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1.
Fishing fleets are subject to numerous factors that affect economic performance, making identification and attribution of such impacts difficult. This paper separately identifies the effects of changing input and output prices, fishery management, and quota allocations on total factor productivity using a Lowe Index. Indices account for technical change and decompose productivity estimates into its technical, environmental, and scale-mix components. This results in measures that reflect shifts in the production frontier, and movements by vessels toward and around the frontier, to capture economies of scale and mix after a policy shift to a catch share program that includes fishing cooperatives and a limited access fishery. The difference between cooperative and limited access vessels is exploited to compare the changes in economic performance between the groups after the introduction of the shift to catch shares and cooperative management, which allowed the vessels to improve the timing and coordination across multi-species fisheries and to decrease incidental catch of quota-limited bycatch species that had closed the target fisheries prematurely in the past. Results indicate that total factor productivity increased significantly after the move to a catch share program, largely due to increases in technical change that shifted out the production frontier of the fishery.  相似文献   

2.
The applicability of catch shares programs is evaluated for the various fisheries of the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council region in each of the archipelagoes. Implementation of Catch Shares programs in the region is problematic, but would require better data to be done fairly and equitably. Catch shares are currently under initial consideration for the Hawaii and American Samoa longline fisheries and the Hawaii Deep 7 bottomfish fishery. It is argued that current conditions in all the other small boat fisheries in the region make them inappropriate for catch shares management. Overfishing and the “race for fish” are not yet an issue for these fisheries and some are underdeveloped. Catch share programs can cause significant negative social consequences for Western Pacific communities because data on fishermen's participation, catch histories, and motivations to fish for cultural needs is not adequate for any initial allocation scheme to be developed equitably. The prevailing Western Pacific cultural value of sharing the fish by gifting portions, sharing the catch widely and sharing fishing opportunities widely is in clear conflict with the individualized commercial profit motive philosophy of fisheries that are appropriate for catch shares. The small boat fisheries lack adequate monitoring and enforcement, and do not have a total allowable catch or quota. Nor do they usually have a demonstrated need for one. Preliminary community outreach by Council staff and community discussion of catch shares shows a general lack of information yet a potential for strong resistance to the imposition of catch shares.  相似文献   

3.
Catch shares, where annual catch limits are divided among individuals, communities or cooperatives, are a commonly used fisheries management strategy to increase profits and reduce overcapitalization. Usually these quota shares can be sold or leased, which is theorized to allow for greater utilization of fleet-wide quota. However, this catch-quota balancing may not be achieved in multispecies trawl fisheries where it is difficult to selectively target valuable species while avoiding overfished species. Two similar catch-share-managed, multispecies trawl fisheries were compared to evaluate whether catch shares lead to catch-quota balancing. The U.S. West Coast Groundfish fishery has several species with low total allowable catches (TACs) while the Canadian British Columbia Trawl fishery has comparatively higher TACs. Results indicate that the West Coast fishery had a statistically significant decrease in catch-quota ratios from 0.41 in the three years before catch shares to 0.29 in the three years after catch shares. In contrast, the BC fishery experience no statistically significant change in fishery-wide average catch-quota ratios, which were 0.70 in the three years before and 0.62 in the three years after catch shares. In the West Coast fishery, the risk of exceeding quotas for some species may be so high that fishers are unable to achieve high degrees of catch-quota balancing and instead focus on species that can be easily selected with changes in fishing behavior. Multispecies fisheries management has direct tradeoffs between maximizing yield and achieving conservation goals, and these results may highlight the tradeoff between rebuilding overfished species by reducing TACs, and the achievement of catch-quota balancing.  相似文献   

4.
A unique database was created that describes the methods used to allocate shares in nearly every major catch share fishery in the world. Approximately 54% of the major catch share fisheries in the world allocated the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) solely on the basis of historical catch records, 3% used auctions, and 6% used equal sharing rules. The remaining 37% used a combination of methods, including vessel-based rules. These results confirm the widely-held belief that nearly all catch share programs have “grandfathered” private access to fishery resources: 91% of the fisheries in the database allocated some fraction of the TAC on the basis of historical catch. This publicly available database should be a useful reference tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in catch shares management in Hawai'i and across the globe.  相似文献   

