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1.
《Marine Policy》2014
To date, none of the fisheries in the U.S. Pacific Islands Region is managed under a catch share program. In light of the NOAA policy to encourage the use of catch shares as a fishery management tool, the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council (WPFMC) listed six commercial fisheries, including the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery, the largest in the region, as potential candidates for catch share programs. This study examines the baseline economic characteristics and the main challenges facing the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery and evaluates the impact of these on the desirability and feasibility of a catch share program for this particular fishery. 相似文献
2.
《Marine Policy》2017
Fishing vessel and permit buyback programs have been implemented to reduce excess capacity and improve profitability in a number of fisheries around the world. These programs are generally publicly funded, but in a few cases they have been financed by loans to be paid back by the remaining fleet. In 2003, a buyback permanently removed 91 vessels and 239 fishing permits from the Pacific groundfish trawl fishery and associated corollary fisheries of Dungeness crab and pink shrimp. The buyback was financed with $10 million in public funding and a $36 million loan to be repaid over 30 years with fees on landings. In the same year, a control date was set for catch share program in the groundfish trawl fishery. When the catch share program was implemented in 2011, the permit owners that remained in the fishery after the buyback were allocated the quota shares that would otherwise have been issued to the permits bought back in 2003. Estimates of the annual profits generated by this quota are compared to the cost of servicing the buyback loan. The results provide evidence that a buyback program, when implemented in conjunction with catch shares, can enable a sustained increase in profitability for the remaining vessels sufficient to justify its cost. However, using landings taxes as the mechanism to repay the loan may result in a mismatch between those who benefit from and pay for the buyback. 相似文献
3.
《Marine Policy》2014
A unique database was created that describes the methods used to allocate shares in nearly every major catch share fishery in the world. Approximately 54% of the major catch share fisheries in the world allocated the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) solely on the basis of historical catch records, 3% used auctions, and 6% used equal sharing rules. The remaining 37% used a combination of methods, including vessel-based rules. These results confirm the widely-held belief that nearly all catch share programs have “grandfathered” private access to fishery resources: 91% of the fisheries in the database allocated some fraction of the TAC on the basis of historical catch. This publicly available database should be a useful reference tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in catch shares management in Hawai'i and across the globe. 相似文献
4.
《Marine Policy》2015
A growing number of US fisheries are managed with catch share programs, which allocate exclusive shares of the total allowable catch from a fish stock to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. All of these catch share programs allow transferability of catch privileges in some form. Information on these transfers, particularly prices, could be valuable to fishery managers and to fishery participants to support management and business decisions and to increase efficiency of the catch share market itself. This article documents the availability and quality of data on transfers of catch privileges in fourteen US catch share programs. These catch share programs include several individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs and a number of programs that allocate catch privileges to self-organized cooperatives. Price information on catch share transfers is found to be limited or unavailable in most US catch share programs. Recommendations are made on how to improve the design of catch share programs and associated data collection systems to facilitate effective catch share markets, collection of catch share market data, and better use of information from catch share markets. 相似文献
5.
《Marine Policy》2014
Tracking the financial well-being of vessels that depend on a marine fishery resource is an important function of regulators. This research demonstrates how simple indices can be constructed and utilized to track the economic well-being of vessels operating in the Northeast (USA) Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery. The indices, which use both public and private data, can separately track trends in inputs, outputs, and prices. For the Northeast Multispecies Fishery, the indices reveal that the economic well-being of the groundfish fleet has improved under catch share management through gains in productivity. 相似文献
6.
《Marine Policy》2014
To address overfishing concerns, a total allowable catch (TAC) management program was instituted in the main Hawaiian Islands (MHI) bottomfish fishery during 2007. Using results from a recent survey of bottomfish fishermen, this paper details behavioral and social aspects of bottomfish fishing in Hawaii and explores fisher perceptions towards current fishery conditions and future management alternatives. The paper further discusses the applicability of potential catch share management for this fishery. Bottomfish fishermen expressed uncertainty towards catch share programs and appear to be reluctant about any movement towards catch share management. This paper describes many preexisting conditions in the fishery that suggest a catch share program may not be practical at this time. 相似文献
7.
