baseline scenario cannot be ignored, the models’ inherent characteristics are the main factor for the different outcomes, thereby highlighting different mitigation options. Policy relevance The relevance of modelling tools used to support the design of domestic climate policies is assessed by evaluating the mitigation options suggested by a bottom-up and a top-down model. The different outcomes of each model are significant for climate policy design since each suggest different mitigation options like end-use energy efficiency and the promotion of low-carbon technologies. Policy makers should carefully select the modelling tool used to support their policies. The specific modelling structures of each model make them more appropriate to address certain policy questions than others. Using both modelling approaches for policy support can therefore bring added value and result in more robust climate policy design. Although the results are specific for Portugal, the insights provided by the analysis of both models can be extended to, and used in the climate policy decisions of, other countries. 相似文献
13.
Samuel Fankhauser 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):345-362
Drawing primarily on the UK experience, five practical lessons are identified for policy makers who seek to decarbonize their economies. First, decarbonization needs a solid legal basis to give it credibility and overcome time inconsistency problems. Second, putting a price on carbon is essential, but low-carbon policies also have to address wider market, investment, and behavioural failures. This in turn raises issues of policy complexity and coordination. Third, the low-carbon economy is likely to be highly electrified. Clean electricity could be a cost-effective way of decarbonizing many parts of the economy, including transport, heating, and parts of industry. Decarbonization therefore starts in the power sector. Fourth, the low-carbon transition is primarily a revolution of production and not consumption. Both supply-side innovation and demand-side adjustments in lifestyle and behaviour are needed, though the former should dominate. Fifth, the transition to a low-carbon economy is economically and technologically feasible. Achieving it is a question of policy competence and having the political will to drive economic and social change. Policy relevance Practically all major GHG emitters now have climate change legislation on their statute books. Given what is at stake, and the complexity of the task at hand, it is important that policy makers learn from each other and establish a code of good low-carbon practice. The main lessons from the UK are distilled and presented. Carbon policy is considered for key sectors, such as electricity, buildings, and transport, and possible decarbonization paths are also outlined. It is shown that the transition to a low-carbon economy is economically and technologically feasible. Achieving it is primarily a question of policy competence and political will. This in turn means that climate change action needs a strong legislative basis to give the reforms statutory legitimacy. Low-carbon policies will have to address a wide range of market, investment and behavioural failures. Putting a price on carbon is an essential starting point, but only one of many policy reforms. 相似文献
14.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):309-326
Abstract Carbon dioxide emissions from UK energy use have fallen by more than 20% over the last 30 years, and carbon intensity—carbon emissions per unit of GDP—has halved. These reductions have been achieved by a combination of decarbonisation of the energy system and substantial improvements in energy efficiency. Use of natural gas in power generation has been a big factor in recent years, but energy efficiency improvements in households and particularly industry have been more important over a longer period. Government policies designed primarily to address climate change have not been important contributors, until recently. Future reductions in emissions will require more proactive policies. However, they are possible without any economic difficulties, notably by adopting cost-effective energy efficiency measures, using new renewable energy sources and reducing dependence on private cars. These policies will improve economic efficiency. The new UK Climate Change Programme includes policies that combine regulation, investment, fiscal measures and other economic instruments. By working with the grain of other social, environmental and economic policies, they can achieve far more than a carbon tax alone, set at any politically acceptable level. Modelling the costs of emission reductions using a carbon tax as the only instrument would not only massively over-estimate costs, it would bear little resemblance to real world politics. The paper demonstrates that a more diverse set of policy instruments is likely to be an effective and politically acceptable approach in a mature industrial economy. It is concluded that the UK's Kyoto target of a 12.5% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is not challenging. The UK Government's target of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20% between 1990 and 2010 is also achievable. By 2010 per capita emissions from the UK will be well below 2.5 tC per year. Claims that some countries, notably the USA, could not reduce per capita emissions below 6 tC per year seem inconsistent with this experience. 相似文献
15.
