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1.
Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs. 相似文献
2.
Designing ITQ programs for commercial recreational fishing 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
This paper discusses the potential for implementing individual transferable quota (ITQ) schemes in commercial recreational fisheries, focusing particularly on charter and headboat fisheries. After a brief discussion of ITQs in commercial fisheries, the paper discusses the manner in which rents get dissipated in commercial recreational fisheries. Fishing mortality in recreational fisheries is determined as a joint outcome of angler behavior and trip supply. In the recreational sector under open access conditions, there are likely to be too many vessels providing too many trips at prices that are too low. Vessel input configurations are likely to be distorted in a manner that generates excessive fishing mortality. Designing ITQs for recreational fisheries requires consideration of issues not prominent in the design of commercial fisheries. Among the most important is the manner in which angler preferences and types affect overall mortality from both landings and discards. While catch and release fisheries and pure food fish recreational fisheries are relatively easy to manage with recreational ITQs, fisheries with both angler types present difficult monitoring problems that add complexities to ITQ design. Various ways to design programs that account for both landings and discard mortalities and that generate incentives for anglers and vessel owners to reduce discard mortality are discussed. 相似文献
3.
《Marine Policy》2017
The Netherlands was one of the first nations to introduce ITQs in their fisheries to manage national yearly Total Allowable Catches (TACs). These ITQs have gradually developed from an individual quota system in 1976 to an ITQ system in the 1980s. In 1993 the system was reformed into a co-management system. In this paper it is argued that many of the usual negative socio-economic consequences of ITQs mentioned in the literature have been largely absent, due to the embeddedness of ITQs in co-management arrangements. However, cracks have appeared lately in this combined management system, allowing an identification of its vulnerabilities. These findings show that the social and economic structure of Dutch fisheries is changing from a rather cooperative to a more competitive and exclusive system, more like conventional ITQs. 相似文献
4.
Managing marine fisheries using output controls in the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can be an attractive alternative to more traditional input controls. There are now a number of examples of where ITQ-managed fisheries have been able to reduce the impact of the major management problems in global fisheries, namely, gross over-capitalisation and effort. However, ITQs are not the perfect management tool and one of the lesser known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries where ITQs consist of a harvest right is the implicit relationship between ITQ property rights and rights of access to the fishing grounds. This implicit spatial right to the grounds can provide obstacles in the way of allocating water-space within fishing grounds for alternative uses such as marine-protected areas, large-scale aquaculture, and wind farms. These lesser-known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries are discussed here. 相似文献
5.
There are recognised benefits to managing fisheries by individual transferable quotas (ITQs), but ITQs may increase incentives to discard fish. 相似文献
6.
《Marine Policy》2013
The resource economic theory tells us that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) improve efficiency in the fishing industry by removing the least efficient actors from a fishery and allowing ownership to concentrate in the hands of the most efficient operators. Assertions about the nature of this allocative efficiency are, however, often based on purely theoretical assumptions. This paper presents a case study of the efficient operators remaining in the UK pelagic fishing fleet. After over 30 years of rights-based management (RBM) and 12 years of ITQs, the UK pelagic fleet numbers only 31 large-scale boats. Seven of these operate from the island of Whalsay in Shetland, which, with a population of approximately 1000 people (0.000016% of the population of the UK), is entitled to land around 22% of the UK pelagic catch. A key characteristic of the economically efficient Whalsay fleet is a crew ownership structure. This is now under threat from the long-term dynamics of the UK's ITQ system, as the high price of quota prevents the renewal of the fishery through new entrants. In the majority of global fisheries, where vessel ownership structures do not follow an assumed economic norm, fully marketised transferable rights may not be the most efficient method of management. 相似文献
7.
This article discusses inequality in the Icelandic cod fishery, focusing on changes in the actual distribution of fishing quotas and the ways in which Icelanders currently talk about equity and ownership. The individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, introduced in 1984, divided access to an important resource among those who happened to be boat owners at that time. Statistical findings with respect to the cod fishery - based on a database (the ‘Quotabase’) constructed using detailed information on all vessels that have been allotted ITQs from the onset of the system - show that ITQs have been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the biggest companies. Many of the small-scale boat owners that still hold ITQs are increasingly compelled to enter into contracts that involve fishing for larger ITQ holders. It is suggested that the distribution of ITQs, as well as their evaluation in social discourse, represents an important field of research. In Iceland, public discontent with the concentration of fishing rights and the ensuing social repercussions is increasingly articulated in terms of loaded metaphors, including ‘profiteering’, ‘tenancy’ and ‘lords of the sea’. It is argued that the ultimate efficiency of management programs may be jeopardized if managers ignore the history and culture of the fisheries involved and the likely social and ecological consequences of their programs. 相似文献
8.
