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1.
The feasibility of two low-carbon society (LCS) scenarios, one with and one without nuclear power and carbon capture and storage (CCS), is evaluated using the AIM/Enduse[Global] model. Both scenarios suggest that achieving a 50% emissions reduction target (relative to 1990 levels) by 2050 is technically feasible if locally suited technologies are introduced and the relevant policies, including necessary financial transfers, are appropriately implemented. In the scenario that includes nuclear and CCS options, it will be vital to consider the risks and acceptance of these technologies. In the scenario without these technologies, the challenge will be how to reduce energy service demand. In both scenarios, the estimated investment costs will be higher in non-Annex I countries than in Annex I countries. Finally, the enhancement of capacity building to support the deployment of locally suited technologies will be central to achieving an LCS. Policy relevance Policies to reduce GHG emissions up to 2050 are critical if the long-term target of stabilizing the climate is to be achieved. From a policy perspective, the cost and social acceptability of the policy used to reduce emissions are two of the key factors in determining the optimal pathways to achieve this. However, the nuclear accident at Fukushima highlighted the risk of depending on large-scale technologies for the provision of energy and has led to a backlash against the use of nuclear technology. It is found that if nuclear and CCS are used it will be technically feasible to halve GHG emissions by 2050, although very costly. However, although the cost of halving emissions will be about the same if neither nuclear nor CCS is used, a 50% reduction in emissions reduction will not be achievable unless the demand for energy service is substantially reduced. 相似文献
2.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):309-326
Abstract Carbon dioxide emissions from UK energy use have fallen by more than 20% over the last 30 years, and carbon intensity—carbon emissions per unit of GDP—has halved. These reductions have been achieved by a combination of decarbonisation of the energy system and substantial improvements in energy efficiency. Use of natural gas in power generation has been a big factor in recent years, but energy efficiency improvements in households and particularly industry have been more important over a longer period. Government policies designed primarily to address climate change have not been important contributors, until recently. Future reductions in emissions will require more proactive policies. However, they are possible without any economic difficulties, notably by adopting cost-effective energy efficiency measures, using new renewable energy sources and reducing dependence on private cars. These policies will improve economic efficiency. The new UK Climate Change Programme includes policies that combine regulation, investment, fiscal measures and other economic instruments. By working with the grain of other social, environmental and economic policies, they can achieve far more than a carbon tax alone, set at any politically acceptable level. Modelling the costs of emission reductions using a carbon tax as the only instrument would not only massively over-estimate costs, it would bear little resemblance to real world politics. The paper demonstrates that a more diverse set of policy instruments is likely to be an effective and politically acceptable approach in a mature industrial economy. It is concluded that the UK's Kyoto target of a 12.5% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is not challenging. The UK Government's target of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20% between 1990 and 2010 is also achievable. By 2010 per capita emissions from the UK will be well below 2.5 tC per year. Claims that some countries, notably the USA, could not reduce per capita emissions below 6 tC per year seem inconsistent with this experience. 相似文献
3.
Dominique Finon 《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):130-145
The mainstream community of energy experts is not aware of the long-term impacts that carbon policies directly concerned with promoting the development of low-carbon technologies produce on the electricity market regime. Long-term market coordination should be replaced by public coordination with long-term arrangements. The current market coordination makes carbon pricing ineffective in orienting investors towards capital-intensive low-carbon technologies. Fossil fuel generation technologies are preferred because their investment risks are much lower in the market regime, even with a high but unstable carbon price. Thus, in order to avoid delaying investment that is aimed at the decarbonization of the electricity system, a number of new market arrangements that lower the investment risk of low-carbon technologies and provide output-based subsidization have or are being selected by governments. As the use of low-carbon equipment to produce electricity develops, long-term market coordination for other technologies (e.g. peaking units, combined cycle gas turbine) will fade away because they alter the market price setting. Thus it is likely that, in the future, public coordination and planning will replace the decisions of market players not only for low-carbon technologies but also for every other type of capacity development. Policy relevance The development of renewables as promoted by both feed-in tariffs and green certificate obligations, which answer to different market failures, is well known. Similar long-term arrangements, which both subsidize and de-risk low-carbon investments for every small-sized and large-sized technology, shift learning costs and risks onto consumers. Energy experts and regulators have ignored that the expansion and generalization of these arrangements are changing the coordination function of the electricity markets. Apart from those in the UK, they are still unaware of the impacts that such technology-focused policies produce on the electricity market regime. The transition from market coordination to public coordination, which is inconsistent with the market principles of European electricity legislation, and long-term contracting is inevitable and should be anticipated. 相似文献
4.
