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1.
欧盟自1997年起就如何通过市场和行政手段“双轮驱动”控制碳排放总量进行不断探索,并逐步建立了较为成熟的碳排放交易体系及减排责任分担机制,已经取得了良好的减排效果。文中梳理分析《责任分担条例》修正案中关于成员国减排目标更新的内容、目标分配的原则与方法、灵活性机制,归纳了欧盟采用行政手段控制碳排放交易系统未涉及部门的温室气体排放的经验,并对中国如何构建充分考虑市场手段和行政手段的CO2排放总量控制制度提出政策建议。 相似文献
2.
按照欧盟法律,自2012年1月1日起在欧盟境内起降的航班排放将被纳入欧盟排放交易系统。通过详细解读欧盟这一法律,指出欧盟排放交易体系是典型的"上限-交易"系统,即通过规定排放上限与进行配额交易实现减排目标。欧盟此举本质目的是强化气候变化主导权,最终为经济谋利,加快完善欧盟碳交易市场以建设欧元货币权力体系。其结果可能引发其与《联合国气候变化框架公约》及《京都议定书》等国际法之间的法律冲突,购买配额将对民航运输发展造成制约,"可测量、可报告和可核实"将对发展中国家能力建设提出挑战,并将一定程度影响《联合国气候变化框架公约》下的行业减排谈判走向。 相似文献
3.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):227-241
How effective is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in promoting emissions reduction for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol commitment? A theoretical benchmark is determined in order to assess the stringency of the ETS cap and to evaluate whether emissions allowances have been over-allocated. This analysis clarifies how the emissions reduction effort has been divided between ETS and non-ETS sectors, highlighting the extent to which Member States effectively rely on the ETS to comply with their Kyoto commitments. Finally, inefficiencies relating to the over-allocation of allowances are analysed; namely cross-subsidization from non-ETS to ETS sectors, national subsidies to the ETS sectors, and distortion of competition. 相似文献
4.
Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on how to mitigate climate change. The current carbon leakage literature focuses largely on industrial production, and less attention has been given to carbon leakage from the electricity sector (the largest source of carbon emissions in China). Moreover, very few studies have examined in detail electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading system (which leads, for example, to double counting) or addressed its implications for potential linkage between the EU and Chinese emissions trading systems (ETSs). This article seeks to fill this gap by analysing the problem of ‘carbon leakage’ from the electricity sector under the China ETS. Specifically, a Law & Economics approach is applied to scrutinize legal documents on electricity/carbon regulation and examine the economic incentive structures of stakeholders in the inter-/intra-regional electricity markets. Two forms of ‘electricity carbon leakage’ are identified and further supported by legal evidence and practical cases. Moreover, the article assesses the environmental and economic implications for the EU of potential linkage between the world’s two largest ETSs. In response, policy suggestions are proposed to address electricity carbon leakage, differentiating leakage according to its sources.
Key policy insights
Electricity carbon leakage in China remains a serious issue that has yet to receive sufficient attention.
Such leakage arises from the current electricity/carbon regulatory framework in China and jeopardizes mitigation efforts.
With the US retreat on climate efforts, evidence suggests that EU officials are looking to China and expect an expanded carbon market to reinforce EU global climate leadership.
Given that the Chinese ETS will be twice the size of the EU ETS, a small amount of carbon leakage in China could have significant repercussions. Electricity carbon leakage should thus be considered in any future EU–China linking negotiations.
5.
Peter Heindl 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):314-329
This article empirically investigates the impact of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions on companies regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in Germany. Based on a unique panel dataset, we investigate if MRV costs are dependent on the amount of annual emissions of regulated companies and if there are differences in transaction costs between economic sectors. The results indicate that administrative costs are dependent on the amount of annual emissions for larger companies, which has implications for the economic efficiency of the EU ETS. The most important finding, however, is that there are significant differences in MRV transaction costs dependent on the type and size of companies. This implies the existence of considerable economies of scale. Overall, the EU ETS could benefit from reforms by means of a push towards upstream regulation as this would likely increase administrative efficiency.Policy relevance statementTransaction costs are, among other things, an important aspect of market-based climate policy design. A policy instrument with low transaction costs is preferred over instruments with larger transaction costs under equal conditions. This is occasionally referred to as administrative efficiency, and its importance was acknowledged in directive 2009/29/EC of the European Commission. Thoughtful empirical examination of transaction costs is essential in order to inform about the extent and impact of these costs. This article provides an analysis of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions in the EU ETS. It is shown that administrative costs will likely have negative effects on the cost efficiency of the EU ETS. However, the most relevant finding is that small companies (<250 employees) or firms emitting small amounts of carbon dioxide per year face far higher average transaction costs compared with larger firms or emitters. Thus, there is a tendency for the EU ETS to cause MRV transaction costs that are disadvantageous for small companies. A regulation that is more upstream-oriented could mitigate this negative effect to some extent. The EU ETS could initiate a reform that is targeted on putting a price on the carbon content of fossil fuels instead of directly regulating emissions in a so-called ‘end-of-the-pipe’ way at the installation level. 相似文献
6.
