共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
The successful implementation of the Paris Agreement requires substantial energy policy change on the national level. In national energy policy-making, climate change mitigation goals have to be balanced with arguments on other national energy policy goals, namely limiting cost and increasing energy security. Thus far, very little is known about the relative importance of these goals and how they are related to political partisanship. In order to address this gap, we focus on parliamentary discourse around low-carbon energy futures in Germany over the past three decades and analyze the relative importance of, and partisanship around, energy policy goals. We find that the political discourse revolves around four, rather than three, goals as conventionally assumed; improving the competitiveness of the national energy technology industry is not only an additional energy policy goal, it is also highly important in the political discourse. In general, the relative importance of these goals is rather stable over time and partisanship around them is limited. Yet, a sub-analysis of the discourse on renewable energy technologies reveals a high level of partisanship, albeit decreasing over time. Particularly, the energy industry goal’s importance increases while its partisanship vanishes. We discuss how these findings can inform future energy policy research and provide a potential inroad for more ambitious national energy policies. Key policy insights In addition to the three classic goals of energy policy (limiting cost, securing access and reducing the environmental burden) we identify a fourth policy goal: strengthening the national energy technology industry Conformity between the three classical energy and the industrial policy goals is a key driver explaining policy change For renewable energy technologies, partisanship around this fourth goal is lower than around other goals and decreases over time as innovation allows these technologies to increasingly correspond to policy-makers’ high-level goals Extant research underestimates the importance of industry policy goals, but overestimates environmental co-benefits of low-carbon energy options Paradigmatic policy change in Germany did not depend on top-down shifts in high-level policy goals but was driven by lower-level technology-specific goals
相似文献
2.
Energy and climate policies may have significant economy-wide impacts, which are regularly assessed based on quantitative energy-environment-economy models. These tend to vary in their conclusions on the scale and direction of the likely macroeconomic impacts of a low-carbon transition. This paper traces the characteristic discrepancies in models’ outcomes to their origins in different macro-economic theories, most importantly their treatment of technological innovation and finance. We comprehensively analyse the relevant branches of macro-innovation theory and group them into two classes: ‘Equilibrium’ and ‘Non-equilibrium’. While both approaches are rigorous and self-consistent, they frequently yield opposite conclusions for the economic impacts of low-carbon policies. We show that model outcomes are mainly determined by their representations of monetary and finance dimensions, and their interactions with investment, innovation and technological change. Improving these in all modelling approaches is crucial for strengthening the evidence base for policy making and gaining a more consistent picture of the macroeconomic impacts of achieving emissions reductions objectives. The paper contributes towards the ongoing effort of enhancing the transparency and understanding of sophisticated model mechanisms applied to energy and climate policy analysis. It helps tackle the overall ‘black box’ critique, much-cited in policy circles and elsewhere. Key policy insights Quantitative models commissioned by policy-makers to assess the macroeconomic impacts of climate policy generate contradictory outcomes and interpretations. The source of the differences in model outcomes originates primarily from assumptions on the workings of the financial sector and the nature of money, and of how these interact with processes of low-carbon energy innovation and technological change. Representations of innovation and technological change are incomplete in energy-economy-environment models, leading to limitations in the assessment of the impacts of climate-related policies. All modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their treatment of finance and innovation. A strong recommendation is given for modellers of energy-economy systems to improve their representations of money and finance.
相似文献
3.
With cities being responsible for up to 70% of energy-related carbon emissions, municipal governments worldwide are becoming increasingly aware of their responsibility to act. Many large cities have committed to mitigation by becoming member of a municipal climate network, such as the C40 or the Compact of Mayors. However, there is no consistent assessment of whether membership of such networks translates into measurable outcomes. To fill this gap, we propose the use of novel outcome variables, combining financial data with geospatial information. As a starting point, this paper compares utility-scale investment in photovoltaics (PV) within the administrative boundaries of large global cities, combining the Bloomberg New Energy Finance database with information from Google Maps. We analyse 512 global cities with a population of above 1 million, and consider the impact of 5 networks and 2 reporting platforms. The results suggest that membership of the C40 network has a positive effect on utility-scale solar PV investment, while no such evidence is found for any of the other networks or reporting platforms under study. Based on our findings, we recommend that municipal climate networks increase their efforts to trigger city regulation that is conducive to solar PV investment. More generally, measuring early indicators, such as low-carbon investment, can help municipal climate networks in their role as ‘commitment brokers’ for climate action on the ever-more important city level. Key policy insights Cities have considerable policy space to foster utility-scale solar PV investment within their administrative boundaries. While some large global cities exhibited significant growth in utility-scale solar PV, many others with good solar potential did not have a single project by the end of 2016. Outside of China (where city boundaries often include rural areas), Tokyo tops the list with utility-scale solar PV projects by far, followed by San Diego and Rome. Membership of the C40 network appears to make a positive difference to PV investment, unlike other networks or reporting platforms. Outcome measures like low-carbon investment can be used more generally to assess the climate action performance of cities.