Patricia Fortes Sofia Simões Júlia Seixas Denise Van Regemorter Francisco Ferreira 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):285-304
Bottom-up and top-down models are used to support climate policies, to identify the options required to meet GHG abatement targets and to evaluate their economic impact. Some studies have shown that the GHG mitigation options provided by economic top-down and technological bottom-up models tend to vary. One reason for this is that these models tend to use different baseline scenarios. The bottom-up TIMES_PT and the top-down computable general equilibrium GEM-E3_PT models are examined using a common baseline scenario to calibrate them, and the extend of their different mitigation options and its relevant to domestic policy making are assessed. Three low-carbon scenarios for Portugal until 2050 are generated, each with different GHG reduction targets. Both models suggest close mitigation options and locate the largest mitigation potential to energy supply. However, the models suggest different mitigation options for the end-use sectors: GEM-E3_PT focuses more on energy efficiency, while TIMES_PT relies on decrease carbon intensity due to a shift to electricity. Although a common baseline scenario cannot be ignored, the models’ inherent characteristics are the main factor for the different outcomes, thereby highlighting different mitigation options. Policy relevance The relevance of modelling tools used to support the design of domestic climate policies is assessed by evaluating the mitigation options suggested by a bottom-up and a top-down model. The different outcomes of each model are significant for climate policy design since each suggest different mitigation options like end-use energy efficiency and the promotion of low-carbon technologies. Policy makers should carefully select the modelling tool used to support their policies. The specific modelling structures of each model make them more appropriate to address certain policy questions than others. Using both modelling approaches for policy support can therefore bring added value and result in more robust climate policy design. Although the results are specific for Portugal, the insights provided by the analysis of both models can be extended to, and used in the climate policy decisions of, other countries. 相似文献
5.
Energy system pathways which are projected to deliver minimum possible deployment cost, combined with low Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, are usually considered as ‘no-regrets’ options. However, the question remains whether such energy pathways present ‘no-regrets’ when also considering the wider environmental resource impacts, in particular those on land and water resources. This paper aims to determine whether the energy pathways of the UK’s Carbon Plan are environmental “no-regrets” options, defined in this study as simultaneously exhibiting low impact on land and water services resulting from resource appropriation for energy provision. This is accomplished by estimating the land area and water abstraction required by 2050 under the four pathways of the Carbon Plan with different scenarios for energy crop composition, yield, and power station locations. The outcomes are compared with defined limits for sustainable land appropriation and water abstraction.The results show that of the four Carbon Plan pathways, only the “Higher Renewables, more energy efficiency” pathway is an environmental “no-regrets” option, and that is only if deployment of power stations inland is limited. The study shows that policies for future low-carbon energy systems should be developed with awareness of wider environmental impacts. Failing to do this could lead to a setback in achieving GHG emission reductions goals, because of unforeseen additional competition between the energy sector and demand for land and water services in other sectors. 相似文献
6.
