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1.
Managing marine fisheries using output controls in the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can be an attractive alternative to more traditional input controls. There are now a number of examples of where ITQ-managed fisheries have been able to reduce the impact of the major management problems in global fisheries, namely, gross over-capitalisation and effort. However, ITQs are not the perfect management tool and one of the lesser known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries where ITQs consist of a harvest right is the implicit relationship between ITQ property rights and rights of access to the fishing grounds. This implicit spatial right to the grounds can provide obstacles in the way of allocating water-space within fishing grounds for alternative uses such as marine-protected areas, large-scale aquaculture, and wind farms. These lesser-known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries are discussed here. 相似文献
2.
This paper discusses actual and possible achievements and failures of Codland and examines it from the point of view of efficiency and in terms of distribution. Joint analysis of the two approaches is needed when contemplating fisheries management reforms, since such reforms may create both winners and losers. The analysis demonstrates how rent drain from fishing communities and countries may occur despite significant resource rent creation. The change in the Codland economy is illustrated and compared to that of actual countries and to resource economic theory. It is concluded that if distributional and equity objectives matter, other instruments than ITQs, such as conditional tradeable fish quotas and vessel licences, resource taxes, co-management, public ownership, auctions, leases, time limited rights, time and area regulations, territorial user rights (TURFs) and marine protected areas (MPAs), should also be used. 相似文献
3.
Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs. 相似文献
4.
《Marine Policy》2013
The resource economic theory tells us that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) improve efficiency in the fishing industry by removing the least efficient actors from a fishery and allowing ownership to concentrate in the hands of the most efficient operators. Assertions about the nature of this allocative efficiency are, however, often based on purely theoretical assumptions. This paper presents a case study of the efficient operators remaining in the UK pelagic fishing fleet. After over 30 years of rights-based management (RBM) and 12 years of ITQs, the UK pelagic fleet numbers only 31 large-scale boats. Seven of these operate from the island of Whalsay in Shetland, which, with a population of approximately 1000 people (0.000016% of the population of the UK), is entitled to land around 22% of the UK pelagic catch. A key characteristic of the economically efficient Whalsay fleet is a crew ownership structure. This is now under threat from the long-term dynamics of the UK's ITQ system, as the high price of quota prevents the renewal of the fishery through new entrants. In the majority of global fisheries, where vessel ownership structures do not follow an assumed economic norm, fully marketised transferable rights may not be the most efficient method of management. 相似文献
5.
This article discusses inequality in the Icelandic cod fishery, focusing on changes in the actual distribution of fishing quotas and the ways in which Icelanders currently talk about equity and ownership. The individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, introduced in 1984, divided access to an important resource among those who happened to be boat owners at that time. Statistical findings with respect to the cod fishery - based on a database (the ‘Quotabase’) constructed using detailed information on all vessels that have been allotted ITQs from the onset of the system - show that ITQs have been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the biggest companies. Many of the small-scale boat owners that still hold ITQs are increasingly compelled to enter into contracts that involve fishing for larger ITQ holders. It is suggested that the distribution of ITQs, as well as their evaluation in social discourse, represents an important field of research. In Iceland, public discontent with the concentration of fishing rights and the ensuing social repercussions is increasingly articulated in terms of loaded metaphors, including ‘profiteering’, ‘tenancy’ and ‘lords of the sea’. It is argued that the ultimate efficiency of management programs may be jeopardized if managers ignore the history and culture of the fisheries involved and the likely social and ecological consequences of their programs. 相似文献
6.
《Marine Policy》2013
This paper discusses the development of ITQs in Norway. Even if some would deny that anything such exists, fisheries management in Norway has some unmistakable characteristics of an ITQ system. Both boatowners and policy makers have discovered the attractions of transferable quotas, the former as a means to increase their private profits, the latter as a vehicle to reduce fleet overcapacity. The slow evolution of transferability is mainly the result of ideological opposition and opposition to structural changes, the latter involving falling number of fishermen, changes in location of the fishing industry, and changed composition of the fishing fleet. The development of this system in the purse seine fleet and the fleet fishing for cod and similar species is traced. Then the concept of resource rent is discussed, as well as how it has become capitalized in quota values, which show up as a rise in value of long term assets of the fishing industry. 相似文献
7.
《Marine Policy》2003,27(3):207-218
A fishery management approach is presented which combines (1) a buyback of fishing vessels, and (2) a management tax or fee on seafood going to market. Tax rate by species is set proportional to the extent of overexploitation. Tax revenue is used for several purposes, including a buyback of licenses at free-market price. Advantages and disadvantages of this policy are discussed, with specific comparison to individual transferable quotas (ITQs). This regulatory policy offers advantages (1) for multispecies fisheries, (2) with ecosystem fishery management, (3) where self-funded financing for license buyback is needed, and in place of or together with ITQs (4) where allocation, discarding and highgrading, quota setting, or enforcement of ITQs is problematic. 相似文献
8.
