共查询到16条相似文献，搜索用时 125 毫秒
1.
国家自主贡献(NDC)是《巴黎协定》最核心的制度,体现了全球气候治理模式从"自上而下"到"自下而上"的变迁.文中对截至2021年7月1日92个缔约方通报或更新的NDC进行了比较分析,识别出7种更新方式:提高量化减排目标数字、调整减排目标类型和覆盖范围、增加适应目标和政策、增加2050年减排愿景、主动适用NDC信息和核算... 相似文献
2.
《巴黎协定》将努力控制全球温升到2100年不超过工业化前的1.5℃确定为全球温控目标之一。继2℃目标后,1.5℃也被作为应对气候变化的全球温控目标之一。目前科学界对于1.5℃目标的研究还十分有限。已有的科学研究表明,尽管区域差异很大,将全球温升控制在1.5℃范围内地球各系统要承受的气候风险可能要低于2℃。相比于2℃目标,1.5℃目标对全球减缓行动的要求更为严苛。尽管在《巴黎协定》中各缔约方承诺了各自到2030（2025）年的减排目标,但相对于实现1.5℃目标而言仍有很大的差距。多家研究机构的模拟结果表明,如完全执行当前国家自主决定贡献（NDC),到21世纪末全球温升范围为2.2～3.4℃。截至2025年,实现当前NDC的减排承诺后,2℃温升目标下全球仍有467 Gt CO2（万亿t CO2当量）的排放空间,1.5℃温升目标下全球仅剩17 Gt CO2。到2030年,基于NDC的排放已经超过了1.5℃目标的排放量。按当前的路径来看,若想实现将全球温升控制在1.5℃的范围内,全球不仅需要立即行动并采取强有力的减排、脱碳和固碳措施,在2100年前,还必须实现负排放才有可能实现这一目标。尽管当前的科学研究仍存在很大的不确定性,但1.5℃目标已是全球努力应对气候变化的方向,也是开启未来世界低碳可持续发展的重要标志。 相似文献
3.
《联合国气候变化框架公约》（简称《公约》）第25次缔约方会议取得了一定进展,但未能就各方最为关注的《巴黎协定》第六条市场机制实施细则达成一致。会议成果平淡主要有4个原因:第一,过度强调提高各方减排目标力度而未能聚焦《巴黎协定》第六条相关谈判;第二,主席国和部分缔约方急切将各方尚未形成政治共识的提高承诺力度问题引入谈判进程,破坏了谈判氛围;第三,各个议题推进不平衡;第四,发达国家企图逃避责任,促使发展中国家更加团结并形成对立。展望2020年的全球气候多边进程形势,《巴黎协定》第六条相关谈判将继续作为重点,提高力度也将成为讨论主题,但片面强调1.5℃目标可能引发重谈《巴黎协定》风险,同时发达国家背弃《公约》、转嫁责任意图明显。全球气候治理应聚焦落实承诺的力度,并平行推进《公约》及其《巴黎协定》的实施。 相似文献
4.
巴黎协定——全球气候治理的新起点 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
巴黎气候变化大会完成了历时4年的德班平台谈判进程,达成了以《巴黎协定》（简称《协定》）为核心的一系列决定。《协定》确立了一种全缔约方参与,以“自主贡献+审评”为中心,全面涉及减缓、适应及其支持的全球应对气候变化新模式。这一模式在继承《公约》原则的基础上,明确了发达国家和发展中国家各自的责任,通过国家自主贡献的方式充分动员所有缔约方采取应对气候变化行动,促进可持续发展。《协定》还鼓励除缔约方外的其他主体积极参与应对气候变化进程,鼓励市场和非市场机制的加入,动员资金流向绿色低碳领域。在制度安排上,《协定》体现了激励、透明、非对抗、非惩罚性的特点。《协定》的达成标志着全球气候治理进入了新的发展阶段,传递出全球推动实现绿色低碳、气候适应型和可持续发展的强有力信号。然而由于《协定》全面平衡了各方的利益,在未来的遵约细节和实施落实方面将会有更多的难题,如果处理不当,将可能会损害发展中国家的利益,尤其是发展中大国。 相似文献
5.