Phase 3 of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS; 2013–2020) sees the introduction of new rules governing the free allocations of emissions allowances given to energy-intensive industries. In contrast to Phases 1 and 2, allocations will be based on historical production multiplied by best available emissions technology benchmarks. This article exploits an original database to provide a first analysis of the distributional and economic efficiency implications of the new rules. It is shown empirically that the new allocation rules reduce the scope for windfall gains by EU ETS firms while also effectively mitigating carbon leakage risks, even assuming optimistic forecasts of Phase 3 carbon prices. The example of the cement sector is used to show that benchmarking significantly improves the harmonization of the levels of free allocations to competing firms throughout the EU compared to Phase 2. However, it is also found that the use of ex ante output levels to determine allocations still leaves considerable scope for windfall gains and possible distortions of the internal market. 相似文献
7.
Godefroy Grosjean Sabine Fuss Nicolas Koch Benjamin L. Bodirsky Stéphane De Cara William Acworth 《Climate Policy》2018,18(2):151-169
Although agriculture could contribute substantially to European emission reductions, its mitigation potential lies untapped and dormant. Market-based instruments could be pivotal in incentivizing cost-effective abatement. However, sector specificities in transaction costs, leakage risks and distributional impacts impede its implementation. The significance of such barriers critically hinges on the dimensions of policy design. This article synthesizes the work on emissions pricing in agriculture together with the literature on the design of market-based instruments. To structure the discussion, an options space is suggested to map policy options, focusing on three key dimensions of policy design. More specifically, it examines the role of policy coverage, instruments and transfers to farmers in overcoming the barriers. First, the results show that a significant proportion of agricultural emissions and mitigation potential could be covered by a policy targeting large farms and few emission sources, thereby reducing transaction costs. Second, whether an instrument is voluntary or mandatory influences distributional outcomes and leakage. Voluntary instruments can mitigate distributional concerns and leakage risks but can lead to subsidy lock-in and carbon price distortion. Third, the impact on transfers resulting from the interaction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with emissions pricing will play a key role in shaping political feasibility and has so far been underappreciated.
POLICY RELEVANCE
Following the 2015 Paris Agreement, European climate policy is at a crossroads. Achieving cost-effectively the 2030 and 2050 European targets requires all sectors to reduce their emissions. Yet, the cornerstone of European climate policy, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), covers only about half of European emissions. Major sectors have been so far largely exempted from carbon pricing, in particular transport and agriculture. While transport has been increasingly under the spotlight as a possible candidate for an EU ETS sectoral expansion, policy discussions on pricing agricultural emissions have been virtually absent. This article attempts to fill this gap by investigating options for market-based instruments to reduce agricultural emissions while taking barriers to implementation into account. 相似文献
8.
Stefano F. Verde Jordi Teixidó Claudio Marcantonini Xavier Labandeira 《Climate Policy》2019,19(4):439-452
This paper analyses the rules for free allocation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The analysis draws on the empirical evidence emerging from two literature strands. One group of studies sheds light on the following questions: how efficient are free allocation rules in minimizing the risk of carbon leakage? Have they become more efficient over the trading periods? What are the technical limits to making them more efficient? Further: is firm behaviour affected by allowance allocation? Did specific provisions induce strategic behaviour with unintended effects? Studies from the second group estimate sectoral pass-through rates for the costs imposed by the EU ETS. Taking cost pass-through into account is necessary for properly targeting free allocation. The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability, especially in manufacturing sectors (due to limited data availability and market heterogeneity), is the main hindrance to achieving further efficiency in allowance allocation. The new rules defined in the reform for Phase IV (2021–2030) nevertheless make some progress in this direction.Key policy insights
The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability is the main hindrance to efficient free allocation in minimizing carbon leakage risk.
In Phase IV (2021–2030), carbon leakage risk will be assessed more accurately thanks to: a) carbon intensity and trade intensity considered together through a combined indicator; b) possible use of more disaggregated data, and c) possible consideration of complementary qualitative assessments of abatement potential, market characteristics and profit margins.
