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1.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):588-606
The regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector within a cap-and-trade system poses significant policy questions on where to locate the point of compliance. Electricity markets often cross national or other regulatory boundaries, so that electricity generated within the boundary may comply with expectations but imported electricity may not. The question addressed in this article is where to locate the point of compliance in the electricity sector—where in the supply chain linking fuel suppliers to generators to the transmission system to retail load-serving entities should the obligation for measurement and compliance be placed? This problem is examined in the specific context of California's legislative requirements and particular energy markets, with the implications of the different policy options explored. The conclusion offered is that one particular approach to regulating the electricity sector—the ‘first-seller approach’—would be best for California. The alternative ‘load-based approach’ has had a head start in the policy process but would undermine an economy-wide market-based emissions trading programme. 相似文献
2.
Controlling GHG emissions from the transportation sector through an ETS: institutional arrangements in Shenzhen,China 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Many different approaches are needed to achieve reductions in GHG emissions from the transportation sector. Carbon emissions trading schemes (ETSs) are widely used in industry and are effective in reducing the overall social cost of emissions abatement. This article reports the development of a downstream ETS for the transportation sector and its application in Shenzhen, China. The ETS was devised as a mandatory cap-and-trade scheme and, as a first step, was applied to public transportation. An integrated cap was set on the total emissions from buses and taxis: an absolute cap for existing vehicles and a relative increment for new entrants. Allowances were allocated by grandfathering or benchmarking and a ‘reverse mechanism’ was established to encourage the transformation of urban transportation to a low-carbon system. Online fuel consumption monitoring was used to quantify the emissions from vehicles, and the operators were required to surrender enough allowances or credits to account for their verified annual emissions. The mechanisms for allowance trading and carbon offsets provided sufficient flexibility to make emissions abatement and the use of new-energy vehicles and environmentally friendly travel within Shenzhen's urban transportation system economically attractive.
Policy relevance
The transportation sector is becoming a major contributor to the growth in China's GHG emissions. Achieving large reductions in GHG emissions from the transportation sector is a great challenge and requires both technology and policy innovation. The tradable carbon permit is a popular concept in mitigating climate change, but the introduction of a cap-and-trade ETS into the transportation sector is a relatively innovative concept. Shenzhen has launched the first cap-and-trade ETS in a developing country and is currently exploring ways to mitigate carbon emissions by a downstream cap-and-trade ETS for the transportation sector. This article considers the main institutional arrangements and regulatory framework of Shenzhen's transportation carbon ETS. It not only refreshes the theoretical analysis and practical application of downstream cap-and-trade carbon emissions trading in urban transportation, but also provides developing countries with a cost-effective instrument to mitigate their rapid growth in traffic carbon emissions during urbanization. 相似文献
3.
Over the last decade, cap-and-trade emissions schemes have emerged as one of the favoured policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions. An inherent design feature of cap-and-trade schemes is that, once the cap on emissions has been set, no additional reductions beyond this level can be provided by the actions of those individuals, organizations and governments within the covered sectors. Thus, the emissions cap constitutes an emissions floor. This feature has been claimed by some to have undesirable implications, in that it discourages ethically motivated mitigation actions and preempts the possibility that local, state and national governments can take additional mitigation action in the context of weak national or regional targets. These criticisms have become prominent in Australia and the US within the public debate regarding the adoption of an emissions trading scheme (ETS). These criticisms and their potential solutions are reviewed. A set-aside reserve is proposed to automatically retire ETS permits, which would correspond to verified and additional emissions reductions. This minimizes the possibility that ethically motivated mitigation actions are discouraged, allows for additional action by other levels of government, while providing transparency to other market participants on the level of permit retirements. 相似文献
4.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):731-751
Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price. 相似文献
5.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):813-828
A novel approach is described for limiting transport emissions through a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme, whereby local governments would be the participants of emissions trading. It is proposed that emissions trading for passenger road transport has the effect of channelling the carbon costs away from fuel prices to land use costs. A ‘municipal emissions trading scheme’ could achieve this—local governments would have to cover vehicle traffic emissions generated by homes, businesses and industry on their territory. Municipalities are able to participate in an emissions trading scheme because they have planning control over development on their territory, and could control the amount of future vehicular traffic. Through planning, municipalities have access to a wide range of strategies to minimize transport emissions. Municipal emissions can be calculated as a share of total national road transport emissions with the help of a gravity model of traffic attraction. A municipal emissions trading system would result in capping and controlling passenger road transport emissions, not through raising fuel prices or importing credits, but by enforcing prudent and climate-efficient urban planning practices. 相似文献
6.
