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1.
全球增温潜势和全球温变潜势对主要国家温室气体排放贡献估算的差异 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
全球增温潜势（GWP）和全球温变潜势（GTP）是目前常用的温室气体增温能力的通用指标。如果用GTP代替GWP,1990-2005年,欧盟、美国、日本、加拿大和南非温室气体排放所占份额增加,而巴西、澳大利亚、中国、印度、墨西哥和俄罗斯所占份额减少;2015-2030年,欧盟、美国、日本、中国所占份额将增加,而俄罗斯、加拿大、澳大利亚、印度、墨西哥和巴西所占份额会减少。用GTP代替GWP后,巴西、澳大利亚等国所占份额减小,而欧盟所占份额增加,这可能是巴西、澳大利亚等国考虑尽早采用GTP代替GWP而欧盟反对的一个重要原因。 相似文献
2.
What drives the development of climate policy? Brazil, China, and India have all changed their climate policies since 2000, and single-case analyses of climate policymaking have found that all three countries have had climate coalitions working to promote climate policies. To what extent have such advocacy coalitions been able to influence national policies for climate-change mitigation, and what can explain this? Employing a new approach that combines the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) with insights from comparative environmental politics and the literature on policy windows, this paper identifies why external parameters like political economy and institutional structures are crucial for explaining the climate advocacy coalitions’ ability to seize policy windows and influence policy development. We find that the coalitions adjust their policy strategies to the influence-opportunity structures in each political context—resulting in confrontation in Brazil, cooperation in China, and a complementary role in India. 相似文献
3.
The exponential growth in global populations, economic activity and resource utilization means it is becoming increasingly difficult to satisfy global demand for a number of fundamental resources, while some key ecosystems services are under stress. The likelihood of future resource scarcities have begun to influence the positions taken within international climate change negotiations by fast-growing developing countries. When Brazil, South Africa, India, and China formed the BASIC group it took many by surprise. The coordination needed to align this heterogeneous group of countries cannot simply be understood in terms of a set of shared interests around climate policy. How the BASIC group emerged and the nature of its cooperation on climate change are examined within the broader context in which these increasingly powerful countries came to join forces. Although traditionally aligned with the G77 group of developing countries, recent strategising as a group of emerging economies reflects their realization that there are insufficient global resources available to follow the same development pathway as industrialized countries. Hence, they must seek alternative growth pathways, which requires establishing common ground while also keeping track of each others' positions on important global issues like climate change. 相似文献
4.
《Climate Policy》2002,2(4):303-318
To stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, all countries will eventually need to be included in the effort to limit climate change. This article explores what potential future greenhouse gas allocation schemes might mean for key developing countries. The need for development is widely acknowledged, but growth in non-Annex I country emissions means that such development may need to take a different path to business as usual. The national interests of developing countries in negotiating potential future commitments are shaped by basic characteristics, notably emissions (both annual and historical cumulative), economic growth and population. These factors in turn shape the acceptability of allocations based on ability to pay, emissions intensity, or emissions per capita.Results for six major developing countries (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina and Nigeria) show that the implications for developing countries differ widely. For example, ability to pay does not favour Argentina; a reduction based on emissions intensity is not appropriate for Brazil; and per capita allocations would be problematic for South Africa. It is difficult to conceive of a single allocation scheme that would be appropriate for all developing countries. This points to the need for differentiation between developing countries in terms of any potential future commitments. 相似文献
5.
An innovative approach is introduced for helping developing countries to make their development more sustainable, and also to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a co-benefit. Such an approach is proposed as part of the multilateral framework on climate change. The concept of sustainable development policies and measures (SD-PAMs) is outlined, making clear that it is distinct from many other approaches in starting from development rather than explicit climate targets. The potential of SD-PAMs is illustrated with a case-study of energy efficiency in South Africa, drawing on energy modelling for the use of electricity in industry. The results show multiple benefits both for local sustainable development and for mitigating global climate change. The benefits of industrial energy efficiency in South Africa include significant reductions in local air pollutants; improved environmental health; creation of additional jobs; reduced electricity demand; and delays in new investments in electricity generation. The co-benefit of reducing GHG emissions could result in a reduction of as much as 5% of SA's total projected energy CO2 emissions by 2020. Institutional support and policy guidance is needed at both the international and national level to realize the potential of SD-PAMs. This analysis demonstrates that if countries begin to act early to move towards greater sustainability, they will also start to bend the curve of their emissions path. 相似文献
6.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):303-318
Abstract To stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, all countries will eventually need to be included in the effort to limit climate change. This article explores what potential future greenhouse gas allocation schemes might mean for key developing countries. The need for development is widely acknowledged, but growth in non-Annex I country emissions means that such development may need to take a different path to business as usual. The national interests of developing countries in negotiating potential future commitments are shaped by basic characteristics, notably emissions (both annual and historical cumulative), economic growth and population. These factors in turn shape the acceptability of allocations based on ability to pay, emissions intensity, or emissions per capita. Results for six major developing countries (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina and Nigeria) show that the implications for developing countries differ widely. For example, ability to pay does not favour Argentina; a reduction based on emissions intensity is not appropriate for Brazil; and per capita allocations would be problematic for South Africa. It is difficult to conceive of a single allocation scheme that would be appropriate for all developing countries. This points to the need for differentiation between developing countries in terms of any potential future commitments. 相似文献
7.