Brazil's nationally determined contribution (NDC) pledged under the Paris Agreement has marked a new stage in its climate policy towards strengthening low-carbon economic development beyond the recent drastic cuts in emissions from deforestation. Brazil especially means to limit oil consumption driven by future economic growth and to increase energy efficiency and biofuel use in the transport sector. On the other hand, Brazil still aspires to become a major petroleum province given its huge reserves of ‘pre-salt’ oil. This article aims to clarify under what conditions low-carbon economic development and oil exploration can possibly be combined in Brazil and what would be the energy system, environmental and macroeconomic implications of enabling policies for doing so. To address these questions, an energy–economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Brazilian economy is used to simulate alternative scenarios up to 2030. The results first show that implementing the most recent energy plans, which take into account the new economic reality in Brazil, should lead to over 20% lower domestic CO2 emissions in 2030 than the indicative NDC target, and to the export of the bulk of newfound crude oil. Second, with the same level of oil production, deeper domestic decarbonization, triggered by additional carbon pricing and sustainable efficiency measures, appears achievable with very small gross domestic product (GDP) loss and maximum oil exports, while being aligned with a 2°C emission pathway. However, (i) extra oil exports may induce net additional emissions outside Brazil and be seen as a perverse incentive and (ii) the economic growth strategy based on high oil exports may hinder the necessary diversification of the Brazilian economy.
Key policy insights
Low-carbon development goals will strongly interact with oil policy in Brazil.
The 2030 NDC target should be easy to achieve considering the new economic reality in Brazil.
Deeper domestic decarbonization is achievable with very limited GDP loss and significant oil exports, while being aligned with a 2°C emission pathway.
A broad strategic vision is needed to reconcile climate policy, energy policy and other economic development objectives.
7.
There are compelling reasons for policy makers to be interested in the low-carbon agenda. More than half of the world's population lives in, and more than half of the world's economic output comes from, cities. Up to 70% of global carbon emissions can also be attributed to consumption that takes place in cities. Recent research has shown that cost-effective investments in low-carbon options could deliver a 40% reduction in GHG emissions from cities by 2020, while also providing wider economic benefits such as enhanced competitiveness and increased employment. As yet, however, investments in low-carbon cities have not been made at scale due mainly to the scale of the finance required, local government budgetary constraints, and perceptions about their costs and benefits. With a focus on the UK, a contemporary account is provided of what local authorities see as the major financial risks associated with funding low-carbon cities. Practical proposals – which also have more general relevance to the future financing of low-carbon cities around the world – are offered on how local authorities, in conjunction with central government, the private sector, and institutional investors, can effectively manage these risks. Policy relevance Cities house more than half of the world's population, generate more than half of the world's economic output, and produce between 40% and 70% of all anthropogenic GHG emissions. In the UK, 70% of such emissions are under the influence of its local authorities. Thus, one of the key public policy challenges for the low-carbon transition is how it should be financed. There are several obstacles and related risks to this transition, including financial and legal obstacles and the differing views and perceptions of stakeholders. These can be attenuated, somewhat, by national government support at scale, local authority leadership, and cooperation between other authorities and the private sector, and the development of tools and guidance to reduce transaction costs. 相似文献
8.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):343-362
Abstract This paper discusses Japan's quantitative Kyoto target in the context of the country's socio-economic and political background and its desire to express international leadership. Japan's initial negotiating target was developed as a compromise between domestic industrial considerations and its international ambitions, and was strengthened further under the pressures to achieve success at Kyoto. The original projections relied heavily upon nuclear expansion that will not be realized. Though economic stagnation has helped emissions to decline from their mid-1990s peak, it has also reduced the attention devoted to climate change and the willingness to bear costs, and Japan's commitment remains daunting. Japanese bureaucrats and diplomats are called to work closer together and in an integrated manner in order to develop a new, more realistic policy package for achieving their target. This report analyses various scenarios for additional policies for Japan, including fuel switching, carbon taxation and emissions trading, and concludes that the introduction of gas in the context of energy market liberalization is a key possibility. It also considers the sink and the nuclear energy issues both of high importance for the country. 相似文献
9.
