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81.
82.
Over the last decade, cap-and-trade emissions schemes have emerged as one of the favoured policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions. An inherent design feature of cap-and-trade schemes is that, once the cap on emissions has been set, no additional reductions beyond this level can be provided by the actions of those individuals, organizations and governments within the covered sectors. Thus, the emissions cap constitutes an emissions floor. This feature has been claimed by some to have undesirable implications, in that it discourages ethically motivated mitigation actions and preempts the possibility that local, state and national governments can take additional mitigation action in the context of weak national or regional targets. These criticisms have become prominent in Australia and the US within the public debate regarding the adoption of an emissions trading scheme (ETS). These criticisms and their potential solutions are reviewed. A set-aside reserve is proposed to automatically retire ETS permits, which would correspond to verified and additional emissions reductions. This minimizes the possibility that ethically motivated mitigation actions are discouraged, allows for additional action by other levels of government, while providing transparency to other market participants on the level of permit retirements. 相似文献
83.
Robert MacNeil 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):259-276
Although it is likely that the political–economic coalition required for implementing a federal cap-and-trade programme for GHGs in the US is now sufficiently strong, the structural impediments that have prevented its legislative passage remain impressively durable and can be expected to continue to lay waste to congressional proposals for the foreseeable future. Indeed, given the complex history of environmental policy gridlock in Washington since the early 1980s, any expectations that a cap-and-trade programme could have been realistically achieved through the traditional legislative passage in Congress are fundamentally misplaced. Building on previous research, it is argued that – as with most other forms of environmental policy in the US over the past three decades – a national carbon market is more plausible given alternative policy pathways, which if taken are capable of circumventing the Federal Congress altogether. In particular, the interaction between litigation against the federal government and the ‘rulemaking’ authority possessed by the Executive Branch provides the potential space for the current administration to unilaterally establish a model rule for a national carbon-trading programme. Policy relevance This article aims to contribute to American climate policy debates by re-thinking the policy mechanisms most capable of establishing a national carbon market in the US. By taking into account the array of structural factors that have prevented the legislative passage of such a programme in federal Congress, a range of alternative policy ‘pathways’ is considered that have historically allowed progressive environmental policies to endure in Washington (despite increased Congressional gridlock over the past few decades). Two specific alternative strategies and the relationship between them are assessed: the use of litigation to impose legal obligations on federal agencies to regulate effluents, and the use of executive authority to define the nature and scope of environmental regulation. The administration's current potential to unilaterally develop a model-rule for a cap-and-trade programme under the Clean Air Act is emphasized, and the political implications of such a strategy are considered. 相似文献
84.
Martin Wolf 《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):772-783
Is it possible for all of humanity to enjoy the standards of living of today's high-income countries? What would happen if these limits were reached, perhaps because of climate change or a shortage of natural resources essential to production? How would society manage – or fail to manage – such limits? Notwithstanding the current financial and economic crises, these are perhaps the biggest questions confronting our species (and of a host of other species, who are the victims of our decisions). The article begins by considering the biggest economic event of our lifetimes – the ‘great convergence’ and its implications for the demand for resources. The discussion then turns to a specific limit on our development, climate change, which is different from most other limits, because it involves a global public good: the atmosphere. What such limits might mean for our civilization is discussed. One can persuade people to tackle climate change only if those concerned with the dangers persuade ordinary people that action will not come at the expense of their prosperity. 相似文献
85.
MARTIN CAMES 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):104-120
Which actors in the aviation sector ought to be obliged to participate in emissions trading? The European Commission opted for the aircraft operator in their proposal for a Directive. A major drawback is that non-EU aircraft operators might legally challenge their inclusion in this scheme and, if the challenge was successful, discrimination between EU and non- EU operators would undermine the scheme. An alternative would be to place an obligation on fuel suppliers to prove possession of allowances, thus avoiding discrimination. However, emissions trading can be evaded to some extent by increased refuelling beyond EU boundaries (tankering). Typical city pairs were used to analyse the conditions under which such tankering strategies are economically attractive. The analysis shows that the attractiveness of tankering depends substantially on the relationship between fuel prices and allowance prices. If the price relation as of March 2006 is taken as a basis, tankering would be attractive within a radius of up to 4,000 km especially on southbound and eastward routes. Emissions trading could, under unfavourable conditions, be evaded for up to 20% of the total fuel consumption in aviation with the help of tankering. Although this value is only a theoretical upper limit, more than 10% of fuel consumption could be affected by tankering. 相似文献
86.