《Marine Policy》2014
The movement toward catch shares by NOAA Fisheries and fisheries managers worldwide responds to dysfunctional fisheries plagued by a host of interrelated problems including radically shortened seasons, a race to fish, supply gluts, lowered product quality, increased bycatch, safety issues, excess capacity, and lack of profitability. However, the NOAA Catch Shares Policy recognizes that catch shares are not appropriate for every fishery, and others have agreed that the success of catch shares programs depends on their fit with ecological, economic, and social characteristics. This article describes the characteristics of the Hawaii-based deep-set longline fleet, identified by NOAA Fisheries as a possible candidate for catch shares because it operates under a bigeye tuna quota instituted by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. One of the main concerns in the fishery is the potential for closing during the holiday season, a culturally important time for fish consumption in Hawaii. An evaluation of the fishery suggests that many of the problems leading to development of catch shares programs in other fisheries are not present, but that some warning signs exist which could be addressed by catch share programs or other management alternatives. 相似文献
8.
Fleet communication systems report near real-time observations of bycatch hotspots to enable a fishery to operate as a coordinated “One Fleet” to substantially reduce fleet-wide capture of protected bycatch species. This benefits the bycatch species per se, reduces waste, and can provide economic benefits to industry by reducing risk of exceeding bycatch thresholds and causing future declines in target species catch levels. We describe case studies of fleet communication programs of the US North Atlantic longline swordfish fishery, US North Pacific and Alaska trawl fisheries, and US Alaska demersal longline fisheries, and identify alternative fleet communication program designs to reduce fisheries bycatch. Evidence supports the inference that these three fleet communication programs substantially reduced fisheries bycatch and provided economic benefits that greatly outweighed operational costs. Fleet communication may be appropriate in fisheries where there are strong economic incentives to reduce bycatch, interactions with bycatch species are rare events, adequate onboard observer coverage exists, and for large fleets, vessels are represented by a fishery association. 相似文献
9.
10.
《Marine Policy》2015
After 16 years under a limited access program with effort controls, the New England groundfish fishery transitioned to a catch share management system in 2010. For much of its earlier management history, issues related to fishing capacity were paramount as effort controls were increasingly restrictive to meet biological objectives. As the size of the active fleet declined from over 1000 vessels from 1994 to 2001 to less than 400 vessels in 2012, the management concern shifted to fleet diversity. Fleet diversity has been cast in terms of vessels based on characteristics such as size, gear, and region rather than their share in landings or economic value. Measuring fleet diversity with indices commonly used in the biodiversity literature such as richness, effective diversity based on the Shannon index, and evenness appears appropriate for this context. In this paper these indices were applied to measure changes in diversity of the active New England groundfish fleet from 1996 to 2012. Fleet diversity as measured by the Shannon Index has declined by approximately 35% from 1996 to 2012, but has remained relatively stable since 2007. Forty vessel types were present in all 17 years, which accounted for about 85% of active groundfish vessels and over 90% of total groundfish landings in all years. Even though the fleet size and overall diversity have declined the “core” groundfish fleet remains stable. 相似文献
11.
《Marine Policy》2015
This study investigates changes in the total factor productivity (TFP) and identifies the main sources of TFP growth following the adoption of an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper commercial fishery. Utilizing an unbalanced panel of 722 vertical line vessels Malmquist indices were derived from an output-oriented stochastic distance frontier. The analysis shows that the IFQ program had a positive impact on the productivity of the fleet and that most of the productivity gains were due to improvements in technical efficiency. The study also finds that changes in technical efficiency were time variant suggesting that the exit of the less efficient vessels and easing of command and control regulations such as trip limits and short fishing seasons were responsible for most of these gains. Changes in the exploitable biomass of red snapper were found to have a moderate impact on productivity growth whereas the impact of technological progress was minimal. 相似文献
12.
Dietmar Grimm Ivan Barkhorn David Festa Kate Bonzon Judd Boomhower Valerie Hovland Jason Blau 《Marine Policy》2012,36(3):644-657
What are the effects of transitioning traditionally managed fisheries to incentive-based catch shares fisheries? In a study of all major United States federal catch share fisheries and associated shared stock fisheries in British Columbia, catch shares result in environmental improvements, economic improvements, and a mixture of changes in social performance, relative to the race for fish under traditional management. Environmentally, compliance with total allowable catch increases and discards decrease. Economically, vessel yields rise, total revenues grow, and long-term stock increases are encouraged. Socially, safety increases, some port areas modestly consolidate, needed processing capacity often reduces, and labor markets shift from part time jobs to full time jobs with similar total employment. Newer catch shares address many social concerns through careful design. 相似文献
13.
