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1.
Mattia Fosci 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):170-190
It is argued that the subordination of policies to results-based payments for emissions reductions causes severe economic inefficiencies, which affect the opportunity cost, transaction cost, and economic rent of the programme. Such problems can be addressed by establishing sound procedural, land, and financial governance at the national level, before Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) economic incentives are delivered at scale. Consideration is given to each governance dimension, the entry points for policy intervention, and the impact on costs. International support must consider the financial and political cost of governance reforms, and use a pay-for-results ethos based on output and outcome indicators. This can be done in the readiness phase but only if the latter's legal force, scope, magnitude, and time horizon are adequately reconsidered. This article provides ammunition for the institutionalists’ argument that United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Parties must prioritize governance reforms between now and the entry into force of the new climate agreement in 2020. Finally, specific recommendations about how such governance reforms can be achieved, which will create the basis for the programme's financial sustainability, are offered. Policy relevance UNFCCC Parties could make the most cost-effective use of REDD+ resources if they were to prioritize investments in governance over the interim period 2012–2020. REDD+’s financial, technical and political capital should be used to establish sound procedural, sectoral (land), and financial governance systems in relevant countries. This will generate long-term economic savings, compared to an approach that privileges the implementation of results-based payments for emissions reductions. In particular, it will reduce economic inefficiencies, which affect the opportunity and transaction costs, and the private rents embedded in the current programme design. In order to promote the necessary policy reforms, stakeholders should work together to address technical, financial, and political economy issues at the domestic level. In particular, UNFCCC Parties should re-conceptualize the readiness phase by strengthening its legal force, expanding its scope, increasing its financial firepower, and extending its time horizon. 相似文献
2.
Jonathan Gewirtzman Sujay Natson Julie-Anne Richards Victoria Hoffmeister Alexis Durand Romain Weikmans 《Climate Policy》2018,18(8):1076-1086
After decades of pressure from vulnerable developing countries, the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (the WIM) was established at the nineteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 19) in 2013 to address costly damages from climate change. However, little progress has been made towards establishing a mechanism to fund loss and damage. The WIM's Executive Committee issued its first two-year workplan the following year at COP 20 which offered, among other things, a range of approaches to financing loss and damage programmes, which we review here. We provide brief overviews of each mechanism proposed by the WIM ExCom, describe their current applications, their statuses under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), some of their advantages and disadvantages, and their current or potential application to loss and damage. We find that several of these mechanisms may be useful in supporting loss and damage programmes, but identify some key gaps. First, most of the mechanisms identified by the WIM ExCom are insurance schemes subsidized with voluntary contributions, which may not be adequate or reliable over time. Second, none were devised to apply to slow-onset events, or to non-economic losses and damages. That is, if harms are inflicted on parts of a society or its ecosystems that have no price, or if they occur gradually, they would probably not be covered by these mechanisms. Finally, the lack of a dedicated and adequate flow of finance to address the real loss and damage being experienced by vulnerable nations will require the use of innovative financial tools beyond those mentioned in the WIM ExCom workplan.
Key policy insights
Despite a full article of the 2015 Paris Agreement devoted to loss and damage, there is little international agreement on the scope of loss and damage programmes, and especially how they would be funded and by whom.
Most of the loss and damage funding mechanisms identified by the WIM ExCom are insurance schemes subsidized with voluntary contributions, which may burden the most vulnerable countries and may not be reliable over time.
None of the mechanisms were devised to apply to slow-onset events, or to non-economic losses and damages.
3.