It is expected that benchmarked allocation introduced in Phase III (2013–2020) has induced additional emission abatement, but there is still a lack of empirical evidence.
9.
Alex L. Marten Elizabeth A. Kopits Charles W. Griffiths Stephen C. Newbold Ann Wolverton 《Climate Policy》2013,13(5):678-679
The light bulb ban introduced by the EU is used as an example to illustrate how to assess the climate impact of a policy that overlaps with a cap-and-trade scheme. The European Commission estimates that by 2020 the reduction in GHG emissions induced by banning incandescent light bulbs will reach 15 million tons annually. The number is a conservative estimate for the reduction in emissions from lighting if the total residential stock of incandescent light bulbs in 2008 is replaced by more efficient lighting sources. However, it ignores that use-phase and some non-use-phase emissions are covered by the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This drastically reduces the amount of GHG emissions saved.Policy relevanceSeveral policies such as the EU-wide ban on incandescent light bulbs, energy efficiency mandates and support mechanisms for renewable energy overlap with the EU ETS. While there are typically several justifications for these policies, a chief reason is the reduction of GHG emissions. However, given that the aggregate emissions of the industries covered are fixed by the EU ETS, the climate change mitigation aspect of these policies is not obvious. Using the light bulb ban as an example, this article illustrates how a focus on non-EU ETS emissions changes the assessment of an intervention in terms of GHG reductions. 相似文献
10.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):87-102
Alternative mechanisms for EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) quota allocations within the Romanian economy were evaluated using a general equilibrium model within a dynamic intertemporal framework. Several distribution rules were simulated based on: the historical emissions, the least-cost approach, and the auctioning scheme with and without a preliminary selection of eligible sectors. We found that the resulting marginal abatement cost in ETS-eligible sectors is only €5.75/tCO2 for reducing pollution by 20.7%. Such a low cost is explained by low energy prices and by substitution possibilities with low carbon content resources (nuclear and hydroelectricity). Including all sectors in the trade creates a more flexible market than in the ETS, since more reduction options are available. The ETS has high feasibility for monitoring. All eligible sectors (except refineries and metallurgy) present the lowest abatement costs in the economy. Auctioning introduces a strong carbon price signal, which reduces emission intensity but creates distortions in terms of trade and worsens the country's energy dependency. Environmental policy has modest macroeconomic results and tends to correct the resources allocation. The strong double dividend obtained under certain circumstances indicates Romania's potential for improving its energy efficiency and carbon intensity. 相似文献
11.
The establishment of a carbon market assumes that there is an effective means of transforming price information into technical carbon reduction measures. However, empirical evidence reveals that the links between price information and carbon management strategies are far from obvious. To understand how delegating CO2 responsibility affects CO2 trading behaviour, this article proposes a neo-institutionalist approach to answering the question of why companies became sellers, buyers or a combination of both during phase I of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Original data from a survey on companies that participated in this scheme were collected and analysed. It was assumed that the trading scheme offered two ways to delegate decisions regarding emissions trading: decoupling from technical knowledge and financialization (i.e. delegating to financial departments) or coupling using technicalization (i.e. delegating to manufacturing departments). The results support the hypothesis that a company that adopts a decoupling strategy is more likely to buy certificates to fulfil their emissions targets. Adopting a coupling strategy indicates that a company is more likely to become a seller, all else equal. Professional identity is the theoretical basis for this relationship. Delegating carbon management to different departments represents either a stronger coupling or a stronger decoupling from core technological processes.Policy relevanceThe transaction data from phase I of the EU ETS open new questions and possibilities regarding the reasons that drive selling and buying in companies. It is important to look not only at the traditional sources of transaction costs, but rather also at the reasons for these tensions. One important source is the professional education of the people in charge of the EU ETS. Tailored information that directly addresses the different professional backgrounds of managers working in both financial departments and more technical departments might help to lower these types of transaction costs. In today's context, important emitter countries, such as China and Korea, have launched their own emissions markets, copying many aspects of the EU ETS. For the positive development of these markets and as a way of establishing a global emissions market, these new schemes should learn from the EU ETS experience. 相似文献
12.