Samuel Fankhauser 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):345-362
Drawing primarily on the UK experience, five practical lessons are identified for policy makers who seek to decarbonize their economies. First, decarbonization needs a solid legal basis to give it credibility and overcome time inconsistency problems. Second, putting a price on carbon is essential, but low-carbon policies also have to address wider market, investment, and behavioural failures. This in turn raises issues of policy complexity and coordination. Third, the low-carbon economy is likely to be highly electrified. Clean electricity could be a cost-effective way of decarbonizing many parts of the economy, including transport, heating, and parts of industry. Decarbonization therefore starts in the power sector. Fourth, the low-carbon transition is primarily a revolution of production and not consumption. Both supply-side innovation and demand-side adjustments in lifestyle and behaviour are needed, though the former should dominate. Fifth, the transition to a low-carbon economy is economically and technologically feasible. Achieving it is a question of policy competence and having the political will to drive economic and social change. Policy relevance Practically all major GHG emitters now have climate change legislation on their statute books. Given what is at stake, and the complexity of the task at hand, it is important that policy makers learn from each other and establish a code of good low-carbon practice. The main lessons from the UK are distilled and presented. Carbon policy is considered for key sectors, such as electricity, buildings, and transport, and possible decarbonization paths are also outlined. It is shown that the transition to a low-carbon economy is economically and technologically feasible. Achieving it is primarily a question of policy competence and political will. This in turn means that climate change action needs a strong legislative basis to give the reforms statutory legitimacy. Low-carbon policies will have to address a wide range of market, investment and behavioural failures. Putting a price on carbon is an essential starting point, but only one of many policy reforms. 相似文献
10.
Today’s climate policies will shape the future trajectory of emissions. Consumption is the main driver behind recent increases in global greenhouse gas emissions, outpacing savings through improved technologies, and therefore its representation in the evidence base will impact on the success of policy interventions. The IPCC’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C (SR1.5) summarises global evidence on pathways for meeting below-2 °C targets, underpinned by a suite of scenarios from integrated assessment models (IAMs). We explore how final energy demand is framed within these, with the aim to making demand-related assumptions more transparent, and evaluating their significance, feasibility, and use or underutilisation as a mitigation lever. We investigate how the integrated assessment models compensate for higher and lower levels of final energy demand across scenarios, and how this varies when mitigating for 2 °C and 1.5 °C temperature targets through an analysis of (1) final energy demand projections, (2) energy-economy relationships and (3) differences between energy system decarbonisation and carbon dioxide removal in the highest and lowest energy demand pathways. We look across the full suite of mitigation pathways and assess the consequences of achieving different global carbon budgets. We find that energy demand in 2100 in the highest energy demand scenarios is approximately three to four times higher than the lowest demand pathways, but we do not find strong evidence that 1.5 °C-consistent pathways cluster on the lower end of demand levels, particularly when they allow for overshoot. The majority of demand reductions happen pre-2040, which assumes absolute decoupling from economic growth in the near-term; thereafter final energy demand levels generally grow to 2100. Lower energy demand pathways moderately result in lower renewable energy supply and lower energy system investment, but do not necessarily reduce reliance on carbon dioxide removal. In this sense, there is more scope for IAMs to implement energy demand reduction as a longer-term mitigation lever and to reduce reliance on negative emissions technologies. We demonstrate the need for integrated assessments to play closer attention to how final energy demand interacts with, relates to, and can potentially offset supply-side characteristics, alongside a more diverse evidence base. 相似文献
11.
《Climate Policy》2001,1(3):309-326
Carbon dioxide emissions from UK energy use have fallen by more than 20% over the last 30 years, and carbon intensity — carbon emissions per unit of GDP — has halved. These reductions have been achieved by a combination of decarbonisation of the energy system and substantial improvements in energy efficiency. Use of natural gas in power generation has been a big factor in recent years, but energy efficiency improvements in households and particularly industry have been more important over a longer period. Government policies designed primarily to address climate change have not been important contributors, until recently.Future reductions in emissions will require more proactive policies. However, they are possible without any economic difficulties, notably by adopting cost-effective energy efficiency measures, using new renewable energy sources and reducing dependence on private cars. These policies will improve economic efficiency. The new UK Climate Change Programme includes policies that combine regulation, investment, fiscal measures and other economic instruments. By working with the grain of other social, environmental and economic policies, they can achieve far more than a carbon tax alone, set at any politically acceptable level. Modelling the costs of emission reductions using a carbon tax as the only instrument would not only massively over-estimate costs, it would bear little resemblance to real world politics.The paper demonstrates that a more diverse set of policy instruments is likely to be an effective and politically acceptable approach in a mature industrial economy. It is concluded that the UK’s Kyoto target of a 12.5% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is not challenging. The UK Government’s target of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20% between 1990 and 2010 is also achievable. By 2010 per capita emissions from the UK will be well below 2.5 tC per year. Claims that some countries, notably the USA, could not reduce per capita emissions below 6 tC per year seem inconsistent with this experience. 相似文献
12.
