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1.
Abstract This article describes a new concept for an international climate regime for differentiation of future commitments: the ‘common but differentiated convergence’ approach (CDC). Under CDC, Annex-I countries' per-capita emission allowances converge within a convergence period to a low level. Individual non-Annex-I countries' allowances converge to the same level also within the same period (‘common convergence’), but starting when their per-capita emissions are a certain percentage above global average (‘differentiated’). Until then they may voluntarily take on ‘positively binding’ targets. This approach eliminates two concerns often voiced in relation to gradually converging per-capita emissions: (i) advanced developing countries have their commitment to reduce emissions delayed and their targets are not the same as Annex-I countries with equal per-capita emissions; (ii) CDC does not provide excess emission allowances to the least developing countries. Under CDC, stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 and 650 ppm CO2-equivalent can be reached with participation at roughly 0% and 50% above global average and convergence to around 3 and 4.5 tCO2-eq/cap within 40 years. Even if the CDC approach is not implemented in its entirety, it is possible that the step-by-step decisions on the international climate regime can be guided by the principles provided in the CDC approach. 相似文献
2.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):137-148
Abstract Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries. This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end. 相似文献
3.
Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries.This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end. 相似文献
4.
This paper uses the OECD’s global recursive-dynamic general equilibrium model ENVLinkages to examine the mid-term economic consequences and the optimal energy supply mix adjustments of a simultaneous implementation of i) a progressive fossil fuel subsidy reform in emerging and developing economies and ii) a progressive phase out of nuclear energy, mostly affecting OECD countries, China and Russia. The analysis is then transposed in the context of climate change mitigation to depict the corresponding implications for CO2 emissions, to assess the interactions between the two energy policies, and to derive how the associated costs are affected by the different policies. The phase-out scenario projects a nuclear capacity halved by 2035 as compared to the Baseline, corresponding to $120 billion losses in value-added of the nuclear industry for that year. The nuclear phase-out leaves GDP and real household consumption marginally affected in energy importing countries. A multilateral subsidy reform is more likely to affect international fossil fuel prices and alter patterns of global energy use. The fossil fuel subsidy reform, when implemented together with nuclear phase-out, more than offsets negative consequences on household consumption but still leads to a decrease in global CO2 emissions. The combined policies help save the equivalent of current energy consumption in the Middle East. Combining a climate policy, an effective fossil fuel subsidy reform, even with a lower nuclear share in the power mix, brings about multiple benefits to OECD countries which reduce their energy bill and achieve large climate change mitigation at lower cost. 相似文献
5.
Erick Lachapelle 《Climate Policy》2013,13(5):547-571
Patterns of national climate policy performance and their implications for the geopolitics of climate change are examined. An overview of levels of emissions performance across countries is first provided. Substantial changes in emissions trends over time are documented, notably with GHG emissions trajectories, which are shaped less and less by the developed/developing country divide. Various patterns of policy convergence and divergence in the types of policies states implement are then surveyed. Four broad types of explanation that may account for these trends are then explored: (1) variation in the institutional form of country-level governance regimes, (2) patterns of dependence on fossil fuel energy, (3) broad systemic differences among states (specifically in their population densities, carbon intensity, and per capita incomes, and (4) variations in the traditions of economic intervention by states. The article contributes to the growing body of work on comparative climate policy, and provides a first attempt at exploring the comparative politics of instrument choice. The analysis challenges the continued importance of a North–South divide for the future of climate policy, thus reinforcing a sense of the ‘new geopolitics’ of climate change. Some of the implications of the analysis for debates about the form of future international agreement on mitigation policy are also explored. Policy relevance The article contributes to the understanding of the variety of institutional conditions under which policy makers develop policy and thus the constraints and opportunities for the design of international agreements under these conditions. 相似文献
6.