In this paper, we compare different policy incentives for overcoming investment uncertainties that are typical for low-carbon technologies prior to their commercialisation, some of which may be attributable to market failures. The paper focuses on the particular case of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and conducts a qualitative multi-criteria analysis of different public policy support schemes for CCS demonstration to evaluate their suitability. The assessed schemes include mandatory CCS, emission performance standards and several different financial incentives (in addition to the European Union Emission Trading Scheme). Based on the available literature and on experience in the UK and Germany with promotion instruments for low-carbon technologies, the results of our analysis suggest that two alternative schemes, a CCS bonus incentive or a carbon dioxide (CO2) price guarantee, perform best in comparison with the other assessed instruments. While they reduce the uncertainty of CCS investments in the face of low European Union Allowance prices, they also avoid significant adverse impacts on operational and investment decisions in electricity markets. 相似文献
16.
Michel Colombier 《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):453-473
What are relevant urban development investment strategies for improving building energy efficiency (BEE) and decarbonizing the urban district heating supply in rapidly urbanizing China? Different trajectories of BEE and energy supply technologies are compared in the urban context in a northern Chinese city. Vigorous improvement of BEE will significantly enhance the prospective financial capacity to facilitate deployment of backstop technologies (e.g. carbon capture and storage) in order to decarbonize the energy supply and achieve the long-term targets of low-carbon buildings. Carbon finance instruments should be used to facilitate public policy to accompany the necessary transition in the urban development process. The government-run efficiency procurement scheme will overcome the problem of insufficient incentive and high transaction costs associated with individual Clean Development Mechanism projects. Appropriate investment strategies (allocation of financial resources over the time frame) will allow local governments to harness the large potentials of carbon emissions mitigation while minimizing the risk of long-term technical lock-in in the built environment in Chinese cities. 相似文献
17.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):17-37
While many different greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation technologies can be implemented under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), renewable energy technologies (RETs), in particular, are often viewed as one of the key solutions for achieving the CDM's goals: host-country sustainable development and cost-efficient emissions reductions. However, the viability of emission reduction projects like RETs is technology- and country-specific. To improve the CDM with respect to the diffusion of RETs, it is crucial to understand the factors that ultimately drive or hinder investments in these technologies. This study develops a methodology based on project-level, regional and global variables that can systematically assess the financial and environmental performance of CDM projects in different country contexts. We quantitatively show how six RETs (PV, wind, hydro, biomass, sewage, landfill) are impacted differently by the CDM and how this impact depends on regional conditions. While sewage and landfill are strongly affected independently of their location; wind, hydro and biomass projects experience small to medium impacts through the carbon price, and strongly depend on regional conditions. PV depends more on regional conditions than on the carbon price but is always unprofitable. Furthermore, we determine the carbon prices necessary to push these six RETs to profitability under various regional conditions. Based on these results, we derive policy recommendations to advance the interplay between international and domestic climate policy to further incentivize GHG emission reductions from RETs. 相似文献
18.
Jean-Francois Mercure Florian Knobloch Hector Pollitt Leonidas Paroussos S. Serban Scrieciu Richard Lewney 《Climate Policy》2019,19(8):1019-1037
Energy and climate policies may have significant economy-wide impacts, which are regularly assessed based on quantitative energy-environment-economy models. These tend to vary in their conclusions on the scale and direction of the likely macroeconomic impacts of a low-carbon transition. This paper traces the characteristic discrepancies in models’ outcomes to their origins in different macro-economic theories, most importantly their treatment of technological innovation and finance. We comprehensively analyse the relevant branches of macro-innovation theory and group them into two classes: ‘Equilibrium’ and ‘Non-equilibrium’. While both approaches are rigorous and self-consistent, they frequently yield opposite conclusions for the economic impacts of low-carbon policies. We show that model outcomes are mainly determined by their representations of monetary and finance dimensions, and their interactions with investment, innovation and technological change. Improving these in all modelling approaches is crucial for strengthening the evidence base for policy making and gaining a more consistent picture of the macroeconomic impacts of achieving emissions reductions objectives. The paper contributes towards the ongoing effort of enhancing the transparency and understanding of sophisticated model mechanisms applied to energy and climate policy analysis. It helps tackle the overall ‘black box’ critique, much-cited in policy circles and elsewhere.