In a widely received study Costello and his colleagues found that catch shares give better stock persistence and higher catch for fishermen. The conclusions made by Costello et al. were further supported by Grafton and McIlgorm where they suggested a framework in order to determine the costs and benefits of separate ITQ management in seven Australian commonwealth fisheries, and what the alternatives should be if the net benefits do not justify ITQs. This raises the question why we do not see catch shares being used more often. We explore at a global scale which countries would have the potential to, and indeed do, fulfil the conditions necessary to implement such a management strategy. 相似文献
9.
《Marine Policy》2016
The purpose of the article is to describe the Argentine ITQ system during the early years after the initial allocation in 2009 and introduce the Argentine case in the discussion on ITQs. This paper has been elaborated based on statistical information derived from fleet and catch data of the Fishing Log System of the Undersecretariat of Fisheries and Acquaculture and Management Reports on the Individual Transferable Quotas regime. The implementation of the Argentine ITQs regime took into account issues learned from other countries and from the theoretical debate about the pros and cons of the ITQ system. The Argentine ITQ regime introduced enough flexibility to dismiss the disadvantages of this system pointed out in other international experiences. 相似文献
10.
This study examined the use of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) to effectively manage fishing impacts on all ecosystem components, as required under Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) principles. A consequence of changing from input controls to output-based (catch) management is that the control of the regulating authority tends to be reduced, which may affect the outcomes for ecosystem management. This study reviewed the use of input controls across six fishing methods in 18 ITQ fisheries, which have been independently accredited as ecologically sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council (12 fisheries) or under Australian environmental legislation for Wildlife Trade Operation (six fisheries). Input controls were retained across a range of ITQ fisheries, with non-selective fisheries such as trawl, gillnet and line employing more input controls than selective fisheries such as purse-seine, pot/trap and dredge. Further case-studies confirmed the widespread and recent use of input controls (spatial and temporal closures) with the aim of managing ecosystem impacts of fishing. The retention of input controls, particularly closures affects the security (quality of title) characteristic of the fishing use right and the theoretical ability of fishers to manage their right for their future benefit. The security characteristic is weakened by closures through loss of access, which undermines industry trust and incentive for long-term decision making. By reducing the security of ITQs, individual fisher incentives and behaviour may separate from societal objectives for sustainability, which was one of the foremost reasons for introducing ITQ management. 相似文献
11.
《Marine Policy》2014
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) fisheries management systems are supposed to remedy the over-capacity problem associated with traditional command-and-control management systems. This paper provides some insight with respect to the impact of ITQs on vessel numbers in six different countries. The results indicate that the number of vessels was reduced by at least 30% within a few years of the implementation of individual vessel quotas. Thereafter a slow reduction in vessel numbers continued, indicating that it may take time period before over-capacity is fully removed. Moreover, the total effect on vessel numbers is surprisingly similar across countries and fisheries despite different degrees of transferability in the different cases analysed. 相似文献
12.
A principal challenge in developing any fishery management plan is the allocation of benefits and costs among participants in the fishery. This process is further complicated by imperfect information about future market demand and limited ability to predict the consequences of regulatory change. This paper offers a new approach to policymakers, using econometric analysis to simulate the potential impact of individual tradable quotas (ITQs) in a fishery. We compare the distribution of harvest across participants in the Atlantic Herring fishery under the current open access regime and under a potential ITQ regime, assuming two different levels of future demand. Our results show that production efficiency varies by vessel gear, home-port and relationship with buyers. Some of the predicted consequences of ITQs are: vessels from Massachusetts will gain share relative to those from Maine; trawlers will gain share relative to purse seine vessels; and independent vessels will lose share relative to vessels that are primarily contracted to specific processors or bait companies. These results will help policymakers in developing future management plans for the herring fishery. More generally, this analytical approach can help regulators in any fishery assess the potential impact of alternative policy changes under alternative future demand scenarios. 相似文献
13.
《Marine Policy》2017
This paper provides an example of how one group of fishermen, operating in an ITQ fishery in British Columbia, Canada, used a licence bank to attempt to mitigate the negative consequences of ITQs. After ten years in operation, the licence bank is self-sustaining and has realized modest and limited success. The authors identify a number of lessons learned from the experience, as well as highlight the opportunities that licence banks offer as an alternative mechanism to redress the negative consequences of ITQs. 相似文献
14.
The effectiveness of managing fisheries through the allocation of catch rights, including Individual Transferrable Quota's (ITQs), has been the subject of a number of recent reviews. Inspection of these reviews suggests that the effectiveness of ITQ and similar catch rights schemes in meeting single species sustainability objectives differs from their effectiveness in meeting broader Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management objectives, especially in terms of managing effects on associated and dependent species and habitats. This should not be a surprise, given the attributes of rights-based neoliberal market policy instruments, as discussed here. 相似文献
15.
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been introduced in a number of different countries, including Australia. Using seven Australian commonwealth fisheries the paper undertakes an ex ante cost–benefit analysis whether to introduce ITQs into these fisheries. The analysis uses five cost–benefit criteria, and in particular the gross value of production (GVP), to evaluate whether ITQs should be introduced or not. For fisheries where the net benefits do not currently justify ITQs, a pathway is provided to improve management outcomes with the use of individual transferable efforts units (ITEs). 相似文献
16.