相似文献
4.
Climate policy uncertainty significantly hinders investments in low-carbon technologies, and the global community is behind schedule to curb carbon emissions. Strong actions will be necessary to limit the increase in global temperatures, and continued delays create risks of escalating climate change damages and future policy costs. These risks are system-wide, long-term and large-scale and thus hard to diversify across firms. Because of its unique scale, cost structure and near-term availability, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD+) has significant potential to help manage climate policy risks and facilitate the transition to lower greenhouse gas emissions. ‘Call’ options contracts in the form of the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits from jurisdictional REDD+ programmes at a predetermined price per ton of CO 2 could help unlock this potential despite the current lack of carbon markets that accept REDD+ for compliance. This approach could provide a globally important cost-containment mechanism and insurance for firms against higher future carbon prices, while channelling finance to avoid deforestation until policy uncertainties decline and carbon markets scale up. Key policy insights Climate policy uncertainty discourages abatement investments, exposing firms to an escalating systemic risk of future rapid increases in emission control expenditures. This situation poses a risk of an abatement ‘short squeeze,’ paralleling the case in financial markets when prices jump sharply as investors rush to square accounts on an investment they have sold ‘short’, one they have bet against and promised to repay later in anticipation of falling prices. There is likely to be a willingness to pay for mechanisms that hedge the risks of abruptly rising carbon prices, in particular for ‘call’ options, the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits at a predetermined price, due to the significantly lower upfront capital expenditure compared to other hedging alternatives. Establishing rules as soon as possible for compliance market acceptance of high-quality emissions reductions credits from REDD+ would facilitate REDD+ transactions, including via options-based contracts, which could help fill the gap of uncertain climate policies in the short and medium term.
相似文献
5.
Globally, the metals and mining sector is a major contributor to GHG emissions. Climate change also poses significant challenges for the industry in a number of ways, including risks to infrastructure and equipment, transport routes and the cost of energy supplies. The sector is of particular importance to Russia, and yet very little is known about how the sector positions itself in relation to this key issue. This article conducts an in-depth look at the response of the Russian metals and mining sector to climate change. It looks at the key actors, their willingness to engage with the issue of climate change, preferred policy options and the strategies adopted to further their interests. The role of companies, prominent individuals and business associations is considered. The evidence suggests that, although there is widespread acceptance of climate change as a phenomenon, there is significant variation within the sector, with some companies proactive on climate policy, and others more reluctant. Different responses are attributed to reputational factors and the disproportionate influence of international and domestic policy developments on companies. Russian coal companies, directly threatened by any international attempts to reduce coal consumption, display the strongest opposition to efforts aimed at curbing emissions. The Russian government, far from thinking of transitioning to a low carbon future, is vigorously trying to expand the coal industry. Key policy insights Understanding how Russia’s domestic position on climate policy is formed is fundamental for understanding the factors driving its international engagement on climate policy. The Russian government has no plans to phase out coal and is instead actively seeking to expand the coal industry. This highlights the obstacles to Russia’s commitment to climate policy at both the domestic and international levels. The socio-economic consequences of climate policy for the Russian coal industry are a key consideration for the government, with some regions heavily dependent on the industry for employment and electricity generation.
相似文献
6.