Sir Anthony Brenton 《Climate Policy》2013,13(5):541-546
The concept of ‘Great Powers’ extends well beyond its nineteenth century origins to current business in, for example, the EU, the UN Security Council, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Such core groups can be crucial to finding agreement in complex and fractured negotiations. Climate change was not initially seen as an issue for the Great Power-type architecture. The problem was of universal concern, requiring universal involvement. Moreover, climate's natural great powers (the EU, the US, China, Japan, Russia, Brazil, India, and Canada) split into three antagonistic camps: the EU pressing for sharp emissions reductions; the US, with the other developed powers, much more cautious; and China, India, and Brazil determined that action should be confined to the developed world. These divisions contributed hugely to the ineffectiveness of both the 1992 Rio convention and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. In addition, as non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; particularly Chinese) emissions fast outgrew OECD emissions, their exclusion from any constraint became visibly untenable. So, from 2005 on, the Great Powers began to meet more closely in what became the Major Economies Forum. That cooperation contributed significantly to the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. The climate problem is of course far from being solved, but maintaining Great Power cooperation will be crucial to further progress. 相似文献
8.
Mark Daniel Jaeger 《Climate Policy》2016,16(7):940-951
Along with the large middle-income countries Brazil, China, and South Africa, India has been put under increasing pressure to shoulder parts of the mitigation burden and commit to national emission reduction targets. India, however, refers to its limited capacity and widespread poverty. Is India hiding behind its poor? While others examine the distribution of emissions within the country to answer this question, we study domestic policy making for energy subsidies and access to clean energy. Empirical evidence suggests that domestic policy making is at least partially consistent with the pro-poor arguments advanced at the international level. Given their large number and the country's democratic system, the poor do have some weight in Indian politics. However, pro-poor policies end where they do not translate into greater vote shares. Moreover, India's international position ignores the existing complementarities between climate-friendly and pro-poor activities.Policy relevanceDespite India's recent growth spurt, its concern to fight energy poverty at home before engaging in any commitments on climate policy at the international level should be taken seriously within the international negotiations. Policy making in India is driven by democratic incentives, which, in this case, work to the benefit of the poor. Pro-poor policies may not go as far as one would wish from a developmental perspective, but the impact of the masses of the poor on domestic policy making is politically significant and cannot be ignored. This also provides some broader lessons for mitigation and adaptation policies in developing countries: politicians respond to incentives and support will only reach the needy if the appropriate incentives are in place. While we observe some significant commitment and implementation problems even in a democratic country like India, such problems must be expected to be even more serious elsewhere. This should not be overlooked when designing institutions for the allocation of climate finance, such as the Green Climate Fund. 相似文献
9.
Water harvesting has been widely applied in different social-ecological contexts, proving to be a valuable approach to sustainable intensification of agriculture. Global estimates of the potential of water harvesting are generally based on purely biophysical assessments and mostly neglect the socioeconomic dimension of agriculture. This neglect becomes a critical factor for the feasibility and effectiveness of policy and funding efforts to mainstream this practice. This study uses archetype analysis to systematically identify social-ecological regions worldwide based on >160 successful cases of local water harvesting implementation. We delineate six archetypal regions which capture the specific social-ecological conditions of the case studies. The archetypes cover 19% of current global croplands with hotspots in large portions of East Africa and Southeast Asia. We estimate that the adoption of water harvesting in these cropland areas can increase crop production up to 60–100% in Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and India. The results of this study can complement conventional biophysical analysis on the potential of these practices and guide policy development at global and regional scales. The methodological approach can be also replicated at finer scales to guide the improvement of rainfed agricultural. 相似文献
10.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):293-304
One problem in international climate policy is the refusal of large developing countries to accept emission reduction targets. Brazil, China and India together account for about 20% of today's CO2 emissions. We analyse the case in which there is no international agreement on emission reduction targets, but countries do have domestic targets, and trade permits across borders. We contrast two scenarios. In one scenario, Brazil, China and India adopt their business as usual emissions as their target. In this scenario, there are substantial exports of emission permits from developing to developed countries, and substantial economic gains for all. In the second scenario, Brazil, China and India reduce their emissions target so that they have no net economic gain from permit trade. Here, developing countries do not accept responsibility for climate change (as they bear no net costs), but they do contribute to an emission reduction policy by refusing to make money out of it. Adopting such break-even targets can be done at minor cost to developed and developing countries (roughly $2 bn/year each in extra costs and forgone benefits), while developing countries are still slightly better off than in the case without international emissions trade. This result is robust to variations in scenarios and parameters. It contrasts with Stewart and Wiener (2003) who propose granting ‘hot air’ to developing countries to seduce them to accept targets. In 2020, China and India could reduce their emissions by some 10% from the baseline without net economic costs. 相似文献
11.
