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1.
Carbon pricing, including carbon taxes and emissions trading, has been adopted by different kinds of polities worldwide. Yet, beyond the increasing adoption over time, little is known about what polities – countries as well as sub- and supranational entities – adopt carbon pricing and why. This paper explores patterns of adoption (both implemented policies and those scheduled to be) through cluster analysis, with the purpose of investigating factors that could explain polities’ decisions to adopt carbon pricing. The study contributes empirically by studying carbon taxes and emissions trading together and by ordering the polities adopting carbon pricing into clusters. It also contributes theoretically, by exploring constellations of variables that drive the adoption of carbon pricing within individual clusters. We investigated 66 adopted policies of carbon pricing, which were divided into five clusters: early adopters, North-American subnational entities, Chinese pilot provinces, second-wave developed polities, and second-wave developing polities. The analysis indicates that the reasons for adopting carbon pricing have shifted over time. While international factors (climate commitments or influences from polities within the same region) are increasingly salient, domestic factors (including crises and income levels) were more important for the early adopters.

Key policy insights

  • Carbon pricing has become a global mainstream policy instrument.

  • Economic and fiscal crises provide windows of opportunity for promoting carbon pricing.

  • The international climate regime can support the adoption of carbon pricing through mitigation commitments and international financial and technical assistance.

  • Learning between polities from the same region is a useful tool for promoting carbon pricing.

  • Carbon intensive economies tend to prefer emissions trading over carbon taxes.

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2.
This paper examines power relations, coalitions and conflicts that drive and hinder institutional change in South African climate policy. The analysis finds that the most contested climate policies are those that create distributional conflicts where powerful, non-poor actors will potentially experience real losses to their fossil fuel-based operations. This finding opposes the assumption of competing objectives between emissions and poverty reduction. Yet, actors use discourse that relates to potentially competing objectives between emissions reductions, jobs, poverty reduction and economic welfare.

The analysis relates to the broader questions on how to address public policy problems that affect the two objectives of mitigating climate change and simultaneously boosting socio-economic development. South Africa is a middle-income country that represents the challenge of accommodating simultaneous efforts for emissions and poverty reduction.

Institutional change has been constrained especially in the process towards establishing climate budgets and a carbon tax. The opposing coalitions have succeeded in delaying the implementation of these processes, as a result of unequal power relations. Institutional change in South African climate policy can be predominantly characterized as layering with elements of policy innovation. New policies build on existing regulations in all three cases of climate policy examined: the climate change response white paper, the carbon tax and the renewable energy programme. Unbalanced power relations between coalitions of support in government and civil society and opposition mainly from the affected industry result in very fragile institutional change.

Key policy insights

  • The South African government has managed to drive institutional change in climate policy significantly over the past 7 years.

  • Powerful coalitions of coal-related industries and their lobbies have constrained institutional change and managed to delay the implementation of carbon pricing measures.

  • A successfully managed renewable energy programme has started to transform a coal- and nuclear-powered electricity sector towards integrating sustainable energy technologies. The programme is vulnerable to intergovernmental opposition and requires management at the highest political levels.

  • Potential conflict with poverty reduction measures is not a major concern that actively hinders institutional change towards climate objectives. Predominantly non-poor actors frequently use poverty-related discourse to elevate their interests to issues of public concern.

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3.
Most countries implementing an emissions trading system (ETS), such as EU member states, California in the US, or South Korea, are generally targeting large sized companies, which consume energy above a specific threshold. However, previous studies using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have analyzed climate policies without considering company size. This may have led to inaccurate results because the impacts of climate policy would differ depending on the coverage of regulated companies. Accordingly, this study examines the environmental and economic impacts of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies, assuming policy results vary by firm size, as covered by the Korean emission trading system. To this end, a CGE model with a separate social accounting matrix based on company size is used to compare three scenarios that reflect different types of carbon pricing methods. The results show that greenhouse gases will be reduced to a lower extent and utility will decrease more if mitigation policies are only imposed to large companies.