This article analyses the implementation of emissions trading systems (ETSs) in eight jurisdictions: the EU, Switzerland, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California in the US, Québec in Canada, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and pilot schemes in China. The article clarifies what is working, what isn’t and why, when it comes to the practice of implementing an ETS. The eight ETSs are evaluated against five main criteria: environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, market management, revenue management and stakeholder engagement. Within each of these categories, ETS attributes ? including abatement cost, stringency of the cap, improved allocation practices over time and the trajectory of price stability ? are assessed for each system. Institutional learning, administrative prudence, appropriate carbon revenue management and stakeholder engagement are identified as key ingredients for successful ETS regimes. Recent implementation of ETSs in regions including California, Québec and South Korea indicates significant institutional learning from prior systems, especially the EU ETS, with these regions implementing more robust administrative and regulatory structures suitable for handling unique national and sub-national opportunities and constraints. The analysis also shows that there is potential for a ‘double dividend’ in emissions reductions even with a modest carbon price, provided the cap tightens over time and a portion of the auctioned revenues are reinvested in other emissions-reduction activities. Knowledge gaps exist in understanding the interaction of pricing instruments with other climate policy instruments and how governments manage these policies to achieve optimum emissions reductions with lower administrative costs.Key policy insights
Countries are learning from each other on ETS implementation.
Administrative and regulatory structures of ETS jurisdictions appear to evolve and become more robust in every ETS analysed.
A ‘double dividend’ for emissions reductions may also exist in cases where mitigation occurs as a result of the ETS policy and when auction revenues are reinvested in other emissions-reduction activities.
7.
ZHONGXIANG ZHANG 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):166-170
Although many economic studies suggest that China would reap significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime, China has consistently refused to participate in international negotiations on this issue. Understanding China's underlying concerns is a key to explaining why China has not embraced an international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. This is explored as a potential basis for including China in future negotiations and schemes. This issue is considered from the following perspectives that impact upon China: (a) fairness: how do developing countries perceive emissions caps? (b) why have China and India been sceptical about international emissions trading? (c) what would China's political perceptions be of an inflow of CDM investment in comparison with the exports of emissions permits to the USA? (d) what are the implications of ‘lock in’ to an emissions cap, particularly when no rules and principles exist for setting emissions targets for post-2012? (e) the complex question of establishing future emissions caps for developing countries. 相似文献
8.
This article uses a policy analogy approach to explore China's attitude toward the possibility of global carbon market integration, including the development of a common cap-and-trade market for the global civil aviation industry. Like in other foreign policy domains, in international cap-and-trade, China faces a ‘trilemma’ between carbon market integration, state sovereignty and policy flexibility. By referring to how China has approached a comparable trilemma in foreign exchange policy making, we analyse China's possible stance on international cap-and-trade. We argue that China will prefer to gradually establish and strengthen, to a limited extent, intergovernmental governance mechanisms, which allow nation-states to prioritize sovereignty and policy flexibility in carbon trading policy making. In the conclusion we use this argument to explain China's responses to the carbon-trading initiatives of Australia, the EU, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Bank.Policy relevanceThe international community has reached a consensus on the use of market mechanisms for mitigating climate change. While opposing the EU's plan to include Chinese airlines in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, China has started to co-explore with Australia the possibility of linking their carbon markets, and has adopted a supportive attitude toward the carbon trading initiatives led by the ICAO and the World Bank. Considering China's status as the largest emitting country of GHGs and its interdependence with major developed and developing countries, China's substantial participation would be crucial to the success of the global market-based efforts to reduce GHG emissions. This article presents an initial attempt to develop a better understanding of China's stance on international cap-and-trade. 相似文献
9.
Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on how to mitigate climate change. The current carbon leakage literature focuses largely on industrial production, and less attention has been given to carbon leakage from the electricity sector (the largest source of carbon emissions in China). Moreover, very few studies have examined in detail electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading system (which leads, for example, to double counting) or addressed its implications for potential linkage between the EU and Chinese emissions trading systems (ETSs). This article seeks to fill this gap by analysing the problem of ‘carbon leakage’ from the electricity sector under the China ETS. Specifically, a Law & Economics approach is applied to scrutinize legal documents on electricity/carbon regulation and examine the economic incentive structures of stakeholders in the inter-/intra-regional electricity markets. Two forms of ‘electricity carbon leakage’ are identified and further supported by legal evidence and practical cases. Moreover, the article assesses the environmental and economic implications for the EU of potential linkage between the world’s two largest ETSs. In response, policy suggestions are proposed to address electricity carbon leakage, differentiating leakage according to its sources.
Key policy insights
Electricity carbon leakage in China remains a serious issue that has yet to receive sufficient attention.
Such leakage arises from the current electricity/carbon regulatory framework in China and jeopardizes mitigation efforts.
With the US retreat on climate efforts, evidence suggests that EU officials are looking to China and expect an expanded carbon market to reinforce EU global climate leadership.
Given that the Chinese ETS will be twice the size of the EU ETS, a small amount of carbon leakage in China could have significant repercussions. Electricity carbon leakage should thus be considered in any future EU–China linking negotiations.
10.
Sharon Mascher 《Climate Policy》2018,18(8):1012-1027
The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change is designed to put Canada on track to meet its Paris commitments. A key pillar of the plan is the introduction of a pan-Canadian carbon price by the end of 2018. However, four Canadian provinces, nearly 85% of the Canadian economy and population, have already implemented carbon pricing systems. British Columbia (BC) has a carbon tax. Alberta is transitioning from an output-based allocation system for industrial emitters to a hybrid system combining a carbon levy and refined output-based system. Québec and Ontario have implemented cap-and-trade systems, linked to California. Recognizing these existing systems, rather than impose a single carbon pricing mechanism, the Pan-Canadian Approach to Carbon Pricing gives provinces and territories the flexibility to adopt a carbon tax, a hybrid system, or a cap-and-trade system. To address concerns relating to ‘fairness’ and equivalency of carbon price, a federal carbon pricing benchmark establishes criteria relating to minimum ‘common scope’ and ‘increases in stringency’ that provincial and territorial carbon pricing systems must meet. This article explores the design features of the existing Alberta, BC, Ontario and Québec carbon pricing systems, and considers how the benchmark affects stringency and addresses equivalency of carbon price across these different systems.
Key policy insights
Canada is taking advantage of its federal structure of government to introduce a minimum pan-Canadian carbon price of $10/tCO2e in 2018, rising by $10/year to $50/tCO2e in 2022.
Rather than imposing a uniform pricing mechanism, the Canadian federal government is recognizing existing subnational carbon pricing mechanisms with very different design features – BC’s carbon tax, Québec and Ontario’s cap-and-trade systems, and Alberta’s hybrid system – to deliver the pan-Canadian carbon price.
In order to deliver a minimum level of increasing stringency and to address issues of equivalency of carbon price across sub-national jurisdictions, the federal government is in the early stages of implementing a federal carbon-pricing benchmark.
The lessons learned from the Canadian experience will be relevant to harmonizing carbon pricing systems across both other federal jurisdictions and countries.
11.
Junko Mochizuki 《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):1337-1349
After years of discussions and trials, Japan's domestic emissions trading scheme remains purely voluntary. The newly elected Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has taken a firmer stance on climate change, initially intending to establish a nationwide mandatory cap-and-trade as early as 2011. This has promoted several questions regarding the possible designs and feasibility of such a scheme. This article describes the key features of the two trial schemes implemented, thus far, assesses the effectiveness of their implementation and discusses what will be the likely areas of contention should the Japanese government introduce a mandatory cap-and-trade in the future. The analyses indicate that the initial years of ‘Japan's Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme’ (JVETS) implementation have shown positive performance, although its scale has remained limited. The ‘Trial Implementation of an Integrated Domestic Market for Emissions Trading’ emerged as a hybrid scheme, one that incorporated varying interests. Significant institutional developments have taken place in recent years, however the effectiveness of the present trial scheme also seems restricted. 相似文献
12.