The principle of common, but differentiated, responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR&RC) is fundamental to the UNFCCC. Some options for a nuanced model of differentiation that addresses both responsibility and capability in a changing world are explored, such as new categories of countries, and some of the political issues that such a model might face are considered. The strengths and limitations of options for graduation based on ‘objective’ criteria such that countries could move between categories or ‘graduate’ – an option provided by the UNFCCC – are discussed. Countries could also choose to join another club (e.g. the G20), self-elect into categories or differentiate among themselves implicitly by accepting different commitments and actions. CBDR&RC will form part of the overall legally binding agreement, and must apply symmetry in some respects and differentiation in others to the commitments and actions contained therein. Some possible characteristics of CBDR&RC of relevance in a regime ‘applicable to all’ are outlined. These include promoting climate action and using mechanisms available in the UNFCCC to instil dynamism. Differentiation on mitigation must consider the distinctions between absolute and relative reductions, as well as commitments to outcomes and implementation. CBDR&RC should be applied to mitigation, adaptation, and the means of implementation.Policy relevanceIn Durban, Parties agreed to negotiate a regime ‘applicable to all’, which sent a political signal that there should be greater symmetry between nations. The world has changed since the UNFCCC was negotiated in 1992. It is now less helpful to think only in terms of two groups of countries (e.g. Annex I and non-Annex I), and evident that there are significant differences between member states. This requires a more nuanced interpretation of the principles of equity and CBDR&RC, which is an integral part of the UNFCCC. The options for the different approaches outlined in this article might help in the construction of a more nuanced model. All must do more, while some must do more still than others. To achieve this, some defining characteristics of CBDR&RC in a regime applicable to all are suggested. 相似文献
4.
What are the guiding principles of contemporary international governance of climate change and to what extent do they represent neoliberal forms? We document five main political and institutional shifts within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and outline core governance practices for each phase. In discussing the current phase since the Paris Agreement, we offer to the emerging literature on international neoliberal environmental governance an analytical framework by which the extent of international neoliberal governance can be assessed. We conceptualize international neoliberal environmentalism as characterized by four main processes: the prominence of libertarian ideals of justice, in which justice is defined as the rational pursuit of sovereign self-interest between unequal parties; marketization, in which market mechanisms, private sector engagement and purportedly ‘objective’ considerations are viewed as the most effective and efficient forms of governance; governance by disclosure, in which the primary obstacles to sustainability are understood as ‘imperfect information’ and onerous regulatory structures that inhibit innovation; and exclusivity, in which multilateral decision-making is shifted from consensus to minilateralism. Against this framework, we argue that the contemporary UNFCCC regime has institutionalized neoliberal reforms in climate governance, although not without resistance, in a configuration which is starkly different than that of earlier eras. We conclude by describing four crucial gaps left by this transition, which include the ability of the regime to drive adequate ambition, and gaps in transparency, equity and representation. 相似文献
5.
Lukas Hermwille Wolfgang Obergassel Hermann E. Ott Christiane Beuermann 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):150-170
What can reasonably be expected from the UNFCCC process and the climate conference in Paris 2015? To achieve transformative change, prevailing unsustainable routines embedded in socio-economic systems have to be translated into new and sustainable ones. This article conceptualizes the UNFCCC and the associated policy processes as a catalyst for this translation by applying a structurational regime model. This model provides an analytical distinction of rules (norms and shared meaning) and resources (economic resources as well as authoritative and allocative power) and allows us to conceptualize agency on various levels, including beyond nation states. The analysis concludes that the UNFCCC's narrow focus on emission targets, which essentially is a focus on resources, has proven ineffective. In addition, the static division of industrialized and developing countries in the Convention's annexes and the consensus-based decision-making rules have impeded ambitious climate protection. The article concludes that the UNFCCC is much better equipped to provide rules for climate protection activities and should consciously expand this feature to improve its impact.Policy relevanceThe international community is negotiating a new global climate agreement, to be adopted at the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in December 2015 in Paris and to be applicable from 2020. This article analyses the successes and limitations the UNFCCC has had so far in combating climate change and it develops recommendations on how to enhance efforts within and beyond the framework of the Convention. From our analysis we derive two main recommendations for an effective and structurationally balanced treaty: First, multidimensional mitigation contributions going beyond emission targets could strongly improve countries’ abilities to tailor their contributions around national political discourses. Second, the UNFCCC regime should be complemented with another treaty outside of the UNFCCC framework. This ‘Alliance of the Ambitious’ would allow the pioneers of climate protection to move ahead and enjoy the benefits of cooperation. The dynamics generated through such a club approach could be fed back into the UNFCCC, leading to increased ambition by others in future commitment cycles. 相似文献
6.