Key policy insights

  • Carbon pricing policies should consider the different impacts on companies of different sizes and industry sectors.

  • Without considering the different sizes of companies covered by an ETS, the expected carbon price and its economic impact will be underestimated.

  • Small and medium-sized companies will face more negative impacts than large companies in some industry sectors under an ETS, even if the mitigation burden is only faced by large companies.

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4.
Reducing GHG emissions and mitigating climate change would require significant investments in renewable energy technologies. Foreign direct investments (FDI) in renewable energy (RE) have increased over the last years, contributing to the diffusion of RE globally. In the field of climate policy, there are multiple policy instruments aimed at attracting investments in renewable energy. This article aims to map the FDI flows globally including source and destination countries. Furthermore, the article investigates which policy instruments attract more FDI in RE sectors such as solar, wind and biomass, based on an econometric analysis of 137 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries. The results show that Feed in Tariffs (FIT) followed by Fiscal Measures (FM), such as tax incentives and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), are the most significant policy instrument that attract FDI in the RE sector globally. Regarding carbon pricing instruments, based on our analysis, carbon tax proved to be correlated with high attraction of FDI in OECD countries, whereas Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) proved to be correlated with high attraction of FDI mainly in non-OECD countries.

Key policy insights

  • Feed in Tariffs is the most significant policy instrument that attracts FDI in the Renewable Energy sector globally.

  • Fiscal Measures (FM), such as tax incentives, show a significant and positive impact on renewable energy projects by foreign investors, and particularly on solar energy.

  • Carbon pricing instruments, such as carbon taxation and emissions trading, proved to attract FDI in OECD and non-OECD countries respectively.

  • Public investments, such as government funds for renewable energy projects, proved not as attractive to foreign private investors, perhaps because public funds are not perceived as stable in the long run.

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5.
Research on air travellers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for climate change mitigation has focussed on voluntary emissions offsetting so far. This approach overlooks policy relevant knowledge as it does not consider that people may value public goods higher if they are certain that others also contribute. To account for potential differences, this study investigates Swedish adults’ WTP for a mandatory air ticket surcharge both for short- and long-distance flights. Additionally, policy relevant factors influencing WTP for air travel emissions reductions were investigated. The results suggest that mean WTP is higher in the low-cost setting associated with short-distance flights (495 SEK/ tCO2; 50 EUR/ tCO2) than for long-distance flights (295 SEK/ tCO2; 30 EUR/t CO2). The respondents were more likely to be willing to pay the air ticket tax if they were not frequent flyers, if they were women, had a left political view, if they had a sense of responsibility for their emissions and if they preferred earmarking revenues from the tax for climate change mitigation and sustainable transport projects.

Key policy insights

  • A mandatory air ticket tax is a viable policy option that might receive majority support among the population.

  • While a carbon-based air ticket tax promises to be an effective tool to generate revenues, its potential steering effect appears to be lower for low cost contexts (short-distance flights) than for high cost contexts (long-distance flights).

  • Policy consistency regarding the tax base and its revenue use may increase public acceptability of (higher) air ticket taxes. Earmarking revenues is clearly preferred to tax recycling or general budget use.

  • Insights about the personal drivers behind WTP for emissions reductions from air travel can help to inform targeting and segmentation of policy interventions.

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6.
Energy-intensive industries play an important role in low-carbon development, being particularly exposed to climate policies. Concern over possible carbon leakage in this sector poses a major challenge for designing effective carbon pricing instruments (CPI). Different methodologies for assessing carbon leakage exposure are currently used by different jurisdictions, each of them based on different approaches and indicators. This paper aims to analyse the extent to which the use of different methodologies leads to different results in terms of exposure to the risk of carbon leakage, using the Brazilian industry sector as a case study. Results indicate that carbon leakage exposure is an expected outcome of eventual CPI implementation in Brazilian industry. However, results vary according to the chosen methodology, so the definition of the criteria is paramount for assessing sectoral exposure to the risk of carbon leakage.