5.
New Zealand's Quota Management System (QMS) consists of a two tier operational structure: Quota shares in a fishstock provide an Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) of the total allowable commercial catch (TACC) of the specific fishstock. Fishers operating in a multispecies fishery need a portfolio of ACE that matches the mix of their annual catch. Fishers may own quota shares, and thereby receive the needed ACE allocations or they may operate without quota shares and rely on acquiring ACE in the ACE market. Whatever the fisher's situation, it is common for fishers to both buy and sell ACE during a fishing year as they seek to balance their actual catch against ACE. The incentive to achieve a balance is strong because at year-end fishers whose catch exceeds ACE are required to pay a fee called ‘deemed value’. For many fishstocks the deemed value fee increases sharply as the percentage by which a fisher's catch exceeds their ACE increases. When no ‘unbalanced’ ACE is available for purchase, an overfished fisher may attempt to mitigate their deemed value liability by engaging in arbitrage trading in ACE whereby they buy ACE from other overfished fishers. This study examines the nature and extent of ACE arbitrage behaviour in the New Zealand quota managed fishery. The study finds that the number of fishstocks where arbitrage trading occurs is relatively small and is declining. However, sizeable deemed value mitigation transactions are still evident.  相似文献   

6.
A growing number of US fisheries are managed with catch share programs, which allocate exclusive shares of the total allowable catch from a fish stock to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. All of these catch share programs allow transferability of catch privileges in some form. Information on these transfers, particularly prices, could be valuable to fishery managers and to fishery participants to support management and business decisions and to increase efficiency of the catch share market itself. This article documents the availability and quality of data on transfers of catch privileges in fourteen US catch share programs. These catch share programs include several individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs and a number of programs that allocate catch privileges to self-organized cooperatives. Price information on catch share transfers is found to be limited or unavailable in most US catch share programs. Recommendations are made on how to improve the design of catch share programs and associated data collection systems to facilitate effective catch share markets, collection of catch share market data, and better use of information from catch share markets.  相似文献   

7.
The shared Torres Strait rock lobster (Panulirus ornatus) fishery provides important income for commercial and traditional fishers in Australia and Papua New Guinea. The lobster stock is first fished in Torres Strait by divers from both countries and then becomes vulnerable to Australian prawn trawlers, followed by Papua New Guinea trawlers during its annual breeding migration. Lobster catch sharing arrangements are governed by the Torres Strait Treaty ratified in 1985, but the sequential trawling of breeding lobsters has been controlled by bilateral agreements. A trawl ban was implemented in 1984 in both countries to conserve the breeding stock, but some trawling has been conducted in the Gulf of Papua since then and there is renewed interest in Papua New Guinea to resume trawling. To evaluate the impact of trawling migratory breeding lobsters on the lobster fishery, a model that combines a cohort depletion model with a stock recruitment relationship was developed in this study. The model showed that when the fishery is fully or over‐exploited by the dive fishery, trawling breeding lobsters would reduce both the spawning stock and the total catch of the fishery. The reduction in catch would increase with increasing fishing mortality. If trawling occurred on the Papua New Guinea side only, a redistribution of catch between Australia and Papua New Guinea would result in a small gain in catch for Papua New Guinea at the expense of the Australian dive fishery. But when fishing mortality reaches a certain level, any trawling in any country will incur catch loss to both countries. For the long‐term sustainability and maximum production of the fishery, regulations should be implemented in both countries under a co‐management scheme of a shared fish stock.  相似文献   

8.
A principal challenge in developing any fishery management plan is the allocation of benefits and costs among participants in the fishery. This process is further complicated by imperfect information about future market demand and limited ability to predict the consequences of regulatory change. This paper offers a new approach to policymakers, using econometric analysis to simulate the potential impact of individual tradable quotas (ITQs) in a fishery. We compare the distribution of harvest across participants in the Atlantic Herring fishery under the current open access regime and under a potential ITQ regime, assuming two different levels of future demand. Our results show that production efficiency varies by vessel gear, home-port and relationship with buyers. Some of the predicted consequences of ITQs are: vessels from Massachusetts will gain share relative to those from Maine; trawlers will gain share relative to purse seine vessels; and independent vessels will lose share relative to vessels that are primarily contracted to specific processors or bait companies. These results will help policymakers in developing future management plans for the herring fishery. More generally, this analytical approach can help regulators in any fishery assess the potential impact of alternative policy changes under alternative future demand scenarios.  相似文献   

