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1.
全球到2100年实现将温度上升控制在和工业化前相比2℃以内,已经成为一个政策目标。本文结合中国能源环境政策综合评估（IPAC）模型的近期研究结果,分析了实现全球2℃温升目标下我国能源活动的CO2排放情景,并对其关键因素进行研究,得到实现这些情景的可行性。研究表明,考虑到我国经济转型、能源效率提升、可再生能源和核电的发展、碳捕获和碳封存技术,以及低碳生活方式的转变,我国能源活动的CO2排放是可以在2025年之前,甚至更早（如在2020—2022年）实现排放峰值,峰值总量在90亿t左右,之后开始下降,这和我国在全球2℃温升目标情景中给予的碳空间相一致,支持我国未来在全球温室气体减排中的国际合作路径,以及国内低碳发展政策的制定。实现这样的减排路径,需要在既有的环境和能源政策之外制定针对气候变化减缓的明确和长期的政策,如碳定价。 相似文献
2.
《巴黎协定》将努力控制全球温升到2100年不超过工业化前的1.5℃确定为全球温控目标之一。继2℃目标后,1.5℃也被作为应对气候变化的全球温控目标之一。目前科学界对于1.5℃目标的研究还十分有限。已有的科学研究表明,尽管区域差异很大,将全球温升控制在1.5℃范围内地球各系统要承受的气候风险可能要低于2℃。相比于2℃目标,1.5℃目标对全球减缓行动的要求更为严苛。尽管在《巴黎协定》中各缔约方承诺了各自到2030（2025）年的减排目标,但相对于实现1.5℃目标而言仍有很大的差距。多家研究机构的模拟结果表明,如完全执行当前国家自主决定贡献（NDC),到21世纪末全球温升范围为2.2～3.4℃。截至2025年,实现当前NDC的减排承诺后,2℃温升目标下全球仍有467 Gt CO2（万亿t CO2当量）的排放空间,1.5℃温升目标下全球仅剩17 Gt CO2。到2030年,基于NDC的排放已经超过了1.5℃目标的排放量。按当前的路径来看,若想实现将全球温升控制在1.5℃的范围内,全球不仅需要立即行动并采取强有力的减排、脱碳和固碳措施,在2100年前,还必须实现负排放才有可能实现这一目标。尽管当前的科学研究仍存在很大的不确定性,但1.5℃目标已是全球努力应对气候变化的方向,也是开启未来世界低碳可持续发展的重要标志。 相似文献
3.
基于气候变化综合模型——全球变化评价模型（GCAM-TU),分析了2030年各国家/地区减排承诺下能源相关CO2的全球排放路径与不同可能性下2℃温升目标对应的最优排放路径的差距。研究发现,当前减排承诺下的全球排放路径与最优路径仍存在一定差距,各国家/地区需加大2030年后的减排承诺力度。进一步分析了主要国家/地区在各自减排承诺下的碳强度下降率、减排成本和人均碳排放,得出中国在全球减排进程中的努力和贡献是巨大的,而南非、日本等国承诺力度不足。为实现自主决定贡献,中国终端能源消耗将较参考情景有所下降,能源结构将进一步优化。 相似文献
4.
国际社会已就2℃温升目标达成政治共识。将温升目标向累积排放及各国减排目标转换的过程需要基于一致的科学认知。但由于目前地球系统模式、减排路径及减排方案的研究仍然存在不确定性,缺乏建立政治共识所需的科学基础。通过谈判形成一个自上而下的国际气候制度的决策基础尚不具备。目前最有效和务实的方案仍是各国自下而上加大减排力度,并不断进行评估,促进各国持续加强减排力度,最终公平地承担减排义务。 相似文献
5.
目前欧盟、中国、日本、韩国、加拿大,以及南非等国家或地区,已经公布了温室气体中和或者碳中和的目标,如果加上很可能很快也会提出碳中和目标的美国,全球有可能近70%的CO2排放的国家或地区提出碳中和的目标。由于这些国家或地区是全球技术主导和经济主导地,因而全球2050年左右实现碳中和具有可行性。2050年左右实现碳中和,即和《巴黎协定》2℃目标,甚至和其1.5℃温升目标下的减排路径相一致。研究表明实现2050年左右碳中和有其可行性,实现该目标需要更多的技术创新,未来将是各个国家技术竞争和经济竞争阶段。 相似文献
6.