Key policy insights

  • Despite increasing discussion about the implementation of carbon pricing on the Brazilian industrial sector, the evaluation of carbon leakage risks is still neglected.

  • Assessments of the risk of carbon leakage are directly related to the indicators and criteria used by each methodology. Thus, a given subsector may present different levels of exposure to carbon leakage depending on the methodological choice.

  • More than a purely technical discussion, the methodological definition of carbon leakage risk is a political discussion – it can be well-conducted, leading to the success of a CPI, or even sabotaged, by implicitly subsidizing energy-intensive industries.

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7.
Research on policy support or public acceptability of climate change policies is proliferating. There is, however, a great diversity in how these evaluative responses have been defined, operationalized, and measured across studies. In order to shed some light on this subject, we reviewed 118 studies published over the last 15 years aiming at measurement of policy acceptability, acceptance, support, and other responses to climate change mitigation policies. We found that conceptual vagueness and weak theoretical embedding are pervasive in the field, which leads to uncertainty over what is being measured, ambiguity of policy recommendations, and difficulties in comparing empirical results. In response, we propose a construct of policy attitudes as an overarching concept comprising the diversity of measures and constructs already in use. The purpose of the construct is to serve as a common basis for operationalization and survey design. In order to inform policy makers, researchers should be clear in how they formulate surveys with a focus on questions of importance to research and policy-making.

Key policy insights

  • Acceptability, acceptance, and support are defined as distinct and possibly empirically distinguishable classes of responses evaluating a policy proposal. These responses are expressions of underlying policy attitudes.

  • People may respond to policies in other ways as well, including lack of interest.

  • There is no popularity threshold for a policy to be safe to implement, but instead it is a matter of identifying the conditions of policy support or other responses.

  • Results obtained using different measures of mitigation policy attitudes vary widely with respect to the characteristics of the policy in question and the measured response. Thus, great care must be taken when designing surveys and interpreting their results.

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8.
This paper explores policies for Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs), in an attempt to move beyond the supply-side focus of the majority of NETs research, as well as the current dominance of carbon pricing as the main NETs policy proposal. The paper identifies a number of existing policies from four key areas – energy/transport, agriculture, sub-soil, and oceans – which will have an impact on three NETs: Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), Direct Air Capture (DAC), and terrestrial Enhanced Rock Weathering (ERW). We propose that non-climate co-benefits may be valuable in terms of the policy ‘demand pull’ for NETs; in particular, we find that ERW may provide multiple co-benefits which can be mandated through existing policy structures. However, interaction with numerous policy areas may also create barriers, particularly where there is tension between the priorities of different government departments. On the basis of existing and analogous policies from a range of geographical contexts and scales, this paper proposes four options for NETs policy that could be reasonably implemented in the near-term. We also argue that ERW demonstrates the importance of scale and framing, because the policy environment depends on whether it is framed as a soil amendment at local scales or as a climate stabilization technique at international scale.

Key policy insights

  • Co-benefits may assist the ‘demand pull’ for novel technologies by providing multiple policy angles for incentivisation rather than relying on a ‘fix-all’ policy such as a high carbon price.

  • DAC with storage might be overly reliant on a high carbon price, because it only provides one core benefit – that of atmospheric carbon reduction.

  • ERW may provide multiple co-benefits which can be mandated through existing policy structures, but should focus on using waste rock rather than mining virgin material.

  • We propose four near-term options for NETs policy: funding for small-scale BECCS demonstration and an international biomass certification mechanism; small-scale loans for ERW on farms and promotion of locally-sourced rock residues; amendment of fertilizer subsidy schemes to include silicate rock; and a clearer framework for licensing sub-soil access for CO2 storage.