《African Journal of Marine Science》2013,35(3):283-292
Namibia's fishing industry is managed using a system of fishing rights and individual fishing quotas. This property rights system was intended to encourage the local fishing industry to exploit the resource responsibly. Unfortunately, unintended perverse incentives have promoted induced overcapacity and inefficient use of vessels. In combination with inconsistent quota allocations, the result has been persistent pressure on the already depleted biological resource. This paper uses a bio-economic model to estimate actual and potential profits in Namibia's hake fishery. N$300 million annual profit was not realised due to the depressed state of the resource. Mean annual profits for the years 2007–2009 were N$80 million, which provides the fishing industry, as a whole, only about 36% of the potential normal profit. Theoretically this implies that the fishing industry would probably receive better returns with less risk if they invested their money elsewhere. This study demonstrates that by rationalising quotas and improving management, better efficiency and higher profits for the fishers and government could be obtained. 相似文献
9.
This paper analyses the extent to which specialisation gains can be achieved by liberalising access to fishing quotas within the European Union (EU). Fishing quotas are today exchanged between EU member states at a rate of 4% of total turnover in EU fisheries. Germany, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands are the most active. Only one fourth of these exchanges are permanent. With the management systems in EU fisheries differing among countries, comparative advantages in fisheries exist in member states with the best management practices. Hence, although positive but small specialisation gains exist in EU fisheries today, these gains might potentially be increased by liberalising access to fishing quotas and allowing transferability of quotas between individuals from different countries on a permanent basis. Increasing the gains might, however, affect relative stability. 相似文献
10.
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been introduced in a number of different countries, including Australia. Using seven Australian commonwealth fisheries the paper undertakes an ex ante cost–benefit analysis whether to introduce ITQs into these fisheries. The analysis uses five cost–benefit criteria, and in particular the gross value of production (GVP), to evaluate whether ITQs should be introduced or not. For fisheries where the net benefits do not currently justify ITQs, a pathway is provided to improve management outcomes with the use of individual transferable efforts units (ITEs). 相似文献
11.
《Marine Policy》2014
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) fisheries management systems are supposed to remedy the over-capacity problem associated with traditional command-and-control management systems. This paper provides some insight with respect to the impact of ITQs on vessel numbers in six different countries. The results indicate that the number of vessels was reduced by at least 30% within a few years of the implementation of individual vessel quotas. Thereafter a slow reduction in vessel numbers continued, indicating that it may take time period before over-capacity is fully removed. Moreover, the total effect on vessel numbers is surprisingly similar across countries and fisheries despite different degrees of transferability in the different cases analysed. 相似文献
12.
This short communication is, in part, a response to the Bruce Turris' rejoinder (Marine Policy…2010) to Pinkerton et al., The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas (Marine Policy, July 2009). In responding to this article on the unacknowledged problems of unregulated and even unrecorded leasing of individual transferable fishing quotas (ITQs), Turris illustrated the point of the original article well by minimizing the status of leasing as a major influence leading to problems with the fishery: an elephant in the room. Turris focused instead on relatively small and less relevant details, misrepresented the argument, and largely ignored or skirted our discussion of the absent structural conditions important for open competition and efficient outcomes. This response addresses several of his concerns, elaborates on some of the initial points in the original article and contributes some new ones. 相似文献
13.
《Marine Policy》2014
ITQs offer environmental and economic benefits, including better conservation of a fish stock and greater profitability for fishers. With some limitations, they achieve fairly good alignment between the profit incentive and stewardship objectives. Nevertheless, critics have objected to ITQ schemes because of such factors as the “armchair fishing” phenomenon, unfairness to the public (the owner of the fish), economic and social damage to remote communities, and increased concentration within the fishery. Economists generally dismiss these as distributional issues rather than matters of efficiency or economics, but economic principles are clearly not the only factors that may require attention or action from a government or regulator. This paper proposes an intervention that addresses these concerns within the context of an ITQ scheme. The intervention does not reduce the permanence or values of ITQs, and therefore retains the benefits that ITQs are designed to deliver. Nevertheless, the intervention addresses the criticisms identified above. Modifications of the intervention may enable additional goals and benefits to be achieved as well. 相似文献
14.
《Marine Policy》2017
National wealth can be estimated via the System of National Accounts (SNA). According to SNA-numbers, Norwegian fisheries contributed negatively to the national wealth in the period 1984–2016 with exception of the years 2010–2011 and 2015–2016. Because all parameter values entering the calculation of national wealth are conditional on the existing management regime, the potential value of the natural resources may be concealed. This paper finds that this is the case for the Norwegian fishery sector. Using a numerical optimization model, the paper estimates the contra factual resource rent to be 1.6 billion USD if the fishing quotas were harvested efficiently with the currently available technology. This is 1.2 billion USD more than the observed resource rent in 2011 and means that Norwegian fisheries contribute to national wealth four times more than indicated by 2011 SNA-numbers. Hence, national wealth calculations based on official statistics may trivialize the role of natural resources. 相似文献
15.