In June 2017, the Trump administration decided to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement, a landmark climate agreement adopted in 2015 by 195 nations. The exit of the US has not just raised concern that the US will miss its domestic emission reduction targets, but also that other parties to the Paris Agreement might backtrack on their initial pledges regarding emission reductions or financial contributions. Here we assess the magnitude of the threat that US non-cooperation poses to the Paris Agreement from an international relations perspective. We argue that US non-cooperation does not fundamentally alter US emissions, which are unlikely to rise even in the absence of new federal climate policies. Nor does it undermine nationally determined contributions under pledge and review, as the Paris Agreement has introduced a new logic of domestically driven climate policies and the cost of low-carbon technologies keeps falling. However, US non-participation in raising climate finance could raise high barriers to global climate cooperation in the future. Political strategies to mitigate these threats include direct engagement by climate leaders such as the European Union with key emerging economies, notably China and India, and domestic climate policies that furnish benefits to traditional opponents of ambitious climate policy. Key policy insights US non-cooperation need not be a major threat to pledge and review under the Paris Agreement. US non-cooperation is a serious threat to climate finance. Deeper engagement with emerging economies offers new opportunities for global climate policy.
相似文献
7.
We live in a rapidly advancing digital information age where the ability to discover, access and utilize high-quality information in a reliable and timely manner is often assumed to be the norm. However, this is not always the experience of researchers, practitioners and decision makers responding to the challenges of a rapidly changing climate, despite the billions now being made available for investment in climate change adaptation initiatives throughout the world and particularly in developing countries. In recognition of the importance of information in adaptation planning, Article 7.7 of the Paris Agreement sets out clear guidance for parties to develop, share, manage and deliver climate change knowledge, information and data as a means to strengthening cooperation and action on adaptation. This article provides some key lessons and insights on climate change information and knowledge management (IKM) in small island developing States (SIDS) from the perspective of Pacific SIDS. A situation analysis of current climate change IKM practices in Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu was conducted and key barriers to effective climate change IKM identified. The outcome of this article is a range of pragmatic policy considerations for overcoming common barriers to climate change IKM in the Pacific, which may be of value to SIDS more widely. Key policy insights The partnership approach of co-investigating climate change IKM barriers in collaboration with Pacific SIDS generated considerable trust, a shared purpose and therefore rich IKM lessons and insights. Turning climate change IKM aspirations into practice is significantly more complicated than expected, and requires a long-term commitment from both national governments and development partners. Pacific SIDS need to establish national guiding climate change IKM Frameworks that leverage rather than duplicate growing national investments in whole-of-government IKM. Reframing climate change IKM in the Pacific towards demand and user needs will be critical to ensuring widespread ownership and participation in IKM solutions that lead to greater adaptation and resilience outcomes. It is also critical that IKM activities in SIDS support the development of national capacity to scope, develop, deploy and maintain decision support systems. Federated IKM systems are ideal for encouraging greater IKM collaboration.
相似文献
8.
Little research has been done on the effectiveness of communicative tools for climate change adaptation. Filling this knowledge gap is relevant, as many national governments rely on communicative tools to raise the awareness and understanding of climate impacts, and to stimulate adaptation action by local governments. To address this knowledge gap, this study focuses on the effectiveness of communicative tools in addressing key municipal barriers to climate change adaptation, by conducting a large N-size empirical study in the Netherlands. This study explores the effectiveness of these tools in theory, by checking whether their goals match the perceived barriers to municipal climate change adaptation, and the effectiveness in practice by analysing whether they are used and perceived as useful. Document analyses have clarified the assumptions underlying the tools. By conducting semi-structured interviews with 84 municipalities the key barriers to climate change adaptation and the use and usefulness of the tools in practice were analysed. The research revealed that the key barriers experienced by municipalities are a lack of urgency, a lack of knowledge of risks and measures, and limited capacity, the first being the primary one. Communicative tools, while being effective in theory, are not sufficiently effective in practice in addressing the key barriers. Municipalities that are not experiencing a sense of urgency to take on adaptation planning are not likely to be activated by the tools. Advanced municipalities need more sophisticated tools. This article concludes with some suggestions to improve the effectiveness of communicative tools. Key policy insights Although effective in theory in addressing key barriers to municipal adaptation planning, the effectiveness in practice of communicative tools is limited. To increase their effectiveness in practice, municipalities’ awareness of the existence of the communicative tools needs to be raised. Advanced municipalities need more sophisticated tools that are context-specific and address a wide range of climate risks. The effectiveness of communicative tools can be improved by embedding them in a wider mix of policy instruments.
相似文献
9.