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9.
Sharon Mascher 《Climate Policy》2018,18(8):1012-1027
The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change is designed to put Canada on track to meet its Paris commitments. A key pillar of the plan is the introduction of a pan-Canadian carbon price by the end of 2018. However, four Canadian provinces, nearly 85% of the Canadian economy and population, have already implemented carbon pricing systems. British Columbia (BC) has a carbon tax. Alberta is transitioning from an output-based allocation system for industrial emitters to a hybrid system combining a carbon levy and refined output-based system. Québec and Ontario have implemented cap-and-trade systems, linked to California. Recognizing these existing systems, rather than impose a single carbon pricing mechanism, the Pan-Canadian Approach to Carbon Pricing gives provinces and territories the flexibility to adopt a carbon tax, a hybrid system, or a cap-and-trade system. To address concerns relating to ‘fairness’ and equivalency of carbon price, a federal carbon pricing benchmark establishes criteria relating to minimum ‘common scope’ and ‘increases in stringency’ that provincial and territorial carbon pricing systems must meet. This article explores the design features of the existing Alberta, BC, Ontario and Québec carbon pricing systems, and considers how the benchmark affects stringency and addresses equivalency of carbon price across these different systems.

Key policy insights

  • Canada is taking advantage of its federal structure of government to introduce a minimum pan-Canadian carbon price of $10/tCO2e in 2018, rising by $10/year to $50/tCO2e in 2022.

  • Rather than imposing a uniform pricing mechanism, the Canadian federal government is recognizing existing subnational carbon pricing mechanisms with very different design features – BC’s carbon tax, Québec and Ontario’s cap-and-trade systems, and Alberta’s hybrid system – to deliver the pan-Canadian carbon price.

  • In order to deliver a minimum level of increasing stringency and to address issues of equivalency of carbon price across sub-national jurisdictions, the federal government is in the early stages of implementing a federal carbon-pricing benchmark.

  • The lessons learned from the Canadian experience will be relevant to harmonizing carbon pricing systems across both other federal jurisdictions and countries.

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10.
Energy and climate policies may have significant economy-wide impacts, which are regularly assessed based on quantitative energy-environment-economy models. These tend to vary in their conclusions on the scale and direction of the likely macroeconomic impacts of a low-carbon transition. This paper traces the characteristic discrepancies in models’ outcomes to their origins in different macro-economic theories, most importantly their treatment of technological innovation and finance. We comprehensively analyse the relevant branches of macro-innovation theory and group them into two classes: ‘Equilibrium’ and ‘Non-equilibrium’. While both approaches are rigorous and self-consistent, they frequently yield opposite conclusions for the economic impacts of low-carbon policies. We show that model outcomes are mainly determined by their representations of monetary and finance dimensions, and their interactions with investment, innovation and technological change. Improving these in all modelling approaches is crucial for strengthening the evidence base for policy making and gaining a more consistent picture of the macroeconomic impacts of achieving emissions reductions objectives. The paper contributes towards the ongoing effort of enhancing the transparency and understanding of sophisticated model mechanisms applied to energy and climate policy analysis. It helps tackle the overall ‘black box’ critique, much-cited in policy circles and elsewhere.

Key policy insights

  • Quantitative models commissioned by policy-makers to assess the macroeconomic impacts of climate policy generate contradictory outcomes and interpretations.

  • The source of the differences in model outcomes originates primarily from assumptions on the workings of the financial sector and the nature of money, and of how these interact with processes of low-carbon energy innovation and technological change.

  • Representations of innovation and technological change are incomplete in energy-economy-environment models, leading to limitations in the assessment of the impacts of climate-related policies.

  • All modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their treatment of finance and innovation.

  • A strong recommendation is given for modellers of energy-economy systems to improve their representations of money and finance.

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11.
There is a substantial literature on optimal emissions trading system (ETS) designs, but relatively little on how organized political interests affect the design and operation of these economic instruments. This article looks systematically at the political economy of the diffusion of ETS designs and explores the implications for carbon-market linking. Contrary to expectations of convergence – as has been observed in many areas where economic policy diffuses across markets – we found substantial divergence in the design and implementation of ETS across the nine systems examined. The architects of these different systems are aware of other designs, but they have purposely adjusted designs to reflect local political and administrative goals. Divergence has sobering implications for visions of ubiquitous linkages and the emergence of a global carbon market that, to date, have been predicated on the assumption that designs would converge. More such ‘real world’ political economy analysis is needed to understand how political forces, mainly within countries, act as strong intervening variables that affect instrument design, implementation and effectiveness.

