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1.
In the Alaska halibut individual fishing quota (IFQ) fishery, small remote fishing communities (SRFCs) have disproportionately lost fishing rights. Our analysis of quota market participation from 1995 to 1999 confirms that SRFC residents are more likely to sell than buy quota. Alaska Native heritage is another important predictor of quota market behavior. Residents of Alaska Native villages have an increased likelihood of selling quota. Loss of fisheries participation in small indigenous communities can be an unintended consequence of quota systems. Mitigation measures should take into account the social factors that can lead to such a redistribution of fishing rights in privatized access fisheries.  相似文献   

2.
Catch-quota balancing in multispecies individual fishing quotas   总被引：2，自引：1，他引：2  
Individual fishery quotas (IFQs) are an increasingly prevalent form of fishery management around the world, with more than 170 species currently managed with IFQs. Yet, because of the difficulties in matching quota holdings with catches, many argue that IFQs are not appropriate for multispecies fisheries. Using on-the-ground-experience with multispecies IFQ fisheries in Iceland, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, we assess the design and use of catch-quota balancing mechanisms. Our methodology includes a mix of interviews with fishery managers, industry representatives, and brokers, literature review, and data analysis. We find that a combination of incentives and limits on use rates for the mechanisms provide sufficient flexibility to the quota owner without the fishery manager incurring excessive levels of overexploitation risk. Contrary to some opinions, these programs are evidence that it is possible to implement IFQ programs for multispecies fisheries and that they can be profitable and sustainable.  相似文献   

3.
In 2007, an Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) program was introduced to the valuable red snapper (Lutjanus campechanus) fishery in the US Gulf of Mexico. This study assessed the current perceived scale and causes of red snapper discarding in the Gulf in recent years within the commercial reef fish fishery, according to commercial fishermen. Data were collected through interviews, which took place with fishermen in April and May 2010, and which were unexpectedly halted due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that occurred in late April 2010. Results suggest that for those fishermen fully participating in the IFQ program, snapper discarding has decreased since program implementation. For those not fully involved in the program (e.g., due to participation costs), discarding has likely since increased.  相似文献   

4.
Harvest cooperatives were implemented in several US fisheries over the last decade during a period when US law prohibited implementation of any new individual fishery quota (IFQ) systems. Harvest cooperatives provided an alternative to individual quotas as a means to end the race for fish and increase fishery profitability. The prohibition on new IFQ systems in the US was lifted, but harvest cooperatives remain a more feasible and perhaps a superior alternative to IFQs for some fisheries. The New England Fishery Management Council is on the verge of implementing a new management system for the groundfish fishery based on harvest cooperatives known as “sectors”. This paper describes the New England sector management system and discusses a number of advantages but also some drawbacks relative to IFQs. It argues that a hybrid of the two approaches could have advantages over either.  相似文献   

5.
Scholars and fishermen alike view the privatization of fishing rights as a fundamental driver of social change in fishing communities. This article presents the results of a mixed-methods ethnographic study in Kodiak, Alaska, exploring how fisheries privatization processes remake fishery systems. Findings from this study suggest that a diverse range of fishery participants share core values about the social dimensions of fishery systems. Support or opposition to past privatization processes tended to be articulated in reference to how these core values (e.g., hard work, opportunity, and fairness) were perceived to have been strengthened or eroded by such processes. Data from this study suggest that while still widespread in the Kodiak fishing community, core social values in fishing may be changing as a result of privatization processes. Although ethnographic and survey data showed a range of perspectives on the effects of privatization on fishing and the Kodiak community, study participants tended to talk about privatization as a significant change that had divisive, negative impacts in the community. Crew members and the next generation of fishermen were identified as disproportionately affected by privatization processes. Ethnographic data detail important shifts in the power, status, and livelihoods of crew members. Nearly all Kodiak fishery participants interviewed expressed concern about the future of fisheries access in the community for the next generation, in large part because of the substantial financial barriers to entry generated by privatization of fisheries access. Many discussed the need for more entry-level opportunities necessary for access in all fisheries.  相似文献   