Britta Rennkamp 《Climate Policy》2019,19(6):756-770
This paper examines power relations, coalitions and conflicts that drive and hinder institutional change in South African climate policy. The analysis finds that the most contested climate policies are those that create distributional conflicts where powerful, non-poor actors will potentially experience real losses to their fossil fuel-based operations. This finding opposes the assumption of competing objectives between emissions and poverty reduction. Yet, actors use discourse that relates to potentially competing objectives between emissions reductions, jobs, poverty reduction and economic welfare.
The analysis relates to the broader questions on how to address public policy problems that affect the two objectives of mitigating climate change and simultaneously boosting socio-economic development. South Africa is a middle-income country that represents the challenge of accommodating simultaneous efforts for emissions and poverty reduction.
Institutional change has been constrained especially in the process towards establishing climate budgets and a carbon tax. The opposing coalitions have succeeded in delaying the implementation of these processes, as a result of unequal power relations. Institutional change in South African climate policy can be predominantly characterized as layering with elements of policy innovation. New policies build on existing regulations in all three cases of climate policy examined: the climate change response white paper, the carbon tax and the renewable energy programme. Unbalanced power relations between coalitions of support in government and civil society and opposition mainly from the affected industry result in very fragile institutional change.
Key policy insights
The South African government has managed to drive institutional change in climate policy significantly over the past 7 years.
Powerful coalitions of coal-related industries and their lobbies have constrained institutional change and managed to delay the implementation of carbon pricing measures.
A successfully managed renewable energy programme has started to transform a coal- and nuclear-powered electricity sector towards integrating sustainable energy technologies. The programme is vulnerable to intergovernmental opposition and requires management at the highest political levels.
Potential conflict with poverty reduction measures is not a major concern that actively hinders institutional change towards climate objectives. Predominantly non-poor actors frequently use poverty-related discourse to elevate their interests to issues of public concern.
12.
The radiance lights data in 2006 from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Air Force Defense Meteorological Satellite Program/Operational Linescan System (DMSP/OLS) and authoritative energy data distributed by the United State Energy Information Administration were applied to estimate the global distribution of anthropogenic heat flux.A strong linear relationship was found to exist between the anthropogenic heat flux and the DMSP/OLS radiance data.On a global scale,the average value of anthropogenic heat flux is approximately 0.03 W m 2 and 0.10 W m 2 for global land area.The results indicate that global anthropogenic heat flux was geographically concentrated and distributed,fundamentally correlating to the economical activities.The anthropogenic heat flux concentrated in the economically developed areas including East Asia,Europe,and eastern North America.The anthropogenic heat flux in the concentrated regions,including the northeastern United States,Central Europe,United Kingdom,Japan,India,and East and South China is much larger than global average level,reaching a large enough value that could affect regional climate.In the center of the concentrated area,the anthropogenic heat flux density may exceed 100 W m 2,according to the results of the model.In developing areas,including South America,Central and North China,India,East Europe,and Middle East,the anthropogenic heat flux can reach a level of more than 10 W m 2 ;however,the anthropogenic heat flux in a vast area,including Africa,Central and North Asia,and South America,is low.With the development of global economy and urban agglomerations,the effect on climate of anthropogenic heat is essential for the research of climate change. 相似文献
13.