《巴黎协定》第6条建立的两种国际碳市场机制受到广泛关注,将在2020年后的气候制度中发挥至关重要的作用。文中识别了覆盖范围、交易指标类型和管理模式等3个构成国际碳市场机制的关键要素及其不同设计选项,并以此为基础阐明国际碳市场机制的基本形式。梳理并识别谈判中有关国际碳市场机制的焦点问题及其不同规则设计,并在此基础上分析中国参与国际碳市场机制的机遇和挑战。结合中国气候融资、提升减排力度、推动绿色“一带一路”和气候变化南南合作的内在需求以及国内有关市场机制的现有能力,分析提出两种国际碳市场机制在中国近期、中期和远期的发展前景及其所需的能力建设。 相似文献
6.
《巴黎协定》基本照顾了各缔约方的核心关切,坚持了《联合国气候变化框架公约》（以下简称《公约》）的原则,基本体现了发达国家和发展中国家的区分。在适应部分,《巴黎协定》设立了与全球温升目标相联系的全球适应目标,明确了对发展中国家的适应支持,并确定了具有一定法律约束力的全球适应信息通报和5年周期的全球盘点。在损失损害部分,《巴黎协定》锁定了《公约》下的华沙损失损害国际机制,并基本确定了一个各国通过可持续发展和国际合作共同解决损失损害问题的框架。但是,《巴黎协定》仍然没有解决很多技术性问题和缔约方之间关键性和实质性的分歧。中国作为发展中大国将继续在适应和损失损害问题中面临着出资压力,应通过增强国内适应行动、强化适应和损失损害相关研究和高效利用气候变化南南合作基金3个方面,为谈判争取主动并为推动全球适应气候变化减少损失损害做出贡献。 相似文献
7.
姜克隽 《气候变化研究进展》2023,(2):133-138
IPCC第六次评估报告第三工作组报告于2022年4月发布,与前几次评估报告类似,其中一章是长期减排路径。每次评估报告长期减排路径在整个评估过程中扮演重要角色。长期减排路径可以为全球未来的合作提供学术支持。第六次评估报告对到2021年为止的公开发表的情景进行了评估,其中主要的情景是针对《巴黎协定》中提出的温升目标进行的研究,这次评估报告长期减排路径的核心是分析实现《巴黎协定》目标的路径和相关政策、成本,以及和可持续发展目标的关联。本文解析了IPCC第六次评估报告第三工作组报告中第三章的主要评估结果,也给出了未来长期减排路径研究的方向。实现《巴黎协定》温升目标下的碳预算随着CO2排放持续上升而缩减,要实现这些目标,全球需要在2025年之前实现碳达峰之后进入快速下降阶段,并在未来需要负排放技术,所有部门都需要有力的减排措施,这些减排会给经济发展带来一定的负担。 相似文献
8.
《巴黎协定》在确立2020年后应对气候变化框架性制度安排的同时也给出了一系列留待解决的后续任务,包括制定《巴黎协定》实施细则,细化相应规则、制度和指南等。经过3年的谈判,2018年年底在卡托维兹举行的第24次缔约方会议对《巴黎协定》涉及的除市场机制外的众多议题做出了一揽子安排,建立了一系列指导和帮助各方在2020年后落实和履行《巴黎协定》的实施细则,为全面有效实施《巴黎协定》提供了更明确的指导。本研究致力对《巴黎协定》实施细则的内容和特点、对中国的潜在影响和要求、后续谈判走向以及中国的对策等进行全面深入的梳理和分析。评估发现,实施细则继续保持了《巴黎协定》的“精妙平衡”,严格恪守并充分体现了“自下而上”的《巴黎协定》模式,在为发展中国家保留一定灵活性的基础上统一了报告和审评的“度量衡”,并进一步明确了以五年为周期提高行动和支持力度的序贯决策机制。细则可能给中国引领全球气候治理和国内履约带来新的机遇和挑战。中国需要从观念认识、责任担当、业务协调上做好新的布局,根据国内外新趋势、新特点构建中国特色的气候治理新体系。 相似文献
9.