6.
Whale depredation occurs when whales steal fish, damage fish or damage fishing gear. In Alaska, killer whales (Orcinus orca) and sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus) primarily depredate on demersal sablefish (Anoplopoma fimbria) and Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) longline fisheries. Quantitative data on whale depredation in Alaska is limited due to low fishery observer coverage and minimal depredation evidence left on longline fishing gear. This study utilized semidirected interviews (n=70) and written questionnaires (n=95) with longline fishermen to examine: (1) perceptions and experiences of whale–fishery interactions in Alaska, (2) effects of depredation on fishing practices, and (3) potential depredation mitigation measures. Eighty-seven percent of fishermen surveyed agreed that whale depredation became worse between 1990 and 2010. Respondents reported changing their fishing practices in response to depredating whales in several ways, including: traveling up to 50 nautical miles and ceasing hauling operations up to 24 h until the whales left the fishing grounds. Respondents fishing in western Alaska, primarily encountering killer whales, were forced to wait longer and travel greater distances than fishermen operating in central and southeast Alaska, regions more affected by sperm whales. Deterrent research, gear modifications and real-time tracking of depredating whales were solutions favored by study participants. Survey respondent answers varied based on areas fished, quota owned, years involved in the fishery and vessel size. This study presents the first statewide evaluation of fishermen's perception and knowledge of whale interactions with the Alaskan longline fleet and is a critical step toward developing baseline data and feasible depredation mitigation strategies.  相似文献   

7.
Iceland's nationwide privatized Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system is over thirty years old but remains a topic of public and political debate, particularly because of the continued effects on small-scale fisheries. A national survey of small-boat fishermen was distributed to: (1) identify major defining characteristics of participants in ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries, (2) document and examine differences in satisfaction with fisheries management, and (3) evaluate the existing options for newcomers to participate in small-boat fisheries. Survey results indicate that Icelandic small-boat fishermen are engaged in multiple management systems within a wide range of boat sizes. Those who held quota were more satisfied with the current ITQ system compared to those who did not hold quota; however, nearly all fishermen were still critical of fisheries management in Iceland and the two major non-ITQ options of lumpfish and coastal fishing were not perceived to offer significant opportunity for entry-level fishermen. Dissatisfaction stemmed from the lack of decision-making power, a distrust of scientific advice, and the perception that the ITQ system did not serve the purpose of protecting fisheries resources, but was rather oriented only toward economic goals. The dynamic nature of Icelandic small-boat fishing livelihoods and the pervasive negative attitudes thirty years after ITQ implementation demonstrate the need for culturally appropriate and equitable fisheries management schemes where success is measured in social as well as economic and biological terms.  相似文献   

8.
The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council determined that previous management of the grouper and tilefish fisheries in the northern Gulf of Mexico were not meeting management goals, and developed a catch shares program using individual fishing quotas (IFQs) beginning in January 2010 in order to more effectively manage these fisheries. An IFQ is a management method in which individual fishers and corporations are allocated the right to harvest a percentage of a fishery's total allowable catch, thus specifying how much of a particular species each fisher can harvest. This study makes use of a mail out survey to document the perceptions of fishers, seafood wholesalers, fisheries managers, and academics with an interest in the (northern) Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish IFQ program. While fishers, seafood dealers, fisheries managers, and academics all acknowledge that the IFQ program will create some problems, commercial fishers and dealers were far more skeptical of the alleged benefits of IFQs. Moreover, larger commercial operators were more inclined to agree with managers and academics that the IFQ program will produce several benefits for their operations and the fisheries. Some smaller operators believe that they will be driven to ignore the new rules or be forced out of business. In the future, the Gulf Council might do two things: put a bit more effort into making fishers aware of the potential benefits of IFQs, and develop alternatives with more flexibility perhaps working more closely with communities of fishers, who prize their independent way of life above all else.  相似文献   

9.
A growing number of US fisheries are managed with catch share programs, which allocate exclusive shares of the total allowable catch from a fish stock to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. All of these catch share programs allow transferability of catch privileges in some form. Information on these transfers, particularly prices, could be valuable to fishery managers and to fishery participants to support management and business decisions and to increase efficiency of the catch share market itself. This article documents the availability and quality of data on transfers of catch privileges in fourteen US catch share programs. These catch share programs include several individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs and a number of programs that allocate catch privileges to self-organized cooperatives. Price information on catch share transfers is found to be limited or unavailable in most US catch share programs. Recommendations are made on how to improve the design of catch share programs and associated data collection systems to facilitate effective catch share markets, collection of catch share market data, and better use of information from catch share markets.  相似文献   