Michael Jakob Gunnar Luderer Jan Steckel Massimo Tavoni Stephanie Monjon 《Climatic change》2012,114(1):79-99
This paper compares the results of the three state of the art climate-energy-economy models IMACLIM-R, ReMIND-R, and WITCH to assess the costs of climate change mitigation in scenarios in which the implementation of a global climate agreement is delayed or major emitters decide to participate in the agreement at a later stage only. We find that for stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450?ppm CO2-only, postponing a global agreement to 2020 raises global mitigation costs by at least about half and a delay to 2030 renders ambitious climate targets infeasible to achieve. In the standard policy scenario??in which allocation of emission permits is aimed at equal per-capita levels in the year 2050??regions with above average emissions (such as the EU and the US alongside the rest of Annex-I countries) incur lower mitigation costs by taking early action, even if mitigation efforts in the rest of the world experience a delay. However, regions with low per-capita emissions which are net exporters of emission permits (such as India) can possibly benefit from higher future carbon prices resulting from a delay. We illustrate the economic mechanism behind these observations and analyze how (1) lock-in of carbon intensive infrastructure, (2) differences in global carbon prices, and (3) changes in reduction commitments resulting from delayed action influence mitigation costs. 相似文献
7.
This paper assesses regional abatement action and costs for two scenarios in which atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations
stabilise at 450 and 550 ppm CO2-equivalent. It evaluates two allocation schemes: Multi-Stage and Contraction & Convergence. It was found that abatement costs
as percentages of GDP vary significantly by region, with high costs for the Middle East and the former Soviet Union, medium
costs for the OECD regions and low costs or even gains for (other) developing regions. In addition to the abatement costs
they incur, fossil-fuel-exporting regions are also likely to be affected by losses of coal and oil exports while the former
Soviet Union and South America could experience increased bio-energy exports. Especially in the former Soviet Union and Asia,
non-CO2 abatement options are important in the short term in reducing their emissions. Carbon capture and storage, energy efficiency
improvements, bio-energy use and the use of renewables dominate reductions in the long term in all regions. It was found that
the regional costs are influenced more by the assumed stabilisation level and baseline scenario than by the allocation regimes
explored or the assumptions for different technologies. 相似文献
8.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(5):494-515
A sectoral approach to GHG emissions reductions in developing countries is proposed as a key component of the post-2012 climate change mitigation framework. In this approach, the ten highest-emitting developing countries in the electricity and other major industrial sectors pledge to meet voluntary, ‘no-lose’ GHG emissions targets in these sectors. No penalties are incurred for failing to meet a target, but emissions reductions achieved beyond the target level earn emissions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be sold to industrialized nations. Participating developing countries establish initial ‘no-lose’ emissions targets, based upon their national circumstances, from sector-specific energyintensity benchmarks that have been developed by independent experts. Industrialized nations then offer incentives for the developing countries to adopt more stringent emissions targets through a ‘Technology Finance and Assistance Package’, which helps to overcome financial and other barriers to technology transfer and deployment. These sectorspecific energy-intensity benchmarks could also serve as a means for establishing national economy-wide targets in developed countries in the post-2012 regime. Preliminary modelling of a hybrid scenario, in which Annex I countries adopt economy-wide absolute GHG emissions targets and high-emitting developing countries adopt ‘no-lose’ sectoral targets, indicates that such an approach significantly improves the likelihood that atmospheric concentrations of CO2 can be stabilized at 450 ppmv by the end of the century. 相似文献
9.
Global climate change mitigation action is hampered by systematic under-assessment of national ‘fair shares’, largely on the basis of perceived national interests. This paper aims to inform discussions centred on South Africa’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) by estimating (1) emissions reduction pathways for the country using the Climate Equity Reference Calculator (CERC) assuming a maximum 2°C aggregate warming target and (2) the likely economy-wide net mitigation costs or savings associated with reaching these pathways if known lower-cost mitigation measures, identified through the national mitigation potential analysis, are prioritised. The cumulative net savings associated with achieving the CERC ‘fair share’ emissions pathway, assuming the moderate use of low carbon power generation measures, would reach $5.3 billion by 2030. Net savings could be substantially greater reaching $46.8 billion by 2030 assuming power generation focuses on moving towards full decarbonisation. An unconditional commitment to the mitigation action implied by the ‘fair share’ emissions pathway therefore seems reasonable and prudent purely from the point of view of net country-wide savings. Only if power generation moves towards full decarbonisation would there be a reasonable chance of achieving the more ambitious CERC domestic emissions pathway. However, the significant additional cost associated with achieving the domestic emissions pathway should be conditional on international assistance.