Voluntary (or non-binding) commitments offer an action-oriented mechanism for addressing interconnected, complex and pressing issues. Though not designed to replace negotiated or binding outcomes, voluntary commitments can offer a critical tool in currently ungoverned or under-governed systems. The Blue Economy is an example of a rapidly evolving agenda where formal governance arrangements are at best nascent, in part due to the trans-border nature of issues and prominent involvement of multiple types of actors. As such voluntary commitments provide an important mechanism through which to monitor the evolution of the concept and identify gaps or shortfalls in its implementation. Our analysis of global voluntary commitments on the Blue Economy made to recent high-profile ocean futures meetings, found a trend towards capacity development, research, and investment in emerging and larger scale sectors such as offshore aquaculture and renewable energy. A concurrent focus was on securitizing, regulating or diverting effort from historically significant fisheries sectors. European organizations are playing a dominant role in Blue Economy commitments, with a notable absence of commitments from major Blue Economy powers such as China and India. We identify a number of gaps and shortfalls, particularly in relation to active consideration of social equity in the Blue Economy. We identify a range of recommendations on how these deficiencies may be addressed through a greater focus on a broader suite of objectives and a more inclusive approach to ocean meetings. 相似文献
14.
该研究模拟了全球各区域2008-2050年的经济发展和碳排放状况,并将该模拟结果设定为基准情景。在基准情景中全球GDP随时间增长,而全球的碳排放同样表现出增长趋势。为了模拟碳税政策的减排效应及其对经济的影响,本文构建了其他3种碳税政策情景。情景1,将碳税收入作为一般性财政收入,此时全球升温减缓,世界碳排放下降显著,但中国、印度、俄罗斯、马来西亚和印度尼西亚等发展中国家经济发展严重受创,世界经济不均衡加剧。情景2,将各区域的碳税收入汇总之后按照比例统一分配,该情景下,世界碳减排规模较情景1略有下降,但世界各区域的经济较基准情景得到更好的发展。情景3,碳税税率随时间阶段性增长,此时,碳税政策对全球升温的控制更显著;世界各区域,尤其是发展中国家（地区）,经济增长更迅速。另外,碳税收入用来提升区域技术进步,在一定程度上促进了产业的优化升级。碳税政策与技术进步的协同减排政策,考虑了区域经济发展的不均衡性,兼顾了气候治理的公平性,是一种有效、可行的全球气候治理政策。 相似文献
15.
Tele-connecting local consumption to global land use 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Globalization increases the interconnectedness of people and places around the world. In a connected world, goods and services consumed in one country are often produced in other countries and exchanged via international trade. Thus, local consumption is increasingly met by global supply chains oftentimes involving large geographical distances and leading to global environmental change. In this study, we connect local consumption to global land use through tracking global commodity and value chains via international trade flows. Using a global multiregional input–output model with sectoral detail allows for the accounting of land use attributed to “unusual” sectors – from a land use perspective – including services, machinery and equipment, and construction. Our results show how developed countries consume a large amount of goods and services from both domestic and international markets, and thus impose pressure not only on their domestic land resources, but also displace land in other countries, thus displacing other uses. For example, 33% of total U.S. land use for consumption purposes is displaced from other countries. This ratio becomes much larger for the EU (more than 50%) and Japan (92%). Our analysis shows that 47% of Brazilian and 88% of Argentinean cropland is used for consumption purposes outside of their territories, mainly in EU countries and China. In addition, consumers in rich countries tend to displace land by consuming non-agricultural products, such as services, clothing and household appliances, which account for more than 50% of their total land displacement. By contrast, for developing economies, such as African countries, the share of land use for non-agricultural products is much lower, with an average of 7%. The emerging economies and population giants, China and India, are likely to further increase their appetite for land from other countries, such as Africa, Russia and Latin America, to satisfy their own land needs driven by their fast economic growth and the needs and lifestyles of their growing populations. 相似文献
16.
Ahead of the Conference of Parties (COP) 24 where countries will first take stock of climate action post Paris, this paper assesses India’s progress on its nationally determined contribution (NDC) targets and future energy plans. We find that, although India is well on track to meet its NDC pledges, these targets were extremely modest given previous context. Furthermore, there is considerable uncertainty around India’s energy policy post 2030 and if current plans for energy futures materialise, the Paris Agreement’s 2 degrees goal will be almost certainly unachievable. India’s role in international climate politics has shifted from obstructionism to leadership particularly following the announcement of withdrawal by the United States from the Paris Agreement, but analysis reveals that India’s ‘hard’ actions on the domestic front are inconsistent with its ‘soft’ actions in the international climate policy arena. Going forward, India is likely to face increasing calls for stronger mitigation action and we suggest that this gap can be bridged by strengthening the links between India’s foreign policy ambitions, international climate commitments, and domestic energy realities.