10.
The bluefin tuna fishery has undergone a major shift in Malta, moving from an open access artisanal nature to a privatized and industrialized activity dominated by the purse seining fleet and the BFT ranching industry. The shift has been exacerbated by the national implementation of an individual transferable quota system, which has enabled the concertation of quotas into fewer hands. The main objective of this article is to understand how privatization has evolved within the sector and the way the Maltese artisanal fishermen are experiencing the shift. This study takes an exploratory mixed-method approach to quantitatively and qualitatively understand how policy underpinnings interplay with the sustainability dimension of the small-scale fishing sector. Results show that the transition of the bluefin tuna fishery from artisanal to industrial has generated a legitimacy crisis over fishing rights, decreased profitability amongst most of the artisanal fleet, and led to a series of socio-ecological impacts on the artisanal fisheries system at large. It is concluded that the neo-liberal trajectories of industrialization have directly undermined the continued sustainability of artisanal fishing communities.  相似文献   

11.
In 2012, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council initiated the process of designing a new management structure for the Gulf of Alaska trawl groundfish fleet. The new program is currently structured as a catch share program and driven by the need to end the ‘race for fish’ and provide the trawl fleet with the tools to reduce bycatch. To date much of the discussion among policy makers and stakeholders has centered on community protection measures and how best to avoid the negative social and economic impacts of catch share programs including impacts to crew, consolidation and the flight of quota and resource wealth from Gulf of Alaska fishery dependent communities. This paper examines how community protection measures related to the distribution of benefits and access to fishery resources are considered and challenged in the North Pacific today. Special attention is given to the ongoing debate surrounding the potential inclusion of an initial allocation to place-based Gulf of Alaska communities via a Community Fishing Association. As part of this effort, this paper examines the political space and underlying power dynamics in which consideration of alternatives to the commodification of fishing rights occurs.  相似文献   

12.
Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs.  相似文献   

13.
This paper identifies three management initiatives in New Zealand's Individual Transferable Quota system that facilitated consolidation of the processing sector and limited market access for fishers, even those with quota rights. They are: (1) the placement of responsibility onto a Māori trust in 1992 and tribes (iwi) in 2004 to manage a limited amount of quota to benefit all Māori, fishers and non-fishers, which increased the use of quota as an investment asset; (2) the creation of Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) as a fish access right separate from the quota ownership right, which made it possible to overcome consolidation limits by leasing ACE; (3) the 1997 Licensed Fish Receiver Act that made it illegal for fishers to sell fish off the boat without food safety certification. This account of the fishery policy environment in New Zealand explains why, despite owning significant portions of New Zealand's fishing quota, few Māori are fishing, processing, or selling fish caught by Māori quota.  相似文献   

14.
Despite their apparent economic benefits to harvesters, individual fishing quotas (IFQs) have only been adopted in three US fisheries: Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog; South Atlantic wreckfish; and, North Pacific halibut and sablefish. During the 1996 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Congress temporarily blocked implementation of additional IFQ programs in US fisheries. In this paper, we argue that because of the emergence of an alternative, the cooperative, it is unlikely that new IFQs will be adopted in federally managed US fisheries. From an economic perspective, cooperatives offer the advantage of eliminating production externalities that may remain under an IFQ program with relatively large owner classes. More significantly, development of IFQ programs appears to be increasingly overwhelmed by the proliferation of both equity concerns and seemingly interminable rent-seeking behavior — both issues that can effectively block adoption of IFQs. Ironically (and paradoxically?), by reducing the scope of the equity issues acknowledged, the cooperative alternative narrows the pool of claimants and modifies the behavior of the remainder, making implementation more likely. A further irony exists in that IFQs are widely thought to be best designed at the local/regional level while part of the appeal of the cooperative model is that it appears to shortcut the often protracted nature of the local/regional political process by relying on direct intervention from Washington, DC, in the form of actions by Congress or the Justice Department.  相似文献   

15.
The European common fisheries policy (CFP) advocates measures to sustain small-scale fisheries; hence, in the European Commission's proposal for a reformed CFP, these are exempted from a mandatory system with tradable fishing concessions. This opens up for management actions designed for small-scale fisheries, but also implies new management issues. This article provides insights into the topic based on a Swedish small-scale herring fishery in the western Baltic Sea that was exempted from an ITQ-system. The fishery has been profitable since the system was introduced, and the increasing effort of both incumbent fishermen and new entrants implies a situation where fishermen compete for a limited quota. The migratory pattern of the herring implies high densities in the southern parts of the fishing areas during spring and in the northern parts during autumn. This forms the basis for two different fisheries in the area, as well as for the current management proposal to divide the quota into a spring and an autumn part. This and other management proposals are discussed in the paper. The main conclusion from the case study is that, when exempting a fishery from tradable fishing concessions, it is important to build other institutions dealing with the fundamental problem of access to the quota. Failure to do so might result in an over-capacity issue and threaten the long-run development of an otherwise successful small-scale fishery.  相似文献   