Abstract A process for reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries has been initiated under the UNFCCC. Efforts to agree on a legally binding instrument to halt deforestation have previously failed in other international fora. The magnitude of the social, economic, technical and political complexities underlying deforestation have led to negotiations being challenging. What policy instruments could provide incentives to reduce deforestation, and how could these instruments be framed, under the UNFCCC? This article analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the available alternatives within and outside of the Kyoto Protocol. Staying within the Kyoto framework means low institutional development costs, established but limited incentives for action, and low flexibility. Alternatives outside the Protocol provide higher institutional development costs, uncertainties with regard to the incentives, but greater flexibility. We argue that a separate protocol may be the most viable option, as it could offer the necessary flexibility and avoid some technical and political pitfalls that would be likely to beset new efforts under the Kyoto Protocol. The article also presents the concept of ‘committed forests’ as a means of defining geographically where the reduction of emissions from deforestation can take place. 相似文献
13.
Takeshi Kuramochi Jusen Asuka Hanna Fekete Kentaro Tamura Niklas Höhne 《Climate Policy》2016,16(8):1029-1047
This article assesses Japan's carbon budgets up to 2100 in the global efforts to achieve the 2?°C target under different effort-sharing approaches based on long-term GHG mitigation scenarios published in 13 studies. The article also presents exemplary emission trajectories for Japan to stay within the calculated budget.The literature data allow for an in-depth analysis of four effort-sharing categories. For a 450?ppm CO2e stabilization level, the remaining carbon budgets for 2014–2100 were negative for the effort-sharing category that emphasizes historical responsibility and capability. For the other three, including the reference ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, which showed the highest budget range among all categories, the calculated remaining budgets (20th and 80th percentile ranges) would run out in 21–29 years if the current emission levels were to continue. A 550?ppm CO2e stabilization level increases the budgets by 6–17 years-equivalent of the current emissions, depending on the effort-sharing category. Exemplary emissions trajectories staying within the calculated budgets were also analysed for ‘Equality’, ‘Staged’ and ‘Cost-effectiveness’ categories. For a 450?ppm CO2e stabilization level, Japan's GHG emissions would need to phase out sometime between 2045 and 2080, and the emission reductions in 2030 would be at least 16–29% below 1990 levels even for the most lenient ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, and 29–36% for the ‘Equality’ category. The start year for accelerated emissions reductions and the emissions convergence level in the long term have major impact on the emissions reduction rates that need to be achieved, particularly in the case of smaller budgets.Policy relevanceIn previous climate mitigation target formulation processes for 2020 and 2030 in Japan, neither equity principles nor long-term management of cumulative GHG emissions was at the centre of discussion. This article quantitatively assesses how much more GHGs Japan can emit by 2100 to achieve the 2?°C target in light of different effort-sharing approaches, and how Japan's GHG emissions can be managed up to 2100. The long-term implications of recent energy policy developments following the Fukushima nuclear disaster for the calculated carbon budgets are also discussed. 相似文献
14.
Because of large economic and environmental asymmetries among world regions and the incentive to free ride, an international climate regime with broad participation is hard to reach. Most of the proposed regimes are based on an allocation of emissions rights that is perceived as fair. Yet, there are also arguments to focus more on the actual welfare implications of different regimes and to focus on a ‘fair’ distribution of resulting costs. In this article, the computable general equilibrium model DART is used to analyse the driving forces of welfare implications in different scenarios in line with the 2?°C target. These include two regimes that are often presumed to be ‘fair’, namely a harmonized international carbon tax and a cap and trade system based on the convergence of per capita emissions rights, and also an ‘equal loss’ scenario where welfare losses relative to a business-as-usual scenario are equal for all major world regions. The main finding is that indirect energy market effects are a major driver of welfare effects and that the ‘equal loss’ scenario would thus require large transfer payments to energy exporters to compensate for welfare losses from lower world energy demand and prices.Policy relevanceA successful future climate regime requires ‘fair’ burden sharing. Many proposed regimes start from ethical considerations to derive an allocation of emissions reduction requirements or emissions allowances within an international emissions trading scheme. Yet, countries also consider the expected economic costs of a regime that are also driven by other factors besides allowance allocation. Indeed, in simplified lab experiments, successful groups are characterized by sharing costs proportional to wealth. This article shows that the major drivers of welfare effects are reduced demand for fossil energy and reduced fossil fuel prices, which implies that (1) what is often presumed to be a fair allocation of emissions allowances within an international emissions trading scheme leads to a very uneven distribution of economic costs and (2) aiming for equal relative losses for all regions requires large compensation to fossil fuel exporters, as argued, for example, by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 相似文献
15.