Key policy insights
South Africa can only achieve its ‘fair share’ of the global mitigation effort if greater use is made of renewable energy options, and can realise significant net savings if it does so.
Further emissions reductions would incur costs and require significant upscaling of the share of renewable energy and full implementation of all non-power generation mitigation measures available.
Committing to this further mitigation action contingent on international finance would both strengthen the nation’s position in climate negotiations and support the provision of finance for those vulnerable developing nations that bear little or no responsibility for climate change.
10.
Vanesa Castán Broto 《Climate Policy》2018,18(2):170-183
Should energy projects to extend the use of natural gas be considered for funding under public climate finance commitments? This article provides an overview of evidence for and against climate finance for natural gas projects. The argument focuses on a case study, the UK’s International Climate Fund (ICF). This synthesis concludes that gas-related projects will rarely be eligible for funding under public climate finance, save a few exceptions in which they provide energy access to households directly. Although gas power plants have generally lower emissions than those which use other fossil fuels such as coal, their impact will depend on the material constraints to calculate emissions reductions, the context of implementation, and the political economy of the target country. Three case studies demonstrate that energy access projects need to be understood as providing a whole range of sustainable benefits, from improving local health to reducing emissions. Overall, gas-related projects are complex interventions that require context-specific knowledge of both the effects of technology and the possible business models that can work in context.POLICY RELEVANCEThis article investigates whether projects related to natural gas constitute an appropriate use of public climate finance, with a particular focus on the UK’s International Climate Fund. Policy makers in developed countries will decide in the coming years how to use public climate finance; that is, the fraction of overseas development assistance (ODA) for climate change mitigation and adaptation. In the UK, for example, the ICF is the most important instrument to provide climate finance for developing countries. In 2013, the UK set out a clear position ‘to end support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants overseas, except in rare circumstances.’ This ban has fostered debate about whether similar positions should follow for other fossil fuels such as natural gas, specifically in the context of ICF funding. Similar debates are taking place in other countries such as Germany and Norway, and are informing the implementation of international facilities such as the Green Climate Fund. 相似文献
11.
Slovenia is required to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to an average of 8% below the base year 1986 in the period 2008–2012, due to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. It was the first of the transition countries to implement a CO2 tax in 1997. At the beginning of 2005, Slovenia joined other EU Member States by implementing the Emissions Trading Scheme. In contrast with other new EU Member States, Slovenia will be a net buyer of allowances. Therefore future movements on the emissions market will play an important role in the compliance costs of achieving the Kyoto target. The main purpose of this article is to present the establishment and characteristics of the first national allocation plan (NAP1) and to describe the main elements of the second national allocation plan (NAP2) for Slovenia within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the expected movements on the emissions allowances market in Slovenia, the expected compliance cost of achieving the Kyoto target and to present the main characteristics and efficiency of the CO2 tax in Slovenia. 相似文献
12.
Climate change is a serious threat to all nations. This raises the question of why continuous treaty negotiations for more than two decades have failed to create a viable or adequate international climate regime. The current strategy of addressing climate change misdiagnoses the issue as a pollution problem by focusing on symptoms (emissions) and not on underlying causes (unsustainable development). In short, the wrong treaty is being negotiated. Drawing on negotiation analysis, it is argued that the existing and proposed climate treaties fail to meet the national interests of any party. An alternative strategy for addressing climate change is proposed that reframes the overall approach to reflect all countries’ development needs and links climate protection goals to the development structure of the treaty. The current deadlock over emissions reductions might be overcome and a mutual gains agreement reached by directing international cooperation towards promoting the provision of clean energy services for development and ensuring universal access to those services as part of an ‘early action’ agenda that will complement efforts to utilize forests and reduce other GHGs from multiple sectors. 相似文献
13.