Slovenia is required to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to an average of 8% below the base year 1986 in the period 2008–2012, due to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. It was the first of the transition countries to implement a CO2 tax in 1997. At the beginning of 2005, Slovenia joined other EU Member States by implementing the Emissions Trading Scheme. In contrast with other new EU Member States, Slovenia will be a net buyer of allowances. Therefore future movements on the emissions market will play an important role in the compliance costs of achieving the Kyoto target. The main purpose of this article is to present the establishment and characteristics of the first national allocation plan (NAP1) and to describe the main elements of the second national allocation plan (NAP2) for Slovenia within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the expected movements on the emissions allowances market in Slovenia, the expected compliance cost of achieving the Kyoto target and to present the main characteristics and efficiency of the CO2 tax in Slovenia. 相似文献
87.
John Reilly 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):155-158
Climate change is perhaps the central challenge that faces humanity. If the concept of green growth is to be anything more than a mere rebranding of the concept of sustainability, then it must elucidate the relationship between economic activity and pollution and provide a more detailed economic account of it. The articles in this Special Issue focus on ways in which GHG emissions may be reduced while satisfying the increasing demand for energy: from global, technological or economic solutions, to sub-national, financial or regulatory ones. Although the wide disparity in income between the least and most wealthy makes it difficult to reach a consensus on the best way to achieve a low-carbon society, the scale and potential effects of climate change make it imperative that one is reached. 相似文献
88.
In this study, we aim to describe the background for design characteristics of emissions trading schemes (ETS) in developing and emerging economies, with a particular focus on the case of Korea. These countries may face unique hardships such as fierce opposition from industry sectors, the presence of a power imbalance between the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and ministries that are in charge of supporting output growth, and the absence or incomplete development of financial markets and auctioning mechanisms. To overcome these hardships, the Korean government legislated laws that defined timelines for every stage of ETS development, established a strategic governance architecture to make up the weak position of the MOE, offered strong market-stabilizing measures focused on maintaining the allowance price below a certain level, and provided support packages to make the low-carbon transition easy by compensating for losses caused by the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (KETS). Such policy instruments that made adoption of KETS easier could be obstacles to making it efficient.Policy relevanceIn the process of adopting a cap-and-trade system, both a developing economy and an emerging economy may face unique hardships, such as strong opposition from industry sectors, the presence of a power imbalance between the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and ministries that are in charge of supporting output growth, and the absence or incomplete development of financial markets and auctioning mechanisms. To make up for the weak base of Korea’s ETS, the government legislated laws that defined timelines for every stage of the ETS development, established a strategic governance architecture to make up for the weak position of the MOE, offered strong market-stabilizing measures focused on maintaining the allowance price below a certain level, and provided support packages to make the low-carbon transition easy by compensating for losses caused by the Korea’s ETS. Korea’s experiences can be shared with other developing economies that are considering adoption of a cap-and-trade scheme. 相似文献
89.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):277-292
California is considering the adoption of a cap-and-trade regulatory mechanism for regulating the greenhouse gas emissions from electricity and perhaps other industries. Two options have been widely discussed for implementing cap-and-trade in the electricity industry. The first is to regulate the emissions from electricity at the load-serving entity (LSE) level. The second option for implementation of cap-and-trade has been called the ‘first-seller’ approach. Conceptually, under first-seller, individual sources (i.e. power plants) within California would be responsible for their emissions, as with traditional cap-and-trade systems. Emissions from imports would be assigned to the ‘importing firm’. An option that has not been as widely discussed is to implement a pure source-based system within California, effectively excluding imports from the cap-and-trade system altogether. This article examines these three approaches to implementing cap-and-trade for California's electricity sector. The article discusses many of the issues relating to measurement and the impacts on bidding and scheduling incentives that are created by the various regulatory regimes. 相似文献
90.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):9-21
Governments willing to commit themselves to maintain carbon prices at or above a certain level face the challenge that their commitments need to be credible both for investors in low-carbon technology and for foreign governments. This article argues that governments can make such commitments by issuing long-term put option contracts on the price of CO2 allowances. This mechanism gives investors the right, but not the obligation, to sell allowances to the government at the strike price. From the investors' point of view, a government is therefore fully committed to a price floor for allowances in the future. This proposed approach alters the incentives that a government faces when considering noncompliance and serves to prevent non-compliance. The proposal fares well when assessed against criteria to determine its suitability in legitimacy, enforcement, proportionality, lack of interference from other contracting States, and transparency. It also allows for fine-tuning through the number and duration of issued options and the strike price. A robust contract structure is proposed to protect against government interference that might threaten the credibility of commitments. 相似文献