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1.
Slovenia is required to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to an average of 8% below the base year 1986 in the period 2008–2012, due to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. It was the first of the transition countries to implement a CO2 tax in 1997. At the beginning of 2005, Slovenia joined other EU Member States by implementing the Emissions Trading Scheme. In contrast with other new EU Member States, Slovenia will be a net buyer of allowances. Therefore future movements on the emissions market will play an important role in the compliance costs of achieving the Kyoto target. The main purpose of this article is to present the establishment and characteristics of the first national allocation plan (NAP1) and to describe the main elements of the second national allocation plan (NAP2) for Slovenia within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the expected movements on the emissions allowances market in Slovenia, the expected compliance cost of achieving the Kyoto target and to present the main characteristics and efficiency of the CO2 tax in Slovenia. 相似文献
2.
Alexander Vasa 《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):645-666
The EU allows those installations that are subject to emissions trading to use a limited volume of certified emissions reductions (CERs), generated through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), to cover their own GHG emissions. These CERs can be used in addition to the EU allowances (EUAs), which were primarily allocated free to installations in Phase II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) from 2008 to 2012. For the year 2008, the CER limits, which are differentiated by EU Member State, created substantial arbitrage rents (due to the CER-EUA spread) of approximately EU€250 million. Different options for the allocation of this rent are discussed and it is found that, according to economic theory, making the right to use CERs tradable or the regulator pre-committing to buying CERs at the level of the relevant limit reduces the inefficiencies connected to the current regulation. Furthermore, auctioning these CER usage rights shifts the rents created through the CER-EUA spread to the Member State itself. The improved design and implementation of CDM limits justifies EU policy makers intervening to correct previously competition-distorting choices. 相似文献
3.
Robert Heilmayr 《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):1113-1130
The European Union (EU), the US and Australia have each adopted, or are considering, free allocations to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industries (EITEIs) in order to minimize emissions leakage and industrial offshoring resulting from climate policy. Differences in the design of these schemes, including how a country defines eligible EITEIs, the scale of allocation and the method of distribution, all have the potential to affect the outcomes of the programmes. In crafting their EITEI allocation formulas, policymakers in each country must balance three important priorities – the economic efficiency of the cap and trade programme, an equitable distribution of the programme's allowances and the effectiveness of the allocations in addressing leakage and competitiveness concerns. These three priorities provide a useful framework for considering the tradeoffs inherent in designing allocation schemes for EITEIs. Through this lens, policy approaches taken by the EU, US and Australia are evaluated with respect to four important questions of allocation policy design: the definition of EITEIs, the costs to be covered, the methodology for distributing allowances and the duration of free allocation. 相似文献
4.
Phase 3 of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS; 2013–2020) sees the introduction of new rules governing the free allocations of emissions allowances given to energy-intensive industries. In contrast to Phases 1 and 2, allocations will be based on historical production multiplied by best available emissions technology benchmarks. This article exploits an original database to provide a first analysis of the distributional and economic efficiency implications of the new rules. It is shown empirically that the new allocation rules reduce the scope for windfall gains by EU ETS firms while also effectively mitigating carbon leakage risks, even assuming optimistic forecasts of Phase 3 carbon prices. The example of the cement sector is used to show that benchmarking significantly improves the harmonization of the levels of free allocations to competing firms throughout the EU compared to Phase 2. However, it is also found that the use of ex ante output levels to determine allocations still leaves considerable scope for windfall gains and possible distortions of the internal market. 相似文献
5.
Eugénie Joltreau 《Climate Policy》2019,19(4):453-471
Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms’ competitiveness or profitability. For the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) the empirical literature documents that significant emissions reductions have resulted from it. Surprisingly, however, the literature shows that there have been hardly any concurrent negative effects on firms’ competitiveness during the first two phases of the scheme (2005–2012). We show that the main explanations for the absence of negative impacts on competitiveness are a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop and the ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through combined with free allocation, in turn, partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may have limited the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found so far. Several factors suggest that over-allocation is likely to remain substantial in the upcoming periods of the scheme. Therefore, we expect to see no negative competitiveness effects from the EU ETS in Phases III and IV (2013–2030).