This essay proposes an innovative institutional strategy for global climate protection, quite distinct from but ultimately complementary to the UNFCCC climate treaty negotiations. Our “building block” strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states, but also subnational jurisdictions, firms, and civil society organizations, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as a byproduct. This strategy avoids the problems inherent in developing an enforceable, comprehensive treaty regime by mobilizing other incentives—including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development— to motivate a range of actors to cooperate on actions that will also produce climate benefits. The strategy uses three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage, and dominant actor models) which emerge from economics, international relations, and organizational behavior, to develop a variety of transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems endemic in collective action to provide public goods. These regimes will contribute to global climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. We argue that the building blocks regimes would thereby help secure eventual agreement on a comprehensive climate treaty. 相似文献
14.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):293-304
One problem in international climate policy is the refusal of large developing countries to accept emission reduction targets. Brazil, China and India together account for about 20% of today's CO2 emissions. We analyse the case in which there is no international agreement on emission reduction targets, but countries do have domestic targets, and trade permits across borders. We contrast two scenarios. In one scenario, Brazil, China and India adopt their business as usual emissions as their target. In this scenario, there are substantial exports of emission permits from developing to developed countries, and substantial economic gains for all. In the second scenario, Brazil, China and India reduce their emissions target so that they have no net economic gain from permit trade. Here, developing countries do not accept responsibility for climate change (as they bear no net costs), but they do contribute to an emission reduction policy by refusing to make money out of it. Adopting such break-even targets can be done at minor cost to developed and developing countries (roughly $2 bn/year each in extra costs and forgone benefits), while developing countries are still slightly better off than in the case without international emissions trade. This result is robust to variations in scenarios and parameters. It contrasts with Stewart and Wiener (2003) who propose granting ‘hot air’ to developing countries to seduce them to accept targets. In 2020, China and India could reduce their emissions by some 10% from the baseline without net economic costs. 相似文献
15.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):316-329
Germany's National Allocation Plans (NAP I and NAP II) for implementing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are critically analysed. Emissions trading has created a new scarcity, and grandfathering constitutes a subsidy that is used to reach additional policy goals related to energy and distribution policy. With respect to energy policy, the objective was to protect the German coal industry; but in terms of distribution policy the hidden agenda was to allocate as many emissions allowances as possible to the industries involved. The whole discussion is based on the false premise that a generous, or at least ‘needs-based’, allocation of costless emissions allowances increases an industry's competitiveness. As a consequence, NAP I is overburdened with several complex special rules and exemptions which distort the incentive effect of emissions trading, thus making climate change mitigation in Germany more costly than necessary. The attempted continuation of this policy, in particular with regard to new installations and an over-generous cap, has led to the European Commission's rejection of these rules in the German NAP II in November 2006. Despite significant improvements since then, some important shortfalls remain. Unfortunately, the economic literature available on this topic refers to highly stylized models of allocation rules and neglects the concrete details of the German NAP II. This article tries to close this gap in the literature by analysing the most distorting rules as well as the most important and arguments of the misguided debate on competitiveness. 相似文献
16.
We find that approximately a quarter of the world’s productive capital could be sensitive to climate; therefore, this capital faces the risk of accelerated obsolescence in a world warming by an average of 0.2 °C per decade. We examine the question of optimal adaptation to climate change in a vintage capital growth model without uncertainty. Along the optimal pathway, adaptation is proactive with an anticipation period of approximately twenty years. While there is additional investment in this scenario compared with a no-climate-change baseline, the overall cost to adapt is low relative to the potential losses from maladaptation. Over-investment in protection capital allows the economy to be consistently well-adapted to climate; thus, such a policy prevents transient maladaptation costs. Sensitivity analysis with an integrated assessment model suggests that costs could be ten times larger if adaptation only begins after vulnerable sectors are impacted. 相似文献
17.