Key policy insights

  • Our finding of design divergence indicates that policy efforts aimed at achieving integrated international markets are unlikely to be successful.

  • Visions of carbon market linkage will need to confront the reality that there are well-organized political coalitions, anchored in the status quo, that prefer divergence.

  • In linking ETS, policy-makers should devote more attention to preventing excessive capital flows that can undermine political support for linkage, while also creating incentives for convergence in trading rules over time.

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12.
Emission reductions improve the chances that dangerous anthropogenic climate change will be averted, but could also cause some firms financial distress. Corporate failures, especially if they are unnecessary, add to the social cost of abatement. Social value can be permanently destroyed by the dissolution of organizational capital, deadweight losses paid to liquidators, and unemployment. This article proposes using measures of corporate solvency as an objective tool for policy makers to calibrate the optimal stringency of climate change policies, so that they can deliver the least loss of corporate solvency for a given level of emission reductions. They could also be used to determine the generosity of any compensation to address losses to corporate solvency. We demonstrate this approach using a case study of the UK’s Carbon Price Support (a carbon tax).

Key policy insights

  • Solvency metrics could be used to empirically calibrate the optimal stringency of climate policies.

  • An idealized solvency trajectory for firms affected by climate change policy would cause corporate solvency to initially decline – approaching but not exceeding ‘distressed’ levels – and then gradually improve to a new ‘steady state’ once the low-carbon transition had been achieved.

  • In terms of the UK’s Carbon Price Support, corporate solvency of energy-intensive industries was found to be stable subsequent to its introduction. Therefore, the available evidence does not support its later weakening.

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13.
Although climate change is an urgent problem, behavioural and policy responses have not yet been sufficient to either reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to a disrupted climate system. Significant efforts have been made to raise public awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. One reason why these efforts might not be sufficient is rooted in people’s need to feel efficacy to solve complex problems; the belief that climate change is unstoppable might thwart action even among the concerned. This paper tests for the effect of fatalistic beliefs on behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change using two cross-national surveys representing over 50,000 people in 48 nations.

Key policy insights

  • The perception that climate change poses a risk or danger increases the likelihood of behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change.

  • The belief that climate change is unstoppable reduces the behavioural and policy response to climate change and moderates risk perception.

  • Communicators and policy leaders should carefully frame climate change as a difficult, yet solvable, problem to circumvent fatalistic beliefs.

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14.
Worldwide carbon dioxide emissions continue to increase driven by fossil fuel consumption and industrial discharges. Progress on carbon emission reduction requires firms to adopt clean technologies which minimize material and energy consumption. Technological change is particularly required in developing countries, where industrial emissions often lead to chronic urban pollution problems. In this study, we explore the antecedents of clean technology strategy by firms in developing countries. We combine the contingent natural resource-based view with the relational view to examine how network embeddedness, market incentives and slack resources influence adoption of clean technology. The empirical support for our hypotheses comes from data obtained from 342 firms that operated in the carbon-offset market during the years 2007 to 2009. We find that a firm’s relational network structure influences adoption of clean technologies, particularly when market incentives are low. Contrary to one of the hypotheses, the results of our paper suggest a negative relationship between a firm’s slack resources and its clean technology strategy. Our study highlights the benefits of networks in fostering adoption of clean technology in developing countries. Furthermore, we find that high market incentives (carbon price) decrease the probability of clean technology adoption, so adding to the view that firms respond to carbon-offset rules to realize high carbon revenues at the lowest cost.

Key policy insights

  • High market incentives (carbon price) decrease the probability that firms in developing countries will adopt clean technology.

  • This adds to concerns about the capability of the Clean Development Mechanism to deliver sustainable development.

  • Even where market incentives are low, firms in developing countries are more likely to adopt clean technologies when they are embedded in a closed network of connected partners.