16.
New Zealand's Quota Management System (QMS) consists of a two tier operational structure: Quota shares in a fishstock provide an Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) of the total allowable commercial catch (TACC) of the specific fishstock. Fishers operating in a multispecies fishery need a portfolio of ACE that matches the mix of their annual catch. Fishers may own quota shares, and thereby receive the needed ACE allocations or they may operate without quota shares and rely on acquiring ACE in the ACE market. Whatever the fisher's situation, it is common for fishers to both buy and sell ACE during a fishing year as they seek to balance their actual catch against ACE. The incentive to achieve a balance is strong because at year-end fishers whose catch exceeds ACE are required to pay a fee called ‘deemed value’. For many fishstocks the deemed value fee increases sharply as the percentage by which a fisher's catch exceeds their ACE increases. When no ‘unbalanced’ ACE is available for purchase, an overfished fisher may attempt to mitigate their deemed value liability by engaging in arbitrage trading in ACE whereby they buy ACE from other overfished fishers. This study examines the nature and extent of ACE arbitrage behaviour in the New Zealand quota managed fishery. The study finds that the number of fishstocks where arbitrage trading occurs is relatively small and is declining. However, sizeable deemed value mitigation transactions are still evident.  相似文献   

17.
This study investigates changes in the total factor productivity (TFP) and identifies the main sources of TFP growth following the adoption of an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper commercial fishery. Utilizing an unbalanced panel of 722 vertical line vessels Malmquist indices were derived from an output-oriented stochastic distance frontier. The analysis shows that the IFQ program had a positive impact on the productivity of the fleet and that most of the productivity gains were due to improvements in technical efficiency. The study also finds that changes in technical efficiency were time variant suggesting that the exit of the less efficient vessels and easing of command and control regulations such as trip limits and short fishing seasons were responsible for most of these gains. Changes in the exploitable biomass of red snapper were found to have a moderate impact on productivity growth whereas the impact of technological progress was minimal.  相似文献   

18.
《Marine Policy》1998,22(2):95-108
Fishing vessels from Cornwall, England entered the albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga, Bonnaterre, 1788) fishery using drift-nets in the Bay of Biscay in 1991, the prime motivation for this being concern over excess capacity and quota limitations in existing local fisheries. Although the albacore fishery has made a contribution to the region's prosperity and has reduced pressure other fish stocks, many operators who invested in the necessary fishing equipment have withdrawn their vessels after only one or two seasons. Those staying in the fishery have been able to do so only because of profitability for vessels with very low overheads. Two sources have undermined confidence in the fishery amongst Cornish fishermen; new legislation which evolved from inappropriate, extra-regional sources and conflict between the fishing fleets from different European countries due to its ‘High Seas’ location. The political significance of the fishery is disproportionate to its size and impact on the environment and has meant that the Cornish albacore fleet may cease to exist.  相似文献   

19.
In some fisheries, claims have been made that quota programs have led to increased vertical integration, with processors controlling quota and fishermen. In the US halibut fishery a quota program was designed specifically to maintain the small-scale vessel nature of the fishery. This paper reports on what changes have been seen in the vertical structure of the halibut fishery and offers some explanation for these changes. Results indicate that the specific rights granted can have significantly different effects on the vertical structure of the industry. In the case of the halibut fishery vertical integration was avoided and market transactions actually increased.  相似文献   

20.
《Ocean & Coastal Management》1999,42(2-4):119-142
The large industrial fishery development that turn Chile into the third fishing nation in the world is described, and recent regulatory innovations introduced by new Fishery and Aquaculture legislation are reviewed. In addition to classical Fishery management tools, different types of limited entry systems are now defined in the law and applicable to Chilean fisherie. These for the first time include allocation of resources in the form of Individual Fishing Quotas and Individual Transferable Quotas (IFQs and ITQs). Territorial User’s Rights in Fisheries (TURF’s) were incorporated in the law to enhance self-regulatory practices among artisanal fishermen. Among them, the Areas for Management and Exploitation for Benthic Resources (AME) represent an associative assignment of TURFs. Large-scale zoning is used to re-define Aquaculture Grants and to ritualise the conflicts between Artisanal and Industrial fishermen by establishing the Artisanal Reserve in which small-scale coastal fishermen have Priority Access. Performance of the new management instruments are documented with case studies, for the following fisheries: the loco (Concholepas concholepas) a carnivorous snail, keyhole limpets (Fissurella spp.), langostino or squat lobster (Cervimunida johni), Black hake (Dissostichus eleginoides) and the Yellow prawn (Pleuroncodes monodon).  相似文献   

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