《Marine Policy》2016
Iceland׳s fishing industry has outperformed fishing industries in neighboring countries in recent years. This paper identifies key factors in market structure in recent decades that contribute to long run profitability of the Icelandic fishing (and fish processing) industry using semi-structured interviews with industry participants, and compares those with similar results from Norway. Further, the development of profitability in the Icelandic and Norwegian demersal fishing industries is used to assess the long run effects of different management systems on quality, product focus and profitability. The results indicate that three key changes in Icelandic regulation during the 1980s were important to the development of long run profitability within the fishing industry: the abolition of export barriers, the introduction of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system and the establishment of fish auctions. A large and growing literature supports the role of ITQs in ensuring long run profitability. The importance of market structure for profitability has only recently been identified, affecting the ability of value chains to become market oriented and supply homogenous product flow from heterogeneous raw material. Comparison with Norway indicates that while individual transferable quota management does improve profitability in fishing to a certain extent, management systems must facilitate a strong market connection from consumers, through the stages of retail and processing, to fishers for the full realization of profit potential in the fishing industry. 相似文献
17.
The roots of the Canadian harp seal hunt can be traced to the 16th Century. But in the mid-20th century, opposition to the commercial hunt became widespread after television images of seal pups being killed with clubs on the pack ice off the coast of Newfoundland were broadcast around the world. International conservation groups, animal welfare groups, animal rights groups, and foreign governments have been calling for the Canadian government to end the commercial seal hunt on the grounds that it is inhumane and that harvest levels are unsustainable. The Canadian government defends the traditional practices of hunting harp seals, argues that seal pelts are an important source of income for sealers, and insists that the killing methods are humane and that harvest levels are sustainable. Emotions run high on both sides of the debate. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether or not there is a purely economic argument for ending Canada's commercial seal hunt. The paper finds that the benefits of ending the commercial hunt exceed the costs, but not unequivocally. However, the paper argues there should be a higher criterion—the Pareto criterion—for ending the commercial hunt; that is the hunt should end only if winners compensate the losers. The paper goes on to argue that an effective way to satisfy this criterion is to introduce a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and let the market reveal the value of the commercial seal hunt. In addition to many other advantages such as improving the safety and efficiency of the hunt, the ITQ market could provide a mechanism by which those willing to pay to end the hunt could do so directly to sealers thereby ensuring that the hunt is scaled back or ultimately ended only when it is economically efficient and unambiguously welfare-improving. 相似文献
18.
《Marine Policy》2017
Iceland's nationwide privatized Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system is over thirty years old but remains a topic of public and political debate, particularly because of the continued effects on small-scale fisheries. A national survey of small-boat fishermen was distributed to: (1) identify major defining characteristics of participants in ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries, (2) document and examine differences in satisfaction with fisheries management, and (3) evaluate the existing options for newcomers to participate in small-boat fisheries. Survey results indicate that Icelandic small-boat fishermen are engaged in multiple management systems within a wide range of boat sizes. Those who held quota were more satisfied with the current ITQ system compared to those who did not hold quota; however, nearly all fishermen were still critical of fisheries management in Iceland and the two major non-ITQ options of lumpfish and coastal fishing were not perceived to offer significant opportunity for entry-level fishermen. Dissatisfaction stemmed from the lack of decision-making power, a distrust of scientific advice, and the perception that the ITQ system did not serve the purpose of protecting fisheries resources, but was rather oriented only toward economic goals. The dynamic nature of Icelandic small-boat fishing livelihoods and the pervasive negative attitudes thirty years after ITQ implementation demonstrate the need for culturally appropriate and equitable fisheries management schemes where success is measured in social as well as economic and biological terms. 相似文献
19.
The Tasmanian rock lobster industry has been managed by Individually Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and several input control measures since 1998. In this study, nine years of rock lobster fishing business data were used to categorise the catch and quota ownership traits and examine the response to the introduction of ITQ management. More specifically the study investigates how profit drivers moderated industry structure change. 相似文献
20.
《Marine Policy》2013
This paper explores the economic environment that makes informal fish trading possible, the nature of these activities and how they are interconnected or might stimulate IUU fishing activities in the port of Progreso, Yucatan, Mexico. The main argument is that fish trading by middlemen has been developed within the scope of an informal sector which depends on the existence of structural and organizational factors such as: a dual economic system where the formal and informal sectors are complementary, and an institutional environment and a socio-economic network that interconnects both sectors and supports the activity. Research for this study was carried out during 2008 and 2009 in the port of Progreso, Yucatan, Mexico. The survey strategy was a non-probability sample adapting and combining chain referral techniques because middlemen in this region are a hidden population. Findings indicate that the main motivation for middlemen to remain underground is to maximize benefits. In order to do so, they need to build a socioeconomic network which is the center of their trading system. This way of operating generates incentives for fishers to fish illegally because middlemen would buy their products even if they do not meet formal regulations. 相似文献