  • To stimulate adoption of clean technology in developing countries, policy makers should focus on initiatives to facilitate partnerships between organizations operating in the carbon market and create opportunities for knowledge sharing and learning.

  • By changing the policy focus to networks of organizations, the carbon market can bring about positive change in terms of shifting the firm behaviour.

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15.
Upon completion, China’s national emissions trading scheme (C-ETS) will be the largest carbon market in the world. Recent research has evaluated China’s seven pilot ETSs launched from 2013 on, and academic literature on design aspects of the C-ETS abounds. Yet little is known about the specific details of the upcoming C-ETS. This article combines currently understood details of China’s national carbon market with lessons learned in the pilot schemes as well as from the academic literature. Our review follows the taxonomy of Emissions Trading in Practice: A Handbook on Design and Implementation (Partnership for Market Readiness & International Carbon Action Partnership. (2016). Retrieved from www.worldbank.org): The 10 categories are: scope, cap, distribution of allowances, use of offsets, temporal flexibility, price predictability, compliance and oversight, stakeholder engagement and capacity building, linking, implementation and improvements.

Key policy insights

  • Accurate emissions data is paramount for both design and implementation, and its availability dictates the scope of the C-ETS.

  • The stakeholder consultative process is critical for effective design, and China is able to build on its extensive experience through the pilot ETSs.

  • Current policies and positions on intensity targets and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits constrain the market design of the C-ETS.

  • Most critical is the nature of the cap. The currently discussed rate-based cap with ex post adjustment is risky. Instead, an absolute, mass-based emissions cap coupled with the conditional use of permits would allow China to maintain flexibility in the carbon market while ensuring a limit on CO2 emissions.

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16.
The successful implementation of the Paris Agreement requires substantial energy policy change on the national level. In national energy policy-making, climate change mitigation goals have to be balanced with arguments on other national energy policy goals, namely limiting cost and increasing energy security. Thus far, very little is known about the relative importance of these goals and how they are related to political partisanship. In order to address this gap, we focus on parliamentary discourse around low-carbon energy futures in Germany over the past three decades and analyze the relative importance of, and partisanship around, energy policy goals. We find that the political discourse revolves around four, rather than three, goals as conventionally assumed; improving the competitiveness of the national energy technology industry is not only an additional energy policy goal, it is also highly important in the political discourse. In general, the relative importance of these goals is rather stable over time and partisanship around them is limited. Yet, a sub-analysis of the discourse on renewable energy technologies reveals a high level of partisanship, albeit decreasing over time. Particularly, the energy industry goal’s importance increases while its partisanship vanishes. We discuss how these findings can inform future energy policy research and provide a potential inroad for more ambitious national energy policies.

Key policy insights

  • In addition to the three classic goals of energy policy (limiting cost, securing access and reducing the environmental burden) we identify a fourth policy goal: strengthening the national energy technology industry

  • Conformity between the three classical energy and the industrial policy goals is a key driver explaining policy change

  • For renewable energy technologies, partisanship around this fourth goal is lower than around other goals and decreases over time as innovation allows these technologies to increasingly correspond to policy-makers’ high-level goals

  • Extant research underestimates the importance of industry policy goals, but overestimates environmental co-benefits of low-carbon energy options

  • Paradigmatic policy change in Germany did not depend on top-down shifts in high-level policy goals but was driven by lower-level technology-specific goals