Sergey Paltsev Valerie Karplus Henry Chen Ioanna Karkatsouli John Reilly Henry Jacoby 《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):438-457
Passenger vehicles and power plants are major sources of GHG emissions. While economic analyses generally indicate that a broader market-based approach to GHG reduction would be less costly and more effective, regulatory approaches have found greater political success. We evaluate a global regulatory regime that replaces coal with natural gas in the electricity sector and imposes technically achievable improvements in the efficiency of personal transport vehicles. Its performance and cost are compared with other scenarios of future policy development including a no-policy world, achievements under the Copenhagen Accord, and a price-based policy to reduce global emissions by 50% by 2050. The assumed regulations applied globally achieve a global emissions reduction larger than projected for the Copenhagen agreements, but they do not prevent global GHG emissions from continuing to grow. The reduction in emissions is achieved at a high cost compared to a price-based policy. Diagnosis of the reasons for the limited yet high-cost performance reveals influences including the partial coverage of emitting sectors, small or no influence on the demand for emissions-intensive products, leakage when a reduction in fossil use in the covered sectors lowers the price to others, and the partial coverage of GHGs. If these regulatory measures are in part correcting other barriers or behavioural limitations consumers face, the benefits of overcoming these could offset at least some of the costs we estimate. The extent of any efficiency gap – the difference between engineering estimates of best practice and what actually happens – is highly contested, and offers an important avenue for future research.Policy relevanceWhile analysts concerned with national cost of GHG control have long advocated a GHG pricing policy, by a cap-and-trade system or a tax, covering all emissions sources and gases, governments more often pursue sectoral policies and technology standards. Given these political realities, the regulations represent a more politically practical approach to GHG reductions, focusing on solutions that are within reach and that do not depend on technological breakthroughs. If regulations are imposed as a way to get started on larger emissions reductions, and then combined with a broader GHG pricing policy pursuing a deep global cut in emissions, its requirements will eventually be overtaken by the pricing policy. The remaining higher costs of the regulatory targets become diluted so that in later years the difference in average cost per ton between a least-cost approach and one preceded by a period of regulatory action becomes very small. 相似文献
16.
Robert MacNeil 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):259-276
Although it is likely that the political–economic coalition required for implementing a federal cap-and-trade programme for GHGs in the US is now sufficiently strong, the structural impediments that have prevented its legislative passage remain impressively durable and can be expected to continue to lay waste to congressional proposals for the foreseeable future. Indeed, given the complex history of environmental policy gridlock in Washington since the early 1980s, any expectations that a cap-and-trade programme could have been realistically achieved through the traditional legislative passage in Congress are fundamentally misplaced. Building on previous research, it is argued that – as with most other forms of environmental policy in the US over the past three decades – a national carbon market is more plausible given alternative policy pathways, which if taken are capable of circumventing the Federal Congress altogether. In particular, the interaction between litigation against the federal government and the ‘rulemaking’ authority possessed by the Executive Branch provides the potential space for the current administration to unilaterally establish a model rule for a national carbon-trading programme. Policy relevance This article aims to contribute to American climate policy debates by re-thinking the policy mechanisms most capable of establishing a national carbon market in the US. By taking into account the array of structural factors that have prevented the legislative passage of such a programme in federal Congress, a range of alternative policy ‘pathways’ is considered that have historically allowed progressive environmental policies to endure in Washington (despite increased Congressional gridlock over the past few decades). Two specific alternative strategies and the relationship between them are assessed: the use of litigation to impose legal obligations on federal agencies to regulate effluents, and the use of executive authority to define the nature and scope of environmental regulation. The administration's current potential to unilaterally develop a model-rule for a cap-and-trade programme under the Clean Air Act is emphasized, and the political implications of such a strategy are considered. 相似文献
17.