赵行姝 《气候变化研究进展》2017,13(5):448-455
《巴黎协定》生效标志着全球气候治理进程从达约阶段转向履约阶段。但是,履约阶段并不意味着全球气候风险得到控制,反而面临新的挑战。本文从《巴黎协定》入手,分析了《巴黎协定》自身存在的不足,重点考察了美国的履约意愿,分析了特朗普政府退出《巴黎协定》及其影响,探讨了未来美国的气候立场。研究发现,《巴黎协定》在减排力度、气候资金及遵约条款三方面存在先天不足,导致《巴黎协定》有效性仍取决于缔约方的履约意愿和履约能力。当前美国国内政局演变导致美国联邦政府气候政策出现倒退,有可能对《巴黎协定》缔约方的履约意愿和履约能力产生不良影响。但是,这种不良影响仅仅是短暂的。美国在国际格局中的地位变化以及美国业已成形的低碳转型,共同决定了特朗普气候政策并不会从根本上动摇《巴黎协定》。长期来看,美国对全球领导力的诉求、国内应对气候变化的内在动力以及来自外部的道义压力这三大因素势将促使美国在未来重新回归《巴黎协定》。 相似文献
10.
《气候变化研究进展》2016,(3)
本文运用"原则与规则"的框架,分析了《巴黎协定》坚持共同但有区别的责任和各自能力原则(共区原则)的重要意义及其适用方式的新变化。共区原则是国际气候治理机制的重要构成要素,它旨在为发达国家与发展中国家规定不同的减排责任与义务,从而使得该国际机制体现出公平性与合理性的制度特征。但是各缔约方对该原则一直存在着不同的解读,并在新的国际政治、经济背景下对其涵义与适用方式产生了重大分歧。《巴黎协定》坚持共区原则在一定程度上解决了这种分歧,具有重要的科学、伦理和制度意义。同时应该注意到,《巴黎协定》在适用该原则的时候加入了动态的因素,使得该协定的规则体系呈现新的特征。但总体上,《巴黎协定》表明国际气候治理机制当前发生的变迁是该项国际治理机制内部的变迁。 相似文献
11.
ABSTRACTThe Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of ‘hot air’ generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC’s ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain ‘hot air’, or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time.Key policy insights
Without additionality testing, market mechanisms under the Paris Agreements might lead to an international diffusion of ‘hot air’. To avoid this, an independent assessment of NDC ambition is in order. Otherwise, activities under the mechanisms need to undergo specific additionality tests.
Additionality testing of projects and programmes should build on the experience developed under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms.
Bold approaches are needed for assessing additionality of policies. To avoid cumbersome assessment of all activities triggered by such policies, highly aggregated approaches are suggested, ranging from payback period thresholds for technologies mandated by regulation to minimum price levels triggered by carbon pricing policies. Over time, the stringency of threshold values should increase.
12.
Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity.
Key policy insights
Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time.
Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13.
The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity.
Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk – through eligibility criteria or limits – could complement these approaches.
13.
The role of market mechanisms was far from certain in the lead up to the 2015 Paris Climate Conference. The use of ‘constructive ambiguity’ led to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, with Article 6.2 specifying a mechanism with limited international oversight, and Article 6.4 establishing a ‘Sustainable Development Mechanism’ (SDM) subject to detailed rules. Clear operationalization of these mechanisms remains a challenge, especially regarding the critical accounting issue that could not be resolved at the 2018 Katowice Climate Conference (COP24) – how to apply corresponding adjustments, especially regarding sectors not covered by targets under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs). By using fictitious examples, we explain two possible approaches to using Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6.2 for achieving NDCs: a ‘target-based’ one where the acquiring Party adds the ITMO amount to the target level of its NDC; and a ‘tally-based’ one where the acquiring Party removes the ITMO amount from the final tally of its NDC. We discuss how these approaches influence the way to make corresponding adjustments and to avoid ‘double counting’. The first one leads to ‘target/budget-based accounting’, the second one to ‘emission-based accounting’. For mitigation outside the scope of the host Party's NDC, we propose using a tally-based interpretation of ITMO use, as opposed to the target-based variety used in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and stress the need for additionality testing. This interpretation allows for mandatory corresponding adjustments for all ITMO usage, while the host Party NDC level remains unchanged. A buffer registry is created for corresponding non-NDC adjustments of the selling party.
Key policy insights
Under the Paris Agreement, transfers of emissions units between two countries through the Article 6 mechanisms need a corresponding adjustment on both sides to prevent double counting.
Corresponding adjustments can be applied either to emissions targets under NDCs or measured emissions levels.
The transfer of emissions reduction credits generated outside an NDC should lead to a corresponding adjustment of a buffer registry of the selling country, but not its emissions level/NDC target. Such credits should only be generated if additionality of the reductions is shown.