Key policy insights
India’s NDC pledges on carbon intensity and share of non-fossil fuel capacity are relatively modest given domestic context and offer plenty of room to increase ambition of action.
India’s ‘soft’ leadership in global climate policy can be matched by ‘hard’ commitments by bringing NDC pledges in line with domestic policy realities.
There is significant uncertainty around future plans for coal power in India which have the potential to exceed the remaining global carbon budget for 2 degrees.
17.
利用全球陆地月降水资料(PREC/L)中3个月的资料,研究了1948—2001年全球陆地3—5月降水长期变化的时空特征。结果表明,1948—2001年,全球3—5月的降水量以负趋势为主要变化特征,明显减少的区域是:热带非洲、亚洲中西部、中国中东部、俄罗斯东部、南极的恩德比地和威尔克斯地等9个地区;降水量增加的区域是:俄罗斯西北部、美国西北部、加拿大西南部、南美洲南部、加拿大北部等7个地区。还研究了35个纬圈3—5月平均降水量的趋势系数。在分析全球季节降水量与ENSO的关系中,指出春季是春夏秋三季中最不显著的。 相似文献
18.
One key aspect of the Paris Agreement is the goal to limit the global average temperature increase to well below 2 °C by the end of the century. To achieve the Paris Agreement goals, countries need to submit, and periodically update, their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Recent studies show that NDCs and currently implemented national policies are not sufficient to cover the ambition level of the temperature limit agreed upon in the Paris Agreement, meaning that we need to collectively increase climate action to stabilize global warming at levels considered safe. This paper explores the generalization of previously adopted good practice policies (GPPs) to bridge the emissions gap between current policies, NDCs ambitions and a well below 2 °C world, facilitating the creation of a bridge trajectory in key major-emitting countries. These GPPs are implemented in eleven well-established national Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) for Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union (EU), India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, that provide least-cost, low-carbon scenarios up to 2050. Results show that GPPs can play an important role in each region, with energy supply policies appearing as one of the biggest contributors to the reduction of carbon emissions. However, GPPs by themselves are not enough to close the emission gap, and as such more will be needed in these economies to collectively increase climate action to stabilize global warming at levels considered safe. 相似文献
19.
China’s influence on climate governance has been steadily increasing since the adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015. Much of this influence, this article argues, has come from China forging a path for climate adaptation and mitigation for the global South. This is having far-reaching consequences, the article further argues, for the politics of global climate governance. China’s discursive and diplomatic power in climate politics is growing as China builds alliances across the global South. China is leveraging this enhanced soft power to elevate the importance of adaptation in multilateral climate negotiations, advance a technocentric approach to climate mitigation, export its development model, and promote industrial-scale afforestation as a nature-based climate solution. China’s strategy is enhancing climate financing, technology transfers, renewable power, and adaptation infrastructure across the global South. To some extent, this is helping with a transition to a low-carbon world economy. Yet China’s leadership is also reinforcing incremental, technocratic, and growth-oriented solutions in global climate governance. These findings advance the understanding of China’s role in global environmental politics, especially its growing influence on climate governance in the global South. 相似文献
20.
The rise of public and private zero-deforestation commitments is opening a new collaborative space in global forest governance. Governments seeking to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions by protecting and restoring forests are partnering with companies motivated to eliminate deforestation from supply chains. The proliferation of zero-deforestation initiatives is creating opportunities for policy synergies and scaling up impacts, but has led to a more complex regulatory landscape. Drawing on policy analysis and expert interviews, we explore public-private policy interactions in Colombia as a case study for tropical forested nations with interest in aligning climate, forest, and development goals. We consider how zero-deforestation priorities are set on the national agenda and scaled up through public-private partnerships. We identify zero-deforestation initiatives in three overlapping governance domains—domestic public policy, REDD+, sustainable supply chain initiatives—and highlight ten multi-stakeholder pledges that have catalyzed supporting initiatives at multiple scales. Emerging from decades of armed conflict, Colombia is pursuing a peace building model based on low-emissions rural development. The peace deal provided a focusing event for zero-deforestation that converged with political momentum and institutional capacity to open a policy window. A government pledge to eliminate deforestation in the Colombian Amazon by 2020 set the national agenda and stimulated international REDD+ cooperation. Lessons from Colombia show that governments provide important directionality among the proliferation of zero-deforestation initiatives. Public pledges and the orchestration of actors through public-private partnerships allow governments to scale up efforts by aligning transnational activities with national priorities. The case of Colombia serves as a potential zero-deforestation model for other nations, but challenges around equitable land tenure, illegality, and enforcement must be overcome for multi-stakeholder initiatives to produce long-term change. 相似文献