《Marine Policy》2016
In 2012, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council initiated the process of designing a new management structure for the Gulf of Alaska trawl groundfish fleet. The new program is currently structured as a catch share program and driven by the need to end the ‘race for fish’ and provide the trawl fleet with the tools to reduce bycatch. To date much of the discussion among policy makers and stakeholders has centered on community protection measures and how best to avoid the negative social and economic impacts of catch share programs including impacts to crew, consolidation and the flight of quota and resource wealth from Gulf of Alaska fishery dependent communities. This paper examines how community protection measures related to the distribution of benefits and access to fishery resources are considered and challenged in the North Pacific today. Special attention is given to the ongoing debate surrounding the potential inclusion of an initial allocation to place-based Gulf of Alaska communities via a Community Fishing Association. As part of this effort, this paper examines the political space and underlying power dynamics in which consideration of alternatives to the commodification of fishing rights occurs. 相似文献
14.
We estimate the unregulated catch and fisher income of the Kabui Bay migrant anchovy fishery operating in the Raja Ampat regency, Papua, Indonesia. Interviews with migrant fishers were conducted in April and November 2006, and estimates were generated through Monte Carlo simulations. Anchovy fisher income averaged US $1835 per year, about twice the average fisher income in the area. The income levels estimated by this study suggests that there is potential for the Raja Ampat Fisheries Bureau to capture some economic rent from the fishery to help fund a fisheries management program, from which Raja Ampat could benefit. 相似文献
15.
Changes in ownership of limited entry permits by “local” residents of the region where a fishery occurs may have significant economic and social implications for fishery-dependent regions. This paper examines changes in local permit ownership in Alaska salmon fisheries, for which a long-term decline in rural local permit ownership is an important policy concern. Theoretically, permit markets allocate permits over time to the individuals who are willing to pay the most for them. Any factors that differentially affect what local and non-local residents are willing to pay for permits may affect the equilibrium share of permits held by local residents. For remote rural fisheries in particular, these may include differences between local and non-local residents with respect to access to and costs of financing permits and boats, costs of travel to the fishery, opportunity costs of participation in the fishery, and many other factors. As a fishery increases in profitability, differences between local and non-local residents in access to financing matter more while differences in costs of travel and opportunity costs matter less in the relative ranking of what local and non-local residents are willing to pay for permits. This tends to increase the share of non-local residents among buyers willing to pay the market price for permits, reducing the equilibrium share of permits held by local residents. This leads to a conflict between two important policy goals: increasing fishery profitability and maintaining rural local permit ownership. Consistent with predictions of this theory, the local share of permit ownership in Alaska salmon fisheries is negatively related to permit prices (an indicator of fishery profitability). 相似文献
16.
《Marine Policy》2014
Ten fishery cooperatives of the Pacific coast of Mexico were studied to examine reasons for successful community-based management of the fishery commons. The cooperatives hold exclusive rights to ‘concession’ territories for major fisheries and are linked by geographic adjacency and through a federation. The case study underscores the role of factors such as smallness of scale; the productivity, visibility and legibility of the resources and fisheries involved; clarity of social and territorial boundaries; adjacency and linkages among territorial units; a strong sense of community. The cooperatives also made considerable investments in attaining high levels of knowledge, leadership, transparent and democratic decision-making, and “vigilance,” or enforcement of the rules and the running of the organization. The study also shows the workings of windows of opportunity and experience with environmental change in the development of strong and adaptive capacities for co-management between local organizations and government agencies. Although particular histories and larger legal, political, and cultural contexts matter, the Mexican case supports arguments for greater community-level engagement in “catch share” and territorial management throughout the Pacific. 相似文献
17.