Key policy insights
Empirical literature on the EU ETS shows that there have been hardly any effects on firms’ competitiveness or profitability.
One main explanation is a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop. This reduced incentives for innovation.
Moreover, firms were able to pass costs on to consumers in some sectors which partly generated windfall profits.
Innovation effects have so far been small but positive.
We expect to see no negative competitiveness effects on regulated firms in the near future suggesting that no further reliefs for regulated firms are required.
6.
7.
This article uses a policy analogy approach to explore China's attitude toward the possibility of global carbon market integration, including the development of a common cap-and-trade market for the global civil aviation industry. Like in other foreign policy domains, in international cap-and-trade, China faces a ‘trilemma’ between carbon market integration, state sovereignty and policy flexibility. By referring to how China has approached a comparable trilemma in foreign exchange policy making, we analyse China's possible stance on international cap-and-trade. We argue that China will prefer to gradually establish and strengthen, to a limited extent, intergovernmental governance mechanisms, which allow nation-states to prioritize sovereignty and policy flexibility in carbon trading policy making. In the conclusion we use this argument to explain China's responses to the carbon-trading initiatives of Australia, the EU, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Bank.Policy relevanceThe international community has reached a consensus on the use of market mechanisms for mitigating climate change. While opposing the EU's plan to include Chinese airlines in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, China has started to co-explore with Australia the possibility of linking their carbon markets, and has adopted a supportive attitude toward the carbon trading initiatives led by the ICAO and the World Bank. Considering China's status as the largest emitting country of GHGs and its interdependence with major developed and developing countries, China's substantial participation would be crucial to the success of the global market-based efforts to reduce GHG emissions. This article presents an initial attempt to develop a better understanding of China's stance on international cap-and-trade. 相似文献
8.
MARTIN CAMES 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):104-120
Which actors in the aviation sector ought to be obliged to participate in emissions trading? The European Commission opted for the aircraft operator in their proposal for a Directive. A major drawback is that non-EU aircraft operators might legally challenge their inclusion in this scheme and, if the challenge was successful, discrimination between EU and non- EU operators would undermine the scheme. An alternative would be to place an obligation on fuel suppliers to prove possession of allowances, thus avoiding discrimination. However, emissions trading can be evaded to some extent by increased refuelling beyond EU boundaries (tankering). Typical city pairs were used to analyse the conditions under which such tankering strategies are economically attractive. The analysis shows that the attractiveness of tankering depends substantially on the relationship between fuel prices and allowance prices. If the price relation as of March 2006 is taken as a basis, tankering would be attractive within a radius of up to 4,000 km especially on southbound and eastward routes. Emissions trading could, under unfavourable conditions, be evaded for up to 20% of the total fuel consumption in aviation with the help of tankering. Although this value is only a theoretical upper limit, more than 10% of fuel consumption could be affected by tankering. 相似文献
9.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):227-241
How effective is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in promoting emissions reduction for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol commitment? A theoretical benchmark is determined in order to assess the stringency of the ETS cap and to evaluate whether emissions allowances have been over-allocated. This analysis clarifies how the emissions reduction effort has been divided between ETS and non-ETS sectors, highlighting the extent to which Member States effectively rely on the ETS to comply with their Kyoto commitments. Finally, inefficiencies relating to the over-allocation of allowances are analysed; namely cross-subsidization from non-ETS to ETS sectors, national subsidies to the ETS sectors, and distortion of competition. 相似文献
10.
Transfer patterns in Phase I of the EU Emissions Trading System: a first reality check based on cluster analysis 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
In 2005, the world's largest Emissions Trading System (ETS) was introduced in the EU. Economic theory assumes high efficiency of such market-based instruments since companies have the flexibility to trade allowances. However, to date there is a lack of understanding on how companies have participated in the allowance markets. This article uses data on transfers of allowances between 2005 and the end of 2007, published by the EU in the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) after a five-year delay. We use cluster analysis to detect patterns in the data and differentiate transfer behaviour. We find that the vast majority of participants (7212 accounts) are rather passive in terms of transfers. Of these, more than half are hardly participating in the market at all, whereas one-third are accounts managed by another account belonging to the parent company. Opposed to that, 143 accounts show more active, but relatively diverse transfer behaviour. We also identify differences in sectoral representations, account types, and primary allocation across the seven clusters. While the passive accounts mostly belong to installations regulated under the EU ETS, the most active accounts are classified as ‘non-regulated account type'. 相似文献
11.