Current country-level commitments under the Paris Agreement fall short of putting the world on a required trajectory to stay below a 2°C temperature increase compared to pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. Therefore, the timing of increased ambition is hugely important and as such this paper analyses the impact of both the short and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement on global emissions and economic growth. Using the hybrid TIAM-UCL-MSA model we consider the achievement of a 2°C target against a baseline of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) while also considering the timing of increased ambition of the NDCs by 2030 and the impacts of cost reductions of key low-carbon technologies. We find that the rate of emissions reduction ambition required between 2030 and 2050 is almost double when the NDCs are achieved but not ratcheted up until 2030, and leads to lower levels of economic growth throughout the rest of the century. However, if action is taken immediately and is accompanied by increasingly rapid low-carbon technology cost reductions, then there is almost no difference in GDP compared to the path suggested by the current NDC commitments. Key policy insights Delaying the additional action needed to achieve the 2°C target until 2030 is shown to require twice the rate of emissions reductions between 2030 and 2050. Total cumulative GDP over the century is lower when additional action is delayed to 2030 and therefore has an overall negative impact on the economy, even without including climate change damages. Increased ratcheting of the NDC commitments should therefore be undertaken sooner rather than later, starting in conjunction with the 2023 Global Stocktake. Early action combined with cost reductions in key renewable energy technologies can reduce GDP losses to minimal levels (<1%). A 2°C future with technological advancements is clearly possible for a similar cost as a 3.3°C world without these advances, but with lower damages and losses from climate change.
相似文献
10.
States will disagree about deployment of solar geoengineering, technologies that would reflect a small portion of incoming sunlight to reduce risks of climate change, and most disagreements will be grounded in conflicting interests. States that object to deployment will have many options to oppose it, so states favouring deployment will have a powerful incentive to meet their objections. Objections rooted in opposition to the anticipated unequal consequences of deployment may be met through compensation, yet climate policy is inhospitable to compensation via liability. We propose that multilateral parametric climate risk insurance might be a useful tool to facilitate agreement on solar geoengineering deployment. With parametric insurance, predetermined payouts are triggered when climate indices deviate from set ranges. We suggest that states favouring deployment could underwrite reduced-rate parametric climate insurance. This mechanism would be particularly suited to resolving disagreements based on divergent judgments about the outcomes of proposed implementation. This would be especially relevant in cases where disagreements are rooted in varying levels of trust in climate model predictions of solar geoengineering effectiveness and risks. Negotiations over the pricing and terms of a parametric risk pool would make divergent judgments explicit and quantitative. Reduced-rate insurance would provide a way for states that favour implementation to demonstrate their confidence in solar geoengineering by underwriting risk transfer and ensuring compensation without the need for attribution. This would offer a powerful incentive for states opposing implementation to moderate their opposition. Key policy insights States favouring deployment of solar geoengineering will need to address other states’ objections—unilateralism is implausible in practice This might be partially achieved using parametric climate risk insurance based on objective indicators A sovereign risk pool offering reduced-rate parametric insurance underwritten by states backing deployment could facilitate cooperation on solar geoengineering deployment States favouring deployment would demonstrate their confidence in solar geoengineering by supporting the risk pool Opposing states would be insured against solar geoengineering risks and proposing states would be incentivized to guard against overconfidence
相似文献
11.
One of the most important challenges for the South East Europe region will be replacing more than 30% of its presently installed fossil fuel generation capacity by the end of 2030, and more than 95% by 2050 if its age structure is considered. This requires a strong policy framework to incentivise new investments in a region currently lacking investors, but also presents an opportunity to shape the electricity sector over the long term according to the broader energy transition strategy of the EU and the Energy Community. The aim of this paper is to assess what type of long-term pathways exist for electricity sector development in the region if they follow the energy transition process of the EU. In this model-based scenario assessment, long term electricity sector futures are explored using a set of interlinked electricity models evaluating the level of renewable energy investment required in the region to reach a deep decarbonization target, assuming emission reduction above 94% by 2050 compared to 1990 in line with the long term market integration and climate policy goals of the EU. It also explores what are the most important system wide impacts of the high deployment of renewable energy concerning generation adequacy and security of supply. Key policy insights Energy policies in the South East Europe (SEE) region, both at the national and regional level, should focus on enabling renewable energy integration, as this will be a key component of the future energy mix. EU and Energy Community policies should be incorporated into national energy planning to ensure that SEE countries embark on the energy transition process at an early stage. Stranded costs should be carefully considered in decision-making on new fossil-fuel generation and gas network investment in order to avoid lock-in to carbon intensive technologies. If consistent decarbonization policy prevails, with a significant and persistent CO2 price signal, the role of natural gas remains transitory in the region. The SEE region offers relatively cheap decarbonization options: the power sector can reduce GHG emissions above 94% by 2050 in the modelled scenarios.