In the recent climate change negotiations it was declared that the increase in global temperature should be kept below 2°C by 2100, relative to pre-industrial levels. China's CO2 emissions from energy and cement processes already account for nearly 24% of global emissions, a trend that is expected to keep increasing. Thus the role of China in global GHG mitigation is crucial. A scenario analysis of China's CO2 emissions is presented here and the feasibility of China reaching a low-carbon scenario is discussed. The results suggest that recent and continued technological progress will make it possible for China to limit its CO2 emissions and for these emissions to peak before 2025 and therefore that the global 2°C target can be achieved. Policy relevance In signing the Copenhagen Accord, China agreed to the global 2°C target. Results from this article could be used to justify low-carbon development policies and negotiations. While many still doubt the feasibility of a low-carbon pathway to support the global 2°C target, the results suggest that such a pathway can be realistically achieved. This conclusion should increase confidence and guide the policy framework further to make possible China's low-carbon development. Related policies and measures, such as renewable energy development, energy efficiency, economic structure optimization, technology innovation, low-carbon investment, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) development, should be further enhanced. Furthermore, China can play a larger role in the international negotiations process. In the global context, the 2°C target could be reaffirmed and a global regime on an emissions mitigation protocol could be framed with countries’ emissions target up to 2050. 相似文献
13.
A. N. Khondaker Karim Malik Nahid Hossain Shaikh Abdur Razzak Rouf Ahmad Khan 《Climate Policy》2013,13(4):517-541
The energy sector is the main contributor to GHG emissions in Saudi Arabia. The tremendous growth of GHG emissions poses serious challenges for the Kingdom in terms of their reduction targets, and also the mitigation of the associated climate changes. The rising trend of population and urbanization affects the energy demand, which results in a faster rate of increase in GHG emissions. The major energy sector sources that contribute to GHG emissions include the electricity generation, road transport, desalination plants, petroleum refining, petrochemical, cement, iron and steel, and fertilizer industries. In recent years, the energy sector has become the major source, accounting for more than 90% of national CO2 emissions. Although a substantial amount of research has been conducted on renewable energy resources, a sustainable shift from petroleum resources is yet to be achieved. Public awareness, access to energy-efficient technology, and the development and implementation of a legislative framework, energy pricing policies, and renewable and alternative energy policies are not mature enough to ensure a significant reduction in GHG emissions from the energy sector. An innovative and integrated solution that best serves the Kingdom's long-term needs and exploits potential indigenous, renewable, and alternative energy resources while maintaining its sustainable development stride is essential.Policy relevanceThe main contributor to GHG emissions in Saudi Arabia is the energy sector that accounts for more than 90% of the national CO2 emissions. Tremendous growth of GHG emissions poses serious challenges for the Kingdom in their reduction and mitigating the associated climate changes. This study examines the changing patterns of different activities associated with energy sector, the pertinent challenges, and the opportunities that promise reduction of GHG emissions while providing national energy and economic security. The importance of achieving timely, sustained, and increasing reductions in GHG emissions means that a combination of policies may be needed. This study points to the long-term importance of making near- and medium-term policy choices on a well-informed, strategic basis. This analytical paper is expected to provide useful information to the national policy makers and other decision makers. It may also contribute to the GHG emission inventories and the climate change negotiations. 相似文献
14.
Russia has significant potential for reducing its carbon emissions. However, investment in new low-carbon technologies has significant risks. Ambiguous energy and climate policy in Russia, along with deterioration of the country's investment climate, create investment barriers that are well described in qualitative terms in the literature. This paper attempts to provide a quantitative analysis of these barriers. For this numerical experiment, we apply the RU-TIMES model. Using a real options methodology, we estimate the risk-adjusted cost of capital in the Russian energy sector (including energy production and consumption technologies represented in the TIMES framework) to be approximately 43% (including a risk-free interest rate) and demonstrate the high risk of investment into energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies. Any future low-carbon emissions pathway depends on the ability of the Russian government to reduce climate and energy policy uncertainties, and to reduce financial risks through improvements of the general investment climate.