ZHOU Tian-Jun SUN Ning ZHANG Wen-Xia CHEN Xiao-Long PENG Dong-Dong LI Dong-Huan REN Li-Wen ZUO Meng 《大气和海洋科学快报》2018,(2)
研究目的:本文采用CMIP5多模式的集合平均,针对多种排放情景,估算了丝绸之路核心区达到1.5度和2度温升的时间,比较了全球平均温度达到1.5度和2度温升阈值时丝绸之路核心区的平均气候和极端气候指标的变化。创新要点:中国西部和中亚位于古丝绸之路核心区,是连接东西方的桥梁。1.5度和2度温控目标的设定,是国际社会应对全球变暖的重要举措。理解在上述增暖阈值下丝绸之路核心区平均气候和极端气候的可能变化,将为一带一路战略的实施提供重要科学参考。研究方法:CMIP5多模式集合平均重要结论:相较于当前气候态(1986–2005年),在四种排放情景下,即RCP2.6、RCP4.5、RCP6.0和RCP8.5,CMIP5多模式集合预估的丝绸之路核心区到21世纪末将分别增温1.5、2.9、2.6和6.0°C。在四种排放情景下,年平均降水较之当前气候态均显著增加,其中在RCP8.5情景下增加约14%。四种排放情景下的预估结果,均显示丝绸之路核心区将在2020年前温升达到1.5°C。在RCP8.5情景下,该地区将在2020年代温升达到2.0°C,而在RCP4.5情景下,温升达到2.0°C的时间则推迟到2030年代。比较全球温升1.5和2.0°C的气候变化,发现全球额外升温0.5°C(较之1.5°C温升阈值)将导致丝绸之路核心区升温0.73°C(0.49–0.94°C),高于全球平均温度的变化,极端热浪的天数将增加4.2天,年平均降水增加2.72%(0.47%–3.82%),而连续干旱日数的变化则具有区域依赖性。 相似文献
7.
《巴黎协定》提出全球暖化程度在21世纪末相对工业革命前控制在2℃以内的目标。青藏高原高寒植被对全球变暖非常敏感，在2℃温升这个边界增温条件下研究高原植被对气候变化的响应关系到高原生态安全问题，有重大现实意义。本文基于CMIP5多模式模拟预测结果研究了高原植被对2℃温升的响应，并探讨了高原植被对于气候因子变化的敏感性，得到主要结论如下：在全球2℃温升背景下，高原植被叶面积指数（Leaf Area Index, LAI）较历史参考期显著增加，高原变绿，其中高原中部LAI和植被碳存储增加最为显著，三江源是植被LAI增加较快的区域。增温后裸地面积迅速减少，植被覆盖率总体增加，大部分地区草地呈增加趋势，森林减少趋势变缓，说明在2℃温升期高原植被有所改善。在全球2℃温升背景下，高原植被覆盖率表现出对温度和降水率等气候因子更强的依赖性和敏感性，在增暖环境中，气温仍是影响高原植被生态系统变化的主控因子。 相似文献
8.
部分国家长期温室气体低排放发展战略比较分析 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
面向21世纪中叶的长期低排放发展战略是继国家自主贡献之后,衡量各国长期减排努力的重要文件。文中针对已向《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处正式提交长期低排放发展战略的12个国家,从各国战略的总体结构、主要内容和实施面临的挑战等方面进行了比较分析。研究发现各国长期减排力度存在较大差别,分行业和分气体类型的减排目标分解仍较为初步,战略涉及的中长期减排目标与全球长期温升控制目标之间仍存在较大差距,长期减排政策措施的经济性尚不明确,并且对发展中国家的资金援助与需求间仍存在巨大缺口,这些问题均会严重制约长期低排放战略的后续有效实施。为推动中国长期战略的制订,文中从持续对各国战略跟踪分析、强化“两步走”战略安排下分阶段减排目标和任务分析研判、强化对战略路径特别是薄弱环节的梳理和拓展研究,以及加强对中国跨领域前瞻性相关重大战略问题的深入研究等4个方面提出了政策建议。 相似文献
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10.