Aviation constitutes about 2.5% of all energy-related CO2 emissions and in addition there are non-CO2 effects. In 2016, the ICAO decided to implement a Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and in 2017 the EU decided on faster emission reductions in its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which since 2012 includes the aviation sector. The effects of these policies on the expected development of air travel emissions from 2017 to 2030 have been analyzed. For the sample country Sweden, the analysis shows that when emissions reductions in other sectors are attributed to the aviation sector as a result of the EU ETS and CORSIA, carbon emissions are expected to reduce by ?0.8% per year (however if non-CO2 emissions are included in the analysis, then emissions will increase). This is much less than what is needed to achieve the 2°C target. Our analysis of potential national aviation policy instruments shows that there are legally feasible options that could mitigate emissions in addition to the EU ETS and CORSIA. Distance-based air passenger taxes are common among EU Member States and through increased ticket prices these taxes can reduce demand for air travel and thus reduce emissions. Tax on jet fuel is an option for domestic aviation and for international aviation if bilateral agreements are concluded. A quota obligation for biofuels is a third option.Key policy insights
Existing international climate policies for aviation will not deliver any major emission reductions.
Policymakers who want to significantly push the aviation sector to contribute to meeting the 2°C target need to work towards putting in place tougher international policy instruments in the long term, and simultaneously implement temporary national policy instruments in the near-term.
Distance-based air passenger taxes, carbon taxes on jet fuel and quota obligations for biofuels are available national policy options; if they are gradually increased, and harmonized with other countries, they can help to significantly reduce emissions.
13.
简要介绍欧盟排放交易体系（EU ETS）的发展情况,调研EU ETS对欧洲电力行业影响的研究现状,认为EU ETS将增加发电企业的生产成本,迅速提高电力市场价格,大幅增加发电企业利润,刺激能源技术投资和创新。同时简要评述EU ETS引发的争议问题,包括当前EU ETS对发电企业和电力市场的实际影响、发电企业巨额利润问题的产生原因等。在此基础上,对比中国和欧盟之间的差异,初步分析建设国内碳交易市场将对我国电力行业产生的影响,最后对我国建设碳交易市场提出建议。 相似文献
14.
Jo Dirix Wouter Peeters Johan Eyckmans Peter Tom Jones Sigrid Sterckx 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):363-383
Although the UN and EU focus their climate policies on the prevention of a 2 °C global mean temperature rise, it has been estimated that a rise of at least 4?°C is more likely. Given the political climate of inaction, there is a need to instigate a bottom-up approach so as to build domestic support for future climate treaties, empower citizens, and motivate leaders to take action. A review is provided of the predominant top-down cap-and-trade policies in place – the Kyoto Protocol and EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – with a focus on the grandfathering of emissions entitlements and the possibility of offsetting emissions. These policies are evaluated according to two criteria of justice and it is concluded that they fail to satisfy them. Some suggestions as to how the EU ETS can be improved so as to enable robust climate action are also offered. Policy relevance The current supranational climate policy has not been successful and global leaders have postponed the adoption of a meaningful successor to the Kyoto Protocol. In view of this inaction, bottom-up approaches with regard to climate policy should be further developed. It is argued that two of the main top-down policies, grandfathering and offsetting, impede the avowed goals of EU climate policy and pose significant ethical dilemmas with regard to participatory and intergenerational justice. In order to provide a more robust EU climate policy, the EU should inter alia provide a long-term perspective for investors, reduce the volatility of the carbon price, and prepare for the possibility of carbon leakage. 相似文献
15.
Brigitte Wolkinger Andrea Damm Stefan Schleicher Andreas Tuerk Wolf Grossman 《Climate Policy》2013,13(6):667-689
Having agreed upon a binding emissions reduction path by 2020, the EU plays a leading role in international climate policy. The EU currently pursues a dual approach through an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) at the EU level and also via national targets in sectors not covered by the ETS. The latter include the buildings sector, transportation, agriculture, and waste. Emissions from these sectors are mainly subject to policies at provincial and local levels. A method is presented for elaborating and implementing a long-term climate policy process up to 2030 for the regional (provincial) level. Building on regional GHG inventory data, a set of indicators for each sector is developed in order to arrive at a target path consistent with the deduced regional GHG reduction requirement. Policy measures and their implementation are then settled subsequent to this process. Quantitative regional targets are found to be a prerequisite for the formation of regional climate policy as they increase participant responsibility and commitment. A five-step process of stakeholder participation ensures effective implementation of regional climate action plans. Insights from an exemplary European region are drawn upon, and policy issues are discussed in both quantitative and institutional terms. 相似文献
16.