相似文献
12.
This paper examines power relations, coalitions and conflicts that drive and hinder institutional change in South African climate policy. The analysis finds that the most contested climate policies are those that create distributional conflicts where powerful, non-poor actors will potentially experience real losses to their fossil fuel-based operations. This finding opposes the assumption of competing objectives between emissions and poverty reduction. Yet, actors use discourse that relates to potentially competing objectives between emissions reductions, jobs, poverty reduction and economic welfare. The analysis relates to the broader questions on how to address public policy problems that affect the two objectives of mitigating climate change and simultaneously boosting socio-economic development. South Africa is a middle-income country that represents the challenge of accommodating simultaneous efforts for emissions and poverty reduction. Institutional change has been constrained especially in the process towards establishing climate budgets and a carbon tax. The opposing coalitions have succeeded in delaying the implementation of these processes, as a result of unequal power relations. Institutional change in South African climate policy can be predominantly characterized as layering with elements of policy innovation. New policies build on existing regulations in all three cases of climate policy examined: the climate change response white paper, the carbon tax and the renewable energy programme. Unbalanced power relations between coalitions of support in government and civil society and opposition mainly from the affected industry result in very fragile institutional change. Key policy insights The South African government has managed to drive institutional change in climate policy significantly over the past 7 years. Powerful coalitions of coal-related industries and their lobbies have constrained institutional change and managed to delay the implementation of carbon pricing measures. A successfully managed renewable energy programme has started to transform a coal- and nuclear-powered electricity sector towards integrating sustainable energy technologies. The programme is vulnerable to intergovernmental opposition and requires management at the highest political levels. Potential conflict with poverty reduction measures is not a major concern that actively hinders institutional change towards climate objectives. Predominantly non-poor actors frequently use poverty-related discourse to elevate their interests to issues of public concern.
相似文献
13.
Brazil's nationally determined contribution (NDC) pledged under the Paris Agreement has marked a new stage in its climate policy towards strengthening low-carbon economic development beyond the recent drastic cuts in emissions from deforestation. Brazil especially means to limit oil consumption driven by future economic growth and to increase energy efficiency and biofuel use in the transport sector. On the other hand, Brazil still aspires to become a major petroleum province given its huge reserves of ‘pre-salt’ oil. This article aims to clarify under what conditions low-carbon economic development and oil exploration can possibly be combined in Brazil and what would be the energy system, environmental and macroeconomic implications of enabling policies for doing so. To address these questions, an energy–economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Brazilian economy is used to simulate alternative scenarios up to 2030. The results first show that implementing the most recent energy plans, which take into account the new economic reality in Brazil, should lead to over 20% lower domestic CO 2 emissions in 2030 than the indicative NDC target, and to the export of the bulk of newfound crude oil. Second, with the same level of oil production, deeper domestic decarbonization, triggered by additional carbon pricing and sustainable efficiency measures, appears achievable with very small gross domestic product (GDP) loss and maximum oil exports, while being aligned with a 2°C emission pathway. However, (i) extra oil exports may induce net additional emissions outside Brazil and be seen as a perverse incentive and (ii) the economic growth strategy based on high oil exports may hinder the necessary diversification of the Brazilian economy. Key policy insights Low-carbon development goals will strongly interact with oil policy in Brazil. The 2030 NDC target should be easy to achieve considering the new economic reality in Brazil. Deeper domestic decarbonization is achievable with very limited GDP loss and significant oil exports, while being aligned with a 2°C emission pathway. A broad strategic vision is needed to reconcile climate policy, energy policy and other economic development objectives.
相似文献
14.