Joseph Szarka 《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):627-638
Abstract To comply with the Kyoto Protocol, signatory nations have implemented a policy template of reducing greenhouse gas emissions mainly from the electricity generation and heavy industry sectors. This article shows how, in the case of France, a policy style based on ‘environmental meso-corporatism’ has largely exhausted this ‘standard recipe’. To consider how far France has developed fresh solutions, two phases of climate policy-making in the 2000s are analysed. Increased recourse to new environmental policy instruments is identified, but implemented through the institutional routines of ‘environmental meso-corporatism’. The article argues that although this policy style has proved relatively well adapted to regulating the technologies of production, it has little purchase on cultures of consumption within the residential and transport sectors. Faced with new challenges, policymakers have proved better equipped to reform policy content than policy style. But France shows some reluctance to resolve the problem of limited policy reach. 相似文献
18.
为了适应气候变化,中国作为世界上产生碳排放最多的国家,正在从多方面制定减少碳排放的计划,并提出了2060年实现碳中和的目标。随着贸易全球化,全球其他国家消费的排放越来越多地在中国生产。国家间的贸易条件受政策影响很大,关税的高低会导致商品的贸易出现变化,进而导致进出口商品包含排放的变化。本文结合中美两国的贸易冲突,对中美两国加征关税后的贸易变化进行模拟,结合全球贸易分析模型的结果与投入产出分析法,定量地研究了关税变动后中国进出口隐含排放的变化。研究发现,在中美加征关税后,中美两国的贸易量大幅减少,并导致两国贸易涉及的排放变少,而中国向世界出口的排放反而有所增加。另外,由于进口市场被冲击,中国从全世界进口的排放明显变少,进而导致中国净出口的碳排放在加征关税后变多,且集中于能源密集型产业。从结果看,中国在贸易受限的情况下依旧向世界出口了大量排放,通过贸易合作来促进新能源产业的进步或许可以更好地解决减排需求。 相似文献
19.
Raphael Trotignon 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):273-287
Linking a cap-and-trade with an offset mechanism has many theoretical advantages: it reduces compliance costs, extends the price signal outside the cap-and-trade, and triggers technology transfer. However, it is feared that such linking will induce outsourcing of emissions reduction at a low price and undermine the price incentive in the cap-and-trade. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the first full-scale example of a cap-and-trade system linked to project-based mechanisms such that offsets have effectively been used by industrial installations. This article is an ex post analysis of EU ETS data for the years 2008 and 2009, and the characteristics of the link and its efficiency are evaluated. Although offsets have been much used, their use is concentrated and not very intense or frequent, which allays the fear that offsets will flood the market. Although the majority of surrendered CERs effectively come from the largest and oldest projects, the credits surrendered are similar to those available on the market. Possible factors that contribute towards inefficiency are the rules for using offsets, transaction costs affecting the participation of small installations, awareness and openness to market-based instruments, and uncertainties regarding CERs offer and demand from other markets. However, the impact on EUA equilibrium price still needs to be quantified. 相似文献
20.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(5):494-515
A sectoral approach to GHG emissions reductions in developing countries is proposed as a key component of the post-2012 climate change mitigation framework. In this approach, the ten highest-emitting developing countries in the electricity and other major industrial sectors pledge to meet voluntary, ‘no-lose’ GHG emissions targets in these sectors. No penalties are incurred for failing to meet a target, but emissions reductions achieved beyond the target level earn emissions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be sold to industrialized nations. Participating developing countries establish initial ‘no-lose’ emissions targets, based upon their national circumstances, from sector-specific energyintensity benchmarks that have been developed by independent experts. Industrialized nations then offer incentives for the developing countries to adopt more stringent emissions targets through a ‘Technology Finance and Assistance Package’, which helps to overcome financial and other barriers to technology transfer and deployment. These sectorspecific energy-intensity benchmarks could also serve as a means for establishing national economy-wide targets in developed countries in the post-2012 regime. Preliminary modelling of a hybrid scenario, in which Annex I countries adopt economy-wide absolute GHG emissions targets and high-emitting developing countries adopt ‘no-lose’ sectoral targets, indicates that such an approach significantly improves the likelihood that atmospheric concentrations of CO2 can be stabilized at 450 ppmv by the end of the century. 相似文献