9.
The literature on catch shares is dominated by analyses of programs in developed countries. To address this research gap, this paper identifies and discusses programs in developing countries. The paper also investigates differences between countries that have and have not implemented programs across a number of relevant dimensions, including governance and resource value, and characterizes the relationship between catch share type (e.g., quota-based or space-based systems) and the species characteristics. The paper identifies programs in about 20 percent of coastal and developing countries and finds that countries with catch shares have higher governance rankings, stronger economies, more valuable fishery export industries, and fewer people employed in fisheries. For example, the average governance effectiveness rank is 38.7 for all coastal and developing countries and 60.8 for countries with quota-based fishing rights. Species managed under quota-based systems are also found to have the potential for strong recruitment externalities. The results support ideas from the fisheries economics literature on the pre-conditions that are more likely to lead to the adoption of a catch share program.  相似文献   

10.
Fishing vessel and permit buyback programs have been implemented to reduce excess capacity and improve profitability in a number of fisheries around the world. These programs are generally publicly funded, but in a few cases they have been financed by loans to be paid back by the remaining fleet. In 2003, a buyback permanently removed 91 vessels and 239 fishing permits from the Pacific groundfish trawl fishery and associated corollary fisheries of Dungeness crab and pink shrimp. The buyback was financed with $10 million in public funding and a $36 million loan to be repaid over 30 years with fees on landings. In the same year, a control date was set for catch share program in the groundfish trawl fishery. When the catch share program was implemented in 2011, the permit owners that remained in the fishery after the buyback were allocated the quota shares that would otherwise have been issued to the permits bought back in 2003. Estimates of the annual profits generated by this quota are compared to the cost of servicing the buyback loan. The results provide evidence that a buyback program, when implemented in conjunction with catch shares, can enable a sustained increase in profitability for the remaining vessels sufficient to justify its cost. However, using landings taxes as the mechanism to repay the loan may result in a mismatch between those who benefit from and pay for the buyback.  相似文献   

11.
We examined the conditions of successful common property-based management for coastal marine living resources, using a case of historically and anthropologically well established women divers communities on Jeju Island, South Korea, focusing on their decentralized work rules and production records. Due to their tight social network and work rule, the women divers have harvested coastal marine living resources with limited fishing pressure exclusively from their village fishing grounds for over 400 years. However, their harvest patterns have been mostly reactive to market prices, eventually requiring direct governmental regulations such as total allowable catch in some cases. Most recently, the communities have been experiencing multiple challenges: their aging population, water pollution in the coastal zone, competition with cultured products and imported seafood, and expanding barren grounds. These challenges demand a multi-scale/dimensional response if the women divers communities are to keep their village fishing grounds and communities sustainable.  相似文献   

12.
The movement toward catch shares by NOAA Fisheries and fisheries managers worldwide responds to dysfunctional fisheries plagued by a host of interrelated problems including radically shortened seasons, a race to fish, supply gluts, lowered product quality, increased bycatch, safety issues, excess capacity, and lack of profitability. However, the NOAA Catch Shares Policy recognizes that catch shares are not appropriate for every fishery, and others have agreed that the success of catch shares programs depends on their fit with ecological, economic, and social characteristics. This article describes the characteristics of the Hawaii-based deep-set longline fleet, identified by NOAA Fisheries as a possible candidate for catch shares because it operates under a bigeye tuna quota instituted by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. One of the main concerns in the fishery is the potential for closing during the holiday season, a culturally important time for fish consumption in Hawaii. An evaluation of the fishery suggests that many of the problems leading to development of catch shares programs in other fisheries are not present, but that some warning signs exist which could be addressed by catch share programs or other management alternatives.  相似文献   

13.
To address overfishing concerns, a total allowable catch (TAC) management program was instituted in the main Hawaiian Islands (MHI) bottomfish fishery during 2007. Using results from a recent survey of bottomfish fishermen, this paper details behavioral and social aspects of bottomfish fishing in Hawaii and explores fisher perceptions towards current fishery conditions and future management alternatives. The paper further discusses the applicability of potential catch share management for this fishery. Bottomfish fishermen expressed uncertainty towards catch share programs and appear to be reluctant about any movement towards catch share management. This paper describes many preexisting conditions in the fishery that suggest a catch share program may not be practical at this time.  相似文献   

14.
This article focuses on the economics of trawling in a location-specific fishery that is affected by seasonal monsoons. Both field evaluation and econometric models were used to determine the economic performances of trawlers of different tonnages. The findings indicate that in a multispecies monsoon-affected fishery medium-sized vessels in the category of 20–30 tons were most efficient.  相似文献   

15.
The hake resource is the most important commercial fish species in the demersal sector of Namibia's fisheries, both in terms of annual catch and contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The fishery now spans four decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, hake were exploited heavily by mainly foreign fleets, total catches peaking at more than 800 000 tons in 1972. The first control measures, the use of a minimum mesh size of 110 mm and the allocation of quotas to each member country participating in the hake fishery, were implemented by the International Commission for the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries in 1975. In 1990, the Namibian Government took action to control fishing activities in Namibian waters, and the enactment of its Fisheries Policy (1991) and Sea Fisheries Act of 1992 provided for the control measures to be taken. The conservative management strategy adopted between 1990 and 1993 resulted in gradual increase in hake biomass, but thereafter the stock declined. The hake fishery is currently managed on the basis of a total allowable catch that takes into consideration the rate of increase or decrease in the size of the resource. Since 1990, the demersal trawl fishery has accounted for approximately 90% of the total hake catch. The resource is subjected to both directed fishing and bycatch, the latter taken in directed fisheries for species such as horse mackerel, monkfish and sole.  相似文献   

16.
The Australian Victorian Western Zone rock lobster fishery is assessed using standardised catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE). Nominal CPUE declined over 1978–2009, but this underrepresents the estimated decline in abundance, and since 2009 standardised CPUE rose notably less than nominal CPUE. This study identified vessel as a key factor that explains the discrepancy between nominal and standardised CPUE. The composition of the fleet changed since 2009, under the pressure of constraining total allowable catch quotas, with vessels exiting the fishery having substantially lower estimated catchability, which increased the average catchability of the remaining fleet. New diagnostic indices were constructed to quantify discrepancies between trends in nominal and standardised CPUE that assisted in identifying periods during which both catchability and fleet composition changed.  相似文献   

17.
Over the past 40 years many fish populations in Indonesian waters have been severely depleted. The paper argues that any explanation of these depletions must take account of the nature of the Indonesian state. The Indonesian state is a highly fragmented structure made up of competing components that in many cases have to raise their own revenue in order to function. The nature of the Indonesian state creates the conditions in which fisheries depletions are likely to occur. The paper develops this argument by focusing on the various ways in which Thai trawlers have operated in Indonesian waters and examining how the Indonesian navy's responsibility for enforcing fishery regulations has often clashed with its own interests in fisheries. The paper argues that one way to overcome the limited ability of the Indonesian government to enforce fisheries regulations and to control the movement of fishing vessels into the waters of other countries is to establish a regional regulatory regime that builds on and expands the Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) advisory body. The paper concludes by examining some of the obstacles that might get in the way of the success of such a regime and proposing ways in which these obstacles can be overcome.  相似文献   

18.
To date, none of the fisheries in the U.S. Pacific Islands Region is managed under a catch share program. In light of the NOAA policy to encourage the use of catch shares as a fishery management tool, the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council (WPFMC) listed six commercial fisheries, including the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery, the largest in the region, as potential candidates for catch share programs. This study examines the baseline economic characteristics and the main challenges facing the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery and evaluates the impact of these on the desirability and feasibility of a catch share program for this particular fishery.  相似文献   

19.
We describe the development and application of a management procedure (decision rule) that resulted in a voluntary reduction in the commercial catch of spiny rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) in the lower east coast of North Island of New Zealand. The management procedure was developed from an accepted assessment of the CRA 4 (Wellington‐Hawke's Bay) fishery, which used an integrated length‐based assessment model fitted to commercial fishery catch‐per‐unit‐effort (CPUE) biomass indices, commercial length‐frequency data, and tag‐recapture data. The assessment model had been Bayesian, and used the joint posterior distribution of parameters to predict the effect of 384 alternative harvest control rules on the future size of the CRA 4 stock. The harvest control rules all used CPUE as their input, and generated annual changes in catch, which were then simulated by the population dynamics of the operating model. Uncertainty was added to evaluations through observation error, added to the simulated CPUE observations, and stochastic serial auto‐correlation variation in recruitment. We describe how this management procedure was used to effect a voluntary reduction in catch to address the problem of a rapidly declining population.  相似文献   

20.
The closure of the Hawaiian longline swordfish fishery over the period 2001–2004, which was motivated by the protection of endangered sea turtles, created the elements of a natural experiment that allows identification of the market transfer of catch (and sea turtle bycatch) to other regions. This paper exploits the fact that the vessels in the Hawaiian longline fishery sell their catch in the US fresh swordfish market to analyze the pattern of changes in US fresh and frozen swordfish consumption both before and after the closure regulation was imposed. The mechanisms by which any unintended consequences on endangered sea turtles in other fishery locations in the world are shown to take place through the US swordfish market. At the estimated annual market transfer, a bootstrap analysis of the probability distribution of bycatch rates indicates that the regulation led to an additional 2882 sea turtle interactions at the sample means.  相似文献   

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