Reducing GHG emissions and mitigating climate change would require significant investments in renewable energy technologies. Foreign direct investments (FDI) in renewable energy (RE) have increased over the last years, contributing to the diffusion of RE globally. In the field of climate policy, there are multiple policy instruments aimed at attracting investments in renewable energy. This article aims to map the FDI flows globally including source and destination countries. Furthermore, the article investigates which policy instruments attract more FDI in RE sectors such as solar, wind and biomass, based on an econometric analysis of 137 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries. The results show that Feed in Tariffs (FIT) followed by Fiscal Measures (FM), such as tax incentives and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), are the most significant policy instrument that attract FDI in the RE sector globally. Regarding carbon pricing instruments, based on our analysis, carbon tax proved to be correlated with high attraction of FDI in OECD countries, whereas Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) proved to be correlated with high attraction of FDI mainly in non-OECD countries. Key policy insights Feed in Tariffs is the most significant policy instrument that attracts FDI in the Renewable Energy sector globally. Fiscal Measures (FM), such as tax incentives, show a significant and positive impact on renewable energy projects by foreign investors, and particularly on solar energy. Carbon pricing instruments, such as carbon taxation and emissions trading, proved to attract FDI in OECD and non-OECD countries respectively. Public investments, such as government funds for renewable energy projects, proved not as attractive to foreign private investors, perhaps because public funds are not perceived as stable in the long run.
相似文献
15.
Climate engineering has received increasing attention, but its discussion has remained on the sidelines of mainstream climate policy. The policy relevance of this previously exotic option is poised to rise because of the gap between the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement and slow global mitigation efforts. It is therefore crucial to understand the risks and benefits of the proposed schemes, and the social implications of policy choices. Assessment of the risks and benefits of solar geoengineering strongly depends on scenarios, but previous scenarios have not reflected the full range of social choices. In light of concerns over risks, a newer set of scenarios is desirable, which represents both uncertainties and social choices more fully. Borrowing and extending lessons from recent literature on the new community climate scenario process, we envision a possible scenario-building process that combines interdisciplinary scholarship with the involvement of stakeholders and citizens. The resultant scenarios would better characterize uncertainties of, and policy choices for, solar geoengineering, and foster critical appraisal of its risks and benefits. Such societal choices might include not only total ban and large-scale deployment, but also limited deployment, which has received less attention in the scenario literature. The interaction between scenario and governance research would be able to highlight the central issues at stake, including ethical, social, and political dimensions. Key policy insights A more comprehensive assessment of solar geoengineering is necessary to evaluate its risks and benefits, necessitating new scenario research It is crucial to reflect the full span of policy choices and uncertainties with interdisciplinary collaboration in such scenarios Such societal choices might include not only total ban and large-scale deployment, but also limited deployment, which has received less attention in the scenario literature Participatory scenario research would enable incorporating the concerns and opinions of stakeholders and citizens in scenario creation
相似文献
16.
Coral reefs are highly vulnerable to the impacts of rising marine temperatures and marine heatwaves. Mitigating dangerous climate change is essential and urgent, but many reef systems are already suffering on current levels of warming. Geoengineering options are worth exploring to protect the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) from extreme warming conditions, but we contend that they require strong governance and public consultation from the outset. Australian governments are currently funding feasibility testing of three geoengineering proposals for the GBR. Each proposal involves manipulating ocean or atmospheric conditions to lower water temperatures and thereby reduce the threat of mass coral bleaching events. Innovative strategies to protect the GBR and field testing of these is essential, but current laws do not guarantee robust governance for field testing of these technologies. Nor do they provide the foundation for a more coherent national policy on climate intervention technologies more generally. Responsible governance frameworks, including detailed risk assessment and early public consultation, are necessary for geoengineering research to build legitimacy and promote scientific progress. Key policy insights Marine heatwaves pose a serious threat to coral reefs, including Australia’s iconic Great Barrier Reef. Australian governments have recognized the threats of warming waters, and are funding research of geoengineering options for the Great Barrier Reef. The limited earlier field testing of geoengineering demonstrates the need for specific governance to manage risks, build legitimacy and maintain public support. Australia requires a framework to govern geoengineering research and development before deployment of such technologies.
相似文献
17.