Climate change adaptation, which has previously been seen as a national and local matter, is today systematically addressed by international institutions such as the UNFCCC, the FAO and the WTO. Research has focused on the overarching institutional architecture of global adaptation, particularly how it relates to development, political economy, efficiency and equity. In contrast to the transnational dimension of climate mitigation, the transnationalization of adaptation governance has received scant attention. By creating a dataset of adaptation projects, we examine transnational adaptation governance in terms of its scope, institutionalization and main functions. We find transnational adaptation governance to be firmly anchored within the UNFCCC, but a recent change towards adaptation governed by a transnational constituency can be identified. When non-state actors become integral to the project of governing adaptation, a ‘fourth era’ of adaption seems to be emerging. This new era is not replacing other forms of governing, but is emerging alongside and in a complementary fashion. In the ‘fourth era’, adaptation is increasingly governed globally and transnationally, and the attention is turned toward ‘softer’ forms of governance such as agenda setting, information sharing and capacity building. 相似文献
7.
《巴黎协定》基本照顾了各缔约方的核心关切,坚持了《联合国气候变化框架公约》（以下简称《公约》）的原则,基本体现了发达国家和发展中国家的区分。在适应部分,《巴黎协定》设立了与全球温升目标相联系的全球适应目标,明确了对发展中国家的适应支持,并确定了具有一定法律约束力的全球适应信息通报和5年周期的全球盘点。在损失损害部分,《巴黎协定》锁定了《公约》下的华沙损失损害国际机制,并基本确定了一个各国通过可持续发展和国际合作共同解决损失损害问题的框架。但是,《巴黎协定》仍然没有解决很多技术性问题和缔约方之间关键性和实质性的分歧。中国作为发展中大国将继续在适应和损失损害问题中面临着出资压力,应通过增强国内适应行动、强化适应和损失损害相关研究和高效利用气候变化南南合作基金3个方面,为谈判争取主动并为推动全球适应气候变化减少损失损害做出贡献。 相似文献
8.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a significant and potentially innovative addition to UNFCCC frameworks for mobilizing increased finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet the GCF faces challenges of operationalization not only as a relatively new international fund but also as a result of US President Trump’s announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Consequently the GCF faces a major reduction in actual funding contributions and also governance challenges at the levels of its Board and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), to which it is ultimately accountable. This article analyzes these challenges with reference to the GCF’s internal regulations and its agreements with third parties to demonstrate how exploiting design features of the GCF could strengthen its resilience in the face of such challenges. These features include linkages with UNFCCC constituted bodies, particularly the Technology Mechanism, and enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially through its Private Sector Facility. The article posits that deepening GCF interlinkages would increase both the coherence of climate finance governance and the GCF’s ability to contribute to ambitious climate action in uncertain times.
Key policy insights
The Trump Administration’s purported withdrawal from the Paris Agreement creates challenges for the GCF operating model in three key domains: capitalization, governance and guidance.
Two emerging innovations could prove crucial in GCF resilience to fulfil its role in Paris Agreement implementation: (1) interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and (2) engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially private sector actors such as large US investors and financiers.
There is also an emerging soft role for the GCF as interlocutor between policy-makers and non-Party actors to help bridge the communication divide that often plagues cross-sectoral interactions.
This role could develop through: (a) the GCF tripartite interface between the Private Sector Facility, Accredited Entities and National Designated Authorities; and (b) strengthened collaborations between the UNFCCC Technical and Financial Mechanisms.
9.