IPCC评估报告对国际气候变化谈判进程有重要影响,目前正在陆续发布的第五次评估报告已明确作为气候变化新协议谈判的重要信息来源,对讨论2020年后应对气候变化国际合作机制的影响不容忽视。最先发布的第一工作组评估报告基于新的科学观测事实、更为完善的归因分析和气候系统模式模拟结果,进一步确认了气候变暖的事实,发现了人类活动与全球温升之间因果关系的新证据,以及温室气体累积排放与温升响应之间的定量联系。本文通过分析其中一些关键结论可能的政策含义,探讨了这些关键结论对目前国际气候变化谈判进程和新协议等相关问题的可能影响,探讨了科学信息在气候变化决策过程中的作用,以及如何更为科学地理解和利用这些重要结论。 相似文献
11.
Limiting global warming to ‘well below’ 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C is an integral part of the 2015 Paris Agreement. To achieve these aims, cumulative global carbon emissions after 2016 should not exceed 940 – 390?Gt of CO2 (for the 2°C target) and 167 – ?48?Gt of CO2 (for the 1.5°C target) by the end of the century. This paper analyses the EU’s cumulative carbon emissions in different models and scenarios (global models, EU-focused models and national carbon mitigation scenarios). Due to the higher reductions in energy use and carbon intensity of the end-use sectors in the national scenarios, we identify an additional mitigation potential of 26–37 Gt cumulative CO2 emissions up to 2050 compared to what is currently included in global or EU scenarios. These additional reductions could help to both reduce the need for carbon dioxide removals and bring cumulative emissions in global and EU scenarios in line with a fairness-based domestic EU budget for a 2°C target, while still remaining way above the budget for 1.5°C.Key policy insights
Models used for policy advice such as global integrated assessment models or EU models fail to consider certain mitigation potential available at the level of sectors.
Global and EU models assume significant levels of CO2 emission reductions from carbon capture and storage to reach the 1.5°C target but also to reach the 2°C target.
Global and EU model scenarios are not compatible with a fair domestic EU share in the global carbon budget either for 2°C or for 1.5°C.
Integrating additional sectoral mitigation potential from detailed national models can help bring down cumulative emissions in global and EU models to a level comparable to a fairness-based domestic EU share compatible with the 2°C target, but not the 1.5°C aspiration.
12.
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez Jordi Teixidó-Figueras Cori Vilella 《Climatic change》2016,136(3-4):693-703
An effective climate agreement is urgently required, yet conflict between parties prevails over cooperation. Thanks to advances in science it is now possible to quantify the global carbon budget, the amount of available cumulative CO2 emissions before crossing the 2 °C threshold (Meinshausen et al. Nature 458(7242):1158–1162, 2009). Countries carbon claims, however, exceed this. Historically such situations have been tackled with bankruptcy division rules. We argue that framing climate negotiations as a classical conflicting claims problem (O’Neill Math Soc Sci 2(4):345–371, 1982) may provide for an effective climate policy. We analyze the allocation of the global carbon budget among parties claiming the maximum emissions rights possible. Based on the selection of some desirable principles, we propose an efficient and sustainable allocation of the available carbon budget for the period 2000 to 2050 taking into account different risk scenarios. 相似文献
13.
Frederick van der Ploeg 《Climatic change》2018,147(1-2):47-59
Cumulative emissions drive peak global warming and determine the carbon budget needed to keep temperature below 2 or 1.5 °C. This safe carbon budget is low if uncertainty about the transient climate response is high and risk tolerance (willingness to accept risk of overshooting the temperature target) is low. Together with energy costs, this budget determines the optimal carbon price and how quickly fossil fuel is abated and replaced by renewable energy. This price is the sum of the present discounted value of all future losses in aggregate production due to emitting one ton of carbon today plus the cost of peak warming that rises over time to reflect the increasing scarcity of carbon as temperature approaches its upper limit. If policy makers ignore production losses, the carbon price rises more rapidly. If they ignore the peak temperature constraint, the carbon price rises less rapidly. The alternative of adjusting damages upwards to factor in the peak warming constraint leads initially to a higher carbon price which rises less rapidly. 相似文献
14.
Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh 《Climate Policy》2018,18(1):76-85
This study explores the implications of shifting the narrative of climate policy evaluation from one of costs/benefits or economic growth to a message of improving social welfare. Focusing on the costs of mitigation and the associated impacts on gross domestic product (GDP) may translate into a widespread concern that a climate agreement will be very costly. This article considers the well-known Human Development Index (HDI) as an alternative criterion for judging the welfare effects of climate policy. We estimate what the maximum possible annual average increase in HDI welfare per tons of CO2 would be within the carbon budget associated with limiting warming to 2°C over the period 2015–2050. Emission pathways are determined by a policy that allows the HDI of poor countries and their emissions to increase under a business-as-usual development path, while countries with a high HDI value (>0.8) have to restrain their emissions to ensure that the global temperature rise does not exceed 2°C. For comparison, the well-known multi-regional RICE model is used to assess GDP growth under the same climate change policy goals.
Policy relevance
This is the first study that shifts the narrative of climate policy evaluation from one of GDP growth to a message of improving social welfare, as captured by the HDI. This could make it easier for political leaders and climate negotiators to publicly commit themselves to ambitious carbon emission reduction goals, such as limiting global warming to 2°C, as in the (non-binding) agreement made at COP 21 in Paris in 2015. We find that if impacts are framed in terms of growth in HDI per t CO2 emission per capita instead of in GDP, the HDI of poor countries and their emissions are allowed to increase under a business-as-usual development path, whereas countries with a high HDI (>0.8) must control emissions so that global temperature rise remains within 2°C. Importantly, a climate agreement is more attractive for rich countries under the HDI than the GDP frame. This is good news, as these countries have to make the major contribution to emissions reductions. 相似文献
15.
Chris Bataille Henri Waisman Michel Colombier Laura Segafredo Jim Williams Frank Jotzo 《Climate Policy》2016,16(4):S7-S26
Constraining global average temperatures to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels will probably require global energy system emissions to be halved by 2050 and complete decarbonization by 2100. In the nationally orientated climate policy framework codified under the Paris Agreement, each nation must decide the scale and method of their emissions reduction contribution while remaining consistent with the global carbon budget. This policy process will require engagement amongst a wide range of stakeholders who have very different visions for the physical implementation of deep decarbonization. The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) has developed a methodology, building on the energy, climate and economics literature, to structure these debates based on the following principles: country-scale analysis to capture specific physical, economic and political circumstances to maximize policy relevance, a long-term perspective to harmonize short-term decisions with the long-term objective and detailed sectoral analysis with transparent representation of emissions drivers through a common accounting framework or ‘dashboard’. These principles are operationalized in the creation of deep decarbonization pathways (DDPs), which involve technically detailed, sector-by-sector maps of each country’s decarbonization transition, backcasting feasible pathways from 2050 end points. This article shows how the sixteen DDPP country teams, covering 74% of global energy system emissions, used this method to collectively restrain emissions to a level consistent with the 2 °C target while maintaining development aspirations and reflecting national circumstances, mainly through efficiency, decarbonization of energy carriers (e.g. electricity, hydrogen, biofuels and synthetic gas) and switching to these carriers. The cross-cutting analysis of country scenarios reveals important enabling conditions for the transformation, pertaining to technology research and development, investment, trade and global and national policies.Policy relevanceIn the nation-focused global climate policy framework codified in the Paris Agreement, the purpose of the DDPP and DDPs is to provide a common method by which global and national governments, business, civil society and researchers in each country can communicate, compare and debate differing concrete visions for deep decarbonization in order to underpin the necessary societal and political consensus to design and implement short-term policy packages that are consistent with long-term global decarbonization. 相似文献
16.
