Stream flow forecast and its inundation simulations prior to the event are an effective and non-structural method of flood damage mitigation. In this paper, a continuous simulation hydrological and hydrodynamic model was developed for stream flow forecast and for spatial inundation simulation in Brahmani–Baitarani river basin, India. The hydrologic modelling approach includes rainfall-run-off modelling, flow routing, calibration and validation of the model with the field discharge data. CARTOSAT Digital Elevation Model of 30 m resolution, land use/land cover derived from the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS-P6) AWiFS and soil textural data of the study area were used in the modelling to compute topographic and hydraulic parameters. The hydrological model was calibrated with the help of field observed discharge data of 2006 and 2009 and validated with the data of 2008 and 2011. From the results, it is found that computed discharges are very well matching well with the observed discharges. The developed model can provide the stream flow forecast with more than 30 h lead time. Possible flood inundations were simulated using hydrodynamic modelling approach. CARTO Digital Elevation Model of 10 m resolution, landuse and the computed flood hydrographs were used in inundation simulations. 相似文献
The use of shale gas is commonly considered as a low-cost option for meeting ambitious climate policy targets. This article explores global and country-specific effects of increasing global shale gas exploitation on the energy markets, on greenhouse gas emissions, and on mitigation costs. The global techno-economic partial equilibrium model POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems) is employed to compare policies which limit global warming to 2°C and baseline scenarios when the availability of shale gas is either high or low. According to the simulation results, a high availability of shale gas has rather small effects on the costs of meeting climate targets in the medium and long term. In the long term, a higher availability of shale gas increases baseline emissions of greenhouse gases for most countries and for the world, and leads to higher compliance costs for most, but not all, countries. Allowing for global trading of emission certificates does not alter these general results. In sum, these findings cast doubt on shale gas’s potential as a low-cost option for meeting ambitious global climate targets.
POLICY RELEVANCE
Many countries with a large shale gas resource base consider the expansion of local shale gas extraction as an option to reduce their GHG emissions. The findings in this article imply that a higher availability of shale gas in these countries might actually increase emissions and mitigation costs for these countries and also for the world. An increase in shale gas extraction may spur a switch from coal to gas electricity generation, thus lowering emissions. At the global level and for many countries, though, this effect is more than offset by a crowding out of renewable and nuclear energy carriers, and by lower energy prices, leading to higher emissions and higher mitigation costs in turn. These findings would warrant a re-evaluation of the climate strategy in most countries relying on the exploitation of shale gas to meet their climate targets. 相似文献
This paper offers a systematic analysis of the concepts and contexts that frame the climate-smart agriculture (CSA) discourse in the academic and policy literature. Documents (n?=?113) related to CSA and published in peer-reviewed journals, books, working papers, and scientific reports from 2004 to 2016 were reviewed. Three key trends emerged from the analysis: studies are biased towards global policy agendas; research focuses on scientific and technical issues; and the integration of mitigation, adaptation, and food security (the three pillars of CSA) is becoming a popular scholarly solution. Findings suggest that CSA is a fairly new concept used to describe a range of adaptation and mitigation practices without a specific set of criteria. Although CSA is often framed around the three pillars, the underlying issues constructing the discourse differ at global, developing, and developed country scales. Although there is increasing research on developing countries, particularly in relation to how CSA can transform smallholder agriculture, there is a paucity of research documenting the experiences from developed countries. The findings suggest that research on CSA needs to move beyond solely focussing on scientific approaches and only in certain geographical contexts. If CSA is to be applicable for farmers across the globe, then cross-disciplinary research that is underpinned by broad socio-economic and political contexts is essential to understand how differences in narratives might affect implementation on-the-ground in both developing and developed countries.POLICY RELEVANCEAlthough policy makers are increasingly supportive of the climate-smart agriculture (CSA) approach, the rhetoric has largely been developed on the basis of scientific and technical arguments. The political implications of varying perspectives have resulted in a growing divide between how developing and developed countries frame solutions to the impacts of climate change on agriculture under the 2015 Paris Agreement. Different framings are part of the explanation for why the scope of CSA is being rethought, with the scientific community redirecting attention to seeking a separate work programme under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The current policy framing of CSA will give no new policy direction unless it grounds itself in the smallholder farmer and civil society contexts. 相似文献
Although agriculture could contribute substantially to European emission reductions, its mitigation potential lies untapped and dormant. Market-based instruments could be pivotal in incentivizing cost-effective abatement. However, sector specificities in transaction costs, leakage risks and distributional impacts impede its implementation. The significance of such barriers critically hinges on the dimensions of policy design. This article synthesizes the work on emissions pricing in agriculture together with the literature on the design of market-based instruments. To structure the discussion, an options space is suggested to map policy options, focusing on three key dimensions of policy design. More specifically, it examines the role of policy coverage, instruments and transfers to farmers in overcoming the barriers. First, the results show that a significant proportion of agricultural emissions and mitigation potential could be covered by a policy targeting large farms and few emission sources, thereby reducing transaction costs. Second, whether an instrument is voluntary or mandatory influences distributional outcomes and leakage. Voluntary instruments can mitigate distributional concerns and leakage risks but can lead to subsidy lock-in and carbon price distortion. Third, the impact on transfers resulting from the interaction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with emissions pricing will play a key role in shaping political feasibility and has so far been underappreciated.