基于国家自主决定贡献的发展中国家应对气候变化资金需求研究 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
潘寻 《气候变化研究进展》2016,12(5):450-456
2015年年底召开的巴黎气候大会开启了全球联合应对气候变化的崭新时代,构建了“各国提交国家自主决定贡献-全球行动盘点-提高行动力度-各国再次提交国家自主决定贡献-最终实现应对气候变化长期目标”的全球气候治理新模式。本研究以目前《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处收到的160份国家自主决定贡献（涵盖188个缔约方）为对象,对各缔约方的减缓目标进行了分类汇总,并重点对发展中国家资金需求、减排成本和优先投资领域进行了系统梳理。研究结果表明：160份国家自主决定贡献中,有122份明确纳入了资金内容;64份对执行贡献预案提出了具体的资金需求数额;31份对2030年国内温室气体减排量和减排资金需求进行了预估,并基于此测算出发展中国家2030年平均减排成本为22.3美元/t CO2;28个缔约方对国内减缓和适应领域资金需求进行了再分类,减缓和适应总体资金需求比值为1.4。如以目前发达国家缔约方减缓承诺为基准,2030年发展中国家应对气候变化资金需求总量将达到4740亿美元。 相似文献
10.
With market-mechanisms likely to achieve emission reductions at lower cost than alternative approaches, there is a presumption that they will be embraced by those who are serious about achieving ambitious reductions. Two broad messages exist; there is already considerable activity and some ambition in many parts of the world – a fragmented but embryonic ‘global’ trading landscape is emerging – and there are efforts at UN level to provide a unifying framework for these bottom-up developments. The topography of interest and response varies considerably across groups of countries, and there have been delays in making progress on a unifying framework. This article analyses the current carbon market landscape in terms of market dynamics and market-mechanism developments whilst undertaking an examination of how climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is shaping the future carbon market landscape. This work shows that the combination of existing, emerging, and potential carbon market-mechanisms can be regarded as an emerging pre-2020 fragmented ‘global’ carbon market landscape based on differing bottom-up market based approaches. One outcome of a 2015 Climate Agreement could be a post-2020 global carbon market which would include new domestic and international market initiatives such as the Framework for Various Approaches and New Market Mechanism, together with reformed Kyoto mechanisms.Policy relevanceWith the 2015 Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) expected to see Parties commit to ambitious mitigation commitments, post-2020 could see significant Party (& industry) investment in market-mechanisms and associated emissions units in an effort to achieve some of the abatement cost minimization offered by market approaches. This article is written for those who have an interest in understanding what is happening – and what is not happening – as regards the emergence of market-related approaches to GHG mitigation globally in the run up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC which meets in Paris in December 2015, and what could be the shape of things to come post-2020. 相似文献
11.
Reducing fossil fuel supply is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement goal to keep warming ‘well below 2°C’, yet the Agreement is silent on the topic of fossil fuels. This article outlines reasons why it is important that Parties to the Agreement find ways to more explicitly address the phasing out of fossil fuel production under the UNFCCC. It describes how countries aiming to keep fossil fuel supply in line with Paris goals could articulate and report their actions within the current architecture of the Agreement. It also outlines specific mechanisms of the Paris Agreement through which issues related to the curtailment of fossil fuel supply can be addressed. Mapping out a transition away from fossil fuels – and facilitating this transition under the auspices of the UNFCCC process – can enhance the ambition and effectiveness of national and international climate mitigation efforts.
Key policy insights
The international commitment to limit global average temperature increases to ‘well below 2°C’ provides a strong rationale for Parties to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC to pursue a phase-down in fossil fuel production, not just consumption.
Several countries have already made commitments to address fossil fuel supply, by agreeing to phase down coal or oil exploration and production.
Integrating these commitments into the UNFCCC process would link them to global climate goals, and ensure they form part of a broader global effort to transition away from fossil fuels.
The Paris Agreement provides a number of new opportunities for Parties to address fossil fuel production.
12.
详细介绍了《联合国气候变化框架公约》缔约方会议第13次会议通过的"巴厘路线图"的具体内容。"巴厘路线图"规划了未来两年将要谈判的重要议题,包括发达国家在2012年后减排温室气体义务;发展中国家未来温室气体减排行动;适应气候变化;发达国家未来向发展中国家提供技术转让、资金支持和能力建设等。这些议题谈判的成败,将对未来保护气候的国际努力、对未来全球的气候环境产生决定性影响,从而对谈判前景做了分析 相似文献
13.