Key policy insights
The high cost of capital investment into Russian energy production and consumption may prevent the adoption of new energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies.
These investment risks, if not addressed, will delay Russia's low-carbon transition for the coming decades.
Adopting a clear and unambiguous long-term climate and energy policy is important to reduce these risks and alleviate some of the barriers to the new technologies.
The first step could be ratification of the Paris Agreement and adoption of a long-term emission target for the period up to 2050.
15.
开展交通领域大气污染物与温室气体协同减排研究对于实现能源、环境和气候变化综合管理具有重要意义.文中以我国交通部门污染物与温室气体协同治理为切入点,开展道路、铁路、水运、航空和管道运输等各子部门未来需求预测,并运用长期能源可替代规划系统模型(LEAP),通过构建基准情景、污染减排情景、绿色低碳情景和强化低碳情景,模拟分析... 相似文献
16.
David Klein Gunnar Luderer Elmar Kriegler Jessica Strefler Nico Bauer Marian Leimbach Alexander Popp Jan Philipp Dietrich Florian Humpenöder Hermann Lotze-Campen Ottmar Edenhofer 《Climatic change》2014,123(3-4):705-718
This study investigates the use of bioenergy for achieving stringent climate stabilization targets and it analyzes the economic drivers behind the choice of bioenergy technologies. We apply the integrated assessment framework REMIND-MAgPIE to show that bioenergy, particularly if combined with carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a crucial mitigation option with high deployment levels and high technology value. If CCS is available, bioenergy is exclusively used with CCS. We find that the ability of bioenergy to provide negative emissions gives rise to a strong nexus between biomass prices and carbon prices. Ambitious climate policy could result in bioenergy prices of 70 $/GJ (or even 430 $/GJ if bioenergy potential is limited to 100 EJ/year), which indicates a strong demand for bioenergy. For low stabilization scenarios with BECCS availability, we find that the carbon value of biomass tends to exceed its pure energy value. Therefore, the driving factor behind investments into bioenergy conversion capacities for electricity and hydrogen production are the revenues generated from negative emissions, rather than from energy production. However, in REMIND modern bioenergy is predominantly used to produce low-carbon fuels, since the transport sector has significantly fewer low-carbon alternatives to biofuels than the power sector. Since negative emissions increase the amount of permissible emissions from fossil fuels, given a climate target, bioenergy acts as a complement to fossils rather than a substitute. This makes the short-term and long-term deployment of fossil fuels dependent on the long-term availability of BECCS. 相似文献
17.
Can near-term public support of renewable energy technologies contain the increase of mitigation costs due to delays of implementing emission caps at the global level? To answer this question we design a set of first and second best scenarios to analyze the impact of early deployment of renewable energy technologies on welfare and emission timing to achieve atmospheric carbon stabilization by 2100. We use the global multiregional energy?Ceconomy?Cclimate hybrid model REMIND-R as a tool for this analysis. An important design feature of the policy scenarios is the timing of climate policy. Immediate climate policy contains the mitigation costs at less than 1% even if the CO2 concentration target is 410?ppm by 2100. Delayed climate policy increases the costs significantly because the absence of a strong carbon price signal continues the carbon intensive growth path. The additional costs can be decreased by early technology policies supporting renewable energy technologies because emissions grow less, alternative energy technologies are increased in capacity and their costs are reduced through learning by doing. The effects of early technology policy are different in scenarios with immediate carbon pricing. In the case of delayed climate policy, the emission path can be brought closer to the first-best solution, whereas in the case of immediate climate policy additional technology policy would lead to deviations from the optimal emission path. Hence, technology policy in the delayed climate policy case reduces costs, but in the case of immediate climate policy they increase. However, the near-term emission reductions are smaller in the case of delayed climate policies. At the regional level the effects on mitigation costs are heterogeneously distributed. For the USA and Europe early technology policy has a positive welfare effect for immediate and delayed climate policies. In contrast, India looses in both cases. China loses in the case of immediate climate policy, but profits in the delayed case. Early support of renewable energy technologies devalues the stock of emission allowances, and this effect is considerable for delayed climate policies. In combination with the initial allocation rule of contraction and convergence a relatively well-endowed country like India loses and potential importers like the EU gain from early renewable deployment. 相似文献
18.