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17.
States will disagree about deployment of solar geoengineering, technologies that would reflect a small portion of incoming sunlight to reduce risks of climate change, and most disagreements will be grounded in conflicting interests. States that object to deployment will have many options to oppose it, so states favouring deployment will have a powerful incentive to meet their objections. Objections rooted in opposition to the anticipated unequal consequences of deployment may be met through compensation, yet climate policy is inhospitable to compensation via liability. We propose that multilateral parametric climate risk insurance might be a useful tool to facilitate agreement on solar geoengineering deployment. With parametric insurance, predetermined payouts are triggered when climate indices deviate from set ranges. We suggest that states favouring deployment could underwrite reduced-rate parametric climate insurance. This mechanism would be particularly suited to resolving disagreements based on divergent judgments about the outcomes of proposed implementation. This would be especially relevant in cases where disagreements are rooted in varying levels of trust in climate model predictions of solar geoengineering effectiveness and risks. Negotiations over the pricing and terms of a parametric risk pool would make divergent judgments explicit and quantitative. Reduced-rate insurance would provide a way for states that favour implementation to demonstrate their confidence in solar geoengineering by underwriting risk transfer and ensuring compensation without the need for attribution. This would offer a powerful incentive for states opposing implementation to moderate their opposition.

Key policy insights

  • States favouring deployment of solar geoengineering will need to address other states’ objections—unilateralism is implausible in practice

  • This might be partially achieved using parametric climate risk insurance based on objective indicators

  • A sovereign risk pool offering reduced-rate parametric insurance underwritten by states backing deployment could facilitate cooperation on solar geoengineering deployment

  • States favouring deployment would demonstrate their confidence in solar geoengineering by supporting the risk pool

  • Opposing states would be insured against solar geoengineering risks and proposing states would be incentivized to guard against overconfidence

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18.
Brianna Craft 《Climate Policy》2018,18(9):1203-1209
The Paris Agreement establishes a global goal on adaptation which will be assessed through the global stocktake, the first attempt by the international climate change regime to measure collective progress on adaptation. This policy analysis identifies four main challenges to designing a meaningful assessment. These are: designing a system that can aggregate results; managing the dual mandate of reviewing collective progress and informing the enhancement of national level actions; methodological challenges in adaptation; and political challenges around measurement. We propose a mixed-methods approach to addressing these challenges, combining short-term needs for reporting with longer-term aims of enhancing national adaptation actions.

Key policy insights

  • Broad domains of adaptation activity could be identified within each of the objectives of the adaptation goal and progress could be measured and aggregated through simple scorecards.

  • The goal should have both process and outcome indicators as well as some narrative linking activities to outcomes over time.

  • Reporting could be a compilation of national data using qualitative and quantitative sources, aligning with the global stocktake’s aim of enhancing national actions over time and reducing immediate reporting burdens.

  • There would be a complementary role at least in the short term for an expert assessment of priority areas.

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19.
Climate policy uncertainty significantly hinders investments in low-carbon technologies, and the global community is behind schedule to curb carbon emissions. Strong actions will be necessary to limit the increase in global temperatures, and continued delays create risks of escalating climate change damages and future policy costs. These risks are system-wide, long-term and large-scale and thus hard to diversify across firms. Because of its unique scale, cost structure and near-term availability, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD+) has significant potential to help manage climate policy risks and facilitate the transition to lower greenhouse gas emissions. ‘Call’ options contracts in the form of the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits from jurisdictional REDD+ programmes at a predetermined price per ton of CO2 could help unlock this potential despite the current lack of carbon markets that accept REDD+ for compliance. This approach could provide a globally important cost-containment mechanism and insurance for firms against higher future carbon prices, while channelling finance to avoid deforestation until policy uncertainties decline and carbon markets scale up.

Key policy insights

  • Climate policy uncertainty discourages abatement investments, exposing firms to an escalating systemic risk of future rapid increases in emission control expenditures.

  • This situation poses a risk of an abatement ‘short squeeze,’ paralleling the case in financial markets when prices jump sharply as investors rush to square accounts on an investment they have sold ‘short’, one they have bet against and promised to repay later in anticipation of falling prices.

  • There is likely to be a willingness to pay for mechanisms that hedge the risks of abruptly rising carbon prices, in particular for ‘call’ options, the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits at a predetermined price, due to the significantly lower upfront capital expenditure compared to other hedging alternatives.

  • Establishing rules as soon as possible for compliance market acceptance of high-quality emissions reductions credits from REDD+ would facilitate REDD+ transactions, including via options-based contracts, which could help fill the gap of uncertain climate policies in the short and medium term.

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20.
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