Brandon B. Derman 《Climate Policy》2014,14(1):23-41
Justice dilemmas associated with climate change and the regulatory responses to it pose challenges for global governance, arguably hampering progress and raising concerns over efficacy and relevance. Scholarly literature suggests that transnational civil society groups can help address problems of governance and injustice that cross borders and pit states against each other. Findings of a comparative, qualitative study of climate justice advocacy suggest, however, that civil society groups' work in the US and EU is significantly shaped by institutional factors specific to those regimes, limiting advocates' broader impact. Moreover, political opportunities for the pursuit of climate action, and justice particularly, have diminished in those settings. By contrast, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides greater opportunities for discussions of justice, although civil society actors are significantly constrained within it. It is argued that greater roles for civil society in the UNFCCC could prove constructive in the face of current challenges connected with justice issues. Three themes in civil society advocacy linking principles of global justice with current climate policy debates are summarized. Finally, it is suggested that the first iteration of the UNFCCC Periodic Review provides timely opportunities to more fully draw upon civil society's potential contributions toward a fair and effective global climate regime.Policy relevanceThe roles of civil society organizations in climate governance were examined in three policy contexts: the UNFCCC, the US, and the EU, with special attention to advocacy addressing issues of equity and justice, identified as key challenges for a post-2012 global agreement. Findings suggest that (1) civil society roles are significantly constrained in each context, and (2) political opportunities for climate advocacy have diminished since 2009 in the US and EU, underlining (3) the continued salience of the UNFCCC as a forum for engagement and the construction of effective and equitable climate policy. Potential exists for increased civil society involvement at the UNFCCC to help resolve obstacles based in divergent national priorities. Three areas of justice-focused civil society activity are reviewed for current negotiation topics and the governance structure of the institution. The current UNFCCC Periodic Review is identified as an opportunity to increase civil society involvement. 相似文献
14.
详细介绍了《联合国气候变化框架公约》缔约方会议第13次会议通过的"巴厘路线图"的具体内容。"巴厘路线图"规划了未来两年将要谈判的重要议题,包括发达国家在2012年后减排温室气体义务;发展中国家未来温室气体减排行动;适应气候变化;发达国家未来向发展中国家提供技术转让、资金支持和能力建设等。这些议题谈判的成败,将对未来保护气候的国际努力、对未来全球的气候环境产生决定性影响,从而对谈判前景做了分析 相似文献
15.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):207-220
Since 2005, Parties to the UNFCCC have been negotiating policy options for incentivizing reductions of (greenhouse gas) emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) in a future climate regime. Proposals on how to operationalize REDD range from market-based to pure fund-based approaches. Most of the current proposals suggest accounting for REDD at the national level. Accounting for emission reductions and implementing policy reform for curbing deforestation will take time and imply high levels of technical and institutional capacity. Therefore it is essential that developing countries receive sufficient support to implement national REDD programmes. To save time and ensure prompt action in reducing deforestation, a REDD approach is proposed that integrates project-level and subnational REDD schemes into national-level accounting. This ‘nested approach’ can achieve meaningful reductions in GHG emissions from improved forest governance and management, while allowing for an immediate and broad participation by developing countries, civil society and the private sector. 相似文献
16.
The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC’s) Paris Agreement—which aims to limit climate change and increase global resilience to its effects—was a breakthrough in climate diplomacy, committing its Parties to develop and update national climate plans. Yet the Parties to the Agreement have largely overlooked the effect of climate change on ocean-based communities, economies, and ecosystems—as well as the role that the ocean can play in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Because the ocean is an integral part of the climate system, stronger inclusion of ocean issues is critical to achieving the Agreement’s goals. Here we discuss four ocean-climate linkages that suggest specific responses by Parties to the Agreement connected to 1) accelerating climate ambition, including via sustainable ocean-based mitigation strategies; 2) focusing on CO2 emissions to address ocean acidification; 3) better understanding ocean-based mitigation; and 4) pursuing ocean-based adaptation. These linkages offer a more complete perspective on the reasons strong climate action is necessary and inform a systematic approach for addressing ocean issues under the Agreement to strengthen climate mitigation and adaptation. 相似文献
17.