随着气候变化影响加剧,全球气候治理进程加速,实现碳达峰已经成为全球气候行动的核心,各国也相继制定碳中和目标并开展行动。中国在第75届联合国大会一般性辩论上提出了碳达峰碳中和目标,部分已实现碳达峰的发达经济体也提出了各自的碳中和承诺。文中从“整体-阶段”及“焦点-公平”视角分析了欧盟和美国等主要发达经济体碳达峰的历程和特点,以及其碳中和目标和规划。研究发现,发达经济体在碳达峰过程中普遍经历了较长的爬坡期（58~136年）和平台期（4~20年),在碳达峰时,发达经济体的能源结构以油气为主,油气占一次能源消费比重为57%~77%,其人均排放量、历史累计排放以及人均GDP也都处于较高水平,在碳达峰前后总体处于经济与碳排放脱钩状态。各发达经济体的碳中和路径均以能源转型为重点,采用了多元化的政策工具,并且注重低碳和负碳技术的革新。根据发达经济体的政策展望,在实现碳中和时,均难以将绝对排放量降为零,都需要通过碳移除手段进行抵消。通过对比分析,发现中国的碳达峰和碳中和目标是具有雄心的气候承诺,相较其他发达经济体需要付出更大努力。建议运用全面综合的政策工具支撑碳中和目标的有效落实,加快中国的气候立法,在兼顾公正转型的同时推动能源结构调整,注重可再生能源和能效方面的新技术开发应用。 相似文献
17.
Jo Dirix Wouter Peeters Johan Eyckmans Peter Tom Jones Sigrid Sterckx 《Climate Policy》2013,13(3):363-383
Although the UN and EU focus their climate policies on the prevention of a 2 °C global mean temperature rise, it has been estimated that a rise of at least 4?°C is more likely. Given the political climate of inaction, there is a need to instigate a bottom-up approach so as to build domestic support for future climate treaties, empower citizens, and motivate leaders to take action. A review is provided of the predominant top-down cap-and-trade policies in place – the Kyoto Protocol and EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – with a focus on the grandfathering of emissions entitlements and the possibility of offsetting emissions. These policies are evaluated according to two criteria of justice and it is concluded that they fail to satisfy them. Some suggestions as to how the EU ETS can be improved so as to enable robust climate action are also offered. Policy relevance The current supranational climate policy has not been successful and global leaders have postponed the adoption of a meaningful successor to the Kyoto Protocol. In view of this inaction, bottom-up approaches with regard to climate policy should be further developed. It is argued that two of the main top-down policies, grandfathering and offsetting, impede the avowed goals of EU climate policy and pose significant ethical dilemmas with regard to participatory and intergenerational justice. In order to provide a more robust EU climate policy, the EU should inter alia provide a long-term perspective for investors, reduce the volatility of the carbon price, and prepare for the possibility of carbon leakage. 相似文献
18.
Emissions from the production of iron and steel could constitute a significant share of a 2°C global emissions budget (around 19% under the IEA 2DS scenario). They need to be reduced, and this could be difficult under nationally based climate policy approaches. We compare a new set of nationally based modelling (the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project) with best practice and technical limit benchmarks for iron and steel and cement emissions. We find that 2050 emissions from iron and steel and cement production represent an average 0.28?tCO2 per capita in nationally based modelling results, very close to the technical limit benchmark of 0.21?tCO2 per capita, and over 2.5 times lower than the best practice benchmark of 0.72?tCO2 per capita. This suggests that national projections may be overly optimistic about achievable emissions reductions in the absence of global carbon pricing and an international research and development effort to develop low emissions technologies for emissions-intensive products. We also find that equal per capita emissions targets, often the basis of proposals for how global emissions budgets should be allocated, would be inadequate without global emissions trading. These results show that a nationally based global climate policy framework, as has been confirmed in the Paris Agreement, could lead to risks of overshooting global emissions targets for some countries and carbon leakage. Tailored approaches such as border taxes, sectoral emissions trading or carbon taxes, and consumption-based carbon pricing can help, but each faces difficulties. Ultimately, global efforts are needed to improve technology and material efficiency in emissions-intensive commodities manufacturing and use. Those efforts could be supported by technology standards and a globally coordinated R&D effort, and strengthened by the adoption of global emissions budgets for emissions-intensive traded goods.Policy relevanceThis article presents new empirical findings on global iron and steel and cement production in a low-carbon world economy, demonstrates the risks associated with a nationally based global climate policy framework as has been confirmed in the Paris Agreement, and analyses policy options to deal with those risks. 相似文献