Key policy insights
Quantitative models commissioned by policy-makers to assess the macroeconomic impacts of climate policy generate contradictory outcomes and interpretations.
The source of the differences in model outcomes originates primarily from assumptions on the workings of the financial sector and the nature of money, and of how these interact with processes of low-carbon energy innovation and technological change.
Representations of innovation and technological change are incomplete in energy-economy-environment models, leading to limitations in the assessment of the impacts of climate-related policies.
All modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their treatment of finance and innovation.
A strong recommendation is given for modellers of energy-economy systems to improve their representations of money and finance.
19.
As the number of instruments applied in the area of energy and climate policy is rising, the issue of policy interaction needs to be explored further. This article analyses the interdependencies between the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the German feed-in tariffs (FITs) for renewable electricity in a quantitative manner using a bottom-up energy system model. Flexible modelling approaches are presented for both instruments, with which all impacts on the energy system can be evaluated endogenously. It is shown that national climate policy measures can have an effect on the supranational emissions trading system by increasing emission reduction in the German electricity sector by up to 79 MtCO2 in 2030. As a result, emission certificate prices decline by between 1.9 €/tCO2 and 6.1 €/tCO2 and the burden sharing between participating countries changes, but no additional emission reduction is achieved at the European level. This also implies, however, that the cost efficiency of such a cap-and-trade system is distorted, with additional costs of the FIT system of up to €320 billion compared with lower costs for ETS emission certificates of between €44 billion and €57 billion (cumulated over the period 2013–2020).Policy relevanceIn order to fulfil ambitious emission reduction targets a large variety of climate policy instruments are being implemented in Europe. While some, like the EU ETS, directly address CO2 emissions, others aim to promote specific low-carbon technologies. The quantitative analysis of the interactions between the EU ETS and the German FIT scheme for renewable sources in electricity generation presented in this article helps to understand the importance of such interaction effects. Even though justifications can be found for the implementation of both types of instrument, the impact of the widespread use of support mechanisms for renewable electricity in Europe needs to be taken into account when fixing the reduction targets for the EU ETS in order to ensure a credible long-term investment signal. 相似文献
20.
There are compelling reasons for policy makers to be interested in the low-carbon agenda. More than half of the world's population lives in, and more than half of the world's economic output comes from, cities. Up to 70% of global carbon emissions can also be attributed to consumption that takes place in cities. Recent research has shown that cost-effective investments in low-carbon options could deliver a 40% reduction in GHG emissions from cities by 2020, while also providing wider economic benefits such as enhanced competitiveness and increased employment. As yet, however, investments in low-carbon cities have not been made at scale due mainly to the scale of the finance required, local government budgetary constraints, and perceptions about their costs and benefits. With a focus on the UK, a contemporary account is provided of what local authorities see as the major financial risks associated with funding low-carbon cities. Practical proposals – which also have more general relevance to the future financing of low-carbon cities around the world – are offered on how local authorities, in conjunction with central government, the private sector, and institutional investors, can effectively manage these risks. Policy relevance Cities house more than half of the world's population, generate more than half of the world's economic output, and produce between 40% and 70% of all anthropogenic GHG emissions. In the UK, 70% of such emissions are under the influence of its local authorities. Thus, one of the key public policy challenges for the low-carbon transition is how it should be financed. There are several obstacles and related risks to this transition, including financial and legal obstacles and the differing views and perceptions of stakeholders. These can be attenuated, somewhat, by national government support at scale, local authority leadership, and cooperation between other authorities and the private sector, and the development of tools and guidance to reduce transaction costs. 相似文献