Different ways of framing the nexus between climate change and migration have been advanced in academic, advocacy and policy circles. Some understand it as a state-security issue, some take a protection (or human security) approach and yet others portray migration as an adaptation or climate risk management strategy. Yet we have little insight into how these different understandings of the ‘problem’ of climate change-related migration are beginning to shape the emergence of global governance in the climate regime. Through a focus on the UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement we argue that these different framings of climate change migration shape how actors understand the appropriate role of the TFD, including the substantive scope of its mandate; its operational priorities; the nature of its outputs and where it should be situated in the institutional architecture. We show that understanding the different framings of the nexus between climate change and migration – and how these framings are contested within the UNFCCC – can help to account for institutional development in this area of climate governance. 相似文献
18.
United Nations climate change conferences have attracted an increasing number and range of observer participants, often outnumbering national delegates. The interactions between the formal and informal spaces of climate governance at the Conference of the Parties (COP) are explored by investigating why non-nation state actors (NNSAs) attend them and by measuring to what extent official UN Side Events provide relevant information for the formal negotiations. Based on primary empirical research at recent COPs, it is found that 60–75% of Side Events have related directly to items under negotiation in the post-2012 climate negotiations. In this regard, Side Events that facilitate informal exchange between stakeholders not only provide input into the negotiations but also allow issues beyond the realm of the negotiations to be discussed, reflecting the scope of climate change. Although Side Events are an effective forum to exchange ideas and network, their current format and purpose as being events ‘on the side’ does not offer a sufficient framework for coordination between the work of NNSAs and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. 相似文献
19.
气候变化影响与适应问题的谈判进展 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
从《气候变化框架公约》（以下简称《公约》）第一次缔约方会议到目前为止，几乎历次会议都涉及气候变化影响与适应的谈判内容，但谈判进展甚微。通过综述《公约》谈判进程中与适应气候变化有关的主要决定，分析了适应气候变化影响与适应问题谈判的制约因素，最后提出了我国在气候变化影响与适应问题谈判中应持的立场。 相似文献
20.
Youth articulations of climate change injustice are experiencing an unprecedented moment in the spotlight as, inspired by Greta Thunberg, young people around the world take to the streets demanding justice for their generation in the face of climate emergency. Formal opportunities for youth voices to be heard in environmental governance are slim, although the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) offers a rare opportunity for youth to share their perspectives as one of nine civil society constituencies: YOUNGO. Recent research in Global Environmental Change has called for empirical exploration of justice claims-making by different stakeholders to develop understanding of how justice is conceptualised and negotiated in climate change governance spaces. To date, climate justice claims from youth have not been explored in the academic literature. This paper draws upon rich, ethnographic, longitudinal data on the evolution of justice claims made by a group of youth participants in the UNFCCC to contribute to this empirical gap. In our research, a UK-based case study organisation and long-established member of YOUNGO was studied between 2015 and 2018, including observation of their participation at the 21st, 22nd and 23rd Conferences of the Parties. We find that youth participants first articulated injustices based on perceived future risks to their generation but, over time, switched to solidarity claims about injustices experienced by other groups in the present. Whilst laudable, this impedes their mandate as representatives of younger generations. We also make three theoretical contributions to environmental justice theory. First we expand participation justice theory to both the visible structures of participation (procedural justice) and the informal rules and discourses shaping participation (representation justice). Second we demonstrate the importance of both external and self-recognition for the articulation of justice claims. Third we clarify the relationship between power and justice claim-making, proposing that we must look beneath what is articulated to shed light on the exercise of ideological power that shapes the framing and claiming of justice in environmental governance spaces. 相似文献