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41.
Paula Castro 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):198-218
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ argument is analysed empirically by comparing marginal abatement cost curves. Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in most countries. Although the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped are below the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM predominantly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for the adoption of low-cost abatement options. 相似文献
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《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):97-103
Abstract The possibility of using flexibility mechanisms as a way to achieve national commitments under an international agreement to reduce climate gases has been a hot issue throughout the negotiating process of the Kyoto Protocol. A variety of arguments either in favour of or against emissions trading have been put forward by different Parties and by different groups. The purpose of this viewpoint is to look further into the various arguments opposing emissions trading or favouring their restriction (which are really arguments that could be used against all the different flexibility mechanisms) and comment on their validity. 相似文献
44.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):85-108
Abstract To reduce the costs of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Kyoto protocol, international trades of emissions quotas are allowed. The revenue from the sale of quotas may exceed the sanctions for non-compliance if these penalties are weak or poorly enforced. Under these circumstances emissions trading enables a country to benefit financially through non-compliance. To counter non-compliance due to trading a range of liability proposals have been suggested. Using a simple global model, we analyze the economic and environmental performance of these proposals for the first commitment period. In addition, the proposals are tested for their sensitivity to national circumstances and to market power. We find that penalties are sufficient to deter non-compliance if they are high enough and are effectively enforced. If the non-compliance penalties are weak or poorly enforced, the permanent reserve proposal is best able to ensure compliance by sellers at a cost similar to the competitive market equilibrium. While not sufficient to ensure compliance on their own, eligibility requirements and annual retirement of AAUs equal to actual emissions contribute to compliance at little or no cost. Hence, such provisions could complement other liability proposals. 相似文献
45.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):191-205
Abstract In response to Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) have begun to consider greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international aviation and shipping. However, neither ICAO nor IMO have taken any effective action on the issue yet and progress can be characterised as slow. The lack of action has so far not been made up for by measures within the climate change regime or by individual countries. An important motivation for the efforts of ICAO and IMO so far has been the potential regulatory competition with the climate change regime. However, given the lack of political will to act on the issue within the latter, this motivation has not been very forceful. Against this backdrop, I argue that there are in particular three options for furthering progress within ICAO and IMO, namely (1) enhancing the threat of regulation of GHG emissions from international transport under the climate change regime; (2) undertaking unilateral domestic action by various countries (in particular the EU); and (3) furthering a learning process within ICAO and IMO. Furthermore, a closer coordination of efforts under ICAO, IMO and the climate change regime could facilitate and accelerate progress. 相似文献
46.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):137-148
Abstract Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries. This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end. 相似文献
47.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):652-668
Sectoral approaches have been gaining currency in the international climate debate as a possible remedy to the shortfalls of the Kyoto Protocol. Proponents argue that a sector-based architecture can more easily invite the participation of developing countries, address competitiveness issues, and enable immediate emissions reductions. However, given the numerous proposals, much confusion remains as to what sectoral approaches actually are. This article provides a simple, yet comprehensive, taxonomy of the various proposals for sectoral approaches. Based on the dual criteria of content and actors, three such types are identified and described: government targets and timetables; industry targets and timetables; and transnational technology cooperation. For each of these types, existing proposals and ongoing initiatives are discussed. In a second step, the article analyses the political landscape in which sectoral approaches are being debated, identifying the interests of their key advocates as well as the concerns of their critics. The Japanese government and energy-intensive manufacturing industries represent the main proponents of sectoral approaches to address the problems of carbon leakage and economic competitiveness. Developing countries, on the other hand, are wary of attempts to impose emissions reduction targets on their economies through sectoral target-setting. They, therefore, interpret sectoral approaches as sector-based forms of technology cooperation and technology transfer. 相似文献
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Abstract Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have been established under the Kyoto Protocol as project-based instruments to mitigate greenhouse gases of the industrialized countries to the levels imposed by their Kyoto commitments. An unresolved issue associated with the implementation of these two flexibility mechanisms, concerns the choice of the appropriate baseline for calculating the emission reductions in JI or CDM projects. This article describes a computerized tool that constructs and compares different types of standardized baselines and benchmarks. The analysis focuses on the suitability of several different types of benchmarks for assessing the emission reductions of certain types of projects. The analysis is also expanded into a discussion of the extent to which benchmarks reduce the crediting of non-additional projects and limit the risk of missed additional investments. This tool has been applied to actual JI and CDM projects in the Russian Federation and Indonesia. 相似文献
49.
Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the USA: the strategic role of energy tax adjustments at the border 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Abstract This article explores options for countries that have ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and that intend to implement ambitious climate protection strategies—the ‘Kyoto coalition’—to deal with possible comparative disadvantages vis-à-vis third parties, in particular industrialized countries that do not adhere to the Kyoto Protocol. Specifically, the article focuses on the instrument of border adjustments for energy taxes. We outline the rationale for such adjustments and examine in detail whether certain border adjustments for energy taxes would be permissible under world trade law, in particular the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. We conclude that despite remaining ambiguity in both the legal provisions and the pertinent case law, border tax adjustments are under certain circumstances compatible with world trade law. Yet, given persisting legal uncertainty, it seems likely that affected members of the World Trade Organization would challenge such energy tax adjustments at the border before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 相似文献
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Abstract This article describes a new concept for an international climate regime for differentiation of future commitments: the ‘common but differentiated convergence’ approach (CDC). Under CDC, Annex-I countries' per-capita emission allowances converge within a convergence period to a low level. Individual non-Annex-I countries' allowances converge to the same level also within the same period (‘common convergence’), but starting when their per-capita emissions are a certain percentage above global average (‘differentiated’). Until then they may voluntarily take on ‘positively binding’ targets. This approach eliminates two concerns often voiced in relation to gradually converging per-capita emissions: (i) advanced developing countries have their commitment to reduce emissions delayed and their targets are not the same as Annex-I countries with equal per-capita emissions; (ii) CDC does not provide excess emission allowances to the least developing countries. Under CDC, stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 and 650 ppm CO2-equivalent can be reached with participation at roughly 0% and 50% above global average and convergence to around 3 and 4.5 tCO2-eq/cap within 40 years. Even if the CDC approach is not implemented in its entirety, it is possible that the step-by-step decisions on the international climate regime can be guided by the principles provided in the CDC approach. 相似文献