Mobilizing climate finance for climate change mitigation is a crucial part of meeting the ‘well-below’ 2°C goal of the Paris Agreement. Climate finance refers to investments specifically in climate change mitigation and adaptation activities, which involve public finance and the leveraging of private finance. A large proportion of climate finance is Official Development Assistance (ODA) from OECD countries to ODA-eligible countries. The evidence shows that the largest proportion of climate finance for climate change mitigation has been channelled to the development of renewable energy, with a much smaller proportion flowing to other crucial forms of clean energy-related measures, such as demand-side management (DSM) (particularly sustainable cooling) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS). This forms the rationale and aim of this synthesis paper: to review the role of climate finance to develop clean energy beyond renewables. In doing so, the paper draws on practical policy and programme experiences of some donor countries, such as the UK, and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). This paper argues that a greater amount of climate finance from OECD countries to ODA-eligible fossil fuel-intensive emerging economies and developing countries is required for sustainable cooling and CCUS, particularly in the form of technical assistance and clean energy innovation. Key policy insights Demand-side management (DSM) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) are underfunded in climate finance compared with the promotion of renewables. Climate finance for sustainable cooling, in particular, represents just 0.04% of total ODA, despite cooling projected to represent 13% of global emissions by 2030. Public investment in CCUS is limited at US $28 billion since 2007, despite the costs of meeting the Paris Agreement estimated to be 40-128% more expensive without CCUS. Additional climate finance for these sectors should not come at the expense of funding for renewables but should be complementary to it.
相似文献
18.
Although climate change is an urgent problem, behavioural and policy responses have not yet been sufficient to either reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to a disrupted climate system. Significant efforts have been made to raise public awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. One reason why these efforts might not be sufficient is rooted in people’s need to feel efficacy to solve complex problems; the belief that climate change is unstoppable might thwart action even among the concerned. This paper tests for the effect of fatalistic beliefs on behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change using two cross-national surveys representing over 50,000 people in 48 nations. Key policy insights The perception that climate change poses a risk or danger increases the likelihood of behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change. The belief that climate change is unstoppable reduces the behavioural and policy response to climate change and moderates risk perception. Communicators and policy leaders should carefully frame climate change as a difficult, yet solvable, problem to circumvent fatalistic beliefs.
相似文献
19.
Emission reductions improve the chances that dangerous anthropogenic climate change will be averted, but could also cause some firms financial distress. Corporate failures, especially if they are unnecessary, add to the social cost of abatement. Social value can be permanently destroyed by the dissolution of organizational capital, deadweight losses paid to liquidators, and unemployment. This article proposes using measures of corporate solvency as an objective tool for policy makers to calibrate the optimal stringency of climate change policies, so that they can deliver the least loss of corporate solvency for a given level of emission reductions. They could also be used to determine the generosity of any compensation to address losses to corporate solvency. We demonstrate this approach using a case study of the UK’s Carbon Price Support (a carbon tax). Key policy insights Solvency metrics could be used to empirically calibrate the optimal stringency of climate policies. An idealized solvency trajectory for firms affected by climate change policy would cause corporate solvency to initially decline – approaching but not exceeding ‘distressed’ levels – and then gradually improve to a new ‘steady state’ once the low-carbon transition had been achieved. In terms of the UK’s Carbon Price Support, corporate solvency of energy-intensive industries was found to be stable subsequent to its introduction. Therefore, the available evidence does not support its later weakening.
相似文献
20.
The Paris Agreement is the last hope to keep global temperature rise below 2°C. The consensus agrees to holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim for 1.5°C. Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution (NDC) will represent a progression beyond the party’s then current NDC, and reflect its highest possible ambition. Using Ireland as a test case, we show that increased mitigation ambition is required to meet the Paris Agreement goals in contrast to current EU policy goals of an 80–95% reduction by 2050. For the 1.5°C consistent carbon budgets, the technically feasible scenarios' abatement costs rise to greater than €8,100/tCO 2 by 2050. The greatest economic impact is in the short term. Annual GDP growth rates in the period to 2020 reduce from 4% to 2.2% in the 1.5°C scenario. While aiming for net zero emissions beyond 2050, investment decisions in the next 5–10 years are critical to prevent carbon lock-in. Key policy insights Economic growth can be maintained in Ireland while rapidly decarbonizing the energy system. The social cost of carbon needs to be included as standard in valuation of infrastructure investment planning, both by government finance departments and private investors. Technological feasibility is not the limiting factor in achieving rapid deep decarbonization. Immediate increased decarbonization ambition over the next 3–5 years is critical to achieve the Paris Agreement goals, acknowledging the current 80–95% reduction target is not consistent with temperature goals of ‘well below’ 2°C and pursuing 1.5°C. Applying carbon budgets to the energy system results in non-linear CO2 emissions reductions over time, which contrast with current EU policy targets, and the implied optimal climate policy and mitigation investment strategy.
相似文献
|