Unleakable carbon, or the uncombusted methane and carbon dioxide associated with fossil fuel systems, constitutes a potentially large and heretofore unrecognized factor in determining use of Earth’s remaining fossil fuel reserves. Advances in extraction technology have encouraged a shift to natural gas, but the advantage of fuel switching depends strongly on mitigating current levels of unleakable carbon, which can be substantial enough to offset any climate benefit relative to oil or coal. To illustrate the potential warming effect of methane emissions associated with utilizable portions of our remaining natural gas reserves, we use recent data published in peer-reviewed journals to roughly estimate the impact of these emissions. We demonstrate that unless unleakable carbon is curtailed, up to 59–81% of our global natural gas reserves must remain underground if we hope to limit warming to 2°C from 2010 to 2050. Successful climate change mitigation depends on improved quantification of current levels of unleakable carbon and a determination of acceptable levels of these emissions within the context of international climate change agreements.Policy relevanceIt is imperative that companies, investors, and world leaders considering capital expenditures and policies towards continued investment in natural gas fuels do so with a complete understanding of how dependent the ultimate climate benefits are upon increased regulation of unleakable carbon, the uncombusted carbon-based gases associated with fossil fuel systems, otherwise referred to as ‘fugitive’, ‘leaked’, ‘vented’, ‘flared’, or ‘unintended’ emissions. Continued focus on combustion emissions alone, or unburnable carbon, undermines the importance of assessing the full climate impacts of fossil fuels, leading many stakeholders to support near-term mitigation strategies that rely on fuel switching from coal and oil to cleaner burning natural gas. The current lack of transparent accounting of unleakable carbon represents a significant gap in the understanding of what portions of the Earth’s remaining global fossil fuel reserves can be utilized while still limiting global warming to 2°C. Successful climate change mitigation requires that stakeholders confront the issue of both unburnable and unleakable carbon when considering continued investment in and potential expansion of natural gas systems as part of a climate change solution. 相似文献
18.
While the international community has agreed on the long-term target of limiting global warming to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, only a few concrete climate policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been implemented. We use a set of three global integrated assessment models to analyze the implications of current climate policies on long-term mitigation targets. We define a weak-policy baseline scenario, which extrapolates the current policy environment by assuming that the global climate regime remains fragmented and that emission reduction efforts remain unambitious in most of the world’s regions. These scenarios clearly fall short of limiting warming to 2 °C. We investigate the cost and achievability of the stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO2e by 2100, if countries follow the weak policy pathway until 2020 or 2030 before pursuing the long-term mitigation target with global cooperative action. We find that after a deferral of ambitious action the 450 ppm CO2e is only achievable with a radical up-scaling of efforts after target adoption. This has severe effects on transformation pathways and exacerbates the challenges of climate stabilization, in particular for a delay of cooperative action until 2030. Specifically, reaching the target with weak near-term action implies (a) faster and more aggressive transformations of energy systems in the medium term, (b) more stranded investments in fossil-based capacities, (c) higher long-term mitigation costs and carbon prices and (d) stronger transitional economic impacts, rendering the political feasibility of such pathways questionable. 相似文献
19.
Rethinking the Kyoto Emissions Targets 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
The overall targets for greenhouse gas emissions of the Kyoto Protocol are not based on a specific objective for the future world climate. Moreover, the allocations of emissions restrictions among countries do not have a principled logic and impose arbitrary differences in costs. Calculations arepresented of the costs of alternative guidelines for emissions restrictions, each of which has a plausible ethical basis: equal per capita reductions, equal country shares in reductions, equalized welfare costs, and emulation of the United Nations budget allocations. All of these would result in far lower total costs of reaching the Kyoto targets. The alternatives would also eliminate the wholly capricious accommodations given to the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The lower cost alternativeswould permit the Annex B countries to make unequivocal commitments for cost reimbursement to the non-Annex B countries to induce them to participate in emissions reductions. Everyone would gain from that. 相似文献
20.
This article discusses how renewable and low-carbon energies can serve as mitigation options of climate change in China’s power sector. Our study is based on scenarios developed in PowerPlan, a bottom-up model simulating a countries’ power sector and its emissions. We first adjusted the model to China’s present-day economy and power sector. We then developed different scenarios based on story lines for possible future developments in China. We simulated China’s carbon-based electricity production system of today and possible future transitions towards a low-carbon system relying on renewable and low-carbon energies. In our analysis, we compare the business-as-usual scenarios with more sustainable energy scenarios. We found that by increasing the share of renewable and nuclear energies to different levels, between 17% and 57% of all CO2 emissions from the power sector could be avoided by 2030 compared to the business-as-usual scenario. We also found that electricity generation costs increase when more sustainable power plants are installed. As a conclusion, China has two options: choosing for high climate change mitigation and high costs or choosing for moderate climate change mitigation and moderate costs. In case high climate change mitigation will be chosen, development assistance is likely to be needed to cover the costs. 相似文献