POLICY RELEVANCE
Following the 2015 Paris Agreement, European climate policy is at a crossroads. Achieving cost-effectively the 2030 and 2050 European targets requires all sectors to reduce their emissions. Yet, the cornerstone of European climate policy, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), covers only about half of European emissions. Major sectors have been so far largely exempted from carbon pricing, in particular transport and agriculture. While transport has been increasingly under the spotlight as a possible candidate for an EU ETS sectoral expansion, policy discussions on pricing agricultural emissions have been virtually absent. This article attempts to fill this gap by investigating options for market-based instruments to reduce agricultural emissions while taking barriers to implementation into account. 相似文献
The shale gas boom in the United States spurred a shift in electricity generation from coal to natural gas. Natural gas combined cycle units emit half of the CO2 to produce the same energy as a coal unit; therefore, the market trend is credited for a reduction in GHG emissions from the US power sector. However, methane that escapes the natural gas supply chain may undercut these relative climate benefits. In 2016, Canada, the United States and Mexico pledged to reduce methane emissions from the oil and natural gas sector 40–45% from 2012 levels by 2025. This article reviews the science-policy landscape of methane measurement and mitigation relevant for meeting this pledge, including changes in US policy following the 2016 presidential election. Considerable policy incoherence exists in all three countries. Reliable inventories remain elusive; despite government and private sector research efforts, the magnitude of methane emissions remains in dispute. Meanwhile, mitigation efforts vary significantly. A framework that integrates science and policy would enable actors to more effectively inform, leverage and pursue advances in methane measurement and mitigation. The framework is applied to North America, but could apply to other geographic contexts.
Key policy insights
The oil and gas sector’s contribution to atmospheric methane concentrations is becoming an increasingly prominent issue in climate policy.
Efforts to measure and control fugitive methane emissions do not presently proceed within a coherent framework that integrates science and policy.
In 2016, the governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States pledged to reduce methane emissions from the oil and natural gas sector 40–45% from 2012 levels by 2025.
The 2016 presidential election in the United States has halted American progress at the federal level, suggesting a heavier reliance on industry and subnational efforts in that country.
Collectively or individually, the countries, individual agencies, or private stakeholders could use the proposed North American Methane Reduction framework to direct research, enhance monitoring and evaluate mitigation efforts, and improve the chances that continental methane reduction targets will be achieved.
To assess the potential impacts of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, this study applied GCAM-TU (an updated version of the Global Change Assessment Model) to simulate global and regional emission pathways of energy-related CO2, which show that US emissions in 2100 would reduce to ?2.4?Gt, ?0.7?Gt and ?0.2?Gt under scenarios of RCP2.6, RCP3.7 and RCP4.5, respectively. Two unfavourable policy scenarios were designed, assuming a temporary delay and a complete stop for US mitigation actions after 2015. Simulations by the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC) indicate that the temperature increase by 2100 would rise by 0.081°C–0.161°C compared to the three original RCPs (Representative Concentration Pathways) if US emissions were kept at their 2015 levels until 2100. The probability of staying below 2°C would decrease by 6–9% even if the US resumes mitigation efforts for achieving its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) target after 2025. It is estimated by GCAM-TU that, without US participation, increased reduction efforts are required for the rest of the world, including developing countries, in order to achieve the 2°C goal, resulting in 18% higher global cumulative mitigation costs from 2015 to 2100.Key policy insights
President Trump’s climate policies, including planned withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, cast a shadow on international climate actions, and would lower the likelihood of achieving the 2°C target.
To meet the 2°C target without the US means increased reduction efforts and mitigation costs for the rest of the world, and considerable economic burdens for major developing areas.
Active state-, city- and enterprise-level powers should be supported to keep the emission reduction gap from further widening even with reduced mitigation efforts from the US federal government.