Shilpa Rao Shonali Pachauri Frank Dentener Patrick Kinney Zbigniew Klimont Keywan Riahi Wolfgang Schoepp 《Global Environmental Change》2013,23(5):1122-1130
Air pollution and its related health impacts are a global concern. This paper addresses how current policies on air pollution, climate change and access to clean cooking fuels can effectively reduce both outdoor and household air pollution and improve human health. A state of the art modeling framework is used that combines an integrated assessment model and an atmospheric model to estimate the spatial extent and distribution of outdoor air pollution exposures. Estimates of household energy access and use are modeled by accounting for heterogeneous household energy choices and affordability constraints for rural and urban populations spanning the entire income distribution. Results are presented for 2030 for a set of policy scenarios on air pollution, climate change and energy access and include spatially explicit emissions of air pollutants; ambient concentrations of PM2.5; and health impacts in terms of disability adjusted life years (DALYs) from both ambient and household air pollution. The results stress the importance of enforcing current worldwide air quality legislation in addressing the impacts of outdoor air pollution. A combination of stringent policies on outdoor air pollution, climate change and access to clean cooking fuels is found to be effective in achieving reductions in average ambient PM2.5 exposures to below World Health Organization recommended levels for a majority of the world's population and results in a significant decline in the global burden of disease from both outdoor and household air pollution. 相似文献
19.
The 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the consequent accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, have had consequences far beyond Japan itself. Reactions to the accident in three major economies Japan, the UK, and Germany, all of whom were committed to relatively ambitious climate change targets prior to the accident are examined. In Japan and Germany, the accident precipitated a major change of policy direction. In the UK, debate has been muted and there has been essentially no change in energy or climate change policies. The status of the energy and climate change policies in each country prior to the accident is assessed, the responses to the accident are described, and the possible impacts on their positions in the international climate negotiations are analysed. Finally, the three countries' responses are compared and some differences between them observed. Some reasons for their different policy responses are suggested and some themes, common across all countries, are identified Policy relevance The attraction of nuclear power has rested on the promise of low-cost electricity, low-carbon energy supply, and enhanced energy independence. The Fukushima accident, which followed the Japanese tsunami of March 2011, has prompted a critical re-appraisal of nuclear power. The responses to Fukushima are assessed for the UK, Germany, and Japan. Before the accident, all three countries considered nuclear as playing a significant part in climate mitigation strategies. Although the UK Government has continued to support nuclear new build following a prompt review of safety arrangements, Japan and Germany have decided to phase out nuclear power, albeit according to different timescales. The factors that explain the different decisions are examined, including patterns of energy demand and supply, the wider political context, institutional arrangements, and public attitudes to risk. The implications for the international climate negotiations are also assessed. 相似文献
20.
Technological capability and technology transfer both play important roles in achieving low-carbon development targets and the concepts of both have appeared in national development and climate policy debates. Yet, they differ. Improving capabilities and transfer mechanisms are two differing approaches to technological development. Technology transfer is associated with a key political dynamic within international climate policy, in that developing countries request support from industrialised countries. Whereas technological capability focuses on building internal capabilities and is often framed in the context of national industrial policy plans rather than relying on external support. We argue that technology development, a combination of these approaches, can contribute to South Africa's low-carbon development through innovation and technology-based mitigation actions that increase domestic technological capabilities. Technological capability needs to become a determinant of mitigation action to effectively contribute to achieving South Africa's low-carbon development goals. International technology transfer and cooperation should contribute to boosting domestic capabilities to advance technological development. Technology transfer based on pure sales will not contribute to achieving long-term low-carbon development goals. 相似文献