14.
The Paris Agreement heralds a new era in international climate governance. Yet, the Agreement's implementation rulebook is still under negotiation. During this transition, from the Kyoto Protocol to the new regime under the Paris Agreement, many non-state actors are facing a high level of uncertainty. In particular, actors in the voluntary carbon market are struggling to define their new role. The business model of producing carbon credits in developing countries and selling them elsewhere is threatened. Although its financial significance and achieved emission reductions are limited, the voluntary market's role as an incubator for innovation has made it a prominent representative of non-state mitigation mechanisms. Therefore, we ask: What effects will the regime change to the Paris Agreement have on the voluntary carbon offset market (VCM) and how does it react to these effects?This study analyses perceptions of, and reactions to, the new regulatory environment within the VCM. We apply the Discursive Agency Approach to scrutinize the institutions, discourses and influential agents involved in the VCM, and the strategic practices they apply to manage the transition towards the Paris regime. We find two dominant coping strategies: to align the voluntary offsetting mechanism with the Paris Agreement, and to re-invent its overall purpose as a tool to deliver sustainable development rather than solely emission reductions. Based on these results, we outline ‘thought spaces’ for a future VCM: (1) voluntary and non-party offsetting beyond nationally determined contributions (NDCs), (2) results-based financing for emission reductions and sustainable development, and (3) private climate action under international oversight.Key policy insights
The Paris Agreement threatens the VCM's business model, prompting market agents to frame and legitimize their work in new ways.
The voluntary market's viability depends on the future accounting rules for emission reductions under Paris Agreement Article 6. Discursive struggles surround the risks of double counting and NDC ambitions.
Based on an understanding of the past, we can draw lessons from agents’ attempts to re-legitimize their role under the new Paris Agreement; their future visions will shape the debates about this nascent regime.
15.
With market-mechanisms likely to achieve emission reductions at lower cost than alternative approaches, there is a presumption that they will be embraced by those who are serious about achieving ambitious reductions. Two broad messages exist; there is already considerable activity and some ambition in many parts of the world – a fragmented but embryonic ‘global’ trading landscape is emerging – and there are efforts at UN level to provide a unifying framework for these bottom-up developments. The topography of interest and response varies considerably across groups of countries, and there have been delays in making progress on a unifying framework. This article analyses the current carbon market landscape in terms of market dynamics and market-mechanism developments whilst undertaking an examination of how climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is shaping the future carbon market landscape. This work shows that the combination of existing, emerging, and potential carbon market-mechanisms can be regarded as an emerging pre-2020 fragmented ‘global’ carbon market landscape based on differing bottom-up market based approaches. One outcome of a 2015 Climate Agreement could be a post-2020 global carbon market which would include new domestic and international market initiatives such as the Framework for Various Approaches and New Market Mechanism, together with reformed Kyoto mechanisms.Policy relevanceWith the 2015 Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) expected to see Parties commit to ambitious mitigation commitments, post-2020 could see significant Party (& industry) investment in market-mechanisms and associated emissions units in an effort to achieve some of the abatement cost minimization offered by market approaches. This article is written for those who have an interest in understanding what is happening – and what is not happening – as regards the emergence of market-related approaches to GHG mitigation globally in the run up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC which meets in Paris in December 2015, and what could be the shape of things to come post-2020. 相似文献
16.
高翔 《气候变化研究进展》2016,12(2):83-91
由于温室气体排放的全球外部性属性,减缓气候变化必须通过国际合作实现,必须体现一定程度的中央集权,考虑参与主体广泛性、减缓行动的范围和行动力度三大要素。《联合国气候变化框架公约》《京都议定书》及其“多哈修正案”“坎昆协议”等方案,对中央集权程度和三大要素各有取舍,构建了不同的国际减缓气候变化合作模式,但从实践看都未能解决国际减缓合作的问题。《巴黎协定》构建了“承诺+审评”的新模式,有望实现参与主体和行动范围的全覆盖,并通过透明度、遵约和全球盘点机制鼓励各参与方提高行动力度。然而要实现公约目标和科学应对气候变化的要求,《巴黎协定》下的国际减缓合作必须通过强化资金、技术、能力建设机制来保障,并通过进一步明确中长期量化目标来促进各方提高行动力度。 相似文献