This article provides an analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the harmonized benchmark-based allocation procedures by comparing two energy-intensive sectors with activities in three Member States. These sectors include the cement industry (CEI) and the pulp and paper industry (PPI) in the UK, Sweden, and France. Our results show that the new procedures are better suited for the more homogeneous CEI, in which the outcome of stricter allocation of emissions allowances is consistent between Member States. For the more heterogeneous PPI – in terms of its product portfolios, technical infrastructures, and fuel mixes – the allocation procedures lead to diverse outcomes. It is the lack of product benchmark curves, and the alternative use of benchmark values that are biased towards a fossil fuel-mix and are based on specific energy use rather than emission intensity, which leads to allocations to the PPI that do not represent the average performance of the top 10% of GHG-efficient installations. Another matter is that grandfathering is still present via the historically based production volumes. How to deal with structural change and provisions regarding capacity reductions and partial cessation is an issue that is highly relevant for the PPI but less so for the CEI.
Policy relevance
After an unprecedented amount of consultation with industrial associations and other stakeholders, a harmonized benchmark-based allocation methodology was introduced in the third trading period of the EU ETS. Establishing a reliable and robust benchmark methodology for free allocation that shields against high direct carbon costs, is perceived as fair and politically acceptable, and still incentivizes firms to take action, is a significant challenge. This article contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges in effectively applying harmonized rules in industrial sectors that are heterogeneous. This is essential for the debate on structural reformation of the EU ETS, and for sharing experiences with other emerging emissions trading systems in the world that also consider benchmark methodologies. 相似文献
12.
按照欧盟法律,自2012年1月1日起在欧盟境内起降的航班排放将被纳入欧盟排放交易系统。通过详细解读欧盟这一法律,指出欧盟排放交易体系是典型的"上限-交易"系统,即通过规定排放上限与进行配额交易实现减排目标。欧盟此举本质目的是强化气候变化主导权,最终为经济谋利,加快完善欧盟碳交易市场以建设欧元货币权力体系。其结果可能引发其与《联合国气候变化框架公约》及《京都议定书》等国际法之间的法律冲突,购买配额将对民航运输发展造成制约,"可测量、可报告和可核实"将对发展中国家能力建设提出挑战,并将一定程度影响《联合国气候变化框架公约》下的行业减排谈判走向。 相似文献
13.
Korea’s domestic emissions trading scheme commenced in January 2015. It targeted mainly industrial and power sectors, and compelled companies to transform how they manage energy efficiency and mitigate GHGs. This study sets out to explore how Korean companies evaluated their allocation position and engaged in emissions trading in the first compliance period, and to identify their views on trading barriers and policy expectations at the start of emissions trading. Questionnaire surveys and on-site interviews targeting Korean companies under the Korean emissions trading scheme were conducted at the start of operations (February to March 2015) and after the first compliance year (May 2016), respectively. Actual operation results are observed and compared with the survey findings. This study extrapolates implications for policy and presents suggestions for the government and the target companies in terms of how to improve the current emissions trading scheme in order to further stimulate emissions trading.
POLICY RELEVANCE
This study attempts to bridge the gap between companies and government policy in operating the domestic emission trading scheme in Korea. Empirical results, based on analysis of company-level data, reveal how businesses perceive K-ETS and how this relates to the operating results, which saw only limited trading of surplus emissions taking place in the early phase. Key barriers to active trading identified in the study include supply–demand imbalance, policy uncertainty and lack of preparedness of companies over carbon pricing. These barriers could be addressed by improved transparency of allowance allocation methods, possibly restricting carry-over of surplus allowances, ending policy uncertainty and providing more information to companies that can support companies’ policy understanding of the carbon pricing based on the market mechanism. Targeted companies should proactively participate in emissions trading in the early phase, in order to learn from it and prepare for the future introduction of auctioning. 相似文献
14.
