The Montreal Protocol has halted 99% of global production of chemical substances that deplete stratospheric ozone, which protects life on earth from the harmful effects of ultraviolet (UVB) radiation. UVB causes skin cancer and cataracts, suppresses the human immune system, destroys plastics, and damages agricultural crops and natural ecosystems. Because ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) are powerful greenhouse gases, the Montreal Protocol also protects climate. From the authors’ perspectives in multiple roles as environmental entrepreneurs, practitioners, and authorities, this paper explains how individuals, companies, and military organizations researched, developed, commercialized and implemented alternatives to ODSs that are also safer for climate. With the benefit of hindsight, the authors reflect on what was neglected or done badly under the Montreal Protocol and present lessons learned on how Montreal Protocol institutions can be renewed and revitalized to phase down hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). 相似文献
During the Neogene and Quaternary, tectonic and climatic processes have had a profound impact upon landscape evolution in England and, perhaps as far back as 0.9 Ma, patterns of early human occupation. Until the Late Miocene, large-scale plate tectonic processes were the principal drivers of landscape evolution causing localised basin inversion and widespread exhumation. This drove, in places, the erosion of several kilometres of Mesozoic cover rocks and the development of a regional unconformity across England and the North Sea Basin. By the Pliocene, the relative influence of tectonics on landscape evolution waned as the background tectonic stress regime evolved and climatic influences became more prominent. Global-scale climate-forcing increased step-wise during the Plio-Pleistocene amplifying erosional and depositional processes that operated within the landscape. These processes caused differential unloading (uplift) and loading (subsidence) of the crust (‘denudational isostasy’) in areas undergoing net erosion (upland areas and slopes) and deposition (basins). Denudational isostasy amplified during the Mid-Pleistocene Transition (c.0.9 Ma) as landscapes become progressively synchronised to large-scale 100 ka ‘eccentricity’ climate forcing. Over the past 0.5 Ma, this has led to the establishment of a robust climate record of individual glacial/interglacial cycles enabling comparison to other regional and global records. During the Last Glacial-Interglacial Transition and early Holocene (c.16–7 ka), evidence for more abrupt (millennial/centennial) scale climatic events has been discovered. This indicates that superimposed upon the longer-term pattern of landscape evolution is a more dynamic response of the landscape to local and regional drivers. 相似文献
Since the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015, both national and subnational governments have been encouraged to submit Mid-Century Strategies, outlining how they would reach their deep decarbonization goals. However, research on the design and potential of these strategies has been very limited. To address this shortcoming, here we assess 13 such strategies – six national, seven subnational – in a comparative fashion. We find that the energy-economy-climate models underpinning these strategies are generally of high quality, though national jurisdictions generally performed better. However, most strategies are not plausible without significant changes to policy, and the industrial sector in particular presents a major limitation. The strategies are helpful in revealing this gap, but much works remains to be done for plausible mid-century decarbonization trajectories to become a reality. We also find that public input and societal participation in strategy building were a double-edged sword depending on the constellation of domestic preferences.
Governmental Mid-Century Strategies for deep decarbonization are underpinned by high-quality energy-economy-climate models
Governments’ proposed strategies require significant new policies, as even among jurisdictions that have an MCS, extant policies are insufficient to achieve deep decarbonization
No jurisdiction studied has yet put forward a plausible decarbonization policy for the industrial sector.
Public input and societal participation can be a double-edged sword: they can increase durability of the strategy but also enable opposing forces to mobilize against ambitious changes.
Achieving long-term climate mitigation goals in Japan faces several challenges, starting with the uncertain nuclear power policy after the 2011 earthquake, the uncertain availability and progress of energy technologies, as well as energy security concerns in light of a high dependency on fuel imports. The combined weight of these challenges needs to be clarified in terms of the energy system and macroeconomic impacts. We applied a general equilibrium energy economic model to assess these impacts on an 80% emission reduction target by 2050 considering several alternative scenarios for nuclear power deployment, technology availability, end use energy efficiency, and the price of fossil fuels. We found that achieving the mitigation target was feasible for all scenarios, with considerable reductions in total energy consumption (39%–50%), higher shares of low-carbon sources (43%–72% compared to 15%), and larger shares of electricity in the final energy supply (51%–58% compared to 42%). The economic impacts of limiting nuclear power by 2050 (3.5% GDP loss) were small compared to the lack of carbon capture and storage (CCS) (6.4% GDP loss). Mitigation scenarios led to an improvement in energy security indicators (trade dependency and diversity of primary energy sources) even in the absence of nuclear power. Moreover, preliminary analysis indicates that expanding the range of renewable energy resources can lower the macroeconomic impacts of the long term target considerably, and thus further in depth analysis is needed on this aspect.
Key policy insights
For Japan, an emissions reduction target of 80% by 2050 is feasible without nuclear power or CCS.
The macroeconomic impact of such a 2050 target was largest without CCS, and smallest without nuclear power.
Energy security indicators improved in mitigation scenarios compared to the baseline.
ABSTRACTSince the 1990s, climate change impact discourse has highlighted potential for large scale violent conflicts. However, the role of climate stresses on local conflicts over natural resources, the role of policies and adaptation in these conflicts, and opportunities to enhance cooperation have been neglected. These gaps are addressed in this paper using evidence from participatory action research on 79 cases of local collective action over natural resources that experience conflicts in Bangladesh and Nepal. Climate trends and stresses contributed to just under half of these conflict cases. Nine factors that enable greater cooperation and transformation of conflict are identified. Participatory dialogue and negotiation processes, while not sufficient, changed understanding, attitudes and positions of actors. Many of the communities innovated physical measures to overcome natural resource constraints, underlying conflict, and/or institutional reforms. These changes were informed by improving understanding of resource limitations and indigenous knowledge. Learning networks among community organizations encouraged collective action by sharing successes and creating peer pressure. Incentives for cooperation were important. For example, when community organizations formally permitted excluded traditional resource users to access resources, those actors complied with rules and paid towards management costs. However, elites were able to use policy gaps to capture resources with changed characteristics due to climate change. In most of the cases where conflict persisted, power, policy and institutional barriers prevented community-based organizations from taking up potential adaptations and innovations. Policy frameworks recognizing collective action and supporting flexible innovation in governance and adaptation would enable wider transformation of natural resource conflicts into cooperation.Key policy insights
Climate stresses, policy gaps and interventions can all worsen local natural resource conflicts.
Sectoral knowledge and technical approaches to adaptation are open to elite capture and can foster conflicts.
Many local natural resource conflicts can be resolved but this requires an enabling environment for participatory dialogue, external facilitation, flexible responses to context, and recognition of disadvantaged stakeholder interests.
Transforming conflict to greater cooperation mostly involves social and institutional changes, so adaptation policies should focus less on physical works and more on enabling factors such as negotiation, local institutions, knowledge, and incentives.