《Marine Policy》2015
This paper explores the failures of the quota allocation system in the hake fishery in Walvis Bay, Namibia through an examination of the complex processes that link commodities, labour, production, markets, and knowledge in the industrial setting. The relationships between state regulations and public nature point to a specific engagement in which nature is divided, distributed, and owned, namely through the market driven prospects of transferable quotas. This article examines fishing quota as a set of relations that links the transformation of fish from biological organism to global product and thus weaves science, the state, markets, and social relationships into an entanglement of different forms of capital. In this context, the tension between the quota holder, the value of that quota, and their participation in the industry reflects a complex network of capital mediated through various strategies. Based on ethnographic research in the Namibian trawl sector, this article surfaces these modes of capital in the dynamics of the fishing operations. As such, the fishing industry, the company that holds the fishing rights, the government׳s role in quota allocations, the vessels, gear, and technologies, and the relationships and roles of the crewmembers and skippers׳ knowledge all contribute to a particular formulation of fishing practices. Fisher׳s knowledge in industrial fishing practices becomes a site in which to explore the consequences of ITQs that may also begin to destabilise the neoliberal business model for fisheries in times of crisis. 相似文献
16.
《Marine Policy》2015
Achieving a balance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities is one of the major challenges in European fisheries. One way to achieve this is to introduce individual tradable quotas or similar management measures. In several mackerel and herring fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic, such systems have already been introduced on a national basis and the long term economic gains of this have been acknowledged. This paper takes this a step further and investigates the potential economic gains from introducing individual tradable quotas between countries. Overall, the results show that the gross cash flow can be improved by 21% by allowing the mackerel and herring quotas to be traded internationally in the Northeast Atlantic. This rent gain arises mainly from increased productivity by allowing tradability between areas and fleets. The analysis also shows that the Danish pelagic fleet will gain from increasing its share of mackerel and herring quotas, whereas the Irish fleets are incentivised to sell quota, if individual quotas are allowed to be traded among countries. This result is in line with the qualitative analyses that show that Irish fishermen targeting herring in the Celtic Sea are negatively oriented towards international individual tradable quotas, whereas the Danish pelagic fishermen have strong preferences for international individual tradable quotas. 相似文献
17.
Overcapacity in the fishing fleets is considered as the most serious threat to sustainable fisheries. More effective fishing vessels and catching gear contribute to increased catch capacity. Increased catch capacity causes environmental problems such as overexploitation and calls for larger quotas. The problem of overcapacity indicates the need for a stronger integration of technological aspects into fisheries management. This article assesses the differences in sustainability between the Norwegian ocean and coastal fishing fleets in the cod fisheries, by using systems engineering methods. Attributes of sustainability in the Norwegian cod fishing fleets are investigated, as well as acceptance criteria and performance indicators. The results show that there are huge differences in the performance between the vessel groups, and that the results of an evaluation of sustainability in the fishing fleets are dependent on which attributes are explored. Thus, the discussion may contribute to a better decision basis and improved sustainability in fisheries management. 相似文献
18.
《Marine Policy》2013
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), also called “catch shares”, have been broadly adopted in the last two decades, at the same time that concerns about their equity and effectiveness in delivering the predicted outcomes have increased. This paper documents how an alternative fishermen-designed and operated system of spreading fishing effort to avoid the race for fish—called the lay-up system—worked effectively and equitably for four decades in the British Columbia halibut fishery before ITQs were introduced in this fishery. Why the lay-up system was allowed to collapse and its history ignored illustrates important roles played by conflicting ideologies, bureaucratic rationality, and the inability to imagine an alternative way of solving fisheries management problems. Trade-offs between the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of halibut and other management systems are considered. 相似文献
19.
Stock assessments of quota or effort managed fisheries in which the duration of the fishing season is 12 months are invariably delivered well into the subsequent fishing season. As a result, quotas are frequently based on year-old data. This delay is often unavoidable because it may take months to collect, collate and analyse data necessary to assess fishery performance. The South Australian fisheries for blacklip (Haliotis rubra Leach, 1814) and greenlip abalone (H. laevigata Donovan, 1808) have addressed this issue by using provisional data on current stock status to inform application of the harvest strategy decision rules that set the quota for the next year. The primary index of relative abundance for these fisheries is catch per unit effort (CPUE). Our study uses 25 years (1988–2012) of CPUE data to quantify the differences between the provisional and complete-season CPUE estimates at the spatial scales used to assess the fisheries. We demonstrate that, in most cases, there was a strong relationship between the provisional and complete-season CPUE estimates for both species, with little evidence of bias. As the provisional CPUE estimates were a reliable and accurate predictor of the complete-season CPUE estimates, this provides a high degree of confidence in using provisional CPUE estimates to set quotas, thereby overcoming the difficulty of basing decisions on aged data. These findings are likely to be applicable to other fisheries, particularly those where much of the annual catch is obtained (or effort expended) in a short time period at the commencement of the fishing season. 相似文献
20.
The purpose of this rejoinder is to respond to and question the many assertions made by Pinkerton et al. in the recently published Marine Policy article entitled: “The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas”. Particular attention is paid to the assertion that 79% of the British Columbia Pacific halibut TAC is being leased out by “armchair fishermen”. The rejoinder also discusses how ITQs, when used with other fishery management tools, such as catch monitoring, creates incentives that align more closely the fishermen harvesting behaviour and practices with the objectives of the resource manager. 相似文献