Stefano F. Verde Jordi Teixidó Claudio Marcantonini Xavier Labandeira 《Climate Policy》2019,19(4):439-452
This paper analyses the rules for free allocation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The analysis draws on the empirical evidence emerging from two literature strands. One group of studies sheds light on the following questions: how efficient are free allocation rules in minimizing the risk of carbon leakage? Have they become more efficient over the trading periods? What are the technical limits to making them more efficient? Further: is firm behaviour affected by allowance allocation? Did specific provisions induce strategic behaviour with unintended effects? Studies from the second group estimate sectoral pass-through rates for the costs imposed by the EU ETS. Taking cost pass-through into account is necessary for properly targeting free allocation. The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability, especially in manufacturing sectors (due to limited data availability and market heterogeneity), is the main hindrance to achieving further efficiency in allowance allocation. The new rules defined in the reform for Phase IV (2021–2030) nevertheless make some progress in this direction.Key policy insights
The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability is the main hindrance to efficient free allocation in minimizing carbon leakage risk.
In Phase IV (2021–2030), carbon leakage risk will be assessed more accurately thanks to: a) carbon intensity and trade intensity considered together through a combined indicator; b) possible use of more disaggregated data, and c) possible consideration of complementary qualitative assessments of abatement potential, market characteristics and profit margins.
It is expected that benchmarked allocation introduced in Phase III (2013–2020) has induced additional emission abatement, but there is still a lack of empirical evidence.
15.
The establishment of a carbon market assumes that there is an effective means of transforming price information into technical carbon reduction measures. However, empirical evidence reveals that the links between price information and carbon management strategies are far from obvious. To understand how delegating CO2 responsibility affects CO2 trading behaviour, this article proposes a neo-institutionalist approach to answering the question of why companies became sellers, buyers or a combination of both during phase I of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Original data from a survey on companies that participated in this scheme were collected and analysed. It was assumed that the trading scheme offered two ways to delegate decisions regarding emissions trading: decoupling from technical knowledge and financialization (i.e. delegating to financial departments) or coupling using technicalization (i.e. delegating to manufacturing departments). The results support the hypothesis that a company that adopts a decoupling strategy is more likely to buy certificates to fulfil their emissions targets. Adopting a coupling strategy indicates that a company is more likely to become a seller, all else equal. Professional identity is the theoretical basis for this relationship. Delegating carbon management to different departments represents either a stronger coupling or a stronger decoupling from core technological processes.Policy relevanceThe transaction data from phase I of the EU ETS open new questions and possibilities regarding the reasons that drive selling and buying in companies. It is important to look not only at the traditional sources of transaction costs, but rather also at the reasons for these tensions. One important source is the professional education of the people in charge of the EU ETS. Tailored information that directly addresses the different professional backgrounds of managers working in both financial departments and more technical departments might help to lower these types of transaction costs. In today's context, important emitter countries, such as China and Korea, have launched their own emissions markets, copying many aspects of the EU ETS. For the positive development of these markets and as a way of establishing a global emissions market, these new schemes should learn from the EU ETS experience. 相似文献
16.
As the number of instruments applied in the area of energy and climate policy is rising, the issue of policy interaction needs to be explored further. This article analyses the interdependencies between the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the German feed-in tariffs (FITs) for renewable electricity in a quantitative manner using a bottom-up energy system model. Flexible modelling approaches are presented for both instruments, with which all impacts on the energy system can be evaluated endogenously. It is shown that national climate policy measures can have an effect on the supranational emissions trading system by increasing emission reduction in the German electricity sector by up to 79 MtCO2 in 2030. As a result, emission certificate prices decline by between 1.9 €/tCO2 and 6.1 €/tCO2 and the burden sharing between participating countries changes, but no additional emission reduction is achieved at the European level. This also implies, however, that the cost efficiency of such a cap-and-trade system is distorted, with additional costs of the FIT system of up to €320 billion compared with lower costs for ETS emission certificates of between €44 billion and €57 billion (cumulated over the period 2013–2020).Policy relevanceIn order to fulfil ambitious emission reduction targets a large variety of climate policy instruments are being implemented in Europe. While some, like the EU ETS, directly address CO2 emissions, others aim to promote specific low-carbon technologies. The quantitative analysis of the interactions between the EU ETS and the German FIT scheme for renewable sources in electricity generation presented in this article helps to understand the importance of such interaction effects. Even though justifications can be found for the implementation of both types of instrument, the impact of the widespread use of support mechanisms for renewable electricity in Europe needs to be taken into account when fixing the reduction targets for the EU ETS in order to ensure a credible long-term investment signal. 相似文献
17.