Many fish stocks in the world are depleted as a result of overexploitation, which reduces stock productivity and results in loss of potential yields. In this study we analyzed the catch trends and approximate thresholds of sustainable fishing for fished stocks to estimate the potential loss of catch and revenue of global fisheries as a result of overexploitation during the period of 1950–2010 in 14 FAO fishing areas. About 35% of stocks in the global marine ocean have or had suffered from overexploitation at present. The global catch losses amounted to 332.8 million tonnes over 1950–2010, resulting in a direct economic loss of US$298.9 billion(constant 2005 US$).Unsustainable fishing caused substantial potential losses worldwide, especially in the northern hemisphere.Estimated potential losses due to overfishing for different groups of resources showed that the low-value but abundant small-medium pelagics made the largest contribution to the global catch loss, with a weight of 265.0 million tonnes. The geographic expansion of overfishing not only showed serial depletion of world's fishery resources, but also reflected how recent trends towards sustainability can stabilize or reverse catch losses.Reduction of global fishing capacity and changes in fishery management systems are necessary if the long-term sustainability of marine fisheries in the world is to be achieved. 相似文献
18.
《Marine Policy》2014
The last 20 years have seen a fundamental shift in fishery management from reliance on open access and regulated open access to systems based on individual user rights. In some cases, the allocation of harvest rights to defined harvest or community sectors has served as a catalyst to drive the formation of voluntary agreements among fishermen in creating self-governed systems of catch shares. A number of voluntary cooperatives including the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative – which served as the model for the American Fisheries Act – provide examples of self-governing systems which have successfully achieved management objectives including greater economic performance, equity, and conservation. Cooperative arrangements have functioned to devolve some of the responsibilities of management to the cooperative – allowing fishermen greater operational flexibility in achieving individual or community goals, while reducing the burden of management on formal managing bodies. Analysis of voluntary cooperatives shows that their success is based on the existence of certain core conditions including relatively small homogeneous groups of players, secure sector-allocated and divisible rights, and the ability to form binding contracts among coop members. Cooperatives, however, face a number of internal and external threats that can undermine their success and existence. Whether voluntary or designed through regulation, cooperatives may be a promising approach for addressing challenges in non-industrial fisheries in the United States including the Western Pacific – especially if coupled with user rights based on geography, territory, and culture. However, the sheer geographical size and cultural diversity of regions such as the Western Pacific suggests that no single approach may be appropriate throughout the entire region. 相似文献
19.
《Marine Policy》2016
Catch shares, where annual catch limits are divided among individuals, communities or cooperatives, are a commonly used fisheries management strategy to increase profits and reduce overcapitalization. Usually these quota shares can be sold or leased, which is theorized to allow for greater utilization of fleet-wide quota. However, this catch-quota balancing may not be achieved in multispecies trawl fisheries where it is difficult to selectively target valuable species while avoiding overfished species. Two similar catch-share-managed, multispecies trawl fisheries were compared to evaluate whether catch shares lead to catch-quota balancing. The U.S. West Coast Groundfish fishery has several species with low total allowable catches (TACs) while the Canadian British Columbia Trawl fishery has comparatively higher TACs. Results indicate that the West Coast fishery had a statistically significant decrease in catch-quota ratios from 0.41 in the three years before catch shares to 0.29 in the three years after catch shares. In contrast, the BC fishery experience no statistically significant change in fishery-wide average catch-quota ratios, which were 0.70 in the three years before and 0.62 in the three years after catch shares. In the West Coast fishery, the risk of exceeding quotas for some species may be so high that fishers are unable to achieve high degrees of catch-quota balancing and instead focus on species that can be easily selected with changes in fishing behavior. Multispecies fisheries management has direct tradeoffs between maximizing yield and achieving conservation goals, and these results may highlight the tradeoff between rebuilding overfished species by reducing TACs, and the achievement of catch-quota balancing. 相似文献
20.
A principal challenge in developing any fishery management plan is the allocation of benefits and costs among participants in the fishery. This process is further complicated by imperfect information about future market demand and limited ability to predict the consequences of regulatory change. This paper offers a new approach to policymakers, using econometric analysis to simulate the potential impact of individual tradable quotas (ITQs) in a fishery. We compare the distribution of harvest across participants in the Atlantic Herring fishery under the current open access regime and under a potential ITQ regime, assuming two different levels of future demand. Our results show that production efficiency varies by vessel gear, home-port and relationship with buyers. Some of the predicted consequences of ITQs are: vessels from Massachusetts will gain share relative to those from Maine; trawlers will gain share relative to purse seine vessels; and independent vessels will lose share relative to vessels that are primarily contracted to specific processors or bait companies. These results will help policymakers in developing future management plans for the herring fishery. More generally, this analytical approach can help regulators in any fishery assess the potential impact of alternative policy changes under alternative future demand scenarios. 相似文献