基于CGE模型的上海市碳排放交易的环境经济影响分析 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
周晟吕 《气候变化研究进展》2015,11(2):144-152
通过应用上海市能源－环境-经济CGE模型,针对碳排放交易机制所涉及的重要要素,包括覆盖行业和分配方式等设计不同的情景,模拟了在不同的就业条件下碳排放交易机制对经济的影响和对传统污染物的协同减排效应。结果表明,如果碳交易纳管行业释放出来的劳动力能及时被其他行业吸纳和消化,则碳交易对GDP的整体影响为正,碳交易的实施产生了双重红利。若劳动力不能及时转移,则碳交易对GDP的整体影响为负,2020年不同情景下GDP损失为1.5%～2.4%;相比覆盖部分行业,在覆盖全部行业的情景下,碳价格最低,从2013年的30元/t增加到2020年的202元/t,对高耗能行业的竞争力影响相对较小,但是由于所有行业都纳入到纳管范围,使得对GDP的负面影响最大;此外,实施碳交易能明显改善环境效益,有助于推动SO2和NOX减排目标的实现。 相似文献
17.
Most countries implementing an emissions trading system (ETS), such as EU member states, California in the US, or South Korea, are generally targeting large sized companies, which consume energy above a specific threshold. However, previous studies using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have analyzed climate policies without considering company size. This may have led to inaccurate results because the impacts of climate policy would differ depending on the coverage of regulated companies. Accordingly, this study examines the environmental and economic impacts of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies, assuming policy results vary by firm size, as covered by the Korean emission trading system. To this end, a CGE model with a separate social accounting matrix based on company size is used to compare three scenarios that reflect different types of carbon pricing methods. The results show that greenhouse gases will be reduced to a lower extent and utility will decrease more if mitigation policies are only imposed to large companies.
Key policy insights
Carbon pricing policies should consider the different impacts on companies of different sizes and industry sectors.
Without considering the different sizes of companies covered by an ETS, the expected carbon price and its economic impact will be underestimated.
Small and medium-sized companies will face more negative impacts than large companies in some industry sectors under an ETS, even if the mitigation burden is only faced by large companies.
18.
Raphael Trotignon 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):273-287
Linking a cap-and-trade with an offset mechanism has many theoretical advantages: it reduces compliance costs, extends the price signal outside the cap-and-trade, and triggers technology transfer. However, it is feared that such linking will induce outsourcing of emissions reduction at a low price and undermine the price incentive in the cap-and-trade. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the first full-scale example of a cap-and-trade system linked to project-based mechanisms such that offsets have effectively been used by industrial installations. This article is an ex post analysis of EU ETS data for the years 2008 and 2009, and the characteristics of the link and its efficiency are evaluated. Although offsets have been much used, their use is concentrated and not very intense or frequent, which allays the fear that offsets will flood the market. Although the majority of surrendered CERs effectively come from the largest and oldest projects, the credits surrendered are similar to those available on the market. Possible factors that contribute towards inefficiency are the rules for using offsets, transaction costs affecting the participation of small installations, awareness and openness to market-based instruments, and uncertainties regarding CERs offer and demand from other markets. However, the impact on EUA equilibrium price still needs to be quantified. 相似文献
19.
Bernhard Schlamadinger Benoit Bosquet Charlotte Streck Ian Noble Michael Dutschke Neil Bird 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):199-208
Abstract The European Commission is mandated to consider the inclusion of credits from land-use projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), beginning with the second period of the European Union's emission trading scheme (ETS) in its report due in July 2006. Temporary credits from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM are seen by many as posing a technical problem for their use under the ETS. This article summarizes three feasible, efficient and environmentally sound alternatives for achieving the integration of such temporary credits in the European emissions trading market starting in 2008. The first proposal integrates tCERs and lCERs (temporary credits) into the EU ETS by allowing for their direct use for compliance purposes. The second proposal builds on the idea of swapping temporary credits for EU allowances (EUAs) by Member States. The third proposal would not require a political decision at the EU level. Instead supportive Member States or private carbon fund operators would agree to swap temporary credits for the CERs or ERUs they hold in their accounts. All three solutions would be linked to a risk-mitigation strategy based on levying a fee or fixing an exchange rate, which would allow governments to hedge the risk of losing temporary credits. 相似文献
20.
The EU has developed the first and largest international emissions trading system in the world. This development is puzzling due to the EU's scepticism to international emissions trading in greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the run-up to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. This article analyses how the EU ETS was initiated in the first place mainly from the perspectives of Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and multi-level governance (MLG). LI emphasises change in the positions of the EU member states as the key to understand what happened and why, whereas MLG opens up for change in the position of supranational entrepreneurial leaders as the key explanation. The main conclusion is that entrepreneurial epistemic leadership exercised by the European Commission was crucial for making the EU ETS. The principal means of leadership involved building up independent expertise on how an EU ETS could be designed, and mobilizing support from state and non-state actors at various levels of decision-making. This type of leadership may be needed more generally to deal with challenges characterized by high scientific uncertainty and social complexity in which learning is pertinent, such as climate change. 相似文献