This article presents the case of a policy invention where various kinds of entrepreneurship and a window of opportunity played important roles. In 2008 the EU adopted a new Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) policy with an inventive funding instrument at its core: the NER 300 fund, based on revenues from the auctioning of emissions trading allowances. Thus far, the literature on policy entrepreneurs has focused more on success factors that enable particular persons to be especially influential than on the defining characteristics of entrepreneurship. We contribute to the literature on entrepreneurship and windows of opportunity by distinguishing two entrepreneurial techniques – framing and procedural engineering – and two categories of commitment – ‘tortoise’ and carpe diem. We conclude that ‘tortoises’ who contributed to creating the broad and general climate policy window paved the way for issue-specific carpe diemers who promoted the more specific NER 300 policy invention. Furthermore, we distinguish and discuss four different entrepreneurship mechanisms that may influence policy invention processes. 相似文献
18.
Tao Pang 《Climate Policy》2016,16(7):815-835
Seven emissions trading scheme (ETS) pilots have been established in China. They have introduced some unique methods to set emissions caps and allocate allowances, different from textbook models and their counterparts in the EU, California, and many other regions. This article provides a detailed introduction to the methods for cap setting and allowance allocation adopted by the pilots, and presents detailed comparisons of these methods. In terms of cap setting, the pilots adopt flexible caps that can be adjusted where necessary, which primarily depends on the outcomes of the bottom-up approach, namely aggregating the allowances allocated to participants. As for allowance allocation, the pilots not only adopt such methods as grandfathering and benchmarking, which are also widely applied in other existing schemes, but also some special methods that require ex post adjustment, such as those based on enterprises’ historical emissions intensity (including both physical quantity and added-value intensity) and current production/output. The factors influencing the design are further analysed, including the impacts of theory and experience from foreign systems, concerns about economic development, traditions regarding intensity targets and policy, constraints from data availability and preparation time, tight regulation of the electricity and heat generation sector, and concerns regarding price stability. The practice of pilots presents an improvement opportunity and a challenge for China to further balance the theoretical and practical requirements in ETS design in establishing its national system.
Policy relevance
China is piloting emissions trading in seven regions, as part of efforts to try to rely more on market-based instruments to achieve GHG emissions control targets. All seven pilots have been confronted with special issues in the design process when compared with existing foreign schemes. This article analyses in depth the special issues related to cap setting and allowance allocation and the approaches adopted to address these issues. Flexible cap setting through a bottom-up approach and different types of allocation methods with or without ex post adjustment are adopted in the pilots. The flexible and innovative approaches the pilots have developed could provide useful experience for designing the nationwide ETS in China and promoting emissions trading policy in other parts of the world. 相似文献
19.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):87-102
Alternative mechanisms for EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) quota allocations within the Romanian economy were evaluated using a general equilibrium model within a dynamic intertemporal framework. Several distribution rules were simulated based on: the historical emissions, the least-cost approach, and the auctioning scheme with and without a preliminary selection of eligible sectors. We found that the resulting marginal abatement cost in ETS-eligible sectors is only €5.75/tCO2 for reducing pollution by 20.7%. Such a low cost is explained by low energy prices and by substitution possibilities with low carbon content resources (nuclear and hydroelectricity). Including all sectors in the trade creates a more flexible market than in the ETS, since more reduction options are available. The ETS has high feasibility for monitoring. All eligible sectors (except refineries and metallurgy) present the lowest abatement costs in the economy. Auctioning introduces a strong carbon price signal, which reduces emission intensity but creates distortions in terms of trade and worsens the country's energy dependency. Environmental policy has modest macroeconomic results and tends to correct the resources allocation. The strong double dividend obtained under certain circumstances indicates Romania's potential for improving its energy efficiency and carbon intensity. 相似文献
20.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):137-148
